An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities

We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.     

Middlemen: the good,the bad,and the ugly

We examine the role of a middleman as an expert in markets. A seller's effort determines the quality of the good. Buyers observe neither the seller's effort nor the good's quality. A middleman, after observing a signal about the good's quality, decides whether to purchase it and then to sell it. We show that the presence of a middleman may either reduce or exacerbate the seller's moral hazard problem. We also consider a model with multiple middlemen. We find that the seller's effort is minimized if either the middleman's signal is perfect or the number of middlemen is large.     

Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?

Should a seller with private information sell the best or worst goods first? Considering the sequential auction of two stochastically equivalent goods, we find that the seller has an incentive to impress buyers by selling the better good first because the seller's sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in the values of the goods across periods. When this impression effect is strong enough, selling the better good first is the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium. By credibly revealing to all buyers the seller's ranking of the goods, an equilibrium strategy of sequencing the goods reduces buyer information rents and increases expected revenues in accordance with the linkage principle.     

Reliability-Relevance Trade-Offs and the Efficiency of Aggregation

This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firm's past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability‐relevance trade‐offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by—and affect—the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.     

Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs

This article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. The seller's optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer, and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant. Moreover, this ex ante contract mitigates the seller's ex post rent seeking vis‐à‐vis the contracted buyer. Accordingly, it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts, depending upon the contracted buyer's financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus. Implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed.     

An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with “Third Party” Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance

In markets in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers, but cannot convey their superior information either by directly issuing costly signals of the Spence type or by successfully funding the production of information, I suggest another way in which the informational asymmetry problem can be resolved; a third party can produce the necessary information at a cost and use it to price a service consumed by the sellers. Buyers can then observe a seller's choice of service consumption level and be well informed in equilibrium. In this framework I construct a model in which a borrower's choice of insurance coverage signals its default probability to lenders, and explore the properties of the resulting signalling equilibrium in a variety of cases.     

Optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure

We study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset's value he knew prior to the sale. Our results include as either the “damages multiplier” that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases, or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases, the seller discloses his estimate less often, and as the precision of the seller's estimate increases, he sells a larger fraction of the asset.     

Investment and financing decisions of private and public firms

We examine differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. This difference is not attributable to more severe financing constraints of public firms. Instead, because differences in investment‐cash flow sensitivities are only observed for the unexpected portion of firms’ cash flow, the empirical evidence supports an agency‐based explanation. Similar patterns are observable for the expected and unexpected portion of firms’ shareholder distributions. Our results are driven by firms from countries with low ownership concentration and more liquid stock markets, where shareholders have lower incentives to monitor. The results are also more pronounced for public firms with low industry Tobin's q and high free cash flow, which are more prone to suffer from agency problems.     

Do buyer‐size discounts depend on the curvature of the surplus function? Experimental tests of bargaining models

A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that, for buyer‐size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers of different sizes. Nonlinearities in the surplus function are generated by varying the shape of the seller's cost function. Consistent with the theory, we find that quantity discounts emerge only in the case of increasing marginal cost, corresponding to a concave surplus function. We provide additional structural estimates to help identify the source of remaining discrepancies between experimental behavior and theoretical predictions (whether due to preferences for fairness or other factors such as computation errors).     

Investing in a relationship

A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives. Unobservability of returns increases the principal's ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives. The optimal information structure depends on bargaining power.     

Threshold Events and Identification: A Study of Cash Shortfalls

Threshold events are discrete events triggered when an observable continuous variable passes a known threshold. We demonstrate how to use threshold events as identification strategies by revisiting the evidence in Rauh (2006, Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension plans, Journal of Finance 61, 33–71) that mandatory pension contributions cause investment declines. Rauh's result stems from heavily underfunded firms that constitute a small fraction of the sample and that differ sharply from the rest of the sample. To alleviate this issue, we use observations near funding thresholds and find causal effects of mandatory contributions on receivables, R&D, and hiring, but not on investment. We also provide useful suggestions and diagnostics for analyzing threshold events.     

Fair Value: Your Value or Mine? An Observation on the Ambiguity of the Fair Value Notion Illustrated by the Credit Crunch

Current International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) define fair value as a transaction price. In imperfect markets, buyer's and seller's marginal prices, at which they are rationally willing to transact, differ. The transaction price can be any amount within the range between those prices. However, scenarios are conceivable in which no such range exists because the seller's marginal price exceeds the buyer's. In this scenario, no arm's length transactions between knowledgeable, willing parties are possible. Such a scenario can be likely characterised by low liquidity and/or high information asymmetry and seems to be broadly consistent with what is recently referred to as the ‘credit crunch’. Under this scenario, the IFRS definition of fair value is not readily applicable. Two views are possible: under view 1, fair value refers to the potential buyer's marginal price. Although fair value does always exist conceptually, it negates the notion of two rationally acting parties. View 2 acknowledges that no arm's length transaction is possible, resulting in the fair value notion not being applicable. If these two views are applied to the IFRS definition of an active market, view 1 results in markets that are always active. Only view 2 allows distinguishing between active and inactive markets.     

