Growth,Poverty, and Inequality under Jokowi

SUMMARY

The political authority of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was bolstered in the third quarter of 2015 by a cabinet reshuffle, his coalition's gaining a parliamentary majority, and several foreign-policy developments. Indonesia's request to rejoin OPEC, for example, after having left in 2008, seemed more about international relations than oil prices, while official visits to the Middle East and the United States allowed Jokowi to project his presidency on the international stage. He still faces resistance from within his own party, however.

Jokowi's politically bold reshuffle of economic ministers in August soon yielded a range of policy announcements. In September and October, his government introduced its first substantial set of reforms—a number of economic policy packages intended, among other things, to attract investment and stimulate domestic demand. If even half of these policies are put in place, the impact on Indonesia's economy should be tangible.

Few countries have escaped the effects of falling global commodity prices and China's growth slowdown. At 4.7%, year on year, in the third quarter Indonesia's rate of economic growth again fell short of the government's target. Slowing growth and a negative outlook have lowered market expectations and weakened the rupiah, which is also burdened by the large outstanding external debt held by corporate borrowers. Indonesia's real effective exchange rate has recently begun to depreciate, however, which may stimulate exports. Growth prospects will also improve if the substantial increase in capital and infrastructure spending allocated in the state budget is realised.

Against this backdrop, we focus on what has happened to poverty and inequality in Indonesia since Jokowi took office. The distributional impacts of the current macroeconomic climate are likely to be hardest felt by the poor. Indonesia is well known for its record on poverty reduction, but between September 2014 and March 2015 the share of the population in poverty increased, even though economic growth was close to 5.0%. Slowing growth, rising food prices, the falling real wages of farmers, and the delayed disbursement of fuel-price compensation all had an effect. Such impacts may be mitigated in the medium term by Jokowi's budget reallocations to infrastructure, if realised, and his expansion of social spending.     

Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia's respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anticorruption and human-rights issues, for example—in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia's political life and promote the interests of Indonesia's elite.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Amid global economic uncertainty and tumbling world oil prices, Indonesia's economy faces pressure on its external balance and a continued growth slowdown. The government of President Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi) has set an agenda of reform, including simpler, faster investment licensing, historic cuts to fuel subsidies to generate fiscal savings, and increased spending on infrastructure. On the political side, Jokowi has had to deal with several political issues coming not only from parties in opposition but also from parties supporting his government, including during the formation of the new cabinet. We examine the consequences so far of the government's policy initiatives and of the policymaking process. While some initiatives have been implemented with success, some seem to have been launched without enough preparation, consultation, or empirical evidence, and many have been poorly communicated. Although inflation accelerated after the November fuel-price rise, efforts have been made to contain inflationary expectations and to mitigate the effects on poverty through social-assistance programs. The government took steps to cushion the impending impacts of higher fuel prices on vulnerable households by giving cash handouts of Rp 200,000 per month to 15.5 million disadvantaged families who receive the lowest level of welfare, and by promoting publicly funded education and health care. The partial removal of gasoline subsidies and the introduction of a fixed-subsidy policy for diesel in the revised 2015 budget reduce uncertainty about the fiscal position, although increases in government spending in infrastructure development were announced at the same time. The revised budget for 2015 increases spending on infrastructure development by 63% from the 2014 budget, mostly on projects to improve connectivity on land and at sea—such as the development of toll roads, railways, and ports—and to increase the performance of the agricultural sector. However, the recent drop in international oil prices forced the government to increase its target for tax revenue by 30% on last year's target, raising concerns about the effect of falling oil prices on the economy. Trade and investment policy reform is important in unlocking Indonesia's growth potential and improving the country's current external balance. Jokowi's administration, however, has been sending mixed signals about its position towards more open policies. The country has yet to recommence several trade negotiations that were postponed in 2014 and is still struggling to meet its commitments under the ASEAN Economic Community. Although improvement in investment procedures and licensing is currently underway, Indonesia needs to adopt a more positive attitude if it is to attract more investment.     

