Regulatory Control of the Track Access Charges of Railtrack plc

Railtrack plc, floated in 1996, was the private sector owner of Britain's railway track, signals and stations. Its major source of revenue came from track access charges, which individual train operating companies (TOCs) paid for use of the infrastructure. Since many of these TOCs received substantial subsidies to assist in paying their track access charges, Railtrack was in effect being heavily subsidised. In October 2001, the Government decided that these arrangements were no longer viable and placed Railtrack into administration. This article explains how the level of indirect subsidies to Railtrack had become excessive, and raises crucial questions that need to be addressed in settling the future shape of the railway industry.     

'A Lot of Friction at the Interfaces': The Regulation of Britain's Privatised Railway System

This paper examines the regulation of privatised industries, especially the railways. It focuses on the regulation of the infrastructure company, Railtrack, which collapsed into insolvency less than six years after its flotation. It analyses in detail the establishment of a key interface in the railway system, the track access charges, and discusses the extent to which Railtrack's collapse was a failure of regulation. The paper concludes that the key problem was not the regulatory system, but the fundamentally flawed concept of the rail privatisation, and discusses the implications for the success of privatisation and of Railtrack's successor, Network Rail.     

A “fresh start” or the “worst of all worlds”? A critical financial analysis of the performance and regulation of Network Rail in Britain’s privatised railway system

The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree to which Network Rail, the new not-for-profit infrastructure company owned by members, has provided a “fresh start” for Britain’s privatised railway system. Rail privatisation was predicated on the belief that surplus value could be created through redundancies and deskilling in a loss-making subsidy-dependent industry. Network Rail’s predecessor, Railtrack, followed a profit-maximising agenda and collapsed into insolvency in 2001, after several years of poor performance. Unlike Railtrack, Network Rail is not under pressure to pay dividends to shareholders, and so in theory can focus on the maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure. However, its reliance on debt rather than equity finance, combined with escalating infrastructure costs, means that its annual borrowing costs have reached £1 billion. Thus, the nominally private company is only viable because of substantial subsidy and explicit government support for its borrowing. Further, the bulk of its expenditure is on renewals work which is outsourced to contractors aiming to maximise surplus value. The paper uses critical financial analysis to show the extensive and continuing transfers from the taxpayers and passengers to the financial elite, highlighting distribution issues which have been largely missing from the policy debate over Network Rail’s creation.     

THE MODERNISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE UK'S TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

This paper focuses on the creation of new organisational structures under New Labour's modernisation approach in three related areas: the creation of Network Rail as a replacement for the failed company, Railtrack, in the privatised rail industry; the part privatisation of National Air Traffic Services; and the part privatisation of the London Underground. In each case, the arguments of the Government and its critics will be examined. The analysis demonstrates that for each new structure the key objectives of risk transfer and value for money have not been achieved, and concludes with implications of the modernisation agenda for public policy.     

Delivering Better Transport? An Evaluation of the Ten–Year Plan for the Railway Industry

In July 2000, the Government published Transport 2010, its ten–year plan to improve Britain's transport. This article reviews the proposals to improve the railway system, and examines their likely effects on investment by the railway companies and on passenger safety. The plan is analysed in the context of the structure of the privatized railway industry and its regulatory bodies, with particular reference to the performance of Railtrack (now in administration). The authors conclude that the Government was over–confident in believing that a defective privatized structure could deliver the expansion it wanted. The article shows that the Government has been relying on inadequate and under–performing instruments, over some of which it had little control. This will probably continue unless Railtrack is restructured and taken back into public ownership. Progress so far has been limited, and the prospects of success are not good.     

‘Engines of Extravagance’: The privatised British railway rolling stock industry

The privatisation of Britain's railways involved not only the transfer to private ownership but also the break-up of a previously integrated industry. Under the government's plan the railway's passenger rolling stock was sold to three rolling stock companies (or ‘ROSCOs’).This paper focuses on the role of the ROSCOs in the rail industry and their financial performance, critically examining the available literature and in particular the use that has been made of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to analyse the relations between ROSCOs and train operators, as well measuring their profitability from financial statements.The ROSCOs have been able to charge excessively high lease rentals to the train operating companies (TOCs). Analysis based on TCE which argues that ROSCOs have taken on serious risk to justify these returns (of default by a TOC, or of holding rolling stock surplus to requirements) has been misplaced, failing to see the dysfunctional nature of the market and the implicit government guarantee to maintain services.The paper finds that the ROSCOs need to be regulated and more transparent in their dealings with both train operators and the public.     

The Future of Rail? An Evaluation of the 2004 Railway Industry White Paper

In July 2004, the Government published a white paper on 'The Future of Rail', which outlined its planned third attempt to reform the railways. This article reviews the new blueprint for rail, in the context of the performance of the industry and its regulatory bodies. The changes proposed are analysed in terms of their likely effects on the infrastructure authority and the train companies. The author concludes that there are major problems with the white paper as key details are omitted, and the proposed changes are heavily reliant on private companies which have performed poorly. The Government has missed the opportunity to renationalize the infrastructure authority, a move which would reduce borrowing costs and bring direct control over infrastructure costs.     

Privatisation and Franchising of British Train Operations

The Railways Act 1993 privatised the British railways industry resulting in the separation of ownership and control of the railway infrastructure (track, signals and stations) from that of passenger train operations. The Great North Eastern Railway (GNER), a major train operator, was unable to meet its contractual obligations shortly after successfully re‐tendering for its second franchise. By referring to the organisational form and structure of the franