Procurement when price and quality matter

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer's optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a significant proportion of the buyer's strategic surplus (the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the efficient auction). Bargaining does less well and often does worse than the efficient auction.     

Interorganizational cost management in the exchange process

This paper explores interorganizational cost management (IOCM) practices in the exchange process. IOCM can be defined as buyers’ and suppliers’ coordinated efforts to reduce costs. Past research has primarily argued that such practices depend on component characteristics, relationship characteristics, and characteristics of the transaction. Based on a study of three buyer–supplier relationships, this article also finds variations in IOCM practices between six main activities in the exchange process. In this process, the supplier's management accounting is found to be more important than recognized by prior research. The deepest collaboration around IOCM issues and the greatest joint use of suppliers’ management accounting in the three cases typically occurs in earlier activities in the exchange process, including supplier selection, joint product design and joint manufacturing process development. In later activities in the process, during full-speed production as well as in product and manufacturing process redesign, suppliers’ managerial accounting plays a lesser role in our study.     

Price discrimination in input markets

We analyze the short‐ and long‐run implications of third‐degree price discrimination in input markets. In contrast to the extant literature, which typically assumes that the supplier is an unconstrained monopolist, in our model input prices are constrained by the threat of demand‐side substitution. In our model, the more efficient buyer receives a discount. A ban on price discrimination thus benefits smaller but hurts more efficient, larger firms. It also stifles incentives to invest and innovate. With linear demand, a ban on price discrimination benefits consumers in the short run but reduces consumer surplus in the long run, which is once again the opposite of what is found without the threat of demand‐side substitution.     

Disclosure standards for vertical contracts

In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers’ market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.     

Payoff uncertainty,bargaining power,and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference. The buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers. This sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. Moreover, the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing. The first‐ and second‐mover advantages for the sellers are also identified.     

Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing

We show that in contrast to results in the extant literature, single sourcing may not be the optimal strategy of a buyer facing suppliers with strictly convex costs. As we argue, previous findings relied crucially on the joint assumption that, first, there is only a single buyer and that, second, procurement takes place in an auction organized by the buyer. Relaxing these restrictions, we obtain a richer set of results. In particular, we show that even in the original setting, where suppliers bid, committing to single sourcing is only optimal if the respective buyer controls a sufficiently large fraction of the whole procurement market.     

Open-book accounting: Reason for failure of inter-firm cooperation?

Inter-firm accounting techniques such as open-book accounting (OBA) have been described as an important means for effectively managing costs in buyer–supplier relationships and for improving relationship quality. However, disclosing cost data also implies for the supplier the risk that the buyer uses the data during price negotiations to pressure the supplier's profit margin. To date, there is sparse empirical evidence addressing the extent to which cost-data disclosure does affect the supplier's perception of the exchange relationship. This study addresses this gap by investigating the impact of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction. The findings indicate that OBA may negatively affect supplier relationship satisfaction and thus represents a potential risk to cooperation. The results further suggest that effective safeguards against opportunistic behavior, such as relational social norms, significantly attenuate the negative effect of OBA on supplier relationship satisfaction.     

The Role of Auditing in Buyer-Supplier Relations

Supply chain management has emerged as one of the more important topics in managerial accounting. The importance of information exchange between parties involved in supply chains has also been well documented. By addressing the value of audits in this setting, this theoretical paper serves to link two strains of accounting research: the managerial topic of supply chain effectiveness and the value of the audit function, in particular audits of the suppliers conducted by the buyers. We analyze the role of supplier audits with long-term, profit sharing contracts between the buyers and suppliers. Through a stylized model, we demonstrate that when random supplier audits are conducted, the buyer can effectively leave zero informational rents to the supplier, regardless of the supplier's cost type.     

Optimal information revelation in procurement schemes

A buyer procuring a single input possesses private information about each potential supplier's degree of fit with the buyer's needs. She can search among suppliers either sequentially or simultaneously. As long as the distribution of the fit parameter is not overly skewed to the left, sharing information with suppliers yields intensified price competition under simultaneous search. Moreover, the buyer cannot benefit by providing suppliers additional information beyond their own fitness parameter. Information revelation is never optimal with sequential search.     

Make-or-buy in the presence of uncertainty and private information

In textbook discussions of the make-or-buy problem, outsourcing is often justified on technological grounds. Suppliers may have better equipment, more capacity, or benefit from economies of scale. This teaching note demonstrates that even when technological issues are absent, outsourcing can be preferred. The benefit to outsourcing arises because the price set by a self-interested supplier can convey information to a buyer. Information conveyed by a supplier allows the firm to better tailor its production to the circumstance. The case also provides students an opportunity to apply basic concepts from economics, statistics, and mathematics to a common managerial accounting problem.     

