全球国营企业私有化一瞥

全球国营企业私有化一瞥郝红梅（外经贸部国际经济合作研究所）近年来，许多国家都加大了以私有化为核心的市场经济政策的执行力度，对国营企业实行私有化改造，注重发挥私营部门的作用，将政府经济工作的重点放在对基础设施的建设、经营和管理方面。１９９５年，全球出售...     

西方国家企业国有化和私有化问题研究

20世纪上半叶,西方国家的国有企业经历了两次大的扩张浪潮。20世纪70年代以后,西方国家政府开始对政府过度干预经济进行反思,私有化成为潮流,西方国家企业国有化和私有化的反复过程反映了政府职能和市场机制二者关系的动态演化。从国有企业本身来分析,股权结构仅仅是决定其绩效的因素之一,对不同行业的国有企业来说,私有化的后果也是不同的。因此,对大型国有企业要采取多种具体措施来提高其绩效,而不是仅仅从股权私有化来入手。     

论劳动制度与政策对转型国家宏观经济的影响

劳动制度与政策是影响转型国家宏观经济绩效的重要因素。劳动力市场、工会、劳动保障、非就业补助等方面的不同,造成了经济增长、就业水平和收入不平等的差异。     

"华盛顿共识"与"北京共识"比较初探

本文对转型经济中“华盛顿共识”与“北京共识”作了初步比较分析。“华盛顿共识”不仅曾对拉美国家经济发展产生过不利影响，而且曾作为从中央计划经济向市场经济过渡初始阶段的重要政策，在俄罗斯等转型国家广为推行。这一政策导致这些国家经济社会转型发生衰退。2004年5月“北京共识”的问世，实际上从另一个角度说明了“华盛顿共识”政策的失败。“北京共识”是中国转型经验的概括与总结，它表明，对于发展中的转型国家来说，实施什么样的转型政策决定着一个国家转轨与发展的绩效。     

解析“私有化”

“私有化”是一个非常敏感的话题，也是目前我们在改革中必须面对和解决的一个关键性问题，无论是政策制定，还是理论研究，对此都应该有一个明确的态度。我们注意到，在关于“私有化”的讨论中，不同的人对“私有化”的理解和态度不尽相同，而态度的不同在相当大程度上是...     

乌干达的私有化评析

乌干达的私有化评析吕博乌干达在６０年代曾是东非经济和文化的中心，被誉为“东非明珠”，但由于６０年代末以来实行了过激的企业国有化政策，在１９７４—８５年间经历了长达６年的混乱和战争，经济遭到严重的破坏和巨大的滑坡，成为世界上最不发达的国家之一。据统计，...     

转型国家银行私有化绩效研究及对中国的启示

分析了目前国有银行私有化的原因和方式,并从私有化的绩效成果方面对中国今后的银行业改革提出了政策建议.     

“拥抱”还是“拒绝”：经济政策不确定性与企业数字化转型

本文从经济政策不确定性视角，探究在不确定性宏观经济环境下企业是否会强化数字化转型应对外部环境不确定性。以2013—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，探讨了经济政策不确定性对企业数字化转型的具体影响与内在机理。研究结果表明：第一，经济政策不确定性对企业数字化转型产生正向驱动效应，即经济政策不确定性是不确定性环境下企业数字化转型的重要政策因素，经济政策不确定性下企业主动拥抱数字化转型，在系列稳健性检验后研究结论依然成立。第二，经济政策不确定性有助于强化企业创新研发并促进企业数字化转型，推动数字技术驱动的企业数字创新发展；且经济政策不确定性有助于强化企业数字化转型并最终促进企业创新绩效，这足以说明经济政策不确定性下企业数字化转型的创新赋能效应。第三，经济政策不确定性对企业数字化转型的影响效应在非国有产权、非政治关联与市场化强度更低的地区中更强。     

西方国有企业私有化浪潮方兴未艾

70年代末期以来,国际经济中的一个重要现象,就是在社会主义国家纷纷对传统经济体制进行改革的同时,资本主义国家也出现了以国有企业私有化为主要内容的经济调整浪潮。这两股潮流源于不同背景,却有一个相同之处,即承认或者进一步强调市场的作用。正是从这个意义上讲,西方国有企业私有化的过程,可以为社会主义国家的经济改革提供某些借鉴。     

