Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

China's Growing Government Debt in a Computable Overlapping Generations Model

This paper simulates the effects of China's growing government debt in a computable equilibrium model of overlapping generations. Our model assumes that the government increases debt to finance its spending in the short run, and then increases taxes or cuts spending to keep the debt–GDP ratio constant. The spending‐driven government debt increases public capital and output in the short run, but decreases private investment, total capital stock, output, and net exports in the long run, and makes the future generations worse off. Among various means of debt control, a decrease in government spending seems to be the least harmful to private investment, capital stock, and output while an increase in capital taxation is most detrimental.     

Equity and efficiency aspects of the Italian debt reduction

The paper deals with the distributional and efficiency consequences of debt reduction in Italy. A reduction of the deficit from six to three percent of GDP is financed by the so-called Eurotax (introduced temporarily or permanently) combined with an adjustment of consumption taxes or public transfers. The quantitative analysis is based on a dynamic simulation model of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff type, which distinguishes between five lifetime income classes within each age cohort. Our simulation results indicate that debt reduction increases the welfare of future generations between 1 and 2% of lifetime resources and that consumption taxes are preferable to the Eurotax on allocative grounds.     

Public debt dynamics with tax revenue constraints

We develop a dynamic model of public debt under the assumption that it is problematic for governments to implement fast increases of tax revenues, as new taxes require costly infrastructure and expertise that can be built only over time. In this environment, the standard condition requiring economic growth greater than interest costs is not sufficient to guarantee financial stability. Debt might become unstable if the gap between these two indicators falls below a given threshold. Our empirical analysis based on historical public finance data for the US provides strong support for the model. This study conveys a cautionary warning, because the debt of relatively safe borrowers may suddenly become unstable for instance because of a substantial deceleration in the growth of nominal income. These issues can be particularly relevant for those countries that do not have a modern and efficient tax collection system.     

Public investment,national debt,and economic growth: The role of debt finance under dynamic inefficiency

Public investment is a central issue in the dynamic analyses of fiscal policy and economic growth. Debt financing for public investment and its effects have recently received great attention because interest rates have been low, almost invariably remaining below economic growth rates. This paper presents examination of the effects of debt-financed public investment subject to a simple fiscal rule in an overlapping generations model with public capital. This topic includes capital budgeting and the debt–deficit criterion of the Maastricht treaty. We show herein that debt financing for public investment enhances economic growth if an economy is dynamically inefficient and if public capital has a sufficiently large productivity effect. Moreover, it reduces economic growth rates in a dynamically efficient economy. Debt and growth can have a monotonic or non-monotonic relation, depending on the steady-state interest rate, growth rate, and productivity effect of public investment. The findings indicate that debt–growth relations match with controversial empirical evidence. Furthermore, existing generations choose perfect debt finance if dynamic inefficiency exists. In contrast, a balanced budget is preferred in a dynamically efficient economy with low productivity effects of public capital. However, an economy with high productivity effects of public capital might cho ose debt financing. This paper contributes to the elucidation of currently emphasized issues of public investment.     

Debt financing of public investment: On a popular misinterpretation of “the golden rule of public sector borrowing”

In this paper I challenge the proposition that the golden rule of public sector borrowing is consistent with the principle of intertemporal allocative efficiency, in the sense that growth-enhancing public investment justifies a structural public deficit. I demonstrate that in the long run the social opportunity cost of debt-financed public investment exceeds the social opportunity cost of tax financed public investments. This result holds if the social rate of time preference is lower than the interest rate on government borrowing. Thus a benevolent government would use taxes to finance public investment. In the short run, debt financing is justified if public investment has a considerable growth effect on private consumption. This requires a corresponding initial undersupply of public capital.     

Debt,seigniorage, and the Growth Laffer Curve in developing countries

The endogenous growth literature established the existence of an inverted-U curve between taxes and economic growth, namely a Growth Laffer Curve, but empirical evidence on this relationship in developing countries is rather limited. Given that seigniorage and public debt are also important means of financing public spending in these countries, we take into account in this paper their respective impacts on growth, as they might deform the existing relationship between taxes and growth. To this end, we develop a growth model with public investment as the engine of perpetual growth, and look for the effect of debt, tax and money financing on economic growth. We study in particular the way fiscal and monetary policies deform the Growth Laffer Curve in developing countries. An empirical section based on a panel of 100 developing countries over the period 1980–2010 provides both OLS-Fixed Effects and GMM-system estimations that support our theoretical conclusions, namely the existence of Growth Laffer Curves indexed by the levels of debt and of seigniorage.     

ON THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DEBT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: DOES COUNTRY RISK MATTER?

This study examines the nonlinear impacts of four country risk indices on the debt‐growth nexus for 61 countries in a panel data framework. Our results show evidence of the different debt‐growth nexus under the different degrees of country risk. Under a high‐risk environment, a country's economic growth is harmed by raising its public debt. The negative effects public debt has on economic growth become weak under low political and financial‐risk environments, while an increase in public debt could help to stimulate economic growth under low composite and economic risk environments. In addition, the differences of countries' income and debt levels also lead country risks to have different effects on the debt‐growth nexus, suggesting that a country should borrow appropriately based on its current risk environments while improving economic performance. (JEL C33, E02, H63, O43)     

Fiscal Rules,Interest Payments on Debt,and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle

We show that in New Keynesian models with non‐neutral government debt, the Taylor principle ceases to be relevant for equilibrium determinacy if the government follows a fiscal rule of levying taxes in proportion to its interest payments on existing debt. This is in contrast with previous studies, which typically have assumed that taxes respond to the level of debt, and have found either a confirmation or reversal of the Taylor principle depending on the feedback from debt to taxes. We find, instead, that the equilibrium effect of the interest rate on debt is crucial for determinacy. If, as in our model, taxes are raised in response to debt interest payments, the range of indeterminacy monotonically decreases with the fiscal feedback parameter. When interest payments are completely tax‐financed, indeterminacy is ruled out without any restrictions on monetary policy.     

