Business networking and innovation of Asian enterprises in Western countries: The moderation of institutional distance

This study advances extant cross-nation and cross-cultural business-to-business (B2B) supply chain literature by exploring the contingent effect of institutional distance in the business networking-innovation relationship. Unlike previous studies largely based on Western firms operating in the developing economies, this study focuses on Asian firms operating in the Western developed market. By examining the experiences of one hundred and sixty Asian B2B firms operating in New Zealand, this study finds that formal institutional distance positively moderates the effect of business networking on innovation whereas informal institutional distance negatively moderates the effect of business networking on innovation. This study provides new theoretical conceptualizations and perspectives to cross-national and cross-cultural B2B supply chain research.     

The deterrence effect of Guanxi on opportunism: The moderating effects of “three institutional pillars”

Marketing channel members are subject to opportunism, and guanxi (i.e., interpersonal ties) is a useful mechanism to deter it. This article argues that the effect of guanxi on opportunism depends on the institutional environments in which firms are embedded in. Drawing on institutional theory and guanxi literature, we investigated the effects of the “Three pillars” of institutional environments. Specifically, we examined whether legal effectiveness, Confucianism, and organizational culture incongruence moderate the impact of guanxi on exchange partners' opportunism. We collected survey data from both sales managers and salespersons in 268 manufacturing firms and merged the dataset with secondary data that measure institutional factors. The results show that guanxi deters opportunism more effectively when legal effectiveness is high, where Confucianism is more prominent, and when exchange firms' organizational cultures are more incongruent. This study provides implications for marketing channel members on how to use personal ties under different institutional conditions.     

The effects of distributor relationship commitment and relationship exploration on opportunism: The moderating roles of exchange uncertainties and network factors

Channel management entails both the evaluating of incumbent business partners and simultaneously seeking potential new partners. In supplier–distributor exchanges, distributors can explore alternative suppliers while still committing to incumbent suppliers. While the current literature has demonstrated the importance of relationship commitment, the consequences of relationship exploration and whether that exploration is harmful to any incumbent relationships remain unclear. Drawing from relational governance and social network theories, this study thus examines how distributor dual relationship strategies of commitment and exploration influence their opportunistic behavior. The findings from a survey of 328 distributor firms indicate that relationship commitment leads to reduced opportunism; yet relationship exploration exerts no significant main effect on opportunism. More interestingly, these effects are subject to two types of uncertainty and two characteristics of distributor network wherein the focal exchange relationship resides. Specifically, behavioral uncertainty—an internal source of uncertainty—aggravates the opportunism that arises from both strategies, whereas, environmental uncertainty—an external source of uncertainty—alleviates both these effects. The distributor's network density weakens the effect of relationship commitment on opportunism, but network centrality strengthens this effect. By contrasting relationship commitment with relationship exploration under multiple moderating conditions, this study advances the extant channel relationship management literature and practice.     

The power roots and drivers of infidelity in international business relationships

We propose a conceptual model of the power roots and drivers of infidelity in exporter-importer (E-I) working relationships. Based on data collected from 262 Greek export manufacturers, we confirm that the exercise of coercive power in the E-I working relationship by the exporter has positive effects on distance, opportunism, and uncertainty, as opposed to the exercise of non-coercive power that exhibit negative effects. In turn, distance, opportunism, and uncertainty each contribute toward driving infidelity in the relationship by the importer. The relationship length and relationship status were also found to have a control effect on infidelity.     

Do private standards create exclusive supply chains? New evidence from the Peruvian asparagus export sector

Developing countries are increasingly exporting fresh horticultural products to high-income countries. These exports increasingly have to comply with stringent public and private standards, as well as other quality and safety issues. There is an ongoing debate on the effect of private standards on the inclusion of small-scale farmers in export supply chains. With this paper, we contribute to this debate by providing new evidence from the Peruvian asparagus export sector, and by addressing several important methodological shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature. We describe export dynamics using a unique firm level dataset on 567 asparagus export firms from 1993 to 2011 and the evolution of certification to private standards using own survey data from a stratified random sample of 87 export firms. We use an unbalanced panel of the surveyed companies on 19 years and several methods, including fixed effects and GMM estimators, to estimate the causal impact of certification to private standards on companies' sourcing strategy. We find that certification leads to vertical integration and significantly reduces the share of produce that is sourced from external producers, with a larger effect for small-scale producers. When distinguishing between production and processing standards, and between low-level and high-level standards, we find that especially high-level production standards have a negative impact on sourcing from (small-scale) producers.     

The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry mode irreversibility,host market uncertainty,and foreign subsidiary exits

We examine how the exits of multinational companies’ foreign subsidiaries from host countries are foreshadowed by the irreversibility intrinsic to firms’ entry modes and the environmental uncertainty in host countries. For empirical testing, we run a Cox proportional hazard rate model on STATA 10 and deploy a dataset of Korean foreign direct investments (FDIs) for the period 1990–2007. We find a negative association between the greater irreversibility typical of wholly owned Greenfield investments or full acquisitions and subsidiary exits. We also note that host market uncertainty strengthens the impact of irreversible entry modes on subsidiary exits. Our findings support the argument that irreversible investments and uncertain environments are closely related to the probability of a subsidiary exiting.     