Indonesia's economic performance in comparative perspective and a new policy framework for 2049

This is the first paper of a planned ‘Indonesia 2049’ project, which asks how far Indonesia's economy will have developed 100 years after actual political independence in 1949. We compare dimensions of Indonesia's economy with those of two oil exporters (Mexico and Nigeria), three large populous developing economies (China, India and Brazil) and three Southeast Asian neighbours (Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). Under Soeharto, Indonesia's economic performance was better than it had been under Soekarno, and above the average of the eight comparator countries, but below that of the East Asian economies. Our view is that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second administration must adopt a new economic policy framework to ensure successful transition to knowledge-based growth. This proposed new framework goes beyond the Washington Consensus of ‘getting prices right’ and ‘getting institutions right’ to include ‘getting the role of science right’ and ‘getting the conception of the reform process right’.     

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: CHINA AND INDONESIA COMPARED

China's and Indonesia's development strategies have been compared with others, but rarely with each other. Radically different political contexts have produced both similar and distinctly different development patterns. Each using formal planning, Indonesia spurred radical reforms to promote growth, whereas China opted for incremental reforms to ‘grow out of the Plan’, as a political device and to discover what policies and institutions worked. Both strategies produced environments largely conducive to rapid development. Indonesia relied on a few economic technocrats to oversee development; China used decentralisation and party reforms to create a credible environment for non-state investment. Both shared concern for agricultural reform and food security; both opted to open up for trade—China gradually, Indonesia radically. Both did well in growth and poverty reduction following reform. China's growth performance is in a league of its own, especially since Indonesia's Asian crisis setback, but Indonesia had more equitable growth and survived a difficult political transition with, in hindsight, modest costs.     

The Manpower Law of 2003 and its implementing regulations: Genesis,key articles and potential impact

This paper reviews Indonesia's Manpower Law 13/2003 and related regulations, against a backdrop of slow employment growth, business concerns about the legislation and government attempts to change it in 2006. The paper focuses on severance rates and dismissals, short-term contracts and out-sourcing, and minimum wages, also briefly discussing other articles, and comparing the law with those in neighbouring countries. It suggests that certain articles have contributed to significantly higher wage costs and reduced flexibility in the management of labour in Indonesia's formal sector, even though compliance is by no means universal within the private sector. Key provisions, especially large increases in severance rates, and needs criteria imposed for the purpose of setting minimum wages, are also out of step with labour market policies in other developing countries. Circumstantial evidence suggests that these measures have adversely affected the investment climate and damaged prospects for a recovery in employment.     

The struggle to regain effective government under democracy in Indonesia*

With Soeharto's demise, Indonesia gained democracy but lost effective government. A return to sustained, rapid economic growth will require an overhaul of Indonesia's bureaucracy and judiciary which, along with the legislatures, the military and the state-owned enterprises, had been co-opted by the former president into his economy-wide ‘franchise’—a system of government designed to redistribute income and wealth from the weak to the strong while maintaining rapid growth. This franchise has disintegrated, its various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion. The result has been a significant decline in the security of property rights and, in turn, the continued postponement of a sustained economic rebound. To reform the civil service it will be necessary to undertake a radical overhaul of its personnel management practices and salary structures, so as to provide strong incentives for officials to work in the public interest.     

The road to pro-poor growth: the Indonesian experience in regional perspective

Indonesia's long-run ‘pro-poor growth’ record is among the best in Asia. It shows that appropriate policies can free societies from poverty's worst manifestations in a generation, a crucial message as democracy begins to influence the policy process. This paper places Indonesia's record in regional perspective, analysing determinants of income distribution in Asia and connecting this analysis to Indonesia's pro-poor growth process and the policy mechanisms that encourage pro-poor growth. Using a data set for eight Asian countries, it examines patterns of change in incomes and distribution across countries and over time. Building on Indonesian experience, the paper presents a pro-poor growth model encompassing three levels: improving the ‘capabilities’ of the poor, lowering transactions costs in the economy, especially between rural and urban areas, and increasing demand for goods and services produced by the poor. It finds that rapid pro-poor growth requires simultaneous and balanced interaction between growth and distribution processes.     

