How global brands compete

It's time to rethink global branding. More than two decades ago, Harvard Business School professor Theodore Levitt argued that corporations should grow by selling standardized products all over the world. But consumers in most countries had trouble relating to generic products, so executives instead strove for global scale on backstage activities such as production while customizing product features and selling techniques to local tastes. Such "glocal" strategies now rule marketing. Global branding has lost more luster recently because transnational companies have been under siege, with brands like Coca-Cola and Nike becoming lightning rods for antiglobalization protests. The instinctive reaction of most transnational companies has been to try to fly below the radar. But global brands can't escape notice. In fact, most transnational corporations don't realize that because of their power and pervasiveness, people view them differently than they do other firms. In a research project involving 3,300 consumers in 41 countries, the authors found that most people choose one global brand over another because of differences in the brands'global qualities. Ratherthan ignore the global characteristics of their brands, firms must learn to manage those characteristics. That's critical, because future growth for most companies will likely come from foreign markets. Consumers base preferences on three dimensions of global brands--quality (signaled by a company's global stature); the cultural myths that brands author; and firms' efforts to address social problems. The authors also found that it didn't matter to consumers whether the brands they bought were American--a remarkable finding considering that the study was conducted when anti-American sentiment in many nations was on the rise.     

When to ally & when to acquire

Acquisitions and alliances are two pillars of growth strategy. But most businesses don't treat the two as alternative mechanisms for attaining goals. Consequently, companies take over firms they should have collaborated with, and vice versa, and make a mess of both acquisitions and alliances. It's easy to see why companies don't weigh the relative merits and demerits of acquisitions and alliances before choosing horses for courses. The two strategies differ in many ways: Acquisition deals are competitive, based on market prices, and risky; alliances are cooperative, negotiated, and not so risky. Companies habitually deploy acquisitions to increase scale or cut costs and use partnerships to enter new markets, customer segments, and regions. Moreover, a company's initial experiences often turn into blinders. If the firm pulls off an alliance or two, it tends to enter into alliances even when circumstances demand acquisitions. Organizational barriers also stand in the way. In many companies, an M&A group, which reports to the finance head, handles acquisitions, while a separate business development unit looks after alliances. The two teams work out of different locations, jealously guard turf, and, in effect, prevent companies from comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the strategies. But companies could improve their results, the authors argue, if they compared the two strategies to determine which is best suited to the situation at hand. Firms such as Cisco that use acquisitions and alliances appropriately grow faster than rivals do. The authors provide a framework to help organizations systematically decide between acquisition and alliance by analyzing three sets of factors: the resources and synergies they desire, the marketplace they compete in, and their competencies at collaborating.     

Investor Protection and Governance in the Valuation of Emerging Markets Investments

The combination of ineffective corporate governance at the company level and an uncertain legal and regulatory environment can significantly reduce the prices investors are willing to pay when investing in companies in emerging markets. The authors report the findings of their recent survey that asks investment professionals to compare the value of a hypothetical Australian company with that of its identical counterparts located in five emerging markets: Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Iran. The responding investors said they would value the emerging markets investments at discounts from the value of the Australian company that ranged from a low of 13.5% for its Malaysian counterpart to 51.2% for the Iranian company. Moreover, they indicated they would require costs of equity for these investments that were consistent with even larger valuation discounts. The investors' responses to the survey also suggest that corporate governance is especially important in countries with weaker investor protection. Well‐governed companies located in these countries enjoy significant value premiums that can partly offset the negative effect of the poor institutional environments, which suggests there may be a significant payoff for investors that succeed in improving the governance of the companies they invest in.     

Foreign institutional ownership externalities and supplier innovation

Many emerging markets allow foreign investment as a way to reform domestic markets. Extant studies have found a positive externality on innovation brought forth by foreign direct investment (FDI); however, we know very little about the externality of another form of foreign investment, ownership by foreign institutional investors (FII), on innovation. In this paper, we document one form of FII externality by showing that foreign institutional ownership of the customer firm results in higher supplier innovation. We also show that the FII externality on supplier innovation is stronger when customers have more influence on the suppliers and when the FIIs can facilitate information flow better. Our findings suggest that the real impact of FII can go beyond the underlying firms, and promoting FII may benefit firms, especially smaller firms in emerging countries that do not directly have foreign ownership.     