The consequences of voluntary traceability system for supply chain relationships. An application of transaction cost economics

This paper analyses the effects of voluntary traceability on vertical relationships within food supply chains using a transaction cost perspective. The analysis makes reference to the Italian situation where the national standard organization has introduced a private standard for traceability that provides a higher degree of information associated with the individual product than the European mandatory traceability system. A survey was conducted by questionnaire to assess changes in transaction characteristics, costs and governance after the introduction of voluntary traceability. The sample represents all Italian firms applying this standard. Factorial and cluster analyses were applied to find the different reorganizations of transactions. The results highlight an increase in asset specificity and a decrease in the uncertainty level throughout the supply chains. The introduction of voluntary traceability shows increased vertical coordination for firms that previously used oral agreements and variation in transactions conditions for firms using contracts. Instead vertically integrated firms do not reveal any variation in the governance of transactions as they are already internally safeguarded.     

Environment, governance, controls, and radical innovation during institutional transitions

Researchers pay only limited attention to the problem of drive force of radical innovation in institutional transitions, especially in China. Drawing on both institutional theory, managerial control theory, and innovation theory, this study examines the roles of external and internal drivers to firms?? radical innovation. Specifically, we examine the effects of external institutional environment and internal corporate governance on radical innovation by introducing management control systems. Based on data from a sample of 585 firms in China, this study finds that the effect of institutional environment uncertainty on radical innovation is significant but formal corporate governance is not. These results suggest that firms facing an uncertain institutional environment emphasize both financial control and strategic control, and firms that have adopted formal corporate governance prefer strategic control to financial control. The implications of these findings for research during institutional transitions are discussed.     

Deregulation,governance structures,and efficiency: the U.S. electric utility sector

The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U.S. electric utilities from 1998 to 2001, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniting in the letter but breaching in the spirit: Contract flexibility and interfirm collaboration based on the Contracts as Reference Points Theory

Contracts are generally assumed to be farsighted and effective in governing ex post trading behaviors. However, we know little about why not all the ex post trading behaviors can be contractible under conditions of contract flexibility. Drawing on Contracts as Reference Points Theory, this study focuses on contract flexibility which is viewed as an essential ingredient for success in long-term oriented Eastern cultures. We examine the trade-off between uncertainty coping and opportunism induced by contract flexibility, which is conceptualized as a reference-dependence decision problem. Using the dyadic survey data of supplier and buyer relationships, we find that contract flexibility facilitates uncertainty coping. The positive effect of contract flexibility on uncertainty coping is enhanced by buyer political ties and supplier power. The effect of contract flexibility on opportunism is mitigated by supplier power. Moreover, uncertainty coping increases relationship performance, whereas opportunism inhibits relationship performance.     

The impact of psychological contract breaches within east-west buyer-supplier relationships

The expanding role of Asian firms in global supply chains has meant that their Western counterparts need to be capable of transcending the East-West divide in their relational building efforts if they wish to successfully participate in these networks. This paper draws upon social exchange (SE) theory to integrate the exit, voice, loyalty, neglect (EVLN) typology with the psychological contract (PSYCON) literature, to examine how Australian buyer firms build and nurture relationships with their Chinese suppliers. Data from 327 Australian managers collected using an online self-administered questionnaire reveals the negative effects of PSYCON breaches towards their suppliers on neglect, voice and loyalty in the relationship. In addition, contrasting effects of neglect and voice behaviours on trust and commitment, suggest that these behaviours can help erode and build East-West B2B relationships, respectively. These findings extend research on B2B relationships and offer useful managerial insights for decision makers operating in global supply chains involving relationships between firms from Eastern and Western backgrounds.     

Asset specificity and complementarity and MNE ownership strategies: The role of institutional distances

This study integrates transaction cost economics and institutional theory to propose a contingency model of multinational enterprises' design of ownership control. We posit that asset specificity and complementarity influence the design of ownership control, which is further affected by the institutional environment. Furthermore, we argue that regulatory distance and normative distance display differentiating moderations on the main effects. Regulatory distance strengthens the positive effect of asset specificity on ownership control while normative distance enhances the negative effect of asset complementarity on ownership control.     

Outsourcers’ control mechanisms,vendors’ contract schemas,and project performance in cross-border IT outsourcing: A vendor’s perspective

Relational conflicts are likely to occur in cross-border IT outsourcing between partners with different cultural backgrounds. Extant literature diverges on the role of contract and trust as control mechanisms in managing relational conflicts. Prior studies have examined the effectiveness of the control mechanisms primarily from the outsourcer’s perspective, with little consideration of how vendors interpret outsourcers’ control mechanisms. Based on psychological contract theory, this study addresses the effects of contract-based and trust-based control mechanisms on relational conflicts from the vendor’s perspective and further explores the contingency of the effects on vendors’ psychological contract schemas (transactional contract schema and relational contract schema) towards their relationships with outsourcers. Based on survey data from 180 offshore outsourcing IT projects, the results show that vendors’ transactional contract schema reduces the effect of trust-based control whereas vendors’ relational contract schema strengthens the effect of outsourcers’ contract-based control on relational conflict. Relational conflicts, in turn, exhibit a negative impact on project performance. The findings offer new insights into the role of outsourcers’ contract-based control and trust-based controls in relationship management from a vender’s perspective. The findings also extend the outsourcing governance literature by illustrating the contingency of the control mechanisms on vendors’ psychological contract schemas.     

