Financialization of agricultural commodities: Evidence from China

Speculation in the commodity futures market distorts commodity prices, driving them away from rational levels. This phenomenon, which is known as the financialization of commodities, has raised significant concerns in recent years. Particularly, in the agricultural market, ‘financialized’ commodities have been blamed for high world food prices. In this paper, we examine the financialization of agricultural commodities in China. To do so, a time-varying copula is employed to investigate the dependence structure between commodities and stock markets. Four insightful results are obtained. First, positive correlations between agricultural commodities and stock markets demonstrate the financialization of agricultural commodities. Second, the identified correlations are time-varying and idiosyncratic with respect to products. Third, the agricultural commodity market is more closely correlated with the domestic stock market than with the overseas market. Fourth, a growing dependence between commodities and the stock markets is detected and the co-movement became stronger after the global financial crisis.     

Market Power,Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets

Market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of Hahn (Q J Econ 99(4):753–765, 1984), but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit market has not been fully addressed. I show that in this case, the threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market, and that overall efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone. In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is relevant in the context of the EU ETS. I find that the largest German, UK and Nordpool power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived threshold. Conditional on having price-setting power in both the electricity and permit markets, these firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards despite being net permit buyers.     

On the Determinants of Labour Market Institutions: Rent Seeking vs. Social Insurance

What determines the structure of labour market institutions? I argue that common explanations based on rent seeking are incomplete. Unions, job protection and egalitarian pay structures may have as much to do with social insurance of otherwise uninsurable risks as with rent seeking. In support of this more benign complementary hypothesis the paper presents a range of historical, theoretical and cross‐country evidence. The social insurance perspective changes substantially the positive analysis of the future of European labour market institutions. It is not clear that globalization and the ‘new economy’ will force countries to make their labour markets more flexible. These phenomena will probably increase the efficiency costs of existing institutions, but they may also make voters more willing to pay a high premium to preserve institutions that provide insurance.     

Allowing communities to trade in imperfectly competitive pollution-permit markets

Citizens and organizations representing them play an increasingly important role in markets for environmental quality, but much remains to be learned about how their participation affects these markets. We analyze the effects of allowing a community of citizens to trade pollution permits in an imperfectly competitive permit market. Allowing the community to trade directly reveals its preferences, which enhances welfare. However, community participation may also exacerbate distortions due to market power, even though the community itself trades competitively. Including the community in permit distribution may exacerbate market power distortions by affecting a dominant trader’s propensity to participate in the permit market. Second, the community’s demand/supply for permits may be more inelastic than other traders and worsen distortions due to market power. We illustrate in an example that these negative effects on competition can dominate the positive effect from preference revelation through the market place.      

The Brave New World of Carbon Trading

Human-induced climate change has become a prominent political issue, at both national and international levels, leading to the search for regulatory ‘solutions’. Emissions trading has risen in popularity to become the most broadly favoured government strategy. Carbon permits have then quickly been developed as a serious financial instrument in markets turning over billions of dollars a year. In this article, I show how the reality of permit market operation is far removed from the assumptions of economic theory and the promise of saving resources by efficiently allocating emission reductions. The pervasiveness of Greenhouse Gas emissions, strong uncertainty and complexity combine to prevent economists from substantiating their theoretical claims of cost-effectiveness. Corporate power is shown to be a major force affecting emissions market operation and design. The potential for manipulation to achieve financial gain, while showing little regard for environmental or social consequences, is evident as markets have extended internationally and via trading offsets. At the individual level, there is the potential for emissions trading to have undesirable ethical and psychological impacts and to crowd out voluntary actions. I conclude that the focus on such markets is creating a distraction from the need for changing human behaviour, institutions and infrastructure.     

Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

Ten years after the initial Climate Change Convention from Rio in 1992 the industrialized world is finally likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which will impose legally binding greenhouse gas emission reductions on the developed world. However, the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force without the USA, which withdrew under President Bush in March 2001. Accounting for hot air and market power of the Former Soviet Union on emission permit markets, it is shown that US withdrawal has important consequences on environmental effectiveness, compliance costs, and excess costs of market power under the Kyoto Protocol. Non-compliance of the USA implies a dramatic decrease in environmental effectiveness as well as compliance costs of OECD countries whereas the Former Soviet Union and transitional economies in Eastern Europe suffer from a huge decline in permit sales revenues. Excess costs of market power in permit trade increase in relative terms, but decline substantially in absolute terms due to US withdrawal. Policy options are quantified to bypass the problems of hot air and market power through compensation mechanisms.     

Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets

The present paper analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two imperfectly competitive product markets. Even if firms are price takers in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. If there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms, the integration of the permit markets could have a positive effect related to the flexibility of an integrated market; this flexibility can justify integrating the permit markets.     

Transmission channels of international financial crises to African stock markets: the case of the euro sovereign debt crisis

This article investigates the effects of the European sovereign debt crisis on African stock markets within a Bayesian shrinkage VAR framework. This method allows us to consider both North African and Sub-Saharan African stock markets, and provides a flexible parsimonious specification. The results reveal varying reactions of the impulse response functions. The most exposed African stock markets are those of Egypt, South Africa and Mauritius, while the least affected stock market is, surprisingly, that of Ivory Coast. Our analysis shows that, in addition to direct transmission, several macroeconomic and market channels, such as commodities, exports, and exchange rates, are relevant. Specifically, countries with strong commercial links to European countries will be most impacted by the crisis. The severity of transmission also depends on the country’s dependence on commodities.     

Innovation and the demand for food and drug labelling regulation in an evolutionary model of industry dynamics

Product innovation is examined in the context of an evolutionary model of industry and market behaviour in which a new product with a cost advantage and an unobservable, adverse characteristic competes with an existing product. Absent regulatory responses that ensure credible labelling, markets converge to steady state equilibria in which only the new product is traded. With credible labelling, the markets for the commodities become segmented. Welfare effects for consumers depend on the distribution of labelling ‘property rights’ between new and old product firms, market access, the cost advantage of the new product, and the magnitude of labelling costs     

Price Discovery and Efficiency of Indian Agricultural Commodity Futures Market: An Empirical Investigation

This study examines the price discovery process and relative efficiency of ten most liquid agricultural commodities’ futures contracts, traded on the largest agricultural commodity exchange of India (National Commodity and Derivative Exchange Limited). Three different common factor methodologies—component share method (Gonzalo and Granger in J Bus Econ Stat 13:27–35, 1995), information share method (Hasbrouck in J Financ 50:1175–1199, 1995), and modified information share method (Lien and Shrestha in J Futures Mark 29:377–395, 2009)—have been employed to determine the extent of price discovery contribution by spot and futures markets. The sample consists of daily data for the period from January 1, 2009 to October 20, 2015. Stationarity and Cointegration test results reveal that spot and futures prices are integrated and cointegrated for all commodities. The price discovery results show that the futures market leads the spot market in case of six commodities, i.e., castor seed, coriander, cottonseed oilcake, soy oil, sugarM and turmeric. Whereas, in the case of four commodities (chana (chickpea), guar seed, jeera, and mustard seed), price discovery takes place in the spot market. Therefore, it could be inferred that futures market is more efficient in price discovery of agricultural commodities. Policymakers could use these results to design futures contracts on other commodities or to plan concrete policies to curb speculation without hampering the efficiency of the agricultural commodity derivatives market.

     

Creating Markets for Air Pollution Control in Europe and the USA

This paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in Europe and the USA. European policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes. Emission trading has been limited to intra-firm solutions for various reasons: industry structure, absence of real scarcity, and too restrictive trading rules. Bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems. By contrast, the sulphur allowance program in the USA has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions. Problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls. Europe can learn from the USA that regular national permit markets could be installed, preferably for homogenous sectors. In designing the permit system, the differences between the USA and Europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity, stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account.     

Equilibrium with arbitrary market structure

Summary. Fifty years ago Arrow [1] introduced contingent commodities and Debreu [4] observed that this reinterpretation of a commodity was enough to apply the existing general equilibrium theory to uncertainty and time. This interpretation of general equilibrium theory is the Arrow-Debreu model. The complete market predicted by this theory is clearly unrealistic, and Radner [10] formulated and proved existence of equilibrium in a multiperiod model with incomplete markets.In this paper the Radner result is extended. Radner assumed a specific structure of markets, independence of preferences, indifference of preferences, and total and transitive preferences. All of these assumptions are dropped here. We - like Radner - keep assumptions implying compactness.Received: 17 April 2003, Revised: 26 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D40.     