The hidden dragons

Most multinational corporations are fascinated with China. Carried away by the number of potential customers and the relatively cheap labor, firms seeking a presence in China have traditionally focused on selling products, setting up manufacturing facilities, or both. But they've ignored an important development: the emergence of Chinese firms as powerful rivals--in China and also in the global market. In this article, Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson describe how Chinese companies like Haier, Legend, and Pearl River Piano have quietly managed to grab market share from older, bigger, and financially stronger rivals in Asia, Europe, and the United States. Global managers tend to offer the usual explanations for why Chinese companies don't pose a threat: They aren't big enough or profitable enough to compete overseas, the managers say, and these primarily state-owned companies are ill-financed and ill-equipped for global competition. As the government's policies about the private ownership of companies changed from forbidding the practice to encouraging it, a new breed of Chinese companies evolved. The authors outline the four types of hybrid Chinese companies that are simultaneously tackling the global market. China's national champions are using their advantages as domestic leaders to build global brands. The dedicated exporters are entering foreign markets on the strength of their economies of scale. The competitive networks have taken on world markets by bringing together small, specialized companies that operate in close proximity. And the technology upstarts are using innovations developed by China's government-owned research institutes to enter emerging sectors such as biotechnology. Zeng and Williamson identify these budding multinationals, analyze their strategies, and evaluate their weaknesses.     

The triple-A supply chain

Building a strong supply chain is essential for business success. But when it comes to improving their supply chains, few companies take the right approach. Many businesses work to make their chains faster or more cost-effective, assuming that those steps are the keys to competitive advantage. To the contrary: Supply chains that focus on speed and costs tend to deteriorate over time. The author has spent 15 years studying more than 60 companies to gain insight into this and other supply chain dilemmas. His conclusion: Only companies that build supply chains that are agile, adaptable, and aligned get ahead of their rivals. All three components are essential; without any one of them, supply chains break down. Great companies create supply chains that respond to abrupt changes in markets. Agility is critical because in most industries, both demand and supply fluctuate rapidly and widely. Supply chains typically cope by playing speed against costs, but agile ones respond both quickly and cost-efficiently. Great companies also adapt their supply networks when markets or strategies change. The best supply chains allow managers to identify structural shifts early by recording the latest data, filtering out noise, and tracking key patterns. Finally, great companies align the interests of the partners in their supply chains with their own. That's important because every firm is concerned solely with its own interests. If its goals are out of alignment with those of other partners in the supply chain, performance will suffer. When companies hear about the triple-A supply chain, they assume that building one will require increased technology and investment. But most firms already have the infrastructure in place to create one. A fresh attitude alone can go a long way toward making it happen.     

The Evolution of Private Equity in Emerging Markets: The Case of Poland

In the last ten years, there has been a pronounced shift toward emerging markets in institutional investor allocations of capital to private equity. While the lion's share of the allocations to emerging markets have gone to the “BRIC” nations, lesser‐known markets like Poland are threatening to steal the spotlight. Economic stabilization, development of the private sector, a favorable business outlook, and continuous improvement of the local institutional infrastructure (laws, accounting rules, and fiscal regimes) have all contributed to the development of a vibrant private equity industry in Poland. Most private equity firms in Poland structure their deals around five broad investment themes: technology; media; and telecommunications; manufacturing; consumer services; business services; and financial services. Local private equity firms have traditionally adopted two different strategies towards these sectors. The first group of private equity firms initially targeted manufacturing, with the conviction that, as the Polish economy developed, the satisfaction of consumer needs for basic products would be the largest source of market demand. The second group assumed that the market would require access to more services to accommodate the growing local economy. Both approaches have proved reasonably successful, as the leaders among these two groups of firms have continued to succeed in raising new funds while achieving high returns for their limited partners. And while the accomplishments of the private equity industry have been made possible by the extent of Poland's transformation from a socialist into a market economy, the industry itself continues to play an important role in this transformation by providing both outside capital and know‐how for local firms and managers.     

