How Important are Earnings Announcements as an Information Source?

In a competitive information market, a single information source can only dominate other sources individually, not collectively. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar's (2008) [How much new information is there in earnings?, Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, 46(5), pp. 975–1016] R ² metric: the proportion of the variation in annual returns explained by the four quarterly earnings announcement returns. We find that the earnings announcement days' R ² is 11% – higher than the corresponding R ² of days with dividend announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, and 10-K and 10-Q filings and their amendments, and comparable to that of the four days with the largest realised absolute returns in a year. Additional analysis reveals that earnings announcements convey extreme bad news as often as management forecasts and preannouncements; for any other type of news, earnings announcements are much more frequent. We conclude that earnings announcements are an important source of new information in the equity market.     

Implications of limited investor attention to customer–supplier information transfers

This study focuses on the market reaction to information transfers from economically linked customers. I examine whether investors have limited attention with respect to the information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers. Using 1083 unique customer–supplier relationships for the period 1983–2011, I find that the cumulative abnormal returns of a supplier surrounding and following linked customers’ earnings announcements are positively related to the earnings information of the customers, suggesting that customer earnings announcements convey information to suppliers. I also find that the post-earnings announcement drift in customers contributes to the cross-firm reaction, and the predictability of customer earnings surprises for suppliers’ future returns is not entirely due to limited investor attention.     

Estimating the Precision of Information on Earnings and Non-earnings Announcement Days,and Its Relation with the Cost of Equity

ABSTRACT

Using daily stock returns, we estimate the precision of information during earnings and non-earnings announcement days, and find that although the precision of information in daily stock returns increases during earnings announcement days, it explains less of the variation in expected returns than the precision of information on non-earnings announcement days. Our findings suggest that the precision of earnings disclosures has a small effect on the cost of equity relative to the precision of information on other days of the year.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

Developing a Reputation for Reticence

A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom.     

Insider trading around open-market share repurchases

We examine insider trading around open-market share repurchases and find that insiders trade passively in 3 months prior to repurchase announcements and in up to 12 months following the announcements. Furthermore, both pre-announcement and post-announcement abnormal insider trading is unrelated to short-term announcement returns but correlated with long-term post-announcement returns. Our results indicate that corporate insiders trade passively around repurchase announcements in accordance with their perceived undervaluation to exploit the long-run abnormal stock returns related to the events.     

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firm's conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.     

年报信息披露的超常收益及其影响因素

与年报盈余公告效应的研究不同,本文在拓展年报信息考虑范围的基础上,检验盈余信息、股利信息、账市比、成长性和财务风险等年报披露信息对不同公司规模的超常收益的解释能力。研究结果表明,年报信息披露窗口存在显著超常收益,账市比、盈余信息、股利信息对该超常收益有显著的解释能力,因为在大多数公司规模中,账市比、盈余信息的极端值含有股票未来收益的信息,账市比、盈余信息、股利信息对超常收益有显著的边际影响;但成长性和财务风险等年报信息仅对部分公司规模的超常收益有解释能力。     

How Do Financial Constraints Relate to Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

This paper examines how constraints on firms’ financing capacity relate to managers’ discretionary accounting choices. Three hypotheses of earnings management – the opportunism hypothesis, the rational expectations hypothesis, and the signaling hypothesis – predict that constrained firms engage in greater upward earnings management than unconstrained firms when selling equity. Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) announced between 1983 and 2014, I find support for this prediction. The relation between financial constraints and earnings management is robust to including controls such as offer size, growth opportunities, analyst following, and chief executive officer equity holdings, as well as to using the instrumental variable approach. Investors’ reaction around and following the SEO announcement supports the rational expectations hypothesis. I find that aggressive earnings management by constrained issuers is associated with lower SEO announcement returns but is not followed by negative abnormal returns in the long run. The evidence suggests that constrained issuers’ aggressive use of income-increasing accruals is an outcome of managerial myopia caused by capital market pressure, not managerial opportunism intended to mislead investors.     

Securities Regulation, the Timing of Annual Report Release, and Market Implications: Evidence from China

Using a sample of earnings announcements of Chinese firms in the fiscal years 1994–1999, covering the periods before and after the introduction of a regulation to stagger the release of annual reports, we reassess the relation between earnings news and the timing of earnings announcements. We find that even though the reporting lag has significantly shortened as a result of the regulation, the pattern whereby good news is announced earlier than bad news persists. We then examine the behavior of stock prices before earnings announcements and find some indication of information leakage. These findings suggest that the regulation had the expected effect of reducing reporting delay and earnings release clustering. Yet, it did not appear to reduce the extent of the pre‐announcement leakage of information.     

The reaction of security prices to tracking stock announcements

This paper provides some empirical evidence on a relatively new and increasingly prevalent form of equity restructuring called tracking stock. We identify the effects associated with tracking stock announcements by excluding from our sample those announcement events that include other significant news announcements on the event date, such as announcements of acquisitions and earnings. For the 35 announcement events that fit this criteria, we find a mean abnormal return of over 3 percent in the two-day period surrounding the announced proposal to issue a tracking stock, with 30 of the 35 firms in the sample earning positive abnormal returns. The views expressed in this paper are that of the author(s) and do not reflect the views or opinions of Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. or any of its affiliates.     

Loan loss reporting,early disclosure,and investor reactions

Several prior studies present evidence that bank loan-loss announcements have a significant impact on shareholder wealth. There is no satisfactory explanation, however, as to why these announcements should change share prices. This paper examines loan-loss announcements in the context of the early disclosure literature. We find banks that publicly announce losses before releasing their quarterly earnings report have a significant increase in shareholder wealth following the loan-loss announcement. Banks that choose to publicly announce loan-loss increases with the release of quarterly-earnings report experience a significant decrease in shareholder wealth prior to the loan-loss announcement. Our results support the notion that the timing of the loan-loss announcement provides information to investors.     

