RACIAL REDISTRICTING FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION WITHOUT PARTISAN BIAS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH

Scholars of American politics have expressed the concern that concentration of minority voters into limited districts in order to promote minority representation induces the partisan “perverse effect” of reducing the number of seats won by Democrats. Our theory explains how the perverse effect can occur and demonstrates that racial redistricting generates a tradeoff between the number of minority legislators and the number of Democratic legislators. Our theory suggests that in light of this tradeoff, the diversification of districts as well as the concentration of minorities (“second‐order diversity”) may be essential for the proportional representation of minorities without partisan electoral bias.     

Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering

This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. Party leaders have both office‐ and policy‐motivations. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one‐sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy.     

Responsiveness to priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice

We consider the priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice. We weaken the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring at least one minority student to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We find that under both the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism at least one minority student becomes weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We also strengthen the responsiveness to affirmative action policy by requiring all minority students to be weakly better off when their priorities are improved. We call this property strict responsiveness to affirmative action policy. We find that there is no nonwasteful, individually rational, mutually best, and strategy-proof mechanism that is strictly responsive to affirmative action policy. We then find a sufficient condition for the affirmative action policy to satisfy for the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism to be strictly responsive to affirmative action policy by setting restrictions on the priority improvements made by the policy.     

On the political economy of minority rights. Three ways to manipulate a minority: Goals,rules, and border poles

Language rights for speakers of minority languages are analyzed as well-defined policy measures that are implemented in given jurisdictions. For the implementation of such rights in some countries, certain rules concerning the number and geographical distribution of the speakers of a minority language have to be fulfilled. We discuss, how a policy maker with a given attitude towards the minority can manipulate the policy to further his or her goals. We first provide a normative background for this type of language policy, a benchmark, analyzing language policy on the basis of welfare economics, first discussing why language policy is but one type of public policy, then defining and discussing the benefit or “demand” side assuming that benefits are basically proportional to the number of beneficiaries of the planning measure. We then argue that the costs of a planning measure can be described as a function of two variables, “number of beneficiaries” and “size of area of application”. This lets us analyze planning measures in a two-dimensional model fully characterized by the number of beneficiaries and their geographical distribution in the jurisdiction under consideration. Finally, we characterize the optimal size and extension of the jurisdictions where the language rights are to be implemented. It is then shown, how the policy maker can manipulate the goals of the policy, the implementation rules, as well as the borders of the jurisdictions in order to achieve her or his political goals when they differ from the cost-benefit optimum.     

What does IT Take for Congress to Enact Good Policies? an Analysis of Roll Call Voting in the US Congress

We study the conditions under which members of Congress incorporate policy‐specific considerations in their decisions. To do this, we estimate a model that accounts for the influence of private information about legislation quality on voting patterns in the House and Senate. We find that minority party members are more likely to evaluate proposals on their merits than majority members, but institutional and electoral considerations significantly attenuate these partisan differences. In particular, seniority, electoral safety, and constituents' political knowledge have a balancing effect on partisan predispositions to rely on policy‐relevant information, making minority (majority) members less (more) likely to vote informatively.     

Minority representation, election method, and policy influence

Recently a number of legal scholars have advocated jurisdiction-wide cumulative voting as a mechanism to promote minority representation. Among other benefits, they claim minority representatives will have greater policy influence if they are elected in at-large contests rather than from single-member districts. We test this proposition by estimating the deter-minants of minority hiring practices. We find increases in the proportion of black representatives on a city council are positively correlated with the percentage of black police recruits. However, holding constant black representation, the impact of black councilors on municipal hiring is enhanced when councilors are elected at-large rather than by district.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).     

Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making

This article assesses how the institutional context of decisionmaking on three-judge panels of the federal Court of Appealsaffects the impact that gender and race have on judicial decisions.Our central question is whether and how racial minority andwomen judges influence legal policy on issues thought to beof particular concern to women and minorities when serving onappellate panels which decide cases by majority rule. Properanalysis of this question requires investigating whether womenand minority judges influence the decisions of other panel members.We find that the norm of unanimity on panels grants women influenceover outcomes even when they are outnumbered on a panel.     

新疆少数民族大学生就业难问题分析

新疆少数民族大学生的就业经历了从“统包统分”到“双向选择、自主择业”的转变，大规模的高校扩招、入学时的政策倾斜等一系列原因，使得少数民族大学毕业生就业难的问题越来越突出。造成少数民族大学生就业难既有客观方面的原因，如新疆经济结构发展失衡、扩招速度过快、招生及就业政策上存在问题、学校的专业设置、教学内容和培养目标不够清晰等，又有主观方面的原因，如汉语水平较低、就业观念存在的问题等，这就需要政府、高校以及少数民族大学生从自身出发，采取相应的措施，共同解决这一难题。     

Racial/ethnic match and student–teacher relationships

This paper explores the role of teacher race/ethnicity in the teacher-perceived relationships with kindergarten and early elementary school students. Employing a model with both student and teacher fixed effects, we discover a positive link between the racial/ethnic match and the teacher-reported relationships with students. Specifically, minority students tend to have closer relationships with their teachers when they are taught by a minority teacher. Our analyses also provide suggestive evidence that the effects on the teacher–student relationships could not be driven by differential racial discrimination between white and minority teachers. Particularly, white and minority teachers are not differentially biased in judging their relationships with minority students, implying that the source of the racial/ethnic interaction effects is likely to come from the role modeling of behaviors. Given the importance of the relationships between young children and nonparental adults in their early stages of life, these findings have crucial policy implications.     

