国企债转股:法律实践及规范

债转股即债权转股权，是指债权人将其对债务人所享有的合法债权依法转变为对债务人的投资，使债权人与债务人之间的债权债务关系变为股权即持股与被持股的关系。我国目前的债转股仅指银行债权转变为资产管理公司对借款企业持有的股权。债转股是由经济学家首先提出来的，作为国企改革摆脱债务困扰的一种探索方式，有其积极的意义。但债转股的运作存在着一系列法律问题。商品经济社会人们所从事的生产、交换、分配和消费活动都是在债权和物权相互转化的过程中实现的。     

从财务管理看债转股对化解银行不良资产的作用

债转股，即债权转股权的简称，就是指债务人的债权人将其所享有的合法债权依法转变为对债务人的投资，增加债务人注册资本的行为，它包括债权的消灭和股权的产生两个方面。债转股之所为以成当前的热门话题，主要是由于其作为我国一项重大经济政策肩负具有盘活围有商业银行不良资产和促进国有企业摆脱困境的两大重要使命，从银行的角度来看剥离了不良贷款和债转股后，增加了银行资产的流动性，使银行贷款的安全性得到保障，信贷规模得到更加有效的配置，银行也将增强盈利能力。     

国有企业债权转股权的积极效应与分析思考

债转股意在将原来不能流动的资产盘活,在一定程度上化解企业和银行的风险。鉴于国企和银行在国民经济中的特殊地位,债转股不仅对债转股企业和银行对证券市场乃至整个国民经济都有着积极的意义。1、减轻企业债务负担。债转股的最大受益者就是实行债转股的企业,这可以从以下几个方面分析:首先,债权和股权的收益实现形式是不同的,债权的收益是利息,股权的收益是红利。从企业帐面上看,利息费用在税前列支,直接减少了利润总额。债转股后,由于部分利息费用不再支付,即使企业的主营业务利润保持不变,也会由于财务费用减少而使利润相对上升,一部分企…     

债转股的目标取向和制度保证

“债转股”顾名思义就是将债权转为股权。从一般意义上讲,它可发生在任何债权人和债务人之间,像企业间的债权转股权,企业内部的集资转股权(内部职工股),银行在企业的债权转股权,我国财政投资中的“拨改贷”改为“贷改投”的债权转股权等。     

债转股：创新与风险

所谓债转股是指在国家组建金融资产管理公司,依法处置银行原有不良资产的基础上,对部分企业的银行贷款,以金融管理公司作为投资主体,实行债权转股权。债权转股权则是把原来银行与企业的债权债务关系转为金融资产管理公司与企业间的持股与被持投或控股与被控股的关系,原来的还本付息转为按股分红。 与传统的救活国有企业的办法相比,债转股无疑是具备了诸多创新特质,它反映在以下几个方面：（一）政府目标创新。政府推出债转股的举措,其用意是取得“双赢战略”,一方面它可以降低国有商业银行不良资产比例,以规避金融风险。据一些专…     

银行实施债转股问题研究

债转股是处理债权银行不良资产和企业不良债务的一种资本运营手段。本文对银行实施债转股过程中存在的问题进行分析 ,包括从经济理论角度分析债转股的实质 ,利用银行总体运营状况的分析工具CAMEL分析债转股后银行阶段性持股问题 ,以及银行股权处置过程中的问题等。     

“债转股”的作用、问题及对策

所谓债转股是在国家组建资产管理公司，依法处置银行原有不良资产的基础上，对部分国有企业的银行贷款，以资产管理公司作为投资主体实行债权转股权。债转股是把原来银行与企业的债权债务关系，转变为资产管理公司与企业间的持股与被持股或控股与被控股的关系，原来的还本付息转变为按股分红。资产管理公司在债转股的过程中，实际上成为企业的“阶段性”股东，依法行使股东权利，参与公司重大事项的决策，但不参与企业的正常生产经营活动。在企业经济状况好转后，可以通过上市、转让或企业回购的形式收回这笔资金。实施债转股是一项政策性很…     

