价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

网络营销中的歧视定价策略研究

工业经济时代的一个显著特点是市场中供应方相对于需求方而言处于强势地位。由于信息不对称以及受市场空间和时间的隔离，消费者在很大程度上处于一种被动地位。互联网的出现以及由此带来的信息经济使这一切得到了很大的改观。     

价格歧视对市场定价的重要性分析

在市场经济中,市场势力是普遍存在的,许多行业只有少数几个生产商,从而各生产商产生一些垄断势力。并且,许多厂商作为原材料、劳动或者特定的资本货物的买方,在这些要素投入品的市场上具有一定的买方垄断势力。如何更有效的利用他们的市场势力,取决于如何定价、选择要素投入量以及决定产量,以使得企业利润最大化。因此,价格歧视在市场定价中的作用显得十分重要。本文首先介绍了价格歧视的经济学含义,之后描述了价格歧视在市场中的具体运作方式,希望能使读者对其有一个深入的了解。     

价格歧视下的不可再生资源的开采问题研究

自Hotelling开始,不可再生资源开采问题引起了经济学家们的注意,在此过程中,产业组织理论被应用于不可再生资源的研究.文章分析了价格歧视对不可再生资源开采的影响,结果发现,当资源的垄断开采者面向多个市场时,价格歧视因素可能使资源开采偏离最优路径.     

价格歧视在旅游产品定价中的应用

文章在阐述消费者剩余理论和价格歧视理论的基础上 ,结合旅游产品的特点 ,把价格歧视理论应用到旅游产品的定价分析中 ,提出了旅游产品定价的四种模式。强调只要应用恰当的旅游产品定价模式 ,最终达到供求双赢的局面是可能的     

价格歧视及其应用研究

文章通过对价格歧视定义以及价格歧视种类的分析,并运用套利理论验证价格歧视,研究总结了经济中应用较为普遍的价格歧视形式,讨论了价格歧视在多级折扣票价和选择资费中的具体应用。     

欧盟反垄断法认定价格歧视竞争损害的借鉴

反垄断法对价格歧视行为规制的核心要件是竞争损害。竞争损害因竞争主体所处的位置不同而区分为一线竞争与二线竞争。欧盟反垄断法理论及欧盟委员会指南虽肯定价格歧视的竞争损害适用经济效率标准,但欧盟法院未能践行以经济效率为基础的合理规则的适用,仍适用形式的准本身违法规则,体现了经济学的经济效率与法学对话的分离。我国司法实践应扬弃欧盟反垄断法形式主义保护竞争者的弊端,借鉴欧盟反垄断法指南及学者关于竞争损害认定所依据的经济效率理论,从而在价格歧视的反垄断法适用上恢复经济学与法学的对话。     

我国奢侈品贸易价格歧视现象分析

通过伯川德双寡头垄断价格竞争模型,分析了国外奢侈品厂商在我国市场订立高价、实施三级价格歧视的经济条件。模型显示,基于当前假设,国外厂商在我国实现三级价格歧视的经济条件并不完备;不过,在我国奢侈品消费者旺盛的需求下,国外厂商的商品在国际市场的销售会改善。但从长期看,目前国外厂商通过订立高价、提高产品炫耀性效用的情况难以持续。     

价格歧视下四种市场类型的消费者剩余

市场按垄断程度由高到低可以分为四种类型：完全垄断市场、寡头垄断市场、垄断竞争市场和完全竞争市场。在发生二度价格歧视的情形下,这四种市场的价格歧视程度的定量结果是一个值得研究的问题。在二度价格歧视下,用微分法研究了一个垄断厂商市场情形,用博弈论方法研究了n厂商市场情形的均衡总产量,均衡价格,均衡总收益,总收益增长率,消费者剩余,厂商占有的消费者剩余率。最后把各种市场情形的上述指标归纳为统一的公式并详细分析了其性质。     

价格歧视理论与网络经济定价策略

通过对价格歧视理论进行分析,指出消费者需求弹性、消费者效用差别是影响歧视定价的重要因素,而影响消费者需求弹性和消费者效用差别的各种因素是在网络经济条件下制定价格策略时需要考虑的主要因素。由此,网络经济条件下通过市场调查分析消费者的消费行为成为制定网络经济价格策略的重要措施,政府应当对价格进行适当管理和规范。     