Structural Changes in a Reforming World Economy: Implications for Indonesia

How will rapid East Asian industrialisation and international trade policy reforms affect Indonesia's economy? Taking an economy-wide perspective and drawing on projections to 2005, based on a global applied general equilibrium model (GTAP), we show the impact of Uruguay Round implementation, and explore other international influences on Indonesia's and neighbouring economies. Trade reforms likely to accompany China's (and Taiwan's) membership of the WTO are projected to boost the competitiveness of Indonesia's primary sectors at the expense of light manufacturing and the overall economy, while failure by OECD countries to honour Uruguay Round obligations to open their textile and clothing markets would reduce industrialisation in the region, slowing growth in its net food imports. The benefits to Indonesia of APEC liberalisations are also reported. All projections were completed in 1997 before the enormity of the financial crisis became clear; follow-on research should quantify the growth slowdown's impact on these results.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA: FIFTY YEARS OF DISCOURSE

The topic of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been prominent in assessments of economic development in Indonesia during the past 50 years. In this article I review Indonesia's FDI record in a historical perspective; the current urge to control FDI inflows and the need to augment domestic savings and facilitate technology transfers are not at all new in Indonesia. I draw in particular on the discourse on FDI in this journal, the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, giving special attention to contributions by this journal to the international literature on FDI and its impact. The article demonstrates that the relation between FDI and economic growth has been less straightforward in Indonesia than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Although FDI has grown in a restrictive investment climate, on occasion it has failed to do so despite more liberal conditions. This may be attributed to the sustained role of natural resources in determining Indonesia's attractiveness as a host country of FDI.     

SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Summary Political and economic stability prevailed in Indonesia to early June 2007. President Yudhoyono made some badly needed changes to his cabinet, but left the core economic team unchanged. This inspired further confidence in the government's economic policies, yet it still fails to satisfy public expectations. The Lapindo mudflow disaster continues to weigh on the government, with no clear strategy apparent.

The economy shows stable macroeconomic fundamentals. Growth remained at around 6% p.a., driven mainly by investment and exports. The exchange rate strengthened and the stock market continued its rise. The central bank lowered the policy interest rate further, but this is likely to have little effect on growth, and brings some macroeconomic risks. Increasing or even maintaining current growth rates could be a challenge, given that export growth depends strongly on the global commodity boom, and improvements in the investment climate remain uncertain.

The parliament passed the long-awaited new investment law, which promises a more open and friendly investment regime. Doubts surround the implementation of the law, however. There are concerns that the new negative list could be overly protective and that the continued role of the Investment Coordinating Board may cause coordination problems among agencies and with sub-national governments. Boosting growth in manufacturing could be the key to higher overall growth. Structural change in the manufacturing sector over recent years has seen labour-intensive industry decline in terms of both output and exports, mainly because of rigid labour policies.

Efforts to boost private sector investment in infrastructure still show limited success. Implementation of regulatory and bureaucratic reforms is ineffective, and domestic financing remains in short supply. Public provision of infrastructure needs to increase, but suffers from shortcomings in fiscal management and a mismatch between the often cross-district nature of infrastructure projects and the now strongly district-based budgetary authority. Electricity supply exemplifies how the lack of well-designed investment strategies limits Indonesia's growth potential. Power sector investment has stagnated despite strong growth in electricity demand, and current plans for coal-based capacity expansion lack thorough planning.

An emerging long-term challenge for policy makers is climate change. Ahead of the December UN climate change conference in Bali, recent reports have highlighted Indonesia's vulnerability to climate change and its contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, predominantly from deforestation. Slowing or halting of deforestation is unlikely to occur without large-scale international financial flows.     

The Role of Markets,Technology, and Policy in Generating Palm-Oil Demand in Indonesia

Indonesia produces more palm oil and consumes more palm oil per capita than any country in the world. This article examines the processes through which Indonesia has promoted palm-oil consumption and some of the consequences of that promotion. Partial equilibrium modelling shows that Indonesia's remarkable increase in palm-oil consumption since 1985 is not largely attributable to population and income growth. Instead, much of this consumption growth has resulted from substitution away from coconut oil, facilitated by government policies on technology, pricing, distribution, and trade. The switch from coconut oil to palm oil in Indonesia was associated with increased land conversions to agriculture and diminished smallholder competitiveness. Despite lower rates of cooking-oil substitution in the future, simulations suggest that Indonesia's total palm-oil consumption in 2035 will be at least double that of 2010.     