债权转股权的理性思考

债权转股权的意义深远。这一政策的实施,不仅对于深化国有企业改革、降低企业负债率、改变内部治理结构,提高国有企业的经济效益、化解银行不良资产、防范金融风险有积极意义,对我国证券市场的发展亦有积极的影响。一、债权转股权的含义所谓“债权转股权”（以下简称“债转股”）,是由国有商业银行组建的金融资产管理公司和国家开发银行作为投资主体,将商业银行原有的不良信贷资产转为金融资产管理公司以及国家开发银行对企业的股权。它不是将企业债务转为国家资本金,更不是将企业债务一笔勾销,而是将原来银行与企业间的债权债务关系…     

债转股可借鉴国际经验

１．破产式债转股。破产式债转股就是对欠银行贷款的企业依法申请破产，这时所有债权人的债权转化为赔偿要求权，赔偿要求权的出售，就转变为企业剩余资产的股权。美国采用过破产式债转股重组其银行不良资产。美国是一个严格执行破产法的国家，同时，美国也是一个极其重视市场选择机制作用的国家。这一点充分体现在其对债务的处理上。当企业资不抵债时，企业依法可以申请破产。对所有的债权人，可以通过协商来决定是进入清算程序予以破产，还是将债权转化为对企业的所有权，从而对企业实施重组。在这个过程中，所有债权人拥有的债权都可以转…     

债转股中若干难点的思考

当前,国企债转股工作进入实质性的操作阶段。这一举措标志着我国开始以一种与以往不同的全新方式来解决国有商业银行的不良资产。整个债转股的流程大致如下:银行将不良资产债权转让给资产管理公司收回资金→资产管理公司承接债权转化为相应股权→资产管理公司转让股权收回资金。     

Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure

We consider a model of corporate finance with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries. Firms can finance projects either via debt or via equity. Because of asymmetric information about firms’ growth opportunities, equity financing involves a dilution cost. Nevertheless, equity emerges in equilibrium whenever financial intermediaries have sufficient market power. In the latter case, best firms issue debt while the less profitable firms are equity-financed. We also show that strategic interaction between oligopolistic intermediaries results in multiple equilibria. If one intermediary chooses to buy more debt, the price of debt decreases, so the best equity-issuing firms switch from equity to debt financing. This in turn decreases average quality of equity-financed pool, so other intermediaries also shift towards more debt.     

Debt markets and corporate debt structure in an emerging market: The South African example

This is a first attempt at gauging the effects of corporate public debt issuance on the debt structure, risk profile and valuation of firms in an emerging market. We find that financial services firms, along with government institutions, are important early supporters of an organized public debt market. Firms in this market use equity, public debt and private debt funds simultaneously as need be. Consistent with predictions of the corporate debt structure literature, public debt-issuing firms are larger, older, more profitable, and less informational opaque than non-public debt-issuing firms. Moreover, public debt-issuing firms experience significant reductions in both overall and systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than non-public debt issuers. These and other findings of the study suggest deepening national debt markets can be a fruitful financial market development exercise for emerging markets.     

Public debt and welfare in a quantitative Schumpeterian growth model with incomplete markets

This paper quantifies the welfare effects of counterfactual public debt policies using an endogenous growth model with incomplete markets. The economy features public debt, Schumpeterian growth, infinitely-lived agents, uninsurable income risk, and discount factor heterogeneity. Two versions of the model are specified, one with households holding equity in the group of innovating firms. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy to match the degree of wealth inequality, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP, the firms’ exit rate, the average growth rate, and other standard long-run targets. When comparing balanced growth paths, I find large welfare gains in equilibria characterized by governments accumulating public wealth. The result is robust to the mechanism used to generate a highly concentrated wealth (i.e., preference heterogeneity or “superstar” income shocks). Welfare effects decompositions show that level effects and growth effects reinforce each other. The responses of both the intermediate goods and their market conditions are key in explaining the large level effects. The version of the model without equity is computationally easier to solve, allowing to consider transitional dynamics. Taking into account the dynamic adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium, I show that the transitional welfare costs are not large enough to change the sign of the welfare effects stemming from a change in public debt. I find that eliminating public debt would lead to a 0.8% increase in welfare, while moving to a debt/GDP ratio of 100% would entail a welfare loss of 0.5%. A decomposition analysis shows that growth accounts for approximately 50% of the overall welfare effects.     