Does imitation reduce the liability of foreignness? Linking distance,isomorphism, and performance

Research summary : Research demonstrates that foreign firms from institutionally distant countries imitate the practices of domestic firms (i.e., adopt an isomorphism strategy). The conjecture has been that pursuing such a strategy can help foreign firms counteract the deleterious performance consequences associated with institutional distance; yet there is scant evidence of such. This study treats isomorphism as an endogenously selected strategy influenced by institutional distance to examine its performance consequences. Using a dataset of 80 foreign banks from 25 countries operating in the United States, we find that foreign firms from institutionally distant home countries benefit initially from selecting an isomorphism strategy. However, the benefits diminish with experience. Managerial summary : Multinational companies experience great difficulty in managing institutional distance, and research suggests that one way to overcome distance‐related constraints is to imitate the strategies of local companies. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about the performance‐related consequences of engaging in such imitative behavior. This study examines whether imitating local firms improves performance for multinational companies from institutionally distant markets. We find that imitation improves a firm's performance at first; however, with experience those same strategies result in performance decrements. Managers of multinationals should therefore be careful not to get locked into imitative strategies that provide performance benefits upon entry, but that fail to provide benefits over time. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

集群企业合作隐性契约的博弈分析

以弹性化和专业化为主要特点的集群内企业的合作是集群得以健康发展的关键。要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。在新制度经济学的视角下．当企业选择签订长期契约代替一体化经营时，可以采用显性契约和隐性契约两种方案。由于契约的非完备性和未来的不确定性，提高了显性契约的实施成本。因此．基于集群企业间合作的隐性契约在规范集群企业行为方面提供了强有力的保证。本文运用完全信息和不完全信息下的动态博弈理论对防止集群企业机会主义行为的隐性契约进行了博弈分析．阐释了隐性契约运行的内在机理，并在此基础上对如何规范集群内企业的合作行为提出了具有实践指导和可操作性的政策建议。     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

Relational norms and collaborative activities: Roles in reducing opportunism in marketing channels

Reducing opportunism is a critical task to support channel performance and channel member satisfaction. Recent research into marketing channels focuses on the role of relational governance in curbing opportunism; this study advances this thesis by positing that relational governance encompasses both relational norms and collaborative activities (i.e., joint planning and joint problem solving). In turn, the current research investigates how these two aspects of relational governance independently and jointly check opportunism in marketing channels. The tests of the hypotheses involve 149 Chinese manufacturer–distributor relationships. The results show that relational norms have a negative effect on opportunism, but the effect of collaborative activities is contingent on the level of consistency between the relational norms and collaborative activities that mark the relationship. A low level of relational norms prompts joint planning to inhibit opportunism and joint problem solving to exacerbate it. However, a high level of relational norms reverses these effects: Joint planning fosters opportunism, and joint problem solving curbs it. Thus collaborative activities have different properties that need to be devised in accordance with relational norms if the goal is to reduce opportunism.     

Inter-partner control,trust, and radical innovation of IJVs in China: A contingent governance perspective

International joint ventures (IJVs) in emerging markets need to develop radical innovation to compete successfully in the rapidly changing business landscapes there. Taking a contingent governance perspective, this study examines how formal and social governance mechanisms, namely inter-partner control and inter-partner trust, affect radical innovation development in IJVs through knowledge acquisition and integration, and how emerging market institutional governance structures moderate the effectiveness of the two internal governance mechanisms. Based on a sample of 181 IJVs in China, we find that both inter-partner control and inter-partner trust promote IJV radical innovation; moreover, legal enforceability weakens the impact of inter-partner control but strengthens that of inter-partner trust on IJV radical innovation; likewise, government intervention risk weakens the positive role of inter-partner control yet strengthens that of inter-partner trust. This study extends both the innovation and IJV governance literature by connecting governance mechanisms to IJV radical innovation and uncovering important institutional contingencies.     

Traditional culture echoes? The impact of clan culture upon partner surname sharing: Evidence from Chinese supply chains

In many emerging countries, firms face formal institutional voids that raise both the cost and the level of difficulty of business operations. In this study, we examine a unique culture-rooted mechanism that may address those voids, and this comes in the form of supply chain partner surname sharing based on the legacy of clan identification. Using a unique Chinese dataset that was manually collected and merged from multiple sources, we find that firms registered in the region with a stronger clan culture are more likely to cooperate with supply chain partners with the same surname. This positive effect of clan culture is negatively moderated further by the level of subnational marketization. Therefore, we shed new light on the supply chain-level implications of clan culture, an Asian cultural-specific topic that has received little attention in marketing and supply chain literature.