The Basu Measure as an Indicator of Conditional Conservatism: Evidence from UK Earnings Components

Following the work of Basu in 1997, the excess of the sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative share return over its sensitivity to positive share return (the Basu coefficient) has been interpreted as an indicator of conditional accounting conservatism. Although this interpretation is supported by substantial evidence that the Basu coefficient is associated with likely demands for conservatism, concerns have arisen that it may reflect factors not directly related to conservatism, and that this may adversely affect its validity as an indicator of that phenomenon. We argue that evidence on the validity of the Basu coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism can be obtained by disaggregating earnings into components, classifying those components by whether or not they are likely to be affected by conditional conservatism, and examining whether the Basu coefficient arises primarily from components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. We implement this procedure for UK firms reporting under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance from 1992 to 2004. Although a substantial proportion of the Basu coefficient emanates from cash flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), which cannot directly reflect accounting conservatism, its incidence across other components of earnings is predominantly within those components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. Also, although the bias documented by Patatoukas and Thomas in 2009 is present in all of our aggregate earnings measures, it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings and largely absent from components classified as likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. With the important caveat that researchers should test the robustness of their results to the exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash flows, our findings are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient.     

Review

In this study we extend prior research on the international analysis of accounting conservatism (Joos and Lang, 1994; Ball et al., 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001), by examining the level of accounting conservatism across eight European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Belgium), and assessing the statistical significance of the differences among them. The definitions of conservatism that we use are, on the one hand, the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) definition, which implies a persistent understatement of book value of shareholders' equity (balance sheet conservatism). On the other hand, we use the one proposed by Basu (1997), that is, a timelier recognition of bad news in earnings relative to good news (earnings conservatism). We also address the possible scale problems of the models used to measure balance sheet conservatism. Finally, we check whether our comparative results could be influenced by a different sample composition in each country. Our results show that there are both balance sheet and earnings conservatism practices in all countries under study. In addition, while continental countries show larger balance sheet conservatism, differences in earnings conservative practices between countries are not that pronounced, although they tend to be larger in the UK. We also find that the existence of balance sheet conservative practices is associated with reduced levels of earnings conservatism, which is consistent with the results in Pope and Walker (2003).     

The Effect of Religion on Accounting Conservatism

This paper investigates whether religiosity, a key informal institutional factor, strongly influences a firm’s adoption of accounting conservatism. Using a sample from the U.S. stock market, we find that firms located in geographic areas with higher levels of religiosity tend to exhibit greater accounting conservatism. Further tests show that this effect is through the channel of engaging managers in activities that emphasize firms’ long-term growth, concern stakeholder interests, and avoid the risk of litigation. Moreover, we demonstrate that it is the religious environment in an area rather than the personal religious belief of a CEO that drives our baseline results. Finally, a supplementary test suggests that religiosity increases not only the conditional (ex post) conservatism of firms but their unconditional (ex ante) conservatism as well.     

The Impact of Accounting Conservatism on the Compensation Relevance of UK Earnings

Abstract

It has long been established that because of accounting conservatism, the contemporaneous correlation between returns and earnings is lower (higher) for good (bad) news firm-years. Meanwhile, prior analytical agency work suggests that the compensation role of accounting earnings is potentially greater (for tasks such as noise filtering and incentive balancing) when the contemporaneous correlation between earnings and returns is lower. Hence, since accounting conservatism implies that earnings have a lower correlation with returns in good news firm-years, the present paper hypothesises that UK CEO cash compensation exhibits a stronger (weaker) sensitivity to accounting earnings in good (bad) news firm-years. The empirical findings offer substantial support for this hypothesis and are robust to alternative estimation methodologies. In addition, the results appear not to be attributable to the well-established impact of earnings persistence on the compensation–earnings association. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that UK compensation committees appear to take cognisance of the impact of accounting conservatism when awarding earnings-based compensation. In addition, the present work offers additional insights into the nature of the interaction between the contracting and valuation roles of accounting numbers.     