Stock price reactions to stock dividend announcements: A case from a sluggish economic period

The 2007 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed resulted in a loss of confidence among investors, and regaining their full trust and confidence has been a challenge for companies. Although economic growth has been volatile throughout the postwar World War II period, recent growth (2008–2015) has been remarkably weaker than in the previous low-growth period (1974–1995). The 2006–2015 period is often characterized by sluggish economic growth. This study investigates stock price reactions to stock dividend announcements, 30 days before and after the announcement dates, of publicly traded companies in the period 2006–2012. We use an event study methodology for 460 events and daily stock price data for companies in the CRSP historical data set. The study shows a significant reaction in stock prices around the event date. On average, stock prices reacted positively to stock dividend announcements. However, compared to previous findings of abnormal returns (5.9%), results from this study show small abnormal returns (about 1.81%) attributable to stock dividend announcements that are cumulative of the announcement day and up to 3-day post-announcement days. Our estimates are even lower than the 2.01% stock price reaction obtained in the 1987–1996 period.     

Predictions of annual earnings using quarterly earnings,annual earnings and dividend payout ratios

This study empirically examines two issues related to forecasting annual accounting earnings. The first issue studied is the improvement in forecasts of annual earnings that can be obtained by including information about dividend payout along with the past earnings series in forecasting models. The second issue deals with the comparative ability of quarterly earnings time series models and annual earnings time series models to predict annual earnings. The results of this study indicate that considerable improvement in predictive ability can be obtained by expanding the information set to include the dividend payout ratio series. The empirical analysis also indicates that time series models developed using annual earnings generate more accurate predictions of annual earnings than do models developed using quarterly earnings.     

Differential Interpretations,Private Information and Trading Volume Around French Firms' Good News vs. Bad News Preliminary Announcements

ABSTRACT

This study provides new evidence that both differential interpretations and private information production spur trading volume for a sample of 144 preliminary earnings announcements in the French markets. After partitioning the sample into preliminary announcements that convey good news versus bad news, I find that good news stimulates more production of private information, whereas bad news leads to more differential interpretations. I further find that increased production of private information (but not differential interpretations) helps explain trading volume around good news preliminary earnings announcements. In contrast, differential interpretations (and not private information) help explain trading volume around bad news preliminary earnings announcements.     

Price delay and post-earnings announcement drift anomalies: The role of option-implied betas

In this study, we used informational advantage in the options market to investigate whether the option-implied equity risk developed by Chen, Chung, and Tsai (2016) - viewed as a type of time-varying beta - can help explain both the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) price delay premium and post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Our empirical results revealed a clear association between quintile portfolios with greater price delay premiums and higher option-implied betas, while the Fama-MacBeth regressions showed that the implied betas are positively related to future delay-based portfolio returns. Regarding the PEAD, we discerned a general increase in the mean of portfolio option-implied betas with standardized unexpected earnings portfolio drift. Our regression results support the notion that a portfolio’s PEAD can be viewed as compensation for the variations in option-implied betas.     

The Impact of Accounting Conservatism on the Compensation Relevance of UK Earnings

Abstract

It has long been established that because of accounting conservatism, the contemporaneous correlation between returns and earnings is lower (higher) for good (bad) news firm-years. Meanwhile, prior analytical agency work suggests that the compensation role of accounting earnings is potentially greater (for tasks such as noise filtering and incentive balancing) when the contemporaneous correlation between earnings and returns is lower. Hence, since accounting conservatism implies that earnings have a lower correlation with returns in good news firm-years, the present paper hypothesises that UK CEO cash compensation exhibits a stronger (weaker) sensitivity to accounting earnings in good (bad) news firm-years. The empirical findings offer substantial support for this hypothesis and are robust to alternative estimation methodologies. In addition, the results appear not to be attributable to the well-established impact of earnings persistence on the compensation–earnings association. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that UK compensation committees appear to take cognisance of the impact of accounting conservatism when awarding earnings-based compensation. In addition, the present work offers additional insights into the nature of the interaction between the contracting and valuation roles of accounting numbers.     

Analyst Herding and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

We examine the proposition that firms with disproportionately more analysts herding in their coverage, as measured by a larger herding index value, have higher crash risk. Our findings are consistent with the main proposition. The results suggest that information production, rather than monitoring, is the primary mechanism behind the positive relation between herding and crash risk. Our conclusion is robust to different measures of crash risk, crash risk windows, herding measures, subsamples, and instrumental estimation. In addition, using post‐earnings announcement drift, we report that analyst herding slows down bad news transmission in the market. Our findings extend the literature by documenting that analyst herding plays a role in enhancing crash risk. Analyst herding has economic consequences on the covered firms. We offer support for the concern in the literature regarding analyst herding and market fluctuations.     

Extracting Sustainable Earnings from Profit Margins

Revenues and expenses are fundamentally proportional to one another, but are likely to be disproportionally affected by transitory items or economic shocks. We build on this observation and propose a new measure of sustainable earnings based on deviations from normal profit margins. While some other sustainable earnings metrics attempt to identify transitory components on a line-by-line basis, our measure, referred to as the intensity of core earnings (ICE), uses ratio analysis to extract the transitory portion of earnings from all line items. We find that the ICE, as measured here, is positively associated with earnings persistence, better earnings predictability, and stronger market reaction to unexpected earnings. We also find that our measure is positively associated with post-earnings announcement excess stock returns. Comparing our measure with an accrual-based measure of earnings quality, we find that, in general, the two metrics provide distinct incremental information relative to one another and in some instances our measure is better than an accrual-based measure in assessing earnings quality.     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.