私有化、制度环境与经济转轨的路径——转型经济中所有制改革的两种经验

本文通过对我国和一些经济转型国家经济增长状况的实证分析 ,得出了这样的结论 :在大部分经济转型国家中 ,制度环境的建立和完善是私有经济快速增长的前提和条件。在有效的市场体系尚未恰当建立的经济制度转型过程中 ,以及当仍然存在许多对经济自由的障碍时 ,集体所有权安排也许更加有效。只有当转型处于经济自由化与市场化的高级阶段 ,以及当国有经济占整个国民经济非常小的份额时 ,才能实施大规模的私有化。为了使民营经济成为最有效的制度安排并且实现经济体制的平稳转型 ,转型的恰当时机与程序应为首先实施经济自由化 ,然后是市场化 ,最后再实施民营化。     

Privatization and Development

Many of the problems of privatization in developing countries result from the lack of information about the situation of the economy and from the lack of determination on their path of privatization. This paper addresses the lack of information by presenting a theory of incomplete privatization contracts. It then turns to the lack of determination, dealing with particular problems of partially privatized firms and, finally, postulating an elaborate system of price regulation of privatized monopolies, which typically is missing in developing countries.     

Privatization and Reformation*

This paper presents a simple model of a government contemplating the pre-sale reform of a public enterprise. While the government is less efficient at such reform than the eventual owner, failure to reform may be considered an indicator of low commercial value by potential purchasers. Consequently, the government may be unable to avoid socially wasteful restructuring if it wishes to maximize its net sales revenue. The results presented in this paper provide a number of insights and policy recommendations for governments embarking on a privatization program.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.     

Privatization And Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility Privatization

This article examines the effects on poverty of privatization, an impact to which donors have given little attention in their concern with efficiency and markets. The analysis of the distributional impact of privatization activities draws on empirical cases in the utilities sector in a wide range of developing economies, principally in Africa and Latin America. After a critical consideration of the World Bank position on privatization strategies, and the arguments presented by donors on the pro–poor effects of these economic reforms, the article turns to the negative distributional effects. It is argued that privatization has demonstrably damaged the poor, whether through loss of employment and income, or through exclusion from, or reduced access to, basic services. This is mainly because private firms are principally concerned with profits, prices and costs, and are highly selective as to sectors and types of consumer. Meanwhile, the weakness of governance and regulatory capacity in many developing countries lead to poor control of market abuses. The article concludes by proposing that donors should take more account of local variations in state–market relations, and be prepared to give consideration to alternative economic strategies where privatization is not working as intended.     

International Trade and Strategic Privatization

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their publicly‐owned firms. In order to analyze this question, we consider two countries and assume that publicly‐owned firms are less efficient than private firms. We obtain that when the marginal cost of the publicly‐owned firms takes an intermediate value, each government wants it to be the government of the other country that privatizes its publicly‐owned firm. In this case, only one government privatizes, and that government obtains lower social welfare and producer surplus than the other.     

Privatization and Strategic Mergers across Borders

We present a theoretical model to capture the role of privatization in the incentives for and implications of cross‐border horizontal mergers. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we show that a decrease in the degree of privatization will lower the incentives for diversification of international production. The incentives for diversification for any given degree of privatization will fall when the private and public firms are allowed to move sequentially rather than simultaneously. The presence of the public firm also introduces a new source of asymmetry in the incentives for cross‐border mergers: a reduction in the degree of privatization at home will dampen the potential gains from a take‐over of a home firm by a foreign firm but magnify the potential gains from a take‐over of a foreign firm by a home firm.     

Privatization and the British Post Office

This article considers whether privatization or liberalization of the Royal Mail division of the Post Office is likely to be desirable. It examines the natural monopoly issue but finds it not definitive. It then investigates various potential outcomes of change in the direction of privatization and liberalization and several potential instruments for securing these changes. The article argues for improved regulation rather than denationalization as a means of sustaining improvement in performance.     

Mergers,Privatization and Environmental Considerations

The purpose of this paper is to analyze both merger sustainability and optimal privatization decisions, in an international mixed oligopoly model when it is explicitly assumed that firms’ production pollutes the environment. Contrary to traditional theory it is shown that both a merger between private firms and between one private and one public firm could be sustainable. Furthermore, the effects of environmental considerations on mixed firms’ optimal degree of privatization are analyzed.