International Differences in Conditional Conservatism – The Role of Unconditional Conservatism and Income Smoothing

Abstract

Prior research documents that conditional conservatism, measured as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings reflecting bad vs. good news, varies with cross-country differences in institutional regimes. In this paper, we examine the determinants of conditional conservatism and related earnings attributes internationally. First, using panel data, we investigate whether competing earnings attributes such as unconditional conservatism and income smoothing affect conditional conservatism and its international differences. We find that these attributes are predictably correlated with conditional conservatism. Second, we address the question whether income smoothing and conditional conservatism are two fundamentally different earnings attributes. We show theoretically that both attributes yield different earnings distributions and that the motivations for producing earnings which possess these attributes differ. To test these predictions empirically, we calculate firm-specific time-series measures of asymmetric timeliness, using a novel trigonometric measure based on the standard Basu (1997)-type regression. Using this cross-sectional data, we test whether conditional conservatism and income smoothing are different and find them to be only weakly correlated for a broad international sample. Also, we demonstrate that income smoothing explains international differences in conditional conservatism. Finally, we estimate simple determinant models of conditional conservatism and income smoothing, showing that both earnings attributes are driven by different explanatory firm-level factors: Conditional conservatism increases with the importance of debt financing, while income smoothing increases with the importance of dividends. Despite some important limitations, we believe our results to be meaningful because they show that cross-country differences in conditional conservatism are influenced by the effects of other accounting properties, predominantly income smoothing. Especially, legal regime appears to drive income smoothing while losing its explanatory power for conditional conservatism when firm-specific factors are controlled for.     

关于会计稳健问题的理论探讨

本文通过立足于会计稳健原则,引入和借鉴国外学者的研究成果,分类出有条件稳健(盈余稳健)应计项目稳健和无条件稳健(资产负债表稳健)等会计稳健,并对其来源和检验方法进行了分析,对有条件稳健和无条件稳健衡量指标检验方法之间的关系进行了探讨,同时分析了会计稳健产生的原因和经济后果,以期为后续的研究提供参考。     

How CEO narcissism affects earnings management behaviors

This study examined whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs) with narcissistic tendencies are more likely to execute earnings management behavior because of pressure to fulfill earnings thresholds. The results revealed that a CEO who exhibits high narcissism is more likely to be involved in earnings management to compensate for her/his performance. Our findings suggest that CEO narcissism directly influences financial decisions. Considering the earnings thresholds, firms with a more narcissistic CEO experience a regulatory effect on real earnings management behavior. Studies have indicated that CEOs manipulate earnings to satisfy three primary earnings thresholds: prior year’s reported earnings, zero earnings, and analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical results provide further evidence that CEOs engage in earnings management to fulfill positive earnings thresholds and analysts’ forecasts. We infer that CEOs use the abnormal production cost method as an underlying mechanism to increase reported earnings. Our findings help clarify the relationship between CEO personality traits and earnings manipulation to assist investors with decision-making.     

Value Relevance of Accounting Information for Intangible-Intensive Industries and the Impact of Scale: The US Evidence

Abstract

The structural shift in the USA from a tangible- to an intangible-intensive economy raises a concern that reporting based on generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) might have lost its usefulness to investors. Amir and Lev [(1996) Value relevance of nonfinancial information: the wireless communications industry, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22(1–3), pp. 3–30] argue that accounting information is not useful for intangible-intensive firms. In contrast, Collins et al. [(1997) Changes in the value relevance of earnings and book values over the past forty years, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), pp. 39–67] find that the value relevance (measured by R-squared) of accounting information has increased over time and that value relevance for intangible-intensive industries is as high as that for tangible-intensive industries. In this article, we attempt to resolve the above discrepancy by examining the impact of scale on R-squared (Brown, S., Lo, K. and Lys, T. (1999) Use of R² in accounting research: measuring changes in value relevance over the last four decades, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28(2), pp. 83–115). We find that, after controlling for scale, R-squared is lower for intangible-intensive industries than for non-intangible-intensive industries and has declined over time for intangible-intensive industries but remained stable for non-intangible-intensive industries. Interestingly, the declining trend ended with the demise of the ‘New Economy’ period (NEP) (Core, J. E., Guay, W. R. and Van Buskirk, A. (2003) Market valuations in the New Economy: an investigation of what has changed, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34(2–3), pp. 43–67), and value relevance for both industry groups appears to be restored in the post-NEP to the pre-NEP level. We also find that R&D capitalisation increases value relevance for intangible-intensive industries, but does not completely eliminate the gap between the two groups.     

