The true effect of students’ employment on the duration of studies

We examine the effect of the first-degree students’ employment on the prolongation of their studies. When employing a popular instrumental variable, the regional unemployment rate, we find a negative impact of students’ employment on duration of studies. Then, adding a predetermined IV – the individual’s employment prior to the beginning of academic studies – turns the estimate positive. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between the extent of students’ employment and duration of their studies depends on their age: among the younger students (aged 22–26), the extent of employment has no effect on the duration of studies, while among the older students, the effect is positive and statistically significant.     

INSIDER-OUTSIDER EFFECTS IN WAGE FORMATION: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY*

The paper provides a review of empirical work on insider-outsider and duration effects in wage formation. It presents a theoretical model to investigate the relationship between previous employment and the wage rate. The impact of unemployment and long-term unemployment is considered. Empirical results show that the effect of previous employment on the wage rate is generally insignificant. Both short-term and long-term unemployment appear to have a significant negative impact. Micro-studies reveal that both firm-specific and aggregate variables play a role in wage determination.     

Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?

In this paper, we examine the disincentive effects of the public employment service on the search effort of unemployed workers and on their exit rate from unemployment. For that purpose, we specify a structural search model with fixed and variable costs of search in which unemployed workers select their optimal search intensity given the exogenous arrival rate of job contacts coming from the public employment agency. Because the theoretical effect of an increase in this exogenous job contact arrival rate on the structural exit rate from unemployment is ambiguous, we estimate this model using individual unemployment duration data. Our results show that the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service, especially for low-educated and low-skilled workers. They also show that the search effort is more costly for low-educated women and low-skilled adult unemployed workers. This last result suggests that a public employment agency that matches searchers and employers is beneficial, in the sense that it saves searchers in terms of search costs they would otherwise bear.     

Weight discrimination in the German labour market

We explore the effects of higher body mass index (BMI) or obesity on different labour market outcomes. We extend the present literature by investigating the effect of obesity on (i) promotion likelihood and (ii) unemployment duration, in addition to the effect on (iii) wages and (iv) probability of being employed. We find an obesity penalty on wages, employment likelihood, promotion likelihood and unemployment duration among females in Germany taking into account of endogeneity of BMI and sample selection. We are also able to identify an unexplained effect of obesity on wages, employment and promotion likelihood for females using decomposition techniques that can be attributed to weight discrimination.     

Does accessibility to local public employment agencies matter? Answers from a French quasi-experiment

We question whether accessibility to local public employment agencies impacts exits from unemployment. We deal with the potential endogeneity of the residential location of jobseekers by using the unanticipated creation of a new agency in the French region of Lyon as a quasi-natural experiment. We use exhaustive and geo-located individual data on jobseekers and local public employment agencies. Contrary to past evidence based on aggregated data, we find no evidence that jobseekers with improved accessibility to the local public employment services experience an improvement of their probability of exiting unemployment. We however find evidence of transitory organizational effects. These findings strongly question the costly strategy of a fine distribution of local public employment agencies across the territory while suggesting that institutional issues are key.     

Unemployment burden and its distribution: Theory and evidence from India

We develop a measure of unemployment that takes into account both the duration and intensity of unemployment. This measure satisfies several desirable properties, including distribution sensitivity, which deals with differences among the unemployed. It is particularly suited to developing countries because individuals in these countries display considerable variation in labor force participation, unemployment duration, and unemployment intensity. It can also be decomposed into mean and variance components and contributions to unemployment by various subgroups of the population. We use this measure and data from National Sample Surveys on employment and unemployment to understand unemployment in India during the period 1993 to 2012. We show that unemployment has generally fallen, although the distribution of unemployment has worsened. Moreover, unemployment is driven to a greater extent by higher educated groups; the unemployment among these groups is also fairly substantial. We explain these findings and suggest some policies.     

Unemployment Durations in West Germany Before and After the Reform of the Unemployment Compensation System during the 1980s

Abstract. This paper analyzes empirically the distribution of unemployment durations in West Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. It therefore covers periods before and after the changes during the mid‐1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for older unemployed. The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample containing administrative data for about 500,000 individuals. Since these data only partly reveal the unemployment duration in an economic sense, we use a narrow and a wide proxy for unemployment. Our empirical analysis finds significant changes in the distribution of non‐employment durations for older unemployed. At the same time, the distribution of unemployment durations between jobs remained unchanged after the reforms. Our findings clearly show that many firms and workers used the more beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages. Surprisingly, for those workers who found and accepted a new job, we do not observe a prolongation of their search periods to a sizeable extent.     

SIX WAYS TO LEAVE UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper uses a unique Portuguese dataset to examine the effect of access to unemployment benefits (UBs) and their maximum potential duration on escape rates from unemployment. In examining the time profile of transitions out of unemployment, the principal contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it provides a detailed state space of potential outcomes: open-ended employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, government-provided jobs, self employment, and labour force withdrawal. Second, it is able to exploit major exogenous discontinuities in the maximum duration of unemployment benefits to identify disincentive effects. While confirming strong disincentive effects, it is shown that use of an aggregate hazard function regression model compounds very different and even contradictory effects of the determinants of unemployment.     