Insolvency Reform and the Indonesian Financial Crisis

Treatments of Indonesia's financial crisis customarily focus on exchange rate collapse, neglecting the question of why enterprises were so highly leveraged beforehand. This article reviews controlling shareholder-debtor behaviour both before and during the crisis. It then examines Indonesia's emergency bankruptcy legislation effective August 1998—which enjoys a mixed record in implementation—and articulates bankruptcy policy principles for the replacement legislation now being drafted. Progress on the insolvency front has been limited to a relatively small number of voluntary debt reorganisations. Early indications are that such restructurings largely take the form of debt rescheduling rather than debt-equity swaps, loan write-offs, or other approaches that would lessen enterprises' heavy leveraging. This outcome reflects problems in creditor as well as debtor preferences. What began as a private sector insolvency problem increasingly overlaps with efforts to address general banking sector difficulties. Further, nationalism questions complicate the resolution of insolvencies.     

Implications for Indonesia of Asia’s Rise in the Global Economy

This article projects Indonesia's production and trade patterns to 2020 and 2030 in the course of global economic development under various growth and policy scenarios. We support our projections of the global economy by employing the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and version 8.1 of the GTAP database, along with supplementary data from a range of sources. Our baseline projection assumes that trade-related policies do not change in each region, but that endowments and real GDP do change, at exogenously selected rates. We use this baseline and its assumptions to analyse how potential global changes may affect the Indonesian economy over this and the next decade. We then consider the potential impacts of three policy reforms by 2020: an increase in global rice exports, associated with the opening of Myanmar; the recently imposed export taxes in Indonesia on unprocessed primary products; and the implementation of Indonesia's new food law.     

Post-crisis export performance: The Indonesian experience in regional perspective

This paper examines post-crisis export performance in Indonesia against the backdrop of pre-crisis experience and the comparative export performance of other Southeast Asian countries. It surveys trends and patterns of export performance, focusing on comparative experience in major commodity categories and changing revealed comparative advantage. It also examines the implications for Indonesia's export performance of China's emergence as a major competitor in world trade, considers market prospects for textile and garment exports following the demise of the Multi-fibre Arrangement, and explores the factors contributing to the post-crisis export slowdown. The findings support the view that Indonesia's poor export performance in the post-crisis era is largely supply driven. They strengthen the case for reversal of recent backsliding in macroeconomic policy reform, and for speedy implementation of the unfinished reform agenda. Prudent macroeconomic management, while necessary, is not sufficient to achieve rapid and sustained export growth in an era of rapid economic globalisation.     

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 1926–2006: MEANING,METHOD AND INDONESIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

Clifford Geertz was best known for his pioneering excursions into symbolic or in terpretive anthropology, especially in relation to Indonesia. Less well recognised are his stimulating explorations of the modern economic history of Indonesia. His thinking on the interplay of economics and culture was most fully and vigorously expounded in Agricultural Involution. That book deployed a succinctly packaged past in order to solve a pressing contemporary puzzle, Java's enduring rural poverty and apparent social immobility. Initially greeted with acclaim, later and ironically the book stimulated the deep and multi-layered research that in fact led to the eventual rejection of Geertz's central contentions. But the veracity or otherwise of Geertz's inventive characterisation of Indonesian economic development now seems irrelevant; what is profoundly important is the extraordinary stimulus he gave to a generation of scholars to explore Indonesia's modern economic history with a depth and intensity previously unimaginable.     

Recollections of My Career

Teuku Mohamad Daud, a pioneer Indonesian entrepreneur, was born in Perlak, Aceh, in 1920. Educated in Aceh and Jakarta, he joined the fledgling Indonesian National Army (TNI) at the proclamation of independence in 1945. Charged with procuring military equipment for the TNI Sumatra Command based at Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, Mr Daud was forced to finance the procurement by smuggling agricultural commodities, with the help of his uncle, Teuku Abdul Hamid Azwar. In 1947, at the suggestion of Vice President Hatta, Mr Daud and his uncle established Indonesia's first state-owned general trading company, the Central Trading Corporation (CTC, renamed PN Tri Bhakti in 1961, and later PN Panca Niaga), based in Bukittinggi. Mr Daud became a director of CTC while remaining on the TNI staff, and was later President Director until his resignation in 1966. He and several colleagues then established a group of private companies, engaged mainly in construction work.

