Fiscal Decentralization,Budgetary Transparency,and Local Government Size in China

This article makes use of panel data for 31 provinces between 1985 and 2010 and specifies a dynamic panel model to investigate the determinants of local government size in China and achieved several conclusions: (1) the fiscal decentralization since TSS reform in 1994 has increased the local government size; (2) budgetary transparency has a U-shape nonlinear effect on local government size; (3) fiscal revenue is the important factor to drive the overexpansion of local government size in China; and (4) local government size has a strong dependence of past path.     

财政分权、空间效应与产业结构升级——基于SDM模型的经验研究

基于2000-2014年中国31个省级面板数据,运用空间杜宾模型分别考察财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的空间效应以及由此引致的策略性竞争效应,研究表明：财政分权等经济社会因素存在区域差异,这种差异导致产业结构升级在空间分布上具有显著的异质性特征。财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的影响呈现出非对称的空间溢出效应。一方面,财政收入分权对本地区产业结构升级的影响并不显著,而支出分权对本地区产业结构升级具有积极影响;另一方面,财政收入分权和支出分权对相邻地区产业结构升级均产生抑制效应,但较之于收入分权,支出分权的抑制效应更为明显。     

The revolutions in China’s inter-governmental fiscal system

There were three periods in the development of China’s inter-governmental fiscal system. In the first period (1950s to 1979), local governments collected tax revenues and remitted upward to the central government. Reforms during the next two periods made revolutionary changes to the system. The tax-sharing system (established in 1994) provides for revenue centralization, spending decentralization, and large central transfers to local governments. This system remains largely in force.     

地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构

在财政分权与政治垂直管理的激励体制下,地方政府财政支出的逆周期性弱化。同时,地区间初始禀赋差异和风险异质性则使得地方政府财政政策的周期性特征存在明显的地区差异。本文借鉴Rajan与Zingales(1998)发展的固定效应估计模型,采用2004年我国29个省份29个行业的相关数据,考察了周期性财政政策对地区出口结构的影响。本文研究显示,财政政策逆周期性较强的地区,在外部融资依赖性高的行业出口相对更多,具有比较优势。同时,在控制了人力资本、物质资本和自然资源禀赋等传统比较优势影响因素,以及外部市场接近度、国内市场容量和基础设施等新经济地理的因素之后,本文的结论依然成立。     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline?

We investigate the efficiency and equity implications of a redistributive rule that takes into account both local tax collection efforts and deviation of local incomes from respective targets under alternative fiscal mechanisms. We show that, if the general budget constraint is binding, the proposed transfer rule leads to higher fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization (FD) than under centralized redistribution. Although the centralized decision yields better income distribution than FD, FD also improves income distribution unambiguously when equalization across regions is targeted explicitly. When localities act strategically, the private sector’s utility weight enhances the disciplinary effect of decentralization.     

政府间收入分成与财政收入预算偏离

降低收入决算和预算之间的偏离程度是现代预算制度的基本要求,长期以来,中国政府的收入预算偏离一直处于高位运行状态。本文研究了政府间财政收入分成对收入预算偏离的影响。理论上,财政收入分成的上升会对下级政府产生减小财政压力和加大财政扩张两种截然相反的影响,前者会减少政府的收入预算偏离,而后者则会扩大收入预算偏离。运用市县层面加总的预决算数据,实证分析较为稳健地支持了财政压力机制:财政收入分成降低1个百分点,收入预算偏离会增加0.3个百分点。进一步分析表明,收入分成对预算偏离的影响相比市县级,在省本级层面不显著,并且其对预算偏离的影响会随着经济发展水平的上升而降低。本文研究的现实意义是,政府间收入划分的改革方案要兼顾长期稳定性与财力支持性,这对于降低收入预算偏离、推进现代预算制度建设和国家治理现代化具有重要作用。     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Central–provincial sharing of financial responsibilities for China's social safety-net

Using Chinese provincial panel data from 2004 to 2014, this paper describes the division of fiscal responsibilities in basic social assistance and services (BSAS): China's social safety-net programme. The results suggest that there has been a recentralization—provinces with weaker economic conditions rely more on central governmental transfers, showing signs of fiscal equalization. The authors did not find any evidence of ethnicity-based preferential treatments.     

分税制财政体制改革中的利益集团博弈研究

改革开放以来,尤其是中国共产党十八届三中全会召开前后,在财政体制改革过程中,存在着各种利益集团之间错综复杂的博弈问题。本文将以博弈论为主要的分析工具,运用实证分析法来研究完善分税制财政体制过程中的利益集团博弈问题。首先概括性地阐述我国分税制财政体制中的利益集团博弈问题。然而具体分析各种利益集团的博弈问题。从取得财政收入方面来说,主要是处理好税收征纳双方的博弈问题;从支出财政资金层面讲,则是处理好政府各个职能部门之间的博弈关系。由此在深化财政体制改革的过程中,我们必须妥善处理好中央与地方,国家、企业与个人,税收征纳双方,政府各个职能部门等利益集团之间错综复杂的利害关系。激发全社会各方面的活力,使得众多利益集团创造社会财富的源泉动力充分地涌流。目的是完善分税制财政体制,构建与市场经济相适应的现代财政制度。     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