Public Preferences for Government Spending Priorities: Survey Evidence from Germany

Employing data from a representative survey conducted in Germany, this paper examines public preferences for the size and composition of government expenditure. We focus on public attitudes towards taxes, public debt incurrence and public spending in six different policy areas. Our findings suggest, first, that individual preferences for the use of additional tax money can be categorised as either capital‐oriented expenditure or public debt reduction. Second, we find that fiscal preferences differ along various dimensions. Specifically, personal economic well‐being, economic literacy, confidence in politicians, political ideology and time preference are significantly related to individual attitudes towards public spending, taxes and debt. The magnitude of the effects is particularly large for time preference, economic knowledge and party preference. Third, public preferences for public spending priorities are only marginally affected when considering a public budget constraint.     

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.     

Public debt and financial development

We examine the role of public debt in financial development. The literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark. We contrast this “safe asset” view to a “lazy banks” view: developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly, because it could make banks profitable but inefficient. Results from country-level and bank-level regressions are more supportive of the “lazy banks” view, but the “safe asset” view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks. There is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression.     

ENDOGENOUS DEBT‐EQUITY RATIO AND BALANCE‐SHEET CHANNEL: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper endogenizes the debt‐equity ratio and embodies financial leverage in a cash‐in‐advance model of endogenous growth. Our analysis finds that the debt‐equity ratio is positively related to the balanced‐growth rate, since it serves as a ‘financial accelerator’ to stimulate investment projects. Compared to previous studies, this positive relationship gives rise to an additional balance‐sheet effect, which substantially affects the macroeconomic consequences of monetary and taxation policies. Due to the existence of the balance‐sheet effect, we also find that the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal.     

Public debt and economic growth: what do neoclassical growth models teach us?

This paper aims to quantify the crowding-out effect of public debt and the related loss in long-run output in neoclassical growth models. To accomplish this task, we incorporate the government sector into the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans (RCK) model, the Blanchard model and the Solow model, which differ only in their assumptions concerning the consumption behaviour of households. We also introduce a general framework that is capable of gauging the burden of public debt in a neoclassical world in the case of any type of consumption behaviour. Our results are threefold. First, contrary to the RCK model, public debt reduces long-run output in the Blanchard model and the Solow model, although to a different extent: the crowding-out effect is marginal in the former, whereas it can be very large in the latter. Second, the burden of public debt is country-specific depending crucially on the saving rate and the population growth rate. Finally, in developed countries the upper limit of the output loss related to public debt is moderate at best even if distortionary taxes are taken into account.     

Environmental quality,the macroeconomy,and intergenerational distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard–Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes – taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply – is shown to yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed – prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state – to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. Furthermore, it raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.     

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies

We study market inefficiencies and policy remedies when agents choose their occupations, and entrepreneurial talent is subject to private information. Untalented entrepreneurs depress the returns to entrepreneurship because of adverse selection. The severity of this problem depends on the outside option of entrepreneurs, which is working for wages. This links credit, product and labor markets. A rise in wages reduces the adverse selection problem. These multimarket interactions amplify productivity shocks and may generate multiple equilibria. If it is impossible to screen entrepreneurs then all agents unanimously support a tax on entrepreneurs that drives out the less talented ones. However, if screening is possible, e.g., if wealthy entrepreneurs can provide collateral for their loans, then wealthy entrepreneurs do not support surplus enhancing taxes.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Public Debt and Generational Balance in Austria

Based on Austria's fiscal stance in 1995, wecompute the generational accounts for currently living as well as future generations.The results reveal the existence of an intergenerational imbalance in favor of currentlyliving generations. Total public sector liabilities may be more than five times as high asthe officially recorded level of public debt. Without any action, future generations would facelife-time net taxes that are about 65 percent higher than the tax burden of a current newborn.If the government could fully and permanently retain the expenditure cutting andrevenue raising effects of the 1996 fiscal consolidation package and the 1997 pension reform,then it might be able to significantly reduce the intergenerational liabilities. However,enacting both the recent tax reform 2000 and the reform of the family support scheme wouldincrease again the fiscal imbalance and intergenerational bias of fiscal policy in Austria.     

Debt, interest rates, and integration of financial markets

It is commonly believed that higher budget deficits raise interest rates. However, these crowding out effects of increasing public debt have usually been found to be small or non-existent. One explanation is that on globalised bond markets interest rate differentials are offset due to financial integration. This paper tests crowding out, and measures the degree of integration of government bond markets, using spatial modelling techniques. Our main finding is that the crowding out effect of public debt on domestic long term interest rates is small: a 1% increase in the debt ratio pushes up domestic rates by 2 pp at most. Financial integration implies an important spillover effect via international bond markets, but only between OECD, and in particular EU, countries. The feedback effect from these markets on long term interest rates is as important as the domestic crowding out effect of higher public debt. Emerging markets are not as well integrated into international capital markets, causing a stronger crowding out effect.