The blind power: Power-led CEO overconfidence and M&A decision making

The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident. We also show that power-led overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of economic circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make diversifying acquisitions, relative to non-overconfident CEOs. The results suggest that the findings of previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs could be driven by power-led overconfident CEOs.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and Audit Quality

In a setting where mandatory audit firm rotation has been effective for more than 20 years (i.e. Italy), we analyse changes in audit quality during the auditor engagement period. In our research setting, auditors are appointed for a three-year period and their term can be renewed twice up to a maximum of nine years. Since the auditor has incentives to be re-appointed at the end of the first and the second three-year periods, we expect audit quality to be lower in the first two three-year periods compared to the third (i.e. the last) term. Assuming that a better audit quality is associated with a higher level of accounting conservatism, and using abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for the latter, we find that the auditor becomes more conservative in the last three-year period, i.e. the one preceding the mandatory rotation. These results are confirmed using Basu's [1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 3–37] timely loss recognition model. In an additional analysis, we use earnings response coefficients as a proxy for investor perception of audit quality, and we observe results consistent with an increase in audit quality perception in the last engagement period.     

CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns

To motivate managers to pursue shareholder interests, boards may design management compensation packages to reward managers for good firm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career concerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy argue that it may not be optimal for their current compensation to be too dependent on firm performance. Testing this proposition, we find that abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of performance-based pay of newly hired CEOs when companies announce CEO successions. Since these newly hired CEOs are likely some distance from retirement, we interpret these results as being consistent with Gibbons and Murphy; it may be better to allow newly hired CEOs to be paid in human capital increases from the managerial labor market than to have their current pay too closely related to performance.     

Interactive Reporting Bias Surrounding CEO Turnover†

This paper analyzes how CEO turnover affects successive CEOs' financial reporting decisions and the capital market price. I show that when an outgoing CEO (O) in period 1 is succeeded by an incoming CEO (N) in period 2, strategic interaction between O and N leads to interlinked earnings reports. Specifically, when the level of earnings reported by O is lower, N's reporting strategy is more likely to feature a downward reporting bias. Furthermore, by a comparison of the two-CEO setting with a setting with no CEO turnover, I show that with CEO turnover, (i) the period 2 earnings report is more sensitive to the private information of the CEO in control and less sensitive to the period 1 earnings report; (ii) the period 1 earnings report is more sensitive to the private information of the CEO in control; and (iii) the equilibrium stock price has the same sensitivities toward the associated risks, but is less sensitive to the periods 1 and 2 earnings reports. These results provide a novel explanation for managerial under-reporting bias based on strategic interaction between successive CEOs and shed light on the role of CEO turnover in earnings management behavior and capital market responses.     

