谈判力研究现状与前景

作为一个相对性概念,谈判力表示谈判者在所处谈判环境中能够实现自己预期结果的能力,按不同维度有不同分类,在不同分类下学者对谈判力的研究深度不同。谈判力的影响因素繁多复杂且不易度量,需要进一步进行谈判力的定量研究。整合性谈判中的动态谈判力、履约谈判中受合同约束的履约谈判力是进一步研究谈判力的突破口。     

谈判力研究现状与前景北大核心CSSCISSCI

作为一个相对性概念,谈判力表示谈判者在所处谈判环境中能够实现自己预期结果的能力,按不同维度有不同分类,在不同分类下学者对谈判力的研究深度不同。谈判力的影响因素繁多复杂且不易度量,需要进一步进行谈判力的定量研究。整合性谈判中的动态谈判力、履约谈判中受合同约束的履约谈判力是进一步研究谈判力的突破口。     

钟朋荣：关注员工谈判力变化

经济学家钟朋荣提出，老板要始终关注和重视与员工谈判力的变化。钟朋荣认为，老板与员工的谈判力由以下四个方面决定：     

外来民工人力资本的谈判力及其治理

人力资本谈判力是影响人力资本治理模式的主要因素之一,但很少有人以此研究外来民工的人力资本治理问题。本文通过对珠三角民工人力资本谈判力影响因素的分析,提出了群体性谈判力的概念,并据此提出了珠三角民营企业人力资本治理模式。     

中层人员的人力资本谈判力及其影响因素

现实中的中层管理者往往处在一个既有人力资本又有人力资源性质的特殊困境,中层的非人力资本化是企业中层流动性大的主要原因。本文认为,企业中的中层管理者作为人力资本应该与其他资本一起分享剩余权利．对剩余索取权和剩余控制权的分享在很大程度上决定了中层的地位及价值。如何加大企业的中层对剩余索取权和剩余控制权的分享程度．以摆脱中层的特殊困境,取决于中层的谈判力。而知识的通用性、专用性及专有性程度影响了中层管理者的谈判能力,另外．企业信息结构和企业成长的不同阶段等因素也影响和作用着中层管理者的谈判力。     

基于纳什谈判推广模型的国际气候谈判研究

多哈气候大会已经结束,此次多哈气候谈判将《京都议定书》承诺期延长到2020年,俄罗斯、日本、新西兰和加拿大退出了《京都议定书》,美国仍未加入。国际气候谈判经历了相当漫长的时间,至今仍未取得突破性进展。文章首次借助纳什谈判推广模型从谈判力、担心谈判破裂程度与谈判破裂后的效用水平三方面对国际气候谈判进行分析,并据此以气候谈判现状为例进行了说明,得出谈判方的效用水平与谈判力成正比,可以通过提高谈判力水平来提高效用水平,谈判方对谈判破裂的担心程度对谈判有很大影响,并且可以通过惩罚机制来改变其担心程度影响谈判结果。所以我国应努力提高谈判力,通过对其他国家担心谈判破裂程度的分析,预测其谈判动机及立场做出相应对策,另外指出了会议增设惩罚措施的必要性。     

经济波动、超额准备金率和内生货币-基于信贷市场资金搜寻和匹配视角

本文基于信贷市场资金和项目的搜寻与匹配视角建立了一个内生货币模型,分析经济波动和货币政策对超额准备金率和货币乘数的影响。比较静态分析发现,超额准备金率具有逆周期特征;其变化有减弱法定准备金率和基础货币政策效果的作用。动态分析发现,超额准备金率具有滞后周期特征;超额准备金率的内生变化会带来货币政策的时滞效应。通过中国数据校准参数后的模拟发现,较高惰性的法定准备金率调整政策不仅不能有效抚平信贷市场波动,反而可能是造成信贷市场不稳定的原因。对中国数据的实证分析表明,超额准备金率的上述特征都具有很好的统计显著性。     

利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。     

论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应

文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Coumot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题.文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求由线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响.     

