In defence of generalized Darwinism

Darwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core Darwinian principles to cover the evolution of social entities. Also in the nineteenth century, influential social scientists proposed their extension to political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful potential in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy. Others mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves biological reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a generalized Darwinism applies, and upholds that there is no reason to exclude social or economic entities.

品牌生态环境与品牌发展——达尔文生物进化思想对品牌发展演进的启示

在品牌生态环境变化日益激烈的今天,分析品牌生态环境对品牌发展的影响成为品牌理论研究领域的重点课题。达尔文生物进化思想对这一课题的研究具有极大的借鉴作用,品牌的发展过程与生物物种的发展与进化遵循着类似的基本规律。     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to continuity

Currently there is an ongoing discussion about how Darwinian concepts should be harnessed to further develop economic theory. Two approaches to this question, Universal Darwinism and the continuity hypothesis, are presented in this paper. It is shown whether abstract principles can be derived from Darwin’s explanatory model of biological evolution that can be applied to cultural evolution. Furthermore, the relation of the ontological basis of biological and cultural evolution is clarified. Some examples illustrate the respective potential of the two approaches to serve as a starting-point for theory development.

论企业技术创新内部达尔文主义的合理性

企业技术创新中的内部达尔文主义的本质就是外部技术创新竞争与选择的企业内部化。基于高技术企业内部的技术创新竞争实例,从生物学、哲学、管理学和经济学等多个角度分析了技术创新竞争内部化的合理性。     

企业技术创新内部达尔文主义发展历史的比较研究

运用案例分析法和比较分析法,对高科技企业技术创新内部达尔文主义产生的背景、历史发展进程及各阶段特征等问题进行了尝试性研究。     

In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists

Bioeconomics emphasizes the common ontological ground between economics and biology. However, this does not necessarily mean that both disciplines collapse into one. Instead it is proposed here that Darwinism provides a general, meta-theoretical framework for dealing with complex evolving systems, consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities, which are found in both nature and human society. There is no alternative to the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and inheritance to explain the evolution of such systems. Neither the actual existence of human intentionality, nor the hypothetical existence of Lamarckian processes of acquired character inheritance, offer a barrier to the use of Darwinian explanations. However, while Darwinian principles are always necessary to explain complex evolving population systems, they are never sufficient on their own. Such a generalized Darwinism can accommodate several different stances found in the literature on bioeconomics and elsewhere.      

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Evolutionary choice of markets

We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may differ in the liquidity they provide. Traders have idiosyncratic preferences for the markets, e.g.due to differential time preferences for maturity dates of futures contracts. For a broad range of parameters we find that no trade, trade on both markets (individualization) as well as trade on one market only (standardization) is supported by a Nash equilibrium. By contrast, whenever the number of traders becomes large, the evolutionary process selects a unique stochastically stable state which corresponds to the equilibrium with two active markets and coincides with the welfare maximizing market structure. We are grateful to Thorsten Hens, Fernando Vega-Redondo and a referee for valuable comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Zurich, the CES research seminar at the University of Munich, the Koc University in Istanbul as well as conference participants at the SAET conference in Ischia, the ESEM in Lausanne and the ESF workshop on Behavioural Models in Economics and Finance in Vienna. A first version of the paper was written while Marc Oliver Bettzüge was visiting the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich. Financial Support by the Swiss Banking Institute and by the National Centre of Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged. The NCCR FINRISK is a research program supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation.     

Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth. Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim is acknowledged. RID="*" ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de)     

Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences.     

Evolutionary developmental economics: how to generalize Darwinism fruitfully to help comprehend economic change

Darwinism is shown possible to generalize fruitfully to help comprehend economic change by drawing on evolutionary developmental biology (“evo–devo”)—its recent version, less concerned with replication of genes than with genomic instructing of development of organisms. The result is a conceptual model with multilevel applications, generalizing development as instructed self-organizing with inputs from environments, and evolution as experimental search for instructions making the development successful. Its economic interpretation suggests to unite several existing fields into evolutionary developmental economics, where economic change can be studied comprehensively as development instructed by actual institutional rules, intertwined with the evolution of these rules.     