Distress cost and corporate financing policy: evidence from the equity options market

This study examines the link between distress cost and corporate financing policy through the lens of the equity options market. Four features stand out. First, the cost of distress is comparable to the tax shield from debt financing. Second, the results provide evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates understate the impact of market leverage on default risk. Third, consistent with the information models of debt maturity, firms with higher default probability use more long-term debt. Finally, more distressed firms rely on secured debt to a greater extent. Overall, the results support the trade-off theory of capital structure.     

Market timing and corporate capital structure: a transatlantic comparison

This article provides comparative international evidence on the effect of market timing on corporate capital structures using panel data for US, UK and continental European firms. We document that the empirical regularity found for US firms, that historical market-to-book ratios and corporate leverage correlate negatively does not extend to UK and continental European firms. The latter tend to raise debt rather than equity when stock prices are high, thus sticking more closely to a pecking order in which debt is preferred over external equity.     

Bank and investment fund monitoring of privatized firms in Russia1

The active monitoring of enterprises is an important aspect of the transformation of Russian firms into efficient, commercially viable entities. This paper uses detailed case study evidence to provide insights into the mechanisms and processes adopted by investment funds, as equity holders; and banks, as debt providers, to monitor the enterprises in which they invest. The findings provide evidence of the importance of direct involvement and the development of relationships to counteract the shortcomings of the legal infrastructure and financial reporting mechanisms.     

存款人市场约束机制研究

与股东和债权人相比,存款人时银行的市场约束一直以来相对较弱.文章首先回顾了有关存款人市场约束的相关文献,然后利用数学模型分析了影响存款人市场约束力度的因素,在此基础上对我国商业银行加强市场约束提出了相应的建议.本文的创新之处在于将影响存款人市场约束力度的主要因素及其相互关系纳入一个模型中进行综合讨论,从而对加强市场约束机制进行了比较全面的分析.     

Financial Structure and Corporate Behavior in Japan and the US: insulation versus integration with speculative pressures

This paper examines the impact of speculative financial markets on corporate behavior under the Japanese and US financial systems. While both countries experienced speculative financial booms during the 1980s, real sector corporate decision making was relatively insulated from such activity in Japan by its bifurcated capital markets: high-turnover trading of much equity coexists with another segment in which large blocks of firms equity and debt are held long term, by capital suppliers who are strategic business allies. In the American system, in contrast, fluid and impersonal stock trading leaves firms vulnerable to the impact of short term price movements. This avenue for speculative financial market pressures has militated toward reduced time horizons and financial ratio-based decision criteria in the US corporate sector. The main implication is that mechanisms must be found for insulating American corporate decision making from speculative pressures. Rather than attempting to mimic the undemocratic role played by banks and other buysiness insiders in Japan, US policy makers should achieve a similar insulating effect by vesting more power in corporate constituences other than shareholders—especially employees. An approach built around ‘democratic stakeholder governance’ is proposed.     

The impact of cross‐ownership on the reaction of corporate investment and financing constraints: A panel threshold model

This paper studies whether or not investment decisions are financially constrained in a cross‐ownership system of Taiwan. Different from the financial structure in the USA, subsidiaries in Taiwan are allowed to buy stocks of the parent companies. Hence, the conventional debt‐to‐equity ratio is inappropriate to divide firms into high and low‐debt firms. Instead, a new threshold variable?–?the adjusted debt–equity ratio (ADE)?–?is employed to divide the sample into high‐debt firms and low‐debt firms. A panel of 115 Taiwan‐listed firms for the period 1991–1997 is used. Evidence supports the cash flow hypothesis and ADE has a notable significant influence on the financial constraints.     

创新驱动抑或低成本战略——基于融资结构与行业集中度视角的实证检验

融资结构与行业集中度是企业选择创新驱动亦或低成本战略的重要条件。本文以2009-2019年创业板上市公司为研究对象,实证检验融资结构与行业集中度对企业选择上述两种竞争战略的影响。研究表明:(1)负债率越高的企业越偏好低成本战略,而负债率越低的企业越偏好创新驱动战略;(2)相比高集中度行业,在低集中度行业中,负债率高的企业更偏好低成本战略,也更排斥创新驱动战略。本文在此基础上,提出大力发展股权融资以及优化行业竞争环境,以提升企业创新驱动力的政策建议。