The impact of switching costs on vendor financing

We show that vendor financing appears in equilibrium as the result of repeated trade interactions between a buyer and a supplier when changing supplier is costly. Competition between suppliers forces them to offer a rebate before the relationship is initiated and switching costs allow the buyer to borrow from the supplier in the first period and to roll over the debt until the end of the relationship. The sequence of transfers is similar to a long-term financing structure. Our model suggests that switching costs allow small business owners to smooth their dividend income by using vendor financing.     

Major government customers and stock price crash risk

This paper studies whether government’s participation in product market, as a customer, affects supplier firms’ stock price crash risk. Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1980 to 2015, we find robust evidence that the presence of major government customers is associated with a lower level of stock price crash risk for supplier firms. Further, we show that government customers can lower suppliers’ crash risk by imposing monitoring activities on suppliers and/or reducing suppliers’ operational risk, leading to a reduction in supplier managers’ bad news hoarding behavior. Overall, our results indicate that government spending, as an important public policy, can significantly affect shareholders’ value by mitigating stock price crash risk.     

Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs

This article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. The seller's optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer, and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant. Moreover, this ex ante contract mitigates the seller's ex post rent seeking vis‐à‐vis the contracted buyer. Accordingly, it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts, depending upon the contracted buyer's financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus. Implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed.     

Intrafirm Trade,Bargaining Power,and Specific Investments

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.     

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination†

We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions. When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.     

Do buyer‐size discounts depend on the curvature of the surplus function? Experimental tests of bargaining models

A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that, for buyer‐size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers of different sizes. Nonlinearities in the surplus function are generated by varying the shape of the seller's cost function. Consistent with the theory, we find that quantity discounts emerge only in the case of increasing marginal cost, corresponding to a concave surplus function. We provide additional structural estimates to help identify the source of remaining discrepancies between experimental behavior and theoretical predictions (whether due to preferences for fairness or other factors such as computation errors).     

Investor valuations of suppliers' major customer disclosures

I investigate whether or not investors in suppliers to retailers find the major customer disclosure value-relevant. Major customer retailers have buyer power because the retailer represents a significant portion of a supplier's sales. Buyer power can indicate reliance on one customer where the supplier is at a disadvantage in negotiating transaction terms. Alternatively, the existence of major customers may suggest the supplier is in a mutually-benefiting partnership with the retailer. I hypothesize that investors find the major customer disclosure value-relevant; however, the direction depends on whether the investor focuses on the partnership aspect or sales concentrated with one customer. My valuation results are consistent with investors focusing on the sales concentration for larger suppliers (higher risk) and the mutually benefiting partnership for smaller suppliers (lower risk). The findings provide insight on valuation implications of having and disclosing a major customer.     

Customers and cash: How relationships affect suppliers' cash holdings

If one customer accounts for a large portion of a supplier's sales, then the loss of that one customer can cripple the supplier's financial health. As a precaution against the additional operating risk induced by being in an important relationship with a customer, I find that suppliers in such relationships hold more cash on average than suppliers that are not in important relationships. Additionally, supplier's cash holdings increase proportionately with the importance of their customer relationships. Being in an important relationship affects cash holdings and leverage differently, indicating that firms manage cash and debt for different purposes. I find that suppliers in relationships primarily accrue cash through issuance of stock as opposed to debt or retained earnings. The results highlight the importance of understanding buyer–supplier relationships when evaluating a firm's financing policy.     

Price‐cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment

This article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms’ investment behavior and welfare‐maximizing regulation of price and quantity. Regulated firms invest in smaller, more frequent, increments than social planners, with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale. Regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate, and at higher levels when they are substantial. When quantity is also regulated, the average cost of building capacity increases but the price cap decreases. Immediately after firms make their initial investment, regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap to induce additional investment.     

Different open book accounting practices for different purchasing strategies

Extant studies of open book accounting focus primarily on data disclosure in long-term, committed purchasing arrangements. We extend research beyond that context by exploring the association between open book practices (in terms of nature and uses of disclosed data as well as conditions of data disclosure) and two different purchasing strategies. Three case studies are performed. Results indicate that within market procurement characterized by a transactional purchasing strategy, cost data primarily serve to reduce purchase price. Therefore, data disclosure is limited in scope and scale, occurs primarily during supplier evaluation and selection, and is characterized by an adversarial atmosphere. Incentives for suppliers to open their books focus on short-term tangible gains. Within a hybrid exchange arrangement characterized by a relational purchasing strategy, data disclosure supports cost reduction, e.g., through joint product development, and is more comprehensive. The atmosphere is less adversarial and suppliers reap long-term benefits.