Consumer‐surplus‐enhancing collusion and trade

That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated‐product duopoly operates in two geographically separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.     

Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information

Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher‐quality (and hence larger) firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more information, therefore helps consumers. Although it also improves the profitability of the small firm, overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked firm.     

Entry and pricing in a differentiated products industry: evidence from the ATM market

We estimate a structural equilibrium model of the automatic teller machine market (ATM) to evaluate the implications of regulating ATM surcharges. We use data on bank characteristics, potential and actual ATM locations, and consumer locations; identify the model parameters with a regression discontinuity design; and develop methods to estimate the model without computing equilibria. A surcharge ban reduces ATM entry 12% and consumer welfare 24% but increases firm profits 27%. Total welfare under either regime is 4% lower than the surplus maximizing level. The article can help shed light on the implications of unregulated entry for differentiated products industries.     

Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

Domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare

This article investigates the consumer welfare consequences of the recent code‐share agreement between Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines. We develop a discrete choice model based on individual flight characteristics. This structural model recognizes that consumers (i) may have heterogeneous preferences for flight attributes, and (ii) may face different prices for the same flight. The empirical methodology also deals with the measurement error problem stemming from the absence of consumer‐level data on prices. The estimation results suggest that, whereas the code‐share agreement did not impact consumers significantly on average, it increased the average surplus of connecting passengers but decreased the average surplus of nonstop passengers. Interestingly, the magnitude of our welfare results may be attributed in large part to changes in product characteristics other than prices.     

The effect of satellite entry on cable television prices and product quality

How has the entry of satellite television affected the pricing and product quality of incumbent cable firms' programming packages? I estimate a model in which firms compete over both price and product quality (as determined by what channels are offered). Satellite entry typically causes cable firms to raise quality and lower price. However, in some markets, cable optimally responds by raising both price and quality or by lowering both price and quality. A counterfactual scenario that eliminates quality competition results in, on average, softer price competition and lower aggregate consumer surplus, but greater surplus for consumers with weaker preferences for quality.     

Limited Liability and Market Power

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of limited liability on firm behavior when market power is present. A risk-neutral monopolist facing uncertain demand (with constant returns to scale technology) produces higher output, yielding higher expected profits when costless exit is induced by limited liability. The higher output may increase social welfare (monopolist profit plus consumer surplus) even though the monopolist may overproduce relative to the quantity that maximizes social welfare. When no market power is present, the overproduction resulting from the provision of limited liability results in loss of social welfare. Appropriate use of liability limitation laws can thus provide policy makers an additional policy instrument with which to mitigate the effects of market power.JEL Classification: D24, D41, D42, G32, G38     

When does a firm disclose product information?

A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types. It allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity. With independently distributed product and consumer types, full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full‐disclosure profit.     

Measuring consumerwelfareinthe CPU market: anapplication of the pure‐characteristics demand model

In this article, I estimate demand for the personal computer central processing unit and measure consumer welfare using the pure characteristics demand model. The model is based on a quasilinear utility function with multiplicative random variables and does not have the idiosyncratic logit error term, so that consumer welfare directly reflects consumers' valuation of product characteristics. Welfare calculations show that consumer surplus comprises approximately 90% of total social surplus and that large welfare gains have resulted from the introduction of new products.     

Competitive differential pricing

We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.     

Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market‐share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own‐supplier contracts), intra‐ and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market‐share contracts are feasible. Compared to own‐supplier contracts, the use of market‐share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.     

Product differentiation and efficiencies in the retail banking industry

We empirically quantify the welfare implications of bank entry in the United States between 2000 and 2008. We use a fully structural framework that combines a differentiated demand model with an endogenous product model to investigate the market outcomes. We find no evidence for under- or over-entry. Compared with the socially efficient outcome, there is a mild welfare loss resulting from banks entering wrong locations in product space. Compared with the observed outcome, consumer surplus drops by 20–38% and bank profits decline by 48–59% when banks are homogeneous. Therefore product differentiation significantly improves welfare under free entry.     

A Markov‐perfect equilibrium model of the impacts of price controls on the performance of the pharmaceutical industry

I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non‐U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological opportunities, consumer heterogeneity, the extent to which choices internalize prices, barriers to entry in R&D, the extent to which R&D outcomes are correlated, and the nature of the controls.     

Dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger

We evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger in the medium‐sized, wide‐body aircraft industry. We find that the merger led to lower prices. To explain the price drop, we develop a dynamic oligopoly game with learning‐by‐doing. We quantify the welfare effects of the merger by incorporating both increased market power and merger efficiencies from accelerated learning‐by‐doing. Our dynamic analysis indicates that net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion, whereas a static model ignoring efficiencies of learning‐by‐doing predicts a $0.92 billion loss.     

Quantifying the benefits of entry into local phone service

Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We evaluate the consumer welfare effects of entry into residential local telephone service in New York State using household‐level data from September 1999 to March 2003. We address the prevalence of nonlinear tariffs by developing a discrete/continuous demand model that allows for service bundling and unobservable provider quality. We find that the average subscriber to the entrants' services gains a monthly equivalent of $2.33, or 6.2% of her bill, in welfare from competition. These gains accrue primarily from firm differentiation and new plan introductions rather than from price effects.     

Loss leading with salient thinkers

In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such “loss leading” of products would ultimately lead to a race-to-the-bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. But we also show how a prohibition of loss leading can backfire, as it may make it even less attractive for retailers to stock high-quality products, decreasing both aggregate welfare and consumer surplus.     

Implications of biased reporting: conservative and liberal accounting policies in oligopolies

We examine the effects of biased (conservative or liberal) reporting on product market competition. Cournot duopolists observe either firm-specific or industry-wide shocks and provide noisy reports subject to an exogenous mandated bias attributed to public policy. Given neutral prior beliefs, either a conservative bias or a liberal bias enhances overall reporting-system informativeness as measured by the reduction of uncertainty. Consistent with previously established effects in the information sharing literature regarding increases in informativeness, we show that expected industry profits and expected consumer surplus may gain or lose from bias, depending on whether the shocks are firm-specific or industry-wide and the degree of product competition. Expected social welfare, however, always increases in bias, irrespective of the source of uncertainty and product substitutability or complementarity. We next consider a setting where firms self-select whether to bias reports and characterize regions of potential conflict with a public policy that maximizes expected social welfare. Further results on the differential effects of conservative or liberal bias follow from relaxing the assumption of neutral prior beliefs.     

Store characteristics in retail oligopoly

I use a consumer choice model for the British supermarket industry to compare the incentives of firms, selecting store characteristics, with the interests of consumers. I perform a series of counterfactual changes to store size and location and rank the alternatives by gains per unit of fixed cost. Jointly, firms gain most from large stores, which increase total consumer expenditure. Individually, however, firm incentives are strongly influenced by business‐stealing effects, resulting in a close agreement with consumers, who value middle‐sized stores and distance‐reducing relocations. These individual firm incentives provide little consumer‐protection justification for recent size and location regulations.     

The strategic use of download limits by a monopoly platform

We offer a new explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers and mobile‐phone networks, offer plans with download limits: through one of two mechanisms, doing so causes content providers to reduce prices or improve quality. This generates greater surplus for consumers, which a platform captures via higher consumer access fees. Even accounting for congestion externalities, a platform limits downloads more than would be welfare maximizing; indeed, by so much, that barring such practices can be welfare superior to what a platform would do. Paradoxically, a platform will install more bandwidth when it can restrict downloads than when it cannot.     

Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the largest market share. To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium of the coordination game played by consumers for given prices. The equilibrium allocation differs from the efficient one for two reasons. First, the equilibrium allocation of consumers to the networks is too balanced, because consumers fail to internalize network externalities. Second, if access to the networks is priced by strategic firms, then the product with the highest expected quality is also the most expensive. This further reduces the asymmetry between market shares and therefore social welfare.