Technical change and the “tendency of the rate of profit to fall”

For the most part, the discussion of Marx' falling rate of profit has been of a qualitative and fairly imprecise nature. In particular, the transformation problem concerning the relationship between the price and value rates of profit is usually not adequately dealt with. The present article defines the various concepts rigorously and demonstrates the relationship between the price and value concepts. It is then shown that technical change which competitive capitalists will introduce always raises the rate of profit, if real wages are constant; that these viable technical changes are always socially desirable; but that there are socially desirable technical changes which will not be introduced under competitive capitalism. Some of these desirable technical changes would cause the profit rate to fall. Any efforts to demonstrate a falling rate of profit as a consequence of technical change must therefore concentrate on the relationship between technical innovation and changes in the real wage.     

Credence Goods,Misleading Labels,and Quality Differentiation

Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities.     

Relative prices and real factor rewards: A reinterpretation

Two devices are generally available to increase the reward of a productive factor: (i) a direct subsidy to the factor, and (ii) an alteration in relative commodity prices. The Stolper-Samuelson result, whereby method (ii) suffices to improve the real reward of a productive factor in a 2×2 setting with no joint production is shown to be valid in the n-commodity, n-factor model.     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

Asymmetries in price and quantity adjustments by the competitive firm

Focusing on the crucial role of inventory carry-overs in the production and sales decision, we describe the profit maximizing behavior of a dynamic competitive firm facing random prices. Each firm's behavior is incorporated into a stochastic equilibrium model of the competitive industry with uncertain demand. The industry model exhibits asymmetric cyclical fluctuations of the “Keynesian” sort: when demand is weak, output contracts while price holds at a fixed floor; when demand is strong, price increases as output is constrained by a ceiling. Even in a pure world of constant returns, without increasing costs, the inability to instantaneously coordinate production and sales along with the existence of inventories is sufficient to yield a “backward L” shaped supply curve for the short run.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

Adaptive behavior,demand and preferences

This paper extends the work on endogenous change of tastes of Von Weizsäcker to the n-commodity framework and for a general adaptive behavior process. The paper examines the relation between the effect of taste changes to income and price changes. It provides sufficient conditions for stability of the underlying dynamic process, establishes uniqueness of the equilibrium demand vector and some useful relations between the long-run demand functions and the equilibrium short-run demand functions. It is also shown that the long-run demand functions can be rationalized by a utility function if and only if the short-run utility function is such that any good that experiences learning or taste change is separable from all other goods.     

Complementing Cournot’s analysis of complements: unidirectional complementarity and mergers

We study the price and welfare effects of a merger of firms producing unidirectional complements: a firm is producing a product (called an optional good) that is valuable only if it is consumed with the other product (called a base good) produced by another firm. Under the assumption that there are two types of consumers: (i) those who consume one unit of the base good only or nothing (having zero valuation of the optional good), and (ii) those who consume one unit of the composite good or nothing, we show that a merger of the two firms raises the price of the base good, resulting in lower consumer surplus for the former consumer group, if and only if the average willingness to pay in the latter consumer group is sufficiently low. This result is in sharp contrast to Cournot’s (Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth, 1838) classical implication that a merger of firms producing strict complements makes all consumers strictly better off.     

Theory of the firm in relation to exchange rates,import substitution and export

Neoclassical theory deals with the profit maximizing beheviour of the firm in a closed economy. Once an open-economy condition is introduced, the impact of the exchange rate on the cost and price parameters of the firm and, consequently, its import substitution and export decisions becomes relevant. A model is presented with case studies in which, given the exchange rate, the firm seeks to determine the optimal level of import substitution, output and export with the objective of maximizing its profit. In today's competitive world when countries are liberalizing and moving towards an open trade regime, the influence of exchange rates on the decision-making processes of firms is bound to be significant. An approach which provides them with a methodology for spelling out their options and making optimal choices is, therefore, of considerable practical interest.     

