Consumption externalities with endogenous time preference

This paper shows that in a model with inelastic labor supply, consumption externalities have impacts on stationary consumption and capital. The key element in observing the effects of consumption externalities on stationary consumption and capital is the endogeneity of the time preference rate, which depends on future-oriented resources rather than on private consumption. We conclude that when individuals experience jealousy, they become more impatient, leading to a lower level of capital stock and a higher level of consumption relative to those of the social optimum, while when they experience admiration, these relationships are reversed. We examine an optimal tax policy that replicates the socially optimal path in the centrally planned economy. Finally, using numerical analysis we explore how this economy evolves through time.      

Consumption externalities: a representative consumer model when agents are heterogeneous

We examine a growth model with consumption externalities where agents differ in their initial capital endowment and their reference group. We show under which conditions the aggregate equilibrium with heterogeneous agents replicates that obtained with a representative consumer, despite the fact that different individuals have different consumption levels. Next we consider the implications of the presence of consumption externalities for the long-run distributions of income and wealth. We find that, in a growing economy, “keeping up with the Joneses” results in less inequality than would prevail in an economy with no consumption externalities.     

Land rights,rental markets and the post-socialist cityscape

Inefficiently organized, factory-dominated cityscapes have been one of the more enduring legacies of the twentieth century experiment with socialist central planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Drawing on a unique survey of large, formerly state-owned urban industrial firms in Russia, we explore how land tenure reforms affect the pace at which this legacy is being erased. For various historical, political, and economic reasons, there is substantial variation across firms as to their ownership of the land on which they sit. Despite facing no additional formal constraints, those that do not own their plots rent them out at a lower frequency than those that have acquired private tenure to their land. The privatization of plots, in other words, promotes the development of a rental market that transfers land use rights away from socialist-era industrial users. We address the potential endogeneity of land tenure using a measure of regional variation in urban land policy and Communist party vote shares as instrumental variables.     

Consumption externality, efficiency and optimal taxation in one-sector growth model

In an economy with consumption externalities, existing studies find that a competitive equilibrium is efficient in the long run and remains efficient in transitions if preferences are homothetic. This paper revisits the efficiency issue in an otherwise standard one-sector growth model where consumption externalities affect a utility via their effects on the time preference. We find that even if preferences are homothetic, the externality changes the marginal rate of substitution between now and future and leads to a disparity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between the centrally planned economy and a decentralized economy. As a result, a competitive equilibrium is inefficient in transition dynamics. We characterize an optimal tax/subsidy structure that enables the allocation in a decentralized economy to replicate the social optimum.     

Convergence speed and preference externalities in a one-sector model with elastic labor supply

In a one-sector model with elastic labor supply where consumption and leisure externalities are incorporated, we examine the impact of preference externalities on convergence speed.     

Ecosystems,externalities, and economies

This paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy. The decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level. A species may provide utility directly to humans, or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species. We describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species' demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species, and energy is conserved. The ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy. Human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans. This framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans, which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems, and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained.     

Consumption externalities and the effects of international income transfers on the global environment

In this paper, we extend the standard model of private provision of public goods by including consumption externalities to characterize a situation in which economic activities pollute the environment. We consider a case in which there are an industrial country which can afford to invest in the environment and a developing country which cannot. Then, we show that international income transfers in both directions can improve the global environmental quality as well as the welfare of each country. We also show that the results have important implications for policies such as official development assistance or the assignment of tradable emission permits.     

Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

Complete and incomplete markets with short-sale constraints

Summary. This paper argues that the introduction of a short-sale constraint in the Arrow-Radner framework invalidates standard definitions of complete and incomplete markets. Two threshold values with familiar properties arise in this constrained set-up. If short sales are not allowed on some security, then financial markets will be incomplete in the standard sense. Beyond a particular level of the short-sale bound, financial markets are “complete”, since the short-sale constraint is not effective. For intermediate bounds the distinction between complete and incomplete financial markets is blurred. Although some technical definitions hold, agents can not fully transfer wealth among states. These intermediate cases, called “technically incomplete markets”, exhibit interesting welfare properties. For instance, the resulting equilibrium allocations may not be Pareto-dominated by those of the non-restricted complete markets equilibrium. Received: November 28, 2000; / revised version: November 9, 2001     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

Two-sided Markets,Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that “competitive bottlenecks” arise endogenously. In equilibrium, platforms do not compete directly for sellers, instead choosing to compete indirectly by subsidizing buyers to join. Sellers are left with none of the gains from trade. Despite this, it is sellers who choose to purchase from multiple platforms (multihome). Finally, the role of exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming is explored. We are very grateful to Jose Miguel Abito for research assistance, and to the editor and a referee for helpful comments.     

Credit quality, the intensity of regulation and the segmentation of debt markets

Some debt markets have a “competitive advantage” over others due to easier regulatory requirements. Our model explains changes in the market shares of different debt markets. In particular, borrowers may choose between highly regulated and relatively unregulated placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the highly regulated market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk class. In unregulated markets there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market is segmented between less regulated and other, more strictly regulated, placements. Raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of unregulated debt. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.     

