The performance and objectives of public and private utilities operating in the United States

This paper compares the production efficiency of public and private utilities to determine if a significant cost differential results from different behavioral objectives under the alternative modes of ownership. The procedure is to estimate the cost and input demand functions simultaneously while accounting for differences in input prices and technology across firms. The parameter estimates are then employed to compare the efficiency and objectives of public and private firms. The results suggest that public firms minimize cost and have 24–33% lower per unit costs than their privately owned counterpart. This cost differential appears to result from rate-of-return regulation of the privately owned firms.     

The Evolution of Technical Efficiency in the Northern Ireland Manufacturing Sector, 1973–1985

This paper uses a stochastic frontier production function approach to measure technical efficiency in firms in Northern Ireland. Firm level census of production panel data were used to examine how efficiency in firms changed over the period 1973–1985. Once estimates of efficiency were made, the causes of inefficiency based on characteristics of firms were examined. The results indicate that efficiency in Northern Ireland has improved significantly over-time. The largest increases in efficiency were in indigenously owned firms. The results suggest that many Northern Ireland owned firms were 'catching-up' in terms of efficiency with foreign owned firms over the period.     

Who Benefits from Public Utilities?*

We model the determination of output, factor payments and prices within publicly owned firms, assuming the firms are managed by utility-maximizing employees monitored by vote-maximizing politicians. The choice of a public monopoly to supply the output is most suited to further the redistributive aims of the politicians, but will also be favoured by employees who can capture some rents.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Scarce: The Case of n > 2 Firms

This paper describes a model of vertical product differentiation in which more than two firms compete in quality and price. Quality is of fixed supply, so firms participate in an auction to attain it. Firms then simultaneously choose prices. The paper determines equilibrium bids in the quality auction and the Bertrand equilibrium prices. In equilibrium one firm attains all the units of quality, but pays a price such that it, like the minimum-quality firms, earns zero profits. Aggregate welfare is computed, and is shown to decrease as competition increases.     

Alcohol consumption in the UK, 1955–85: a system-wide analysis

As a consequence of economic reforms in China, firms have ben affected by three essential changes. First, instead of surrendering all profits to the Government, firms now pay tax on their profits according to a contract between them and the Government and retain the balance as their own controllable surplus. Second, the central economic plan determines only part of firms' production. After fulfilling the command plan, firms are allowed to adjust their production scale by the availability of inputs and the profitability of production. Third, most consumer and investment goods have two prices, a plan price and a market price. As most of the plan prices are always lower than the market prices, the latter play a basic role in determining firms' profits. After a decade of economic reforms, the important question is: can Chinese state enterprises perform like market entities? The analysis shows that Chinese firms in transition domimic the production behaviour of market-based, efficiency-oriented firms.     

What determines the productivity growth? Evidence from Chinese renewable energy firms by using Bayesian stochastic frontier approach

This paper examines the determinants of the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of Chinese renewable energy firms from 2011 to 2016, using a Bayesian stochastic frontier approach. Employing the “Bauer–Kumbhakar” decomposition method, the TFP growth is decomposed into the technology part and the market part. The empirical results reveal that the TFP improvement of Chinese renewable energy firms is mainly due to technical progress, followed by technical efficiency change. With regard to the market part, the misallocation of production factors has hindered the TFP growth. Our findings also indicate that only for large firms, the TFP growth can benefit from the scale economy effect. Compared with non‐state‐owned firms, state‐owned firms suffer much lower allocative efficiency.     

Does foreign ownership matter?

The paper both compares productivity of Russian firms that have foreign direct investments with productivity of fully domestically owned firms and analyses spillovers from foreign‐owned firms to domestic firms. Foreign firms are found to be more productive than domestic ones, but productivity of the former is negatively affected by slow progress of reforms in the regions where they operate. It is also found that there are positive spillovers from foreign‐owned firms to domestic firms in the same industry, but negative effects on domestic firms that are vertically related to foreign‐owned firms. The stock of human capital in regions where foreign firms operate is one of the factors which help domestic firms to benefit from the entry of foreign firms.     

Regulation and state ownership: conflicts and complementarities in eu telecommunications

Abstract ** :  In many countries infrastructure liberalization proceeded faster than the privatization of former state monopolies. Regulatory agencies, established to oversee the transition and safeguard the preconditions for competition, therefore monitor state‐owned firms in addition to privately owned firms. The research on public‐private firms has generated heterogeneous findings, with some pointing to the advantages and other to the disadvantages of this arrangement. Government regulation of mixed public‐private firms raises additional complicated issues, of which the paper studies two using the example of European telecommunications between 2000 and 2004. It examines, first, whether the dual role of the state as owner and regulator could be abused to disadvantage private competitors. Second, it probes whether, conversely, the combination of government ownership and regulation might help overcome some of the shortcomings of the regulation of private firms. We find weak evidence that public and mixed regulated firms were subject to more favourable regulation of interconnection prices. However, this effect weakened as more independent regulation was established. In the area of universal service provision, there is no clear evidence that public and mixed telecommunication service providers were more likely than private ones to be utilized in pursuit of social output goals without explicit compensation. Overall, it seems that the presence of independent regulation, appeals processes, and competition review is a safeguard against capture of the regulator, by public and mixed firms .     

Price competition,free entry,and welfare in congested markets

In this paper we study the problem of price competition and free entry in congested markets. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian Traffic Equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.     