An informational role of supermajority rules in monitoring the majority party's activities

There often exists a supermajority rule that enables the minority party to delay or prevent a vote on a bill. I construct a two‐period model consisting of a representative voter, self‐interested parties, and a media outlet. In the model, the majority party has an incentive to misrepresent the voter's optimal policy. I show that the minority party's attempt to block a vote (e.g., a filibuster) can signal this misrepresentation. Interestingly, the key is that the minority party and the mass media are complementary in creating the signal. Overall, the results suggest that supermajority rules could be beneficial even for the majority of voters.     

对加快发展少数民族经济重要性的认识

加快发展少数民族经济是党和国家的一项重要政策,中国少数民族地区经济文化发展相对落后。少数民族经济在中国国民经济中占有重要地位,少数民族地区在国防建设中具有重要的战略地位等原因,体现了加快发展少数民族经济的重要性。另外,加快发展少数民族经济还具有重要而深远的意义。     

Do employment quotas explain the occupational choices of disadvantaged minorities in India?

This article investigates the effects of a large-scale public sector employment quota policy for disadvantaged minorities (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) in India on their occupational choices, as defined by skill level, during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that, first, the employment quota policy significantly affects the occupational structure of both disadvantaged minority populations. In response to the employment quotas, individuals belonging to the Scheduled Caste group are more likely to choose high-skill occupations and less likely to choose low- and middle-skill occupations, while individuals belonging to the Scheduled Tribe group are less likely to choose high-skill occupations and more likely to choose low- and middle-skill occupations. Second, the impact of the employment quotas is significantly related with an individual’s years of schooling. Overall, the results indicate that the employment quota policy changes the occupational choices of individuals within the targeted populations and contributes to their improved socio-economic standing.     

Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?

This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste-based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms might increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run, although it would have disappeared without the policy.     

The Costs of Cooperation

Public goods production is not necessarily desirable and involves higher costs than is often recognized. Specifically, public goods production may require that a small minority of individuals can collude at the expense of others or impose strategic sanctions on non-contributors. These facilities may have negative as well as positive effects. The same conditions that support public goods production also support business cartels and racial discrimination, for instance. We examine the implications of this perspective for modern debates on economic policy, civic virtue, communitarianism, and libertarianism.     

Is Trade Liberalization an Important Cause of Increasing U.S. Wage Inequality? The Interaction of Theory and Policy

The majority of mainstream economists believe that globalization and trade liberalization have had a minor role in increasing U.S. wage inequality. A minority argues that capital mobility and outsourcing indicate a larger effect. This paper first surveys these views, and then argues that how we understand the policy consequences of trade liberalization helps determine the character of our analysis of the issue itself. Thus, a shift in policy perspective, to consider the "equity costs" of trade liberalization in terms of eroded U.S. labor market institutions, produces a larger framework for analyzing the consequences of globalization and trade liberalization than is available in traditional comparative advantage efficiency reasoning. From this wider perspective, trade liberalization has likely had a greater impact on U.S. wage inequality than even the minority mainstream position allows.     

论民族贫困地区农村社会保障问题及对策——以贵州三个民族自治州为例

贵州民族地区的社会保障制度存在社会保障资金严重不足、体系结构性倾向突出、保障覆盖范围窄、救助水平低等若干问题。为体现公平,达到共同富裕,应尽快对民族地区实施社会保障制度建设,同时考虑将传统的保障制度和现代保障制度紧密结合,确定与贵州民族地区发展相适应的社会保障政策,构建有利于民族地区发展的社会保障模式,达到促进各民族人民共同繁荣发展。     

COMMENTS ON MARVEL: HOW FAIR IS FAIR TRADE?

Each of the papers in this symposium concludes with policy recommendations regarding the legality of resale price maintenance (RPM). The legal standard used to judge RPM affects the entire universe of manufacturer control over resale prices. Therefore, policy recommendations are valid only to the extent that the proffered economic theory applies to a substantial portion of that universe. My comments focus primarily on how much of the RPM universe is addressed by Marvel's (1985) explanations in “How Fair is Fair Trade?” If an economic theory, no matter how interesting academically, describes only a small minority of RPM instances, it should not form the basis for public policy.