Information, trade and incomplete markets

The no-trade result of Milgrom and Stokey, J Econ Theory 26:17–27 (1982), states that if rational traders begin with an ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation then the arrival of information cannot generate trade. This paper allows traders to trade before and after the arrival of information. If there are enough securities to hedge against all payoff relevant risk, then the preinformation-arrival allocation is Pareto optimal and information arrival has no effect. This no-retrade result is the competitive analog of the no-trade result of (1982). However, information generically generates trade when markets are state-contingent incomplete.We thank seminar participants at Cambridge, Carnegie Mellon,Cornell, Essex, London, Maastricht, USC, and York and participants at the 2003 SITE, the 2003 SAET and the Fall 2002 Cornell–Penn State Macro Conference. We also thank Karl Shell and a referee for this journal for useful comments     

Arbitrage and equilibrium in strategic security markets

Summary. In view of the fundamental price taking hypothesis, arbitrage is never compatible with equilibrium in Walrasian markets because the existence of an arbitrage opportunity in a competitive situation always leads to unbounded arbitrage activity. In strategic markets however, the mere effort of individuals to profit alters market clearing prices and thus distorts arbitrage opportunities as well. This observation suggests a different relationship between arbitrage and equilibrium, than in the competitive model. Indeed, we show that in such markets a spread between the cost of a portfolio and its returns is compatible with equilibrium. We provide an example of an equilibrium where a resourceless individual holds a portfolio with zero cost and positive return in every state. We further demonstrate via an asymptotic result, that no arbitrage is intimately related to price taking behaviour.Received: 8 September 2001, Revised: 6 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G12, D4, D5, D52. Correspondence to: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras     

New financial markets: who gains and who loses

Summary. We evaluate the effects of new financial markets in a two-period incomplete markets model with heterogenous agents. For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case where utility is exponential and risks are normally distributed. We provide a complete characterization of life-cycle consumption and portfolio choice. The effect of new financial markets on individual welfare equals the sum of what we call the portfolio effect and the price effect. The portfolio effect is proportional to the square of the difference between the average exposure to the new asset in the economy and an individual investors exposure adjusted for risk aversion. The portfolio effect is always positive and measures the improved ability of investors to transfer consumption across states. The price effect captures the effect on individual welfare of changes in asset prices. We show that new financial markets drive down the prices of all assets which raises the interest rate and thus affects the ability of investors to transfer consumption across time. The price effect is positive for net savers but can be negative for net borrowers. For net borrower households, the price effect can wipe out the portfolio effect and lead to welfare reductions.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 22 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D52, G11, G12.Paul Willen: Thanks to Viral Acharaya, Alberto Bisin, Steve Davis, John Geanakoplos and a thoughtful anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to seminar audiences at Stanford, Berkeley and at the 2001 Stony Brook workshop on incomplete markets for comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.     

The Consumption/Wealth and Book/Market Ratios in a Dynamic Asset Pricing Contex

This paper addresses new insights into the predictability of financial returns. In particular, we analyze two aspects of the controversial forecasting literature. On the one hand, we demonstrate a positive and contemporaneous link between aggregate book/market and consumption/wealth ratios. On the other hand, we show that real estate and human capital, as the present value of all future salaries, are key components of the consumption/wealth ratio in Spain. Specifically, we find that the cointegrating residuals of consumption, asset holdings, real estate holdings, and our measure of human capital provide a better forecast of future returns than does the standard proxy of the consumption/wealth ratio. This result is important because it clarifies the importance of country-specific components of wealth for cases in which the consumption/wealth ratio is employed as an instrument in conditional asset pricing models.Belén Nieto: Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología grant SEJ2005-09372 is gratefully acknowledged.Rosa Rodríguez: Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología grant SEC2003-06457 is gratefully acknowledged.     

消费文化、认知偏差与消费行为偏差

本文放松了理性经济人假设,在行为经济学双曲线贴现模型框架下,以"自我控制"认知偏差及相应的模型参数设定对东西方消费文化差异进行了技术表达,进而阐明了消费过度(欧美国家)和消费不足(东亚国家)这两类消费行为偏差的形成机制。本文采用全球48个国家和地区1978—2007年的面板数据,以儒家虚拟变量和性生活指数作为消费文化的替代变量检验了文化与消费的关系。结果表明,在解释东西方消费率差异时,预防性储蓄等传统理论的解释力远低于不可观测的国家个体效应。儒家虚拟变量和性生活指数能分别解释国家个体效应的28%和58%。这表明消费文化等不随时间改变的个体因素比传统变量更能解释各国居民的消费差异。实践层面上,双曲线贴现模型中锁定技术能有效纠正"自我控制"认知偏差,从而消解儒家文化对消费的深度抑制,可为扩大内需政策创新提供思路启发和技术支撑。     

Convergence,technological interdependence and spatial externalities: a spatial dynamic panel data analysis

This study adopts a spatial dynamic panel data approach and spatial quasi-maximum likelihood to re-estimate the speed of growth convergence in 91 countries based on technological interdependence and spatial externalities. We perform a conditional Lagrange multiplier test for spatial error dependence and find some differences to previous studies. First, the switch from a cross-sectional to a dynamic panel data framework enables the estimated rate of conditional convergence to be higher, more accurate and more appropriate for realistic and theoretical expectations. Second, the spatial Durbin model (SDM) is a general form of simplified model that considers spatial error correlation, and its likelihood ratio test for the theoretical model of ‘learning by doing’ effect provides further evidence. Finally, statistical tests find that spatial correlation not only occurs in each variable, but also appears in the error term. Thus, the SDM does not exist in the assumptions associated with the spatial error, which are not necessarily correct.     

Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

Consumption,preferences, and the evolutionary agenda

The purpose of this paper is to provide a preliminary evolutionary account of preferences, consumption and demand. This is particularly relevant for the study of innovation which offers consumers the opportunity to develop new behaviours. The paper approaches this question in two stages. First it recognises the importance of time as well as income constraints on consumer behaviour. Secondly, it develops a behavioural approach to consumption routines in terms of Herrnstein's concept of meloriation. In this account the focus is upon activities for which commodities and time are inputs and, with innovation, time is rescheduled on many fronts. Consumer learning is related to a replicator dynamic process. It is shown how changes in wages, prices and the time required to consume influence the demand for activities.