我国民营与国有上市公司投资价值的比较研究

鉴于学界在民营与国有上市公司的绩效、治理结构和投资价值上存在较大的争议,本文对2000年底前上市的1 026个公司在2001-2003年间的数据进行了全面的比较分析,发现:(1)民营上市公司的投资收益和账面值-市值比显著小于国有上市公司,因此具有较低的投资价值.(2)与国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司的盈利能力、发展潜力、资本运营能力和尝债能力均较低,但其股权结构较为分散,而且其经理层激励方式与国有上市公司差别不大.(3)民营上市公司投资价值较差的根源在于其盈利能力、发展潜力和资产运营能力较低.(4)与杨兴君、苏启林及张俊喜和张华的实证结果不同,民营与国有上市公司在股权结构、经理层激励、企业规模及地理位置上的差别无法解释两者投资价值的差异.在上述实证结果的基础上,本文提出了相关的政策建议.     

Does the stock market affect investment by Chinese firms? Some new evidence

During the 1990s, the Chinese government increasingly relied on the stock market as the major tool for state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform and for the allocation of investment resources. This paper investigates the impact of stock market development in China on firm‐level capital investment by using a panel data set constructed by the author of all Chinese listed firms for the period 1992 to 1999. The results show that stock market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s q, has a highly independent, significant and positive influence on listed firms’ investment decisions, particularly during the stock market boom from 1996 to 1999. Given the sizable real effects of the stock market, deviations of stock prices from fundamentals can have substantially negative consequences. As a result, this study suggests that sensible regulation of the Chinese stock market is needed in order to enhance the efficiency of stock prices and facilitate an effective channeling of investment funds.     

Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership

Foreign multinationals often not only export but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the various effects of trade and industrial policies when exports and FDI coexist. We focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross‐border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm locally owned firms but benefit the foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits locally owned firms. These results could have strong policy implications for developing countries that attract an increasing share of world FDI.     

The impact of China's millennium labour restructuring program on firm performance and employee earnings1

Around the turn of the century, China experienced perhaps the largest labour restructuring program in the world. This paper uses a new dataset of Chinese industrial enterprises to examine what leads to downsizing, and tries to understand the effects of labour downsizing on firms’ technical efficiency, financial performance and employee wages. We find that downsizing is more prevalent in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and is more likely when enterprises are older, larger and have higher excess capacity. For both SOEs and private firms, downsizing is more likely when the prices of their products drop, but private firms respond more dramatically. Moreover, downsizing has serious short‐term costs in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). For mild downsizing, private firms suffer more deterioration in productivity. The distribution of surplus after downsizing is more favourable to labour in SOEs. For severe downsizing, both SOEs and private firms exhibit lower TFP growth with similar magnitudes. Our findings imply that private firms emphasize profit goals, while SOEs place a greater weight on labour protection.     

International Trade and Strategic Privatization

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly‐owned firms. In order to analyze this question, we consider two countries and assume that publicly‐owned firms are less efficient than private firms. We obtain that when the marginal cost of the publicly‐owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government wants it to be the government of the other country that privatizes its publicly‐owned firm. In this case, only one government privatizes, and that government obtains lower social welfare and producer surplus than the other.     

OUTPUT CONTINGENT SECURITIES AND EFFICIENT INVESTMENT BY FIRMS

We analyze competitive economies with risky investments. Unlike the classic Arrow–Debreu framing, firms and agents cannot contract upon the exogenous states underlying production risks. They can trade equities and any security written on the endogenous aggregate output. This financial structure is rich enough to promote efficient risk sharing among consumers. However, markets are incomplete from the production perspective, and the absence of prices for each primitive state of nature raises the question about the objective of firms. We show that output‐contingent asset prices convey sufficient information to compute the competitive shareholder value that leads to efficient investment by firms.     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

Abnormal returns before acquisition announcements: evidence from Europe

Acquisition announcements influence the stock price of target firms, providing an opportunity for insiders to obtain significant abnormal returns. We study the presence of positive abnormal returns before the announcement date, in target firms, quoted in Euronext markets (Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Portugal) from 2001 to 2007. We investigate whether the pre-announcement run-up of prices can be explained by rumours in the media and the percentage of capital previously owned by the bidding firm, among other factors. We examine cumulative abnormal returns in an event window of 60 days prior the acquisition announcement, with the event date adjusted for the previous disclosure of news about the acquisition, in the media. We compute a run-up index, and find that there are abnormal positive returns before the announcement date, confirming previous studies. We find that a significant part of the run-up is explained by: (i) market anticipation triggered by legitimate sources of information, namely, rumours in the media about the possibility of an acquisition bid and (ii) the percentage of capital previously owned in the target firm, by the bidding firm.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE 1996 U.S.‐CANADA SOFTWOOD LUMBER AGREEMENT ON THE INDUSTRIAL USERS OF LUMBER: AN EVENT STUDY

In this article, we analyze whether the Softwood Lumber Agreement between the United States and Canada imposed significant economic costs on industries that use softwood lumber in the United States. To ascertain this impact, we use an event study. Our event study analyzes variations in the stock prices of lumber‐using firms listed at the major stock markets in the United States. We find that the news of events leading to the Softwood Lumber Agreement had significant negative impacts on the stock prices of industries using softwood lumber. The average reduction of stock prices for our sample of firms was approximately 5.42% over all the events considered. (JEL F13, F23)     

Joint ownership and interconnection pricing in network industries

This paper investigates a vertical market structure called joint ownership, where a monopolistic upstream firm is jointly owned and operated by competing downstream firms. As such, a common interconnection price to an upstream bottleneck is determined by bargaining among the downstream firms. We show that (1) joint ownership can be superior to the other ownership structures by overcoming vertical externality of double marginalization; (2) collusive outcomes, however, may arise surrounding the setting of common interconnection price; (3) an overall performance of joint ownership depends crucially upon how equity shares are initially distributed and which bargaining rules are employed; and finally (4) a policy measure to promote downstream competition may have ambiguous consequences under joint ownership. Some managerial and political implications in implementing joint ownership in practice are also provided.