Does institutional ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from Vietnam

The literature on institutional ownership and stock return volatility often ignores small emerging countries. However, this issue is more profound, due to the large size of institutional investors and small stock market size, in emerging equity markets. This paper examines the effects of the institutional ownership on the firm-level volatility of stock returns in Vietnam. Our data cover most of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange for the period 2006–2012. Employing different analysis techniques for panel data and controlling for possible endogeneity problems, our empirical results suggest that institutional investors stabilize the stock return volatility. Moreover, we document that: i) the stabilizing effect of institutional investor ownership is higher in dividend paying firms, and ii) if firms are paying out more dividends, this stabilizing effect is greater. Our results outline the important role of institutional investors in maintaining the stability in emerging stock markets.     

Where Is the Market? Evidence from Cross-Listings in the United States

We analyze the location of stock trading for firms with a UScross-listing. The fraction of trading that occurs in the UnitedStates tends to be larger for companies from countries thatare geographically close to the United States and feature lowfinancial development and poor insider trading protection. Forcompanies based in developed countries, trading volume in theUnited States is larger if the company is small, volatile, andtechnology-oriented, while this does not apply to emerging countryfirms. The domestic turnover rate increases in the cross-listingyear and remains higher for firms based in developed markets,but not for emerging market firms. Domestic trading volume actuallydeclines for companies from countries with poor enforcementof insider trading regulation.     

THE RISE OF FUTURE FLOW ASSET SECURITIZATIONS

Since their debut in 1987, future flow asset securitizations (FFS) have found growing acceptance in markets worldwide. FFS are defined simply as the forward sale of hard currency receivables to be generated in the future through normal business operations by an exporter of goods or services. The most widely used receivables include export receivables for corporations, and credit card vouchers, electronic transfers, and paper-based remittances for financial institutions. While companies in emerging markets have led the way in embracing FFS, the instrument's versatility has also made it valuable in industrialized countries where both companies and governments have begun to employ these structures for a variety of purposes.
This article surveys the use of future flow asset securitizations in both emerging and highly developed markets, outlines its basic structure and applications, and evaluates the benefits of the structure to each party to the transaction. Among the most significant advantages in emerging markets is the financial discipline that countries and companies alike must practice in order to qualify for a future flow asset securitization. The authors present three cases where FFS have been employed successfully by companies in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey.
The risk management features of FFS make this instrument particularly valuable in times of economic stress. In fact, no investment-grade FFS transactions have defaulted, despite volatile economic conditions in many countries where FFS have been issued. The authors predict that FFS will continue to find broad applications in a wide variety of markets.     

The Beta Dilemma in Emerging Markets

In principle, emerging markets analysts employ the same analytical framework when estimating the value of businesses as their counterparts in developed economies: they forecast future cash flows and discount those to the present with appropriate costs of capital that are estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. But in practice, emerging market analysts have a more complicated job because the task of estimating costs of equity in emerging markets is more difficult. Whereas developed economies have an abundance of historical data on overall stock market movements, industry share price behavior, and many individual share price histories, emerging market economies often do not. There may be no comparable local firms that are publicly traded—or if there are, their CAPM betas may be unreliable. And if analysts instead use the beta of a U.S. competitor as a surrogate for the emerging market beta, they face the question of whether domestic betas are equivalent across borders. As a consequence, appraisers of emerging market companies confront a “beta dilemma.” Part of this is a data problem stemming from shorter share price histories in emerging markets and the absence of publicly traded companies in some industries. In such cases, analysts may be inclined to use industry betas calculated with U.S. share prices as a substitute. But this creates an equivalence problem—the possibility, as confirmed by the author's research, that domestic U.S. and emerging market betas are not statistically equivalent for most industries. The author proposes a solution to this problem that involves grouping emerging markets into a single, distinctive asset class that allows for reliable calculations of industry betas. He also suggests ways of testing emerging market industry betas to determine whether they are statistically comparable.     

Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.     

Beyond offshoring: assess your company's global potential

In the past few years, companies have become aware that they can slash costs by offshoring: moving jobs to lower-wage locations. But this practice is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how globalization can transform industries, according to research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI). The institute's yearlong study suggests that by streamlining their production processes and supply chains globally, rather than just nationally or regionally, companies can lower their costs-as we've seen in the consumer-electronics and PC industries. Companies can save as much as 70% of their total costs through globalization--50% from offshoring, 5% from training and business-task redesign, and 15% from process improvements. But they don't have to stop there. The cost reductions make it possible to lower prices and expand into new markets, attracting whole new classes of customers. To date, however, few businesses have recognized the full scope of performance improvements that globalization makes possible, much less developed sound strategies for capturing those opportunities. In this article, Diana Farrell, director of MGI, offers a step-by-step approach to doing both things. Among her suggestions: Assess where your industry falls along the globalization spectrum, because not all sectors of the economy face the same challenges and opportunities at the same time. Also, pay attention to production, regulatory, and organizational barriers to globalization. If any of these can be changed, size up the cost-saving (and revenue-generating) opportunities that will emerge for your company as a result of those changes. Farrell also defines the five stages of globalization-market entry, product specialization, value chain disaggregation, value chain reengineering, and the creation of new markets-and notes the different levers for cutting costs and creating value that companies can use in each phase.     

Ownership and control in Central and Eastern Europe

The unique natural experiment of the fall of the iron curtain led to large institutional and governance differences across countries. This allows us to observe the evolution of ownership and control after an initial shock. We utilize this cross-time/cross-country variation in institutions and privatization methods to analyze the determinants and effects of individual investor control in a large sample of firms in 11 CEE countries over the period 2000–2007. Controlling for possible endogeneity and firm effects, we find that large individual investors add value to the firms they control. They do so predominantly compared to state controlled firms but also compared to other privately controlled firms. If large individual investor firms employ professional managers and (only) supervise them actively, they achieve the better performance improvements in Tobin's q than the firms managed by their controlling shareholders. Concerning the determinants of ownership, large individual shareholders substitute for missing good country governance institutions, and ownership is very sticky, since initial conditions (privatization methods) still matter. It appears that secondary markets do not converge on the same ownership equilibria as primary markets do.     

Legal protection of investors,corporate governance,and the cost of equity capital

This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance on the cost of equity capital in emerging markets and how the effect is influenced by country-level legal protection of investors. We find that firm-level corporate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital in these markets. In addition, this corporate governance effect is more pronounced in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection. Thus, in emerging markets, firm-level corporate governance and country-level shareholder protection seem to be substitutes for each other in reducing the cost of equity. Our results are consistent with the finding from McKinsey's surveys that institutional investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate governance, especially when the firms are in countries where the legal protection of investors is weak.     

International capital structure differences among the G7 nations: a current empirical view

Historical research domestically and internationally suggests that differences in capital structures exist for industry classification, firm size and nationality. However, the data for most of these previous studies are based on book values, include a limited number of countries, are not up-to-date, and specifically do not cover the period of the late 1980s when there were important developments in the globalization of financial markets. In addition, no single study specifically compares all seven of the world's major industrial nations (G7 Nations). Financial theory would suggest that in an efficient global market the capital structure of identical firms in different nations would be the same. If international market imperfections still exist through the 1980s, current capital structures and costs may be different among similar firms in different nations; and business advantages (or disadvantages) may provide profits (or costs) to firms incorporated in different countries. The intent of this research is empirically to update the literature with recent international data on both a book value and market value basis and to include for the first time in a single study all the G7 Nations. The results suggest significant financial structure differences still exist among the G7 countries. Specifically, on a market value basis France, Italy and Germany tend to use a higher proportion of total debt, US, UK, Canada and Japan tend to use less debt, and France, Italy and Canada tend to use a higher proportion of institutional debt (non-spontaneous funds) than the US, UK, Japan and Germany.     

Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research

There are important organizational and behavioral differences between firms in emerging markets and those in developed markets. We propose a top-down approach to understand how key institutional forces shape the structures and policies of firms in emerging markets. We review a selective set of prior studies as well as papers included in this Special Issue in identifying government quality, state ownership, and financial development as critical institutional forces that shape the financing and governance of firms in emerging markets. We suggest that future research should pay attention to several important but unanswered topics related to informal enforcement, government incentives, family firms, and network organizations.     

Are Open Markets Good for Foreign Investors and Emerging Nations?

Although policymakers of emerging nations routinely brand foreign capital as "hot money" and hold it responsible for the ills of their economies, this article suggests that the experience of opening up their markets to overseas investors has been largely beneficial for the host countries. Based on their own recent study, the authors report that when emerging economies open their markets, the level of stock prices tends to rise without an associated increase in volatility, and more capital becomes available for domestic investment at a lower cost. The stock markets also appear to become more efficient, thus resulting in a better allocation of resources. Furthermore, the inflow of foreign capital does not lead to higher inflation or stronger currencies, nor does the volatility of inflation or exchange rates increase. If some countries experience large capital outflows with damaging consequences, the culprit is not foreign investors, but rather policymakers' futile attempt to defy market forces and the failure of their economies to put the capital to productive uses.
The authors' analysis also suggests that, when the recent turmoil in emerging markets is set in the context of a longer-run historical perspective, nothing appears to have changed that would materially alter the prospects for investing in emerging markets. The recent market volatility and currency crises in emerging nations are by no means extraordinary—indeed, the currencies of many developing countries fall routinely. What distinguishes the Mexican and Thai currency crises from such run-of-the-mill devaluations is that both governments resisted the inevitable until market forces brought about a crash. The recent emerging market currency crises should accordingly be viewed as more or less predictable "road bumps" that can be expected when the policymakers of emerging economies gradually—and grudgingly—relinquish their power to the markets.     

Does one size fit all? Determinants of insurer capital structure around the globe

As financial markets become more global, the question arises whether any country specific considerations are still relevant for insurance companies’ capital structure. This research examines this question with firm-level data across a broad range of countries including those in developing markets. What we find is that the optimal capital structure of insurance companies is not homogeneous across countries. We find that country-level factors explain a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional variation in insurance companies’ capitalization levels. Our results add to the current policy discussion on global regulatory capital requirements. If insurer capital structure is not homogeneous across countries, a global capital standard – if desired – should take differences in the institutional environments across countries into account to avoid market distortions.     

The Empire strikes back. Counterrevolutionary strategies for industry leaders

Industry leaders frequently worry that their companies will fall victim to some revolutionary business model or disruptive technology. But new research shows that it's strategically better for incumbents to counter a revolution than to ignore or fully embrace it. Successful incumbents rely on one or more of five approaches to restrain, modify, or, if necessary, neutralize a revolutionary threat. A company that perceives a revolution in its earliest stages can use containment strategies. By throwing up roadblocks--raising switching costs, perhaps, or launching discrediting PR efforts--an incumbent can often limit the degree to which customers and competitors accept a nascent insurgency. And, sometimes, revolutions die there. If not, early containment buys a company some time to shape the revolution so that it complements, rather than supersedes, the incumbent's strengths. And even if shaping efforts fail, they can give an industry leader more time to work out how to absorb the threat by bringing the new competencies or technologies inside the firm in such a way that they don't destroy its existing strengths and capabilities. When revolutions have progressed too far to slow them down, incumbents must take a more aggressive tack. Neutralizing strategies meet a revolution head-on and terminate it--by, say, temporarily giving away the benefits offered by the challenger for free. Annulment strategies allow the market leader to leapfrog over or sidestep the threat. These five strategic approaches need not be used in isolation, as a detailed case study of the way Anheuser-Busch countered the craft-beer revolution dramatically demonstrates. Sensible industry leaders do not lead revolutions; they know they may not survive the attempt. Instead, they prefer to lead counterrevolutions.