INTERNATIONAL ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING AND ORIGINAL DESIGN MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS WITH QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS

We build a model of international subcontracting in quality‐differentiated goods. Assuming no entry in an original equipment manufacturing (OEM) market, we show that the foreign outsourcer will choose an original design manufacturing (ODM) contract only if the subcontractor is good enough at product design. However, the product quality with the ODM contract is not necessarily higher than that with the OEM contract. When the subcontracting market becomes perfectly competitive, the outsourcer will always choose an OEM contract. In a two‐period model with learning and entry effects, the foreign outsourcer chooses between different modes of manufacturing contracts. We demonstrate that a laissez‐faire policy on research and development (R&D) activity may be optimal even if the subcontracting firm can only obtain an OEM contract. In the case where the OEM market becomes perfectly competitive in the second period, we predict that a positive R&D subsidy in the first period can help the domestic subcontractor obtain OEM–ODM contracts and, as a result, national welfare rises.     

How Long is a Piece of Cable? Equilibrium Determination of Local Telephone Areas

This paper studies the endogenous determination of telephone local calling areas. In many telephone systems, calls between users in the same calling area are local; calls to outside the calling area are long distance and priced differently. We allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show the extension of the calling areas which maximizes the carrier's profit to be the same which a welfare maximizing regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm manipulates strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop extends the local calling areas in response to decreased efficiency or increased competition of its competitors. Received April 25, 2002; revised version received September 9, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.     

A SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM

This paper examines the optimal production decision of the competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second‐order probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second‐order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first‐order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price risk. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity‐averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. In the case that the price risk is binary, we show that ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion always adversely affect the firm's production decision.     

Competitive auctions

We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as a digital good. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e. encourages bidders to bid their true valuations) and on all inputs yields profit that is within a constant factor of the profit of the optimal single sale price. We justify the use of optimal single price profit as a benchmark for evaluating a competitive auctions profit. We exhibit several randomized competitive auctions and show that there is no symmetric deterministic competitive auction. Our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also give competitive auctions.     

Bertrand versus Cournot revisited

Summary. Bertrand criticized Cournot's analysis of the competitive process, arguing that firms should be seen as playing a strategy of setting price below competitors' prices (henceforth, the Bertrand strategy) instead of a strategy of accepting the price needed to sell an optimal quantity (the Cournot strategy). We characterize Nash equilibria in a generalized model in which firms choose among Cournot and Bertrand strategies. Best responses always exist in this model. For the duopoly case, we show that iterated best responses converge under mild assumptions on initial states either to Cournot equilibrium or to an equilibrium in which only one firm plays the Bertrand strategy with price equal to marginal cost and that firm has zero sales. Received: December 11, 1995; revised version October 2, 1996     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

On industry equilibrium under uncertainty

The paper considers an industry consisting of numerous firms that produce a homogeneous output, the demand for which is a random variable. Each firm belongs to one of K possible types, and each type is characterized by a U-shaped average cost curve. It is shown that: (i) the first-order necessary conditions for efficient investment and output are sufficient; accordingly, the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty and coincides with the set of efficient allocations; (ii) a dynamic process of free entry and exit of firms, guided by expected profits, is quasistable and every limit point is a competitive equilibrium. The paper also defines a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium, in which case it is stable.     

Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm.     

Complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting

In this article we study complementarity between market-enhancing product innovation and cost-reducing process innovation in a monopoly setting. First, we consider the possibility for a firm to alternatively invest only along one of the two directions and compare the incentives of process vs. product innovation. Then, we allow the firm to invest simultaneously in both activities, showing that both investment levels and profit are higher than in the case of individual investment. Thus, product and process innovations are complementary, and the firm always prefers the simultaneous adoption of both activities.     

The competitive firm and the role of information about uncertain factor prices

This paper studies the role of information about uncertain input prices for a competitive firm. The production decision has to be taken when the price of an input factor is perceived as random. However, a signal is observable in advance, conveying some information about the future factor price. Transparency is linked to the informational content of this signal. The impact of a higher level of transparency is analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the information signal is observed. The change of factor use, production amount and cost are determined by comparing the strength of the curvatures of total and marginal product. By contrast, ex ante profit always increases, independently of the shape of the production function.