财政分权如何加剧了养老保险基金失衡?——基于收支二维视角的分析

基金失衡是当前养老保险制度改革面临的困境。本文从财政分权角度构建基金失衡的解释框架,并对其影响效果与作用机制进行实证检验。结果发现,财政分权显著加剧了养老保险基金的失衡风险,在经内生性与稳健性处理后,这一结果依然成立,且财政分权的影响效应主要通过征缴效率和提前退休两个机制实现。具体而言,财政分权诱发地方政府放松缴费监管,导致养老保险缴费收入遭受损失;财政分权引起地方政府降低退休审核,以致职工提前退休现象较为普遍,进而加大了基金支付需求;制度环境对财政分权的两种作用路径具有门槛效应,在基金相对富余、对财政补贴依赖度低以及总体法定费率较高时,财政分权的作用机制更加突显。本文验证了宏观经济体制对养老保险基金运行的影响,深化了对分权体制与养老保险制度关系的理解。     

中国式财政分权影响资本配置效率研究

高度集中的政治管理体制下的财政分权使得中国财政分权对地方政府行为所产生的激励与西方国家不同。使用2002～2009年数据,对中国财政分权与资本配置效率进行理论研究与实证分析,结果表明:财政分权程度的提高对资本配置效率产生了阻碍作用,中国式分权所引致的地方政府规模扩张等行为扭曲是导致财政分权与资本配置效率负相关的主要原因。为此,应改革政绩考核指标、完善税收体系、调整财权分配制度。     

房地产税收的一般经济分析

房地产税作为地方政府理想的收入来源,对于实质性财政分权制度的建立具有非常重要的作用。关于房地产税的税负归宿问题,理论界存在三种不同的观点。但这三种观点并不是相互排斥的,在不同的情况下,每种观点可能都是有效的。按照现代资产定价理论,房地产税收通过改变住宅投资的预期增值,从而影响住宅资产价格的走势。     

社会保障供给中政府间责权配置研究

长期以来,我国社会保障制度面临的一大突出难题就是各级政府提供社会保障的责权不分。合理划分各级政府在社会保障供给中的责任和权力,已经成为我国社会保障制度进一步改革与完善的关键。本文将以财政分权理论为基础,借鉴西方发达国家的经验,结合中国的现实情况,对于如何合理划分各级政府在社会保障供给中的责权,提出若干政策建议。     

分税与地方财政支出结构

本文研究了税收分成对地方财政支出结构的影响。理论分析发现,在地方政府的财政支出结构竞争中,税收分成比例的提高将直接导致地方政府增加生产性公共支出,发挥生产性支出的产出外部性,提高产出水平和自身税收收入水平,实现福利最大化。一系列经验分析显著地验证了上述结论,即当地级市政府的税收分成率提高10%,该地区生产性支出占比将提高1.39%。本文的分析和结论有助于解释中国地方财政支出结构变动的原因,从而为政府间税收分配改革提供有效的政策建议。     

Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization in a country on the level of corruption. Using a tax competition framework with rent-seeking behavior, it is shown theoretically that fiscal decentralization, modeled as an increase in the number of competing jurisdictions, leads to a lower level of corruption. This result is then tested using a small, cross-country data set. The empirical results are not very strong, but they suggest that the hypothesized relationship between decentralization and corruption may indeed exist.     

Revenue Volatility and Fiscal Risks: An Application of Value-at-Risk Techniques to Hong Kong's Fiscal Policy

Revenue volatility poses challenges for fiscal policy makers. It can create risks to service provision, require borrowing, or entail sudden tax changes. This paper investigates the use of value-at-risk techniques to measure the fiscal risks caused by volatility as well as the sensitivity of measured risks to policies that may limit volatility. The revenue of Hong Kong's Special Administrative Region (SAR) is among the most volatile in Asia, and thus is a natural case for applying these techniques. Reflecting its revenue volatility, Hong Kong's SAR has traditionally held high fiscal savings (reserves), and the value of the self-insurance these savings provide is also discussed.     

财政助推地方经济高质量发展探索与实践——来自广东省的经验数据

通过梳理,分析广东省培育"新财源"、优化财政支出结构、促进财政公平、提升财政效率、防范财政风险的具体措施后,认为财政收入、支出和运行体制改革是辩证统一的,是公平、效率和防风险的兼顾,最终目的是更好地为经济发展提质增效。因此,改革应以创新和绿色发展为导向,构建政府与企业的"利益共同体"和"命运共同体",以保障地方经济高质量发展。     

财政性存款对基础货币影响研究——基于中央银行资产负债表的实证分析

根据中央银行资产负债表,财政性存款是中央银行的负债,是基础货币的减项,因此财政性存款特别是国库现金对基础货币的投放或者回笼具有反向影响。本文对分税制改革和国库集中收付改革分别设置虚拟变量,实证分析了财政性存款对基础货币的影响关系。实证结果表明,1994年前财政性存款对基础货币影响较小,分税制后影响大幅提高。但2001年国库集中收付制度改革后,虽然规范了财政资金管理、加快资金流动,但另一方面也带来人行国库与财政国库并存的问题,使得财政性存款对基础货币的"吸储"作用减小。本文认为:人民银行经理国库体制和财政性存款缴存制度共同作用下,财政性存款发挥基础货币回笼作用;财政体制变化等长期制度性因素在财政性存款对基础货币影响中发挥更为明显的作用;财政性存款是非常敏感的指示器,对现行货币政策具有重要意义。