Special Issue on Tax Research

Abstract

This paper is motivated by the links that continue to be forged between security pricing and accounting, building on recent findings that firms tend to be asymmetrically conservative in the timeliness of earnings recognition. The evidence is that firms in the European Union tend to recognise unrealised losses more quickly in their earnings than unrealised gains (Giner and Rees, 2001 Giner, B. and Rees, W. 2001. On the asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 28(9/10): 1285–1331.  [Google Scholar]; Raonic et al., forthcoming), and there is evidence of even greater accounting conservatism in the USA (Basu, 1997 Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 3–37. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Ball et al., 2000 Ball, R., Kothari, S. P. and Robin, A. 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29: 1–51. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Givoly and Hayn, 2000 Givoly, D. and Hayn, C. 2000. The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: has financial reporting become more conservative?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29: 287–320. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This paper investigates whether the Czech market exhibits conformity with the behaviour that has been documented elsewhere by examining the earnings/returns relationship, focusing to begin with on the impact of losses on earnings response coefficients and then considering the asymmetric timeliness of income recognition in the Czech market. The findings indicate that the Czech market is similar to more developed markets, at least in one respect: there is statistically significant evidence of different market effects of profits and losses, in that profits are more persistent than losses. However, contrary to the findings in more developed markets, there is no statistically significant evidence of earnings conservatism in the Czech market. These results are most probably due to the continuing influence of restrictive tax regulations that mitigate any tendency towards conservatism, as well as the transitional nature of the economy. A further reason is likely to be that the regulatory environment in the Czech Republic is close to the kind of stakeholder corporatism that is described by Ball et al. (2000) Ball, R., Kothari, S. P. and Robin, A. 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29: 1–51. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], who show that conservatism tends to be less pronounced in such regimes where there are fewer managerial incentives to bias current earnings. In conclusion, if changes in market prices signal good news and bad news about future risky outcomes, there is no evidence of asymmetry in the Czech market in accounting for such risks.     

Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

The contractual and value relevance of reported earnings in a dividend-focused environment

This study investigates the relevance of reported earnings in the context of an institutional environment, i.e., Switzerland, in which investors focus on dividends. In conjunction with a dividend focus, the financial reporting environment faced by Swiss firms provides their managers with more accounting discretion than managers of Anglo-Saxon firms typically have. From a contractual perspective, dividendbased earnings management is expected since Swiss corporate law explicitly states that dividends, which must be voted on by stockholders, are to be based upon a firm's reported earnings. From a value perspective, thin trading conditions and a long-term investment horizon are expected to increase the importance of dividend payments and to influence the informativeness of reported earnings. Results indicate that Swiss managers do engage in dividend-based earnings management, that earnings quality signals are used by managers to voluntarily constrain their accounting choices and that the value relevance of earnings is conditional upon dividend payments.     

Impact of CEO-board social ties on accounting conservatism: Internal control quality as a mediator

The paper aims to explore the association between CEO-board social ties and accounting conservatism. We found there is a negative relationship between CEO-board social ties and accounting conservatism. It implies that more CEO-board social ties reduce board’s monitoring function and encourage CEO’s tendency to adopt less conservative principles for their own personal gains. We also found the mediating effect of the quality of internal control system between CEO-board ties and accounting conservatism. This piece of finding further implies that the internal control system decided by the board could be the means via which CEO realizes less conservative principles. Contributions, limitations, and implications to corporate governance as well as security exchange commission are also discussed.     

The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation

Abstract

Although defined benefit (DB) pension plans constitute a significant portion of both annual compensation and firm-related wealth for many CEOs, prior studies of CEO compensation contracts generally exclude these plans from their analyses due to lack of data. Taking advantage of recently increased disclosure requirements, we analyse the role of DB pension plans in these contracts. We find that firms with CEO DB pension plans grant the CEO annual compensation that is larger than predicted by economic determinants. We also find that more powerful CEOs, identified by their extraordinary pension benefits, receive higher total pay in addition to the pension benefits. We find no evidence that CEO pension benefits contribute to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the annual pay.     

Capitalization of Costs and Expected Earnings Growth

Abstract

This paper offers a model that shows how the capitalization of costs affects contemporaneous earnings and the growth path of expected earnings. It makes three points. First, reported earnings under successful efforts are more price relevant than earnings under full costing or full expensing. Second, whether conditional or unconditional, conservatism always enhances the growth rate of expected earnings. Third, independent of capitalization policy, the long-run expected earnings growth rate converges either to the long-run expected free cash flow growth rate or to the depreciation rate. Therefore, while capitalization policy affects the price relevance of earnings and short-run expected earnings growth, it does not affect long-run expected earnings growth.