Stepping-stones, dead-ends, or both? An analysis of Swedish replacement contracts

The paper studies whether temporary jobs in the form of fixed-term replacement contracts reduce the risk of future unemployment among job-seekers. Using matching on detailed information on labour market history and personal characteristics we find positive average effects of having a replacement contract. Our second focus is on whether the duration of the contract matters. We use data on replacement contracts with information on the ex ante duration of the contract which is determined by the individual on leave and find no significant effect on the subsequent unemployment risk of the replacement worker. However, the longer the replacement contract the higher is the probability of having an open ended contract at the same site 2–2.5 years after the start of the contract. Overall, the results suggest that replacement contracts may reduce the risk of future unemployment, but that longer contracts only improve the position within the workplace and not necessarily on the labour market in general.     

Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving search incentives while reducing the risks arising from unemployment. This paper identifies the conditions under which integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated with each other.     

Interactions between internal migration,employment growth,and regional income differences in Spain

In this paper migration movements are analyzed in a general framework to other economic variables. A theoretical model is presented which includes the interactions between internal migration flows, employment and unemployment generation, and regional income distribution. The model is then estimated by simultaneous equations techniques using data on recent Spanish history.     

Subjective well‐being and aggregate unemployment: further evidence

According to the literature, individual well‐being is negatively related to aggregate unemployment. This study examines whether the distribution of aggregate unemployment by duration affects well‐being, in addition to the level of unemployment. Different explanations are provided to indicate how the shares of short‐term (up to 3 months) and long‐term (more than 1 year) unemployed people could affect the well‐being of the employed and unemployed. Using data from almost 300,000 individuals from 11 EU countries, we find significant effects of both shares on life satisfaction. Among the unemployed, for example, we find a U‐shaped effect of the distribution of aggregate unemployment by duration on subjective well‐being, which compensates to some extent for the negative effect of the unemployment rate.     

Macroeconomic shocks and the probability of being employed

Macroeconomic theories take polar views on the importance of choice versus chance. At the micro level, it seems realistic to assume that both dimensions play a role for individual employment outcomes, although it might be difficult to separate these two effects. Nevertheless the choice and chance dimension are seldom treated symmetrically in models that use micro data. We estimate a logistic model of the probability of being employed among married or cohabitating women that are in the labor force. Besides variables that measure individual characteristics (choice), we allow a full set of indicator variables for observation periods that represent potential effects of aggregate shocks (chance) on job probabilities. To reduce the number of redundant indicator variables automatic model selection is used, and we assess the economic interpretation of the statistically significant indicator variables with reference to a theoretical framework that allows for friction in the Norwegian labor market. In addition, we also estimate models that use female and male unemployment rates as ‘sufficient’ variables for the chance element in individual employment outcomes. Data are for Norway for the period 1988q2–2008q4.     

Unemployment duration and economic incentives—a quasi random-assignment approach

We investigate how economic incentives and spell duration affect hazard rates out of insured unemployment. We take into account that insured unemployment not always ends in employment, but also in disability, training programs, or benefit sanctions. Our empirical basis is Norwegian register data containing variation in economic incentives and spell duration similar to that of random-assignment experiments. We find that the employment and benefit-sanction hazards are negatively affected by the unemployment insurance replacement ratio, but that the effects vary considerably among individuals. There is negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the disability hazard.     

Accelerating the transition to employment at benefit exhaustion: still possible after four years of unemployment?

This paper provides evidence of how the long-term unemployed react to the threat of running out of unemployment insurance (UI) after receiving it for nearly 4 years. To identify the effect of UI exhaustion, we make use of a 1999 Danish legislative change that progressively reduced potential benefit duration from 5 to 4 years. We find that shortening UI duration hastens the transition to employment throughout the unemployment spell up to benefit exhaustion even if it occurs as long as 4 years later. However, although the proportional effect is large, it is small in absolute value.     

The anatomy of unemployment dynamics

This paper examines the relation between individual unemployment durations and incidence (inflow size) on the one hand and the time-varying macroeconomic conditions in the economy on the other. We develop a model for the analysis of aggregate unemployment incidence and duration data and estimate this model on quarterly French data over the period 1982-1994 stratified by sex. We find upward trends in both incidence and durations. The former is relatively important for females, the latter for males. Male incidence and durations are countercyclical, with only a minor role for cohort effects on durations. In contrast, female cohorts entering at the top of the cycle have relatively short unemployment spells and the female incidence is, if anything, procyclical. There is strong seasonal variation, in particular in the incidence. Finally, we find relatively small non-monotonic individual duration dependence in the first six quarters of unemployment. Unobserved heterogeneity explains the observed negative duration dependence at these durations. We provide some evidence that negative individual duration dependence, and not heterogeneity, is important at higher durations.     

On the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles

We investigate the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles in a model with substantial consumer heterogeneity. The heterogeneity arises from uninsurable and idiosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment, where, regarding employment, we distinguish among employment and short- and long-term unemployment. We calibrate the model to match the distribution of wealth in U.S. data and features of transitions between employment and unemployment. Unlike previous studies, we study how business cycles affect different groups of consumers. We conclude that the cost of cycles is small for almost all groups and, indeed, is negative for some.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C68, D31, D61, E32.     

马克思就业理论与西方就业理论比较研究

对中国失业的研究已是无法回避的一个问题,而寻求理论支持则是进行研究的一个重要方向。检索就业理论的资料,可以发现最有代表性的就业理论是马克思就业理论和西方就业理论。因此,对这两种就业理论加以比较,理解它们形成的不同背景和分析路径,对比它们不同的内容体系,可以发现它们其实发掘的只是失业的一个方面,遵循的是失业发生、发展的一条路径。因此,在比较中更全面地理解失业,并且可以为研究我国的失业提供某些启示。     

Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History

In existing unemployment insurance programmes, it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers. The purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties. In order to do so, we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. We show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs, it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, in particular, the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells.     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.