The Role of Institutional and Economic Factors in the Strategic Use of Non-GAAP Disclosures to Beat Earnings Benchmarks

Abstract

We use hand-collected data for a sample of large European firms to investigate the influence of countries’ institutional and economic factors on managers’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) disclosures. We find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP measures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that GAAP earnings would miss in countries with efficient law and enforcement, strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and good communication and dissemination of information. We also find that managers in countries with developed institutional and economic conditions are more likely to adjust non-GAAP earnings for recurring expenses such as R&D, depreciation, and stock-based compensation expenses. Our findings suggest that in environments in which there is more pressure to achieve earnings benchmarks and less opportunity to manipulate GAAP earnings, managers use more non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet the benchmarks.     

False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad

Is it always wise to disclose good news? Using a new statistical dominance condition, we show that if the receiver has any private receiver information then the weakest senders with good news gain the most from boasting about it. Hence the act of disclosing good news can paradoxically make the sender look bad. Nondisclosure by some or all senders is an equilibrium if standards for the news are sufficiently easy or if prior expectations without the news are sufficiently favorable. Full disclosure is the unique equilibrium if standards are sufficiently difficult or sufficiently fine, or if prior expectations are sufficiently unfavorable. Since the sender has a legitimate fear of looking overly anxious to reveal good news, mandating that the sender disclose the news can help the sender. The model’s predictions are consistent with when faculty avoid using titles such as “Dr.” or “Professor” in voicemail greetings and course syllabi.     

How entrenched managers beat earnings expectations before and after SOX

This study investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and how firms meet or beat earnings forecasts. It further examines whether this relationship changes before and after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). We find that, in the pre-SOX era, entrenched managers meet or exceed analyst forecasts more often than their unentrenched counterparts when analysts’ initial forecasts are high. This is mainly due to the drop in analysts’ consensus rather than earnings management. These results nearly disappear in the post-SOX era.     

Developing a Reputation for Reticence

A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom.     

业绩预告下的股份减持与内幕交易——会计稳健性是遏制还是助力？

选取2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察业绩预告发布前后大股东是否存在以及如何利用自身信息优势进行股份减持交易,会计稳健性是否以及如何对该内幕交易产生影响。研究结果表明:与强制性业绩预告相比,自愿性业绩预告披露前后发生大股东减持的概率更高,并且会计稳健性会显著抑制自愿性业绩预告披露前后的大股东减持行为。进一步将业绩预告消息区分为好消息和坏消息之后研究发现:坏消息的利空程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之前进行股份减持的规模越大;或者好消息的利好程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之后减持的规模也越大;稳健的财务信息能够抑制公司在隐匿坏消息方面进行的内幕交易,但会加剧公司在隐匿好消息方面进行的内幕交易。     

Do aircraft perquisites cause CEOs to withhold bad news?

This paper explores the relation between management forecasts and expensive perquisites. We investigate Yermack's (2006) conjecture that managers withhold bad news in order to receive expensive perquisites. We provide direct evidence supporting Yermack's (2006) conjecture. The frequency and magnitude of bad news release is greater than that of good news after the chief executive officer (CEO) first discloses aircraft perks. In addition, managers with greater numbers of disclosed perks are more inclined to withhold bad news. Additional subsample analyses provide further support for managerial bad news withholding behavior.     

Differential Interpretations,Private Information and Trading Volume Around French Firms' Good News vs. Bad News Preliminary Announcements

ABSTRACT

This study provides new evidence that both differential interpretations and private information production spur trading volume for a sample of 144 preliminary earnings announcements in the French markets. After partitioning the sample into preliminary announcements that convey good news versus bad news, I find that good news stimulates more production of private information, whereas bad news leads to more differential interpretations. I further find that increased production of private information (but not differential interpretations) helps explain trading volume around good news preliminary earnings announcements. In contrast, differential interpretations (and not private information) help explain trading volume around bad news preliminary earnings announcements.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

Timeliness of Annual Report Releases and Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of China

This paper examines the relation between firm performance and the timing of annual report releases in an emerging capital market. Based on the population of listed Chinese firms with A-shares for 1994-1997, we find that good news firms release their annual reports earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest. Moreover, consistent with Chambers and Penman (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998), these firms unexpectedly accelerate the release of good news and delay the disclosure of bad news relative to their previous reporting pattern. We also observe a significant price reaction to the annual earnings announcements for both early (good news) and late (bad news) reporting firms. Similar results are found for those A-share firms which have also issued B- or H-shares to foreign investors. Our study documents a systematic timing pattern of annual report disclosures, which is useful for investors to predict future earnings, especially in anticipating bad news in China's emerging market where information about future earnings is very limited.     

Whistle‐Blowing and Incentives in Firms

Whistle‐blowing is an important mechanism of corporate governance. We show that whistle‐blowing has negative effects on productive efficiency by undermining the incentives within a corporate hierarchy. In our model, a top manager intends to overreport earnings; a division manager may have evidence about the intended overreporting. We show that the division manager is more likely to have such evidence when the performance of his own division is low. Top management may offer a bribe to prevent the manager from blowing the whistle. This provides the division manager with an additional payoff when his division’s output is low. Therefore, potential whistle‐blowing undermines the division manager’s incentives to exert effort, which results in a less efficient outcome.     

The Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Conservatism and Timeliness of Earnings: Evidence from Hong Kong,Malaysia, Singapore,and Thailand

This paper examines conservatism and timeliness of earnings in the period surrounding the 1997 Asian financial crisis in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Prior research suggests that managers tended to be more aggressive in reporting good news and delayed recognition of bad news during the financial crisis (less conservative and less timely in financial reporting). After the crisis, these four countries implemented corporate governance measures to stabilize their financial systems and improve regulation and supervision (that should improve conservatism and timeliness). We examine and find that conservatism and timeliness of earnings during the crisis period are low, but improved in the post‐crisis period. More importantly, conservatism and timeliness in the post‐crisis period is even greater than in the pre‐crisis period. We measure conservatism using Basu's model and the accumulation of non‐operating accruals suggested by Givoly and Hayn. The findings from both measures are consistent with an increase in conservatism after the crisis period. Overall, the results indicate that corporate governance reforms in these four countries had a positive impact on conservatism and timeliness of earnings.     

R&D Cuts and Subsequent Reversals: Meeting or Beating Quarterly Analyst Forecasts

Abstract

Among firms that meet or beat earnings expectations, we find that cuts to R&D spending are more prevalent in Q4 relative to other interim quarters. This is consistent with the relative costs of real-activities management (accruals-based earnings management) decreasing (increasing) in Q4 due to the annual audit. More importantly, we find that the subsequent reversal of such R&D cuts is more prevalent and economically more significant following Q4 cuts relative to the reversals that follow cuts in other interim quarters. Our findings suggest that examination at the quarterly level (rather than annual level) lends new insights into the current debate regarding the prevalence of potentially value-destroying R&D cuts that managers make. Indeed, our findings suggest that some cuts may merely be temporary deferrals of R&D outlays.     

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firm's conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.     

Management Changes,Reputation, and “Big Bath”—Earnings Management

We study the effects of managerial turnover on earnings management activities in a model in which managers care about their external reputation. We develop an overlapping generations model showing that both outgoing and incoming managers bias reported earnings such that typically very low returns are reported in the first period after a manager has been replaced. Outgoing managers shift earnings forward to their last period in office as they will not benefit from earnings realized after that. Incoming managers can have an incentive to shift earnings to the second period in office as reported earnings will, immediately after a management change, only be partly attributed to their own ability. Deferred compensation can reduce incentives for earnings management.     

The Corrosive Effect of Offshore Financial Centers on Multinational Firms’ Disclosure Strategy

Abstract

This study investigates whether U.S. multinational firms with subsidiaries located in offshore financial centers (OFCs) (i.e. offshore firms) are more likely to be opaque in their voluntary disclosure relative to U.S. multinationals without such subsidiaries (non-offshore firms). We use management earnings forecasts to capture corporate voluntary disclosure. Consistent with the opportunism view, but inconsistent with the efficiency argument, our results (including robustness checks) show that offshore firms are less likely to issue earnings forecasts, disclose forecasts less frequently, exhibit a stronger tendency to withhold bad news forecasts, and release less precise forecasts than non-offshore firms. Moreover, of the three distinct dimensions of OFCs’ institutional environment, namely, low taxation, lax regulation, and secrecy policy, each plays a role in negatively shaping firms’ disclosure strategy. Thus, OFCs’ institutional features exacerbate the opacity that plagues firms seeking to avoid taxes via their OFC subsidiaries. Our results are consistent with the notion that, beyond the scope of taxes, multinational firms’ use of OFCs has a corrosive effect on market information dynamics. Hence, OFCs have a much wider impact on the U.S. economy as well as other major economies than just tax avoidance or evasion.     

年报预约披露日变更、时机选择与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

上市公司年度报告普遍存在"好消息早,坏消息晚"的披露现象,但会计准则中稳健性原则对"好消息"、"坏消息"的确认具有非对称性。本文从会计稳健性的视角探讨了盈余稳健性与年报预约披露日变更、时机选择的关系,经验证据表明:相比延迟发布年报,提前披露的年报的会计稳健性更高;而相比非周末披露年报,在周末披露的年报的会计稳健性更低;上市公司年报的会计稳健性与其披露及时性显著正相关,会计稳健性越高,披露越及时。     

Why More Forward-Looking Accounting Standards Can Reduce Financial Reporting Quality

A premise of standard setters and of much empirical research is that improving the quality of accounting standards and their implementation increases information in capital markets. This paper challenges this premise and shows that there are situations in which ‘better’, that is, more forward-looking, accounting standards reduce the information content of financial reports. The reason is that a forward-looking accounting standard affects the smoothness of reported earnings, which can conflict with the manager's smoothing incentive and her willingness to incorporate private information in the financial report. Although the manager could eliminate the effect by earnings management, it is too costly to do so. As a consequence, the capital market's ability to infer the financial and nonfinancial information in reported earnings declines. This finding should increase the awareness that an ‘improvement’ in accounting standards, without considering incentives and other information residing in firms, can adversely affect the quality of financial reporting.     

关于会计稳健问题的理论探讨

本文通过立足于会计稳健原则,引入和借鉴国外学者的研究成果,分类出有条件稳健(盈余稳健)应计项目稳健和无条件稳健(资产负债表稳健)等会计稳健,并对其来源和检验方法进行了分析,对有条件稳健和无条件稳健衡量指标检验方法之间的关系进行了探讨,同时分析了会计稳健产生的原因和经济后果,以期为后续的研究提供参考。     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.     

Securities Regulation, the Timing of Annual Report Release, and Market Implications: Evidence from China

Using a sample of earnings announcements of Chinese firms in the fiscal years 1994–1999, covering the periods before and after the introduction of a regulation to stagger the release of annual reports, we reassess the relation between earnings news and the timing of earnings announcements. We find that even though the reporting lag has significantly shortened as a result of the regulation, the pattern whereby good news is announced earlier than bad news persists. We then examine the behavior of stock prices before earnings announcements and find some indication of information leakage. These findings suggest that the regulation had the expected effect of reducing reporting delay and earnings release clustering. Yet, it did not appear to reduce the extent of the pre‐announcement leakage of information.