Costly search with adverse selection: solicitation curse versus acceleration blessing

We analyze a dynamic trading model of adverse selection where a seller can increase the frequency of strategic price quotes. A low‐quality seller benefits more from trade and, therefore, searches more intensively than a high‐quality seller. This makes a seller's contact carry negative information but a seller's availability become a stronger indicator of high quality. In the stationary environment, the two effects exactly offset each other, and reducing search costs is weakly beneficial to the seller. In the nonstationary environment, the relative strengths of the two effects vary over time, and reducing search costs can be detrimental to the seller.     

An Empirical Examination of the Stated Purposes of Issuer Tender Offers to Purchase Common Stock

This paper documents the purposes of issuer tender offers to repurchase stock, as stated in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures, over the period 1994‐2006. We explore whether stated purposes relate to announcement period returns and find returns are significantly lower when repurchases replace dividends, distribute cash from unspecified sources, or occur subsequent to third‐party tender offers. Announcement period returns are significantly higher when repurchases are viewed by management as the best investment opportunity available or when they occur subsequent to previous repurchase programs. Finally, we find evidence in support of signaling theory and Jensen's (1986) agency cost of free cash flow theory.     

Time-consistent reinsurance and investment strategies for an AAI under smooth ambiguity utility

This paper investigates time-consistent reinsurance(excess-of-loss, proportional) and investment strategies for an ambiguity averse insurer(abbr. AAI). The AAI is ambiguous towards the insurance and financial markets. In the AAI's attitude, the intensity of the insurance claims' number and the market price of risk of a stock can not be estimated accurately. This formulation of ambiguity is similar to the uncertainty of different equivalent probability measures. The AAI can purchase excess-of-loss or proportional reinsurance to hedge the insurance risk and invest in a financial market with cash and an ambiguous stock. We investigate the optimization goal under smooth ambiguity given in Klibanoff, P., Marinacci, M., & Mukerji, S. [(2005). A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity. Econometrica 73, 1849–1892], which aims to search the optimal strategies under average case. The utility function does not satisfy the Bellman's principle and we employ the extended HJB equation proposed in Björk, T. & Murgoci, A. [(2014). A theory of Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control in discrete time. Finance and Stochastics 18(3), 545–592] to solve this problem. In the end of this paper, we derive the equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies under smooth ambiguity and present the sensitivity analysis to show the AAI's economic behaviors.     

Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale

A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resale will take place. The possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller's revenue.     

Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability

We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated firm's production cost is subject to random, publicly observable shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with the firm's cost type, which is private information. The regulator designs an incentive‐compatible regulatory scheme, which adjusts itself automatically ex post given the realization of the cost shock. We derive the optimal scheme, assuming that there is an upper bound on the financial losses that the firm can sustain in any given state. We first consider a two‐type, two‐state case, and then extend the results to the case of a continuum of firm types and an arbitrary finite number of states. We show that the first‐best allocation can be implemented if the state of nature conveys enough information about the firm's type and/or the maximal loss that the firm can sustain is sufficiently large. Otherwise, the solution is characterized by classical second‐best features.     

市场短期操纵行为与订单簿高频信息的关联研究——基于中国市场的实证分析

利用2016年11和12月中国A股市场的5秒高频数据,考量订单簿斜率指标与资产价格之间的关系。结果显示：订单簿斜率指标对存在于高频环境中的市场异象有着较好的解释力。由于订单簿斜率指标在不同市值条件下呈倒挂现象,且买卖订单簿斜率指标与资产价格呈现不同的相关关系。因此,订单簿斜率能在一定程度上捕捉市场操纵行为的信号。该研究有助于更好地理解中国股票市场中的操纵行为,也可为预警机制的建设提供有效的指标选择。     

Reputation and turnover

We consider a repeated duopoly game where each firm privately chooses its investment in quality, and realized quality is a noisy indicator of the firm's investment. We focus on turnover equilibria in which a low‐quality realization is penalized by lowering future demand of the firm that delivered this quality. We determine when a turnover equilibrium that gives higher welfare than the static equilibrium exists and how this relates to market fundamentals. We also derive comparative statics properties, and we characterize a set of investment levels and, hence, payoffs that turnover equilibria sustain.     

A risk-based approach for pricing American options under a generalized Markov regime-switching model

This paper considers a risk-based approach for pricing an American contingent claim in an incomplete market described by a continuous-time, Markov, regime-switching jump-diffusion model. We formulate the valuation problem as a stochastic differential game and use dynamic programming. Verification theorems for the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Issacs (HJBI) variational inequalities of the games are used to determine the seller's and buyer's prices and optimal exercise strategies.