Random Price Discrimination

When a monopolist randomly sorts customers, price discrimination “concavifies” the revenue function of the firm, so that it may be optimal for a monopolist to divide customers into groups that have the same demand function and charge them different prices. It is impossible to rule out this type of result whenever the revenue function is somewhere convex in the “economically relevant” set of quantities, because there always exists a non-decreasing cost function that leads to that conclusion. It is also impossible to rule out the case where, with respect to monopoly, the firm raises or lowers price to all classes and, accordingly, the case where the social welfare decreases or increases. Received December 13, 2001; revised version received June 3, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 I am indebted to Carlo Beretta, Giuseppe Colangelo, Umberto Galmarini, Guido Merzoni, Gerd Weinrich and especially to Carla Peri for helpful discussions and comments. I have also benefited from insightful suggestions of three anonymous referees. Finally, I wish to thank participants to seminars at the Catholic University of Milan and University of Bologna. The usual disclaimer applies. Funds from MIUR are gratefully acknowledged.     

Teaching Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Abstract: Third-degree price discrimination is taught in almost every intermediate microeconomics class. The theory, geometry, and the algebra behind the concept are simple, and the phenomenon is commonly associated with the sale of many of the goods and services used frequently by students. Classroom discussion is usually vibrant as students can relate their experiences of being on the receiving end of third-degree price discrimination, usually to their advantage. However, the precision of the language used in the exposition of the theory in textbooks is generally less precise than one would hope for, leading students to confuse slope and elasticity. The authors ask textbook writers to provide greater precision in their explanation of why differing elasticities are associated with the prices paid by two (or more) distinct groups of buyers facing third-degree price discrimination.     

网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价

近年来,基于行为的区别定价成为区别定价领域研究的热点,但是这方面的文献却鲜有涉及到市场中存在着网络外部性的情形。在理性预期的假设下,本文通过一个两阶段双寡头博弈模型分析了网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价对子博弈精炼纳什均衡的影响。在成熟市场上,网络外部性会对具有不同初始市场份额的厂商产生不同影响;在新兴市场上,无论厂商采取何种定价策略,网络外部性都会加剧市场上的竞争,导致厂商利润下降。与统一定价下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡相比,基于行为的区别定价会加剧竞争从而导致厂商利润的下降,但是会造成较多社会福利的无谓损失。     

价格歧视理论中的若干问题

价格歧视理论在传播和应用中存在着含糊不清甚至是谬误的问题,文中重新界定了价格歧视的概念,规范了实施价格歧视的前提条件,对价格歧视中的社会利问题进行了分析,同时指出了价格歧视理论中的两个常见错误。     

Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

Ethnic Networks and Price Dispersion

We offer and test a model linking ethnic networks to global price dispersion which predicts lower price dispersion as shared ethnic populations between countries rise, effects that may reverse at higher levels as network discipline breaks down. Using Chinese, Indian and Japanese data, we find that country pairs linked by the Chinese network have significantly lower mean price dispersion. A one standard deviation increase in the size of the Chinese coethnic network lowers price dispersion by 6–33%, an effect that reverses as the network gets large. No such evidence exists for the Indian or Japanese networks.     

Two Models of Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Received December 22, 2000; revised version received August 31, 2001     

Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm

Determining the optimal selling strategy for a multiproduct firm facing consumers with unobservable tastes is a difficult task. This paper aims to show how almost optimal nonlinear tariffs can often be found when the number of products is large. Moreover, such tariffs take a simple form: (i) when taste parameters are independently distributed across products, the almost optimal tariff is a single cost-based two-part tariff which can extract virtually all consumer surplus; (ii) when tastes are correlated across products, perhaps because of income differences across consumers, the almost optimal tariff can be implemented as a menu of two-part tariffs each of which has prices proportional to marginal costs.     

Price Discrimination in Public Healthcare

Could a public healthcare system use price discrimination—paying medical service providers different fees, depending on the service provider's quality—lead to improvements in social welfare? We show that differentiating medical fees by quality increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing (i.e. quality‐invariant fee schedules) whenever hospitals and doctors have private information about their own ability. We also show that by moving from uniform to differentiated medical fees, the public healthcare system can effectively incentivise good doctors and hospitals (i.e. low‐cost‐types) to provide even higher levels of quality than they would under complete information. In the socially optimal quality‐differentiated medical fee system, low‐cost‐type medical‐service providers enjoy a rent due to their informational advantage. Informational rent is socially beneficial because it gives service providers a strong incentive to invest in the extra training required to deliver high‐quality services at low cost, providing yet another efficiency gain from quality‐differentiated medical fees.