Volatility transmission to the fine wine market

The goal of this paper is to explore volatility transmission from various markets to the fine wine market. Knowledge of these channels for transmitting volatility to the wine market allows practitioners to anticipate the future volatility and the consequences of a shock on the wine market, to develop their investment strategy and diversify their risk. We especially analyse the impact of U.S. markets (i.e. art, commodities, credit, financial and real estate) during the 2007–2017 period. We shed additional light on how the volatility of the fine wine market varies during an extended period including a financial crisis. Our results indicate that, in the short-term, volatility is transmitted with a negative effect through the financial and commodity markets and with a positive effect through the art, residential real estate, and credit default markets. In the long-term, the wine market is impacted by all other markets. We show that correlations are time-varying.     

Convergence of bank competition in Central and Eastern European countries: do foreign and domestic banks go hand in hand?

Following the massive entry of foreign banks into the Central and Eastern European (CEE) banking markets, one may wonder whether their competitive behaviour differs from that of their domestic counterparts, possibly leading to the segmentation of these markets at the regional and national levels. We find that the competitive behaviour of foreign and domestic banks differs, with foreign banks having less market power until the recent financial crisis and more market power after this financial turmoil. Despite this difference, banks tend to behave similarly, and their market power converges to a similar level. The tendency towards similar competitive behaviour is observed at the regional and national levels and for both foreign and domestic banks, although foreign institutions that enter these markets through the acquisition of domestic banks have slightly more market power. Our findings suggest the regional integration of CEE banking markets and no segmentation between foreign and domestic institutions.     

The influence of black markets on a queue-rationed centrally planned economy

In centrally planned economies in which prices are fixed, and the rationing mechanism is waiting line queues, we show that an equilibrium of waiting times exists. We then introduce a “black market” in which individuals can trade commodities that they have acquired through the official economy. An equilibrium of black market prices and waiting times is shown to exist; further, the economy with a black market is “queue-efficient.”. However, the introduction of black markets is not necessarily a Pareto improvement over an economy without black markets (even when we allow winners to compensate losers).     

Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets

This paper studies the strategic interaction between informal and formal lenders in undeveloped credit markets. In a model with adverse selection, loan seniority, market power, and differences in the cost of lending, it is shown that under general conditions a co-funding equilibrium will be a Nash outcome of the game. We demonstrate that a collateral requirement in connection with formal loans always generates a new co-funding equilibrium in which both lenders earn higher profits. A government subsidy to the formal lender may have the opposite effect. We relate our results to existing empirical evidence and the emerging discussion of how to best ensure financial viability and outreach of microfinance institutions.     

Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

Asset Markets and Endogenous Liquidity

In financial markets characterized by imperfect depth, speculative trading will have transitory effects on the market price as market makers must be compensated for the risk of holding the asset. The number of people providing liquidity to a market will generally be endogenously determined by the quantity of liquidity demanded. This paper looks for evidence of endogenous liquidity provision in several international stock and bond markets. Evidence shows strong support for these speculative dynamics in the stock markets. The evidence for these dynamics is less striking with fixed‐income prices, consistent with the less speculative nature of these markets.     

Impacts of Institutional Intervention on Price Transmissions: The Case of the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange

In the aftermath of the market liberalization reforms, interventions in developing countries shifted toward building institutions. One of such interventions is the introduction of commodity exchanges. The theoretical justification is that commoditization reduces the high transaction costs associated with the information and enforcement problems characterizing agricultural markets of these countries. However it is not known whether these potential gains are transmitted to the various markets along a value chain. By taking the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) as a case, this paper examines the impacts of the introduction of the commodity exchange in transmitting price signals along the coffee value chain (world‐export‐auction‐producer prices). We found that both the speed and symmetry of transmission remains weak even after the launch of ECX. At each level, the market chain was found to favor buyers. This implies that not only the country's gains from export are sub‐optimal, the cumulative burden is on the millions of smallholder farmers who are located at the bottom of the chain. In a context where local agricultural markets remain traditional and export markets barely competitive, the introduction of the commodity exchange will have limited impacts in improving the performance of markets in transmitting price signals. Other policy measures to further liberalize both local and export markets are required.