On 1 October 1996 and again in June 1997, Mr Daud talked with Howard Dick and Thee Kian Wie of the BIES Editorial Board about his experiences in running CTC, both during Indonesia's revolutionary struggle and in the early period of independence, and about his views on the role of government in commerce. References to current government policy relate to the Soeharto administration.     

Recollections of my Career

Subroto, Professor at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FEUI), is one of the architects of the economic policies that brought growing prosperity to Indonesia over the New Order years Educated in Dutch colonial and Japanese occupation schools, he joined Indonesia's independence struggle, and later studied economics at FEUI, McGill University, MIT, and Stanford and Harvard Universities. He taught international economics and business cycles at FEUI and was Secretary of the Faculty. With Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadh, Ali Wardhana and Emil Salim, Subroto was appointed a Personal Economic Adviser to General (later President) Soeharto's new government in 1966 In 1968 he joined the Department of Trade, and later was minister of departments responsible for transmigration, cooperatives, mining and energy. After a 17-year ministerial career serving in four consecutive cabinets, Subroto was Secretary General of OPEC for six years from 1988 He remains active in Indonesia's nongovernmental Indonesian Institute for Energy Economics (IIEE), writing on energy problems, and is also Rector of the private Pancasila University in South Jakarta As part of our occasional series of interviews with economists who have helped shape New Order Indonesia, Professor Subroto talked with Chris Manning and Thee Kian VVie of the Bulletin's Editorial Board about his experience as a cabinet minister and as Secretary General of OPEC, and about his views on Indonesia's economic development, particularly its energy problems.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Outgoing Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second-term record is creditable, measured against the targets he set himself in 2010, but deficient in key areas: economic reform, infrastructure investment, and anti-corruption. Indonesia's 2009–14 parliament has been active in economic policymaking, and will leave as its legacy a raft of protectionist legislation. Both presidential candidates, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, have appealed to nationalism in their campaigns, calling for Indonesia to assert its sovereignty and increase its self-sufficiency, but Jokowi's economic platform is more moderate and economically literate than Prabowo's. The incoming president will inherit an economy that continues to slow. Growth is now not expected to approach 6% until 2015 at the earliest. Having engineered a reduction in the current account deficit, Indonesian policymakers now face the more difficult problem of structural fiscal adjustment. Energy subsidies are the most immediate problem, but fiscal reform more generally will emerge as an overriding and unpleasant imperative for whoever wins the presidential election on 9 July. Unless difficult fiscal policy measures are taken, Indonesia will face major trade-offs between deficit control and investment in social programs and economic infrastructure. The new president will struggle to restrict the deficit to the cap of 3% of GDP: a balanced budget will likely not be feasible for several years. He will need to increase the ratio of revenue to GDP and eliminate fuel subsidies—through a more systematic approach than the infrequent price increases of the past. He will need to choose carefully between competing expenditure priorities, such as infrastructure and defence. The new president would also be well advised to tread cautiously in implementing the legal mandates he will inherit, and to work with parliament to avoid further and unwind current earmarking of public expenditure.     

Indonesian politics in 2010: the perils of stagnation

In the first year after President Yudhoyono's re-election, Indonesian politics continued to evolve in largely familiar patterns. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, Yudhoyono's strong popular mandate and his Democratic Party's newly won parliamentary plurality did not result in significant changes to the president's cautious style of governing or the fickle nature of president–parliament relations. Most political parties also opted for continuity over change, electing or re-electing established figures as leaders despite high levels of public dissatisfaction with their performance. The fact that the 2009 election failed to generate any new momentum for reform does not augur well for the remainder of Yudhoyono's second term. Although the basic parameters of Indonesia's democracy remain intact, political developments during 2010 have also confirmed a pattern of stagnation that is likely to see Indonesia barely muddle through as a reasonably stable yet low-quality democracy.