Economic evolution and the science of synergetics

This paper deals with synergetic methods, which have developed as a sub-field of the self-organisation approach in the natural sciences. Such methods have been used successfully to model structural transitions in physio-chemical contexts. The synergetic approach is explained in a non-technical way and the main elements of the synergetic methodology are introduced. The extent to which such methods can be applied in the presence of historical time series data, which are subject to underlying processes of evolutionary economic change, is assessed. Proposals, concerning more appropriate synergetic methods for evolutionary economic application, are considered.The research from which this paper is derived was supported by an Australian Research Council Large Grant. We would like to thank University of Queensland Emergent Complexity and Organisation in Economics [(ECO)²] Research Group participants-David Anthony, Bryan Morgan and Pradeep Philip-for their comments and criticisms on an earlier draft of this paper (Foster and Wild 1994). We are also grateful to Ulrich Witt for his detailed comments and Gerard Milburn (UQ Physics) for helping us to understand how synergetics is applied in physics. Three anonymous referees also provided invaluable comments on the journal submission. However, the usualcaveat applies.     

A theory of classification and evolution of technologies within a Generalised Darwinism

This paper here proposes a theory of classification and evolution of technology based on taxonomic characteristic of interaction between technologies that is an under-studied field of research in economics of technical change and management of technology. The proposed classification of technologies, in a broad analogy with evolutionary ecology of parasites, within a theoretical framework of Generalised Darwinism, is: (1) parasitic technologies, (2) commensal technologies, (3) mutualistic technologies, (4) symbiotic technologies. This theory here suggests the property of mutual benefaction from interaction between different technologies and the theorem of not independence of any technology to explain and predict characteristics and evolutionary pathways of technologies over time. Overall, then, this study may be useful for bringing a new perspective in economics of innovation to categorise and analyse the interaction between technologies that can be a ground work for development of more sophisticated concepts to explain and predict the evolution of technology and generalise aspects of technological change in human society.     

改革开放30年我国区域创新体系的演化分析

在介绍区域创新体系的内涵的基础上,着重分析了改革开放30年我国区域创新体系演化的历程,并从区域创新体系演化动力的角度对其演化的原因进行了分析,最后总结了我国区域创新体系演化过程中的经验.并对进一步完善我国区域创新体系提出了有益的启示.     

Reciprocity in evolving social networks

We study the viability of conditional cooperation in a dynamically evolving social network. The network possesses the small world property, with high clustering coefficient but low characteristic path length. The interaction among linked individuals takes the form of a multiperson prisoners’ dilemma, and actions can be conditioned on the past behavior of one’s neighbors. Individuals adjust their strategies based on performance within their neighborhood, and both strategies and the network itself are subject to random perturbation. We find that the long-run frequency of cooperation is higher under the following conditions: (i) the interaction radius is neither too small nor too large, (ii) clustering is high and characteristic path length low, (iii) the mutation rate of strategies is small, and (iv) the rate of adjustment in strategies is neither too fast nor too slow.

What is specific about evolutionary economics?

Ever since an “evolutionary” perspective on the economy has been suggested, there have been differing, and partly incommensurable, views on what specifically this means. By working out where the differences lie and what motivates them, this paper identifies four major approaches to evolutionary economics. The differences between them can be traced back to opposite positions regarding the basic assumptions about reality and the proper conceptualization of evolution. The same differences can also be found in evolutionary game theory. Achievements of the major approaches to evolutionary economics and their prospects for future research are assessed by means of a peer survey.

CAS理论视角:财务核心能力系统演化过程探析

财务核心能力在企业发展过程中呈现动态性。本文运用CAS理论对财务核心能力系统的演化过程进行分析,确定了财务核心能力系统是一个复杂适应系统,根据CAS理论原理建立财务核心能力系统演化过程模型,并将该过程分为确定主体、主体个体演化以及系统整体演化三个阶段。