价格估计偏差与婚姻市场失衡

本文利用以"社会价格"为基础的两方搜寻匹配模型分析婚姻市场均衡条件及价格扭曲导致的失衡。在行为主体理性、价格信号准确的婚姻市场,将形成"顺序的"均衡结果,即同等级、同类别男女结合的"同型婚配";但是主体对自身及对象价格估计的偏差,都将导致市场失衡。一方面,自我高估导致本应匹配的男女无法顺利结合,自我低估则使人仓促迈入并不合适的婚姻,此外,两者均有消极外部影响——将条件最差的男人(女人)驱逐出婚恋市场、使其无法找到婚配对象。另一方面,"社会价格"信号可能发生故意或无意的扭曲,造成对他人真实价值的错误估计以及随之而来的恋爱选择偏差;但是这类价格扭曲将随着相处时间的增加、双方信息的对称化而逐步得到修正。     

Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda

The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over “packages” should be a prevailing phenomenon, but we also point to the possibility of multiple equilibria involving even considerable delay. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences

Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We employ simulation techniques to quantify the effects of intercorrelated preferences on men's and women's aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale–Shapley matching mechanism. Our results show that even a small amount of positive intercorrelation in a matching market means increased satisfaction for women and dramatically decreased potential for strategic manipulation. Negative intercorrelation has the opposite effects. Thus, matching markets characterized by positive intercorrelation are well suited for matching via Gale–Shapley, while markets characterized by negative intercorrelation may face opposition from the nonproposing side of the market. So that our results are immediately applicable, we also define and employ a general measure of intercorrelation that can be used for any matching market.     

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

Abstract. We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal–agent (P–A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P–A model and in the alternating offer game.     

谈判能力与标价策略

厂商能够通过策略性地选择不标价销售,利用其较强的谈判能力获取更多的利益。当厂商谈判能力较弱时,厂商将选择标价以最大化其利润。考虑消费者的谈判成本,厂商选择不标价时,其利润和谈判能力呈倒U型关系。当厂商谈判能力过高时,由于消费者将无利可图而放弃购买,因而厂商将选择标价的策略。在一定条件下,厂商实施策略性不标价不是市场有效的,可以通过强制标价实现市场的有效性。     

Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Often a bargainer can use some form of power—legal, military, or political—to impose a settlement. How does the “outside” option of being able to impose a settlement, albeit at some cost, affect the bargaining? And, how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers? These questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to Rubinstein's game of dividing a pie. Each actor can accept an offer, make a counteroffer, or try to impose a solution. Imposing a settlement is, however, costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification number: C72.     

恩格斯婚姻家庭观

恩格斯的著作《家庭、私有制和国家的起源》,对于婚姻家庭的研究,有着重要的意义。在婚姻家庭的历史发展上,恩格斯认为婚姻家庭是历史发展的,具有连续性;在婚姻家庭的道德层面上,恩格斯认为人们在研究婚姻家庭时,要一分为二的看待不同时期、社会、地区的婚姻爱情观念和制度,认为婚姻家庭应该是合乎道德的,同时对资产阶级婚姻家庭进行了批判;在婚姻家庭的未来发展上,他对共产主义社会婚姻家庭也提出了自己的设想,形成了自己的婚姻家庭观。     

Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment

Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C78, J52.     

A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation

The two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are: When a game is played, what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen? Few solution concepts or theories in the current literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions; answers are especially lacking for the first one. In this paper we introduce a new bargaining set, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that provides answers to both fundamental questions endogenously. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

Wage Formation and Bargaining Power during the Great Depression*

We present an econometric analysis of wage behaviour in Norway during the interwar years. The analysis is based on a panel of manufacturing industry data using GMM estimation methods. Our empirical analysis shows that wage formation in the interwar period can be understood with the help of modern bargaining theory and well‐established wage equations. We estimate a long‐run wage curve that has all the standard features of being homogeneous in prices, proportional to productivity, and with a negative unemployment elasticity. We also present some new Monte Carlo evidence on the properties of the estimators used.