Exchange rate regimes in the transition economies

D. Mario Nuti illustrates the extraordinary progress made by central and eastern European economies in their trade and exchange regimes. Surprisingly, instant convertibility of exchange rates was established. In spite of diverse exchange rate regimes they have all experienced initial severe undervaluation - the cost of speed and of unrestricted trade - followed by rapid real revaluation and incipient protectionism. Since 1994 an embarras de richesse has appeared: high capital inflows which are either inflationary or costly to sterilise. Lower interest rates are recommended.     

Pitfalls in estimating equilibrium exchange rates for transition economies

The literature on equilibrium exchange rates for the central and eastern European countries has mushroomed in recent years. In this paper, we discuss the econometric pitfalls involved in such estimations and endow the reader with the methodological ingredients to avoid such biases. We review the commonly used approaches and identify problems related to the most straightforward econometric procedures as they often do not take the transition process properly into account. As an alternative, we propose a two-stage “out-of-sample” strategy that consists of estimating the relationship between the exchange rates and fundamentals and the extrapolation of these relationships to transition economies.     

Political exchange in mass party regimes and the transition from socialism

This paper contrasts the east European and the Chinese routes of exit from the Soviet-type economy and argues that a communist regime, if it is to remain in power, cannot renounce state ownership or control of large-scale industry and party control of managerial appointments, careers, and incomes: these two features make up an enforceable, efficient contract for political service in a monopolistic political market. These features were abandoned in the European route and preserved in the Chinese route because of the average versus modal character of party representation and membership in the two groups of countries, so that the modal nature of the Chinese party is the key to the regime’s survival and success under market reform. The approach also explains the failure of Gorbachev’s attempt to export the Chinese model to the Soviet Union in the form of perestroika.     

Capital inflows,exchange market pressure,and credit growth in four transition economies with fixed exchange rates

With the transition from planned economic systems to membership in the European Union, capital inflows and domestic credit have expanded tremendously in Central and Eastern Europe. Four of these countries—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria—maintain fixed exchange-rate regimes, which may face pressure because of rapid credit growth or during a slowdown. This study uses a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach to assess the contribution of capital inflows to exchange market pressure in these four countries, as well as to the growth of domestic credit. Both FDI and non-FDI flows are shown to feed credit growth in Bulgaria, but not the Baltics. Relatively volatile flows, particularly non-FDI inflows, reduce EMP in three of the four countries.     

The Hungarian exchange rate and inflation over the transition

The relationship from inflation and the real exchange rate to the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate for Hungary is investigated over 1991m6–2002m2. Evidence is found that prior to the adoption of the pre-announced crawl in 1995 depreciation responded to inflation. After the adoption of the crawl inflation is dominated by a trend that indicates the rate of depreciation to be diminishing over time. This trend is interpreted as being deterministic, as a consequence of the gradual reductions in the rate of official devaluations. In both periods depreciation was found to respond to the real exchange rate in ways that limited real appreciations of the currency.     

Partial privatization in transition economies

Privatization in transition countries has often been partial, with the state retaining a non-controlling ownership share in privatized assets. This paper reviews briefly the empirical evidence and then analyzes the justifications that have been put forward for adopting partial privatization. These are related to the objectives of economic efficiency and the generation of government revenue, as well as to political motivations. The issues covered are the stock-flow problem, risk-sharing and restructuring, informational considerations, the role of market structure, bargaining, foreign investment and the irreversibility of reform. The paper ends with some suggestions for further research.     

Export differentiation in transition economies

I investigate changes in the structure of trade of seventeen transition economies between 1996 and 2006, focusing on differences across three types of products - homogeneous goods, reference priced goods, and differentiated products. I examine shares of exports of each type of good, intensive and extensive margins, and the hazard of exporting. While there are cross-country differences in the distribution of export shares and in intensive and extensive margins, the largest differences exist in the hazard of exporting. There are significant differences in the hazard both across countries and time.     

Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.     

The nexus between country risk and exchange rate regimes: A global investigation

Using a sample of 110 countries over the period 1984–2013, this paper examines the impacts of country risks on choosing a specific exchange rate regime (first by utilizing the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger de facto classification and then robusting it by the IMF de jure measurement) relative to other regimes via the panel multinomial logit approach. Empirical findings are as follows. First, in the full samples case we provide evidence that government is more likely to implement a flexible regime, but less likely to adopt a fixed regime, under a low level of composite and financial risk. Second, we find that Eurozone countries are more likely to choose a fixed exchange rate regime with a decrease in the level of country risk and favor a flexible regime in response to a shock from an increase of risk, which is opposite to non-Eurozone countries. Third, we note that high-risk countries are more likely to choose a fixed regime with a low level of composite and political risk in the government, but do not adjust the exchange rate regime as a shock absorber when facing economic and financial risks. It is interesting to see that those countries with relatively low risk display almost opposite results versus high-risk economies. Overall, we believe that it is critically important to account for political economy variables in a government’s exchange rate policy decisions, especially for country risks. All results are robust to the panel ordered probit model.     

Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies

In this paper we develop a regularity theory for stationary overlapping generations economies. We show that generically there is an odd number of steady states in which a non-zero amount of nominal debt (fiat money) is passed from generation to generation and an odd number in which there is no nominal debt. We are also interested in non-steady state perfect foresight paths. As a first step in this direction we analyze the behavior of paths near a steady state. We show that generically they are given by a second order difference equation that satisfies strong regularity properties. Economic theory alone imposes little restriction on those paths: With n goods and consumers who live for m periods, for example, the only restriction on the set of paths converging to the steady state is that they form a manifold of dimension no less than one, no more than 2nm.     

Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies

We study social ordering functions in exchange economies. We show that if a social ordering function satisfies certain Pareto, individual rationality, and local independence conditions, then (i) the set of top allocations of the chosen social ordering is contained in the set of Walrasian allocations and is typically non-empty, and (ii) all individually rational but non-Walrasian allocations are typically ranked indifferently. Thus, such a social ordering function is quite similar to the Walrasian correspondence, which can be regarded as the social ordering function whose associated indifference classes are the set of Walrasian allocations and the set of other allocations.     

Foreign presence and efficiency in transition economies

This paper presents empirical evidence on the role of foreign presence in the performance of domestic manufacturing firms in five Central and Eastern European countries. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used to estimate a frontier for each sector with similar technology common for five transition countries in the sample − Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Following Simar and Wilson (J Econom 136(1):31–64, 2007), this study applies a truncated regression and bootstrap technique in a second stage post-DEA analysis. Some evidence is found to support the hypothesis that foreign presence has an overall positive spillover effects on the performance of domestic firms.     

International trade and hedging in economies in transition

This paper develops a general equilibrium framework to analyze risk management policies in economies in transition. By cross-hedging against real exchange rate risk exposures, these economies can increase their gains from international trade. We suggest that countries with emerging forward markets can gradually introduce the risk sharing markets, as limiting resources may prevent them from introducing complete hedging markets in the first place. Thus the growing demand for risk management instruments can be gradually met and it would be welfare enhancing. Economies in transition benefit when hedging devices are offered by financial markets, irrespective of whether the hedging instruments are de facto perfect or not.     

Heterogeneity of technological regimes and banking efficiency in former socialist economies

Cost efficiency of banks in 20 former socialist emerging economies is analyzed using a latent class stochastic efficiency frontier model that explicitly accounts for unobserved differences in technological regimes due to the heterogeneity of economic environments in which the banks are operating. We find that banking systems in former socialist emerging economies are characterized by three distinct technological regimes. Based on the estimated efficiency scores we group the countries into three categories and provide an intuitive interpretation of these three regimes.     

Accessibility of optima in pure exchange economies

Assuming differentiable monotonicity and differentiable convexity of utility functions, we show that if y and z are allocations of a pure exchange economy with z optimal and preferred to y by every agent, then there is a trade curve of finite length from y to z. We make no assumption on utility functions designed to ‘keep away from the boundary’. The conclusion need not hold if z is not optimal, unless a special boundary condition is assumed and (l, m) ≠ (2, 2).     

Arbitrage and equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies with satiation

In his seminal paper on arbitrage and competitive equilibrium in unbounded exchange economies, Werner (1987) proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium, under a price no-arbitrage condition, without assuming either local or global nonsatiation. Werner’s existence result contrasts sharply with classical existence results for bounded exchange economies which require, at minimum, global nonsatiation at rational allocations. Why do unbounded exchange economies admit existence without local or global nonsatiation? This question is the focus of our paper. First, we show that in unbounded exchange economies, even if some agents’ preferences are satiated, the absence of arbitrage is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibria, as long as each agent who is satiated has a nonempty set of useful net trades– that is, as long as agents’ preferences satisfy weak nonsatiation. Second, we provide a new approach to proving existence in unbounded exchange economies. The key step in our new approach is to transform the original economy to an economy satisfying global nonsatiation such that all equilibria of the transformed economy are equilibria of the original economy. What our approach makes clear is that it is precisely the condition of weak nonsatiation – a condition considerably weaker than local or global nonsatiation – that makes possible this transformation.     

Liberalization,entry and product quality in transition economies

We model the effect of liberalization on product quality and industrial activity in transition economies. As barriers to entry are reduced, entry costs fall. This leads to an increase in the proportion of low quality producers in the market. The decrease in the expected quality can have adverse effects on consumer demand for the domestic product. The analysis suggests a demand side explanation of the observed restructuring and decline in output in sectors exposed to Western competition during transition.     

Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies

This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality $(r,s)$, $0\le r,s$, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers $r$ and $s$. The quality $(r,s)$ measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger $r$ and $s$ the closer the fit. For $r,s\le 1$ this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi (2012) which are exactly the local equilibria of quality $(1,1)$. For $1<r,s$ the local equilibria of quality $(r,s)$ are more stable than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality $(r,s)$ provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents’ valuations, an allocation whose value is at least $\frac{rs}{1+rs}$ the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents’ valuations are $a$-submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by $a\ge 1$, there is a local equilibrium of quality $(\frac{1}{a},\frac{1}{a})$. In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality $(1,\frac{1}{a})$. Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation.     

The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies

Why has the average real risk-free interest rate been less than one percent? The question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative-agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk-free debt. I construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk-free asset. I calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally. With a borrowing constraint of one year's income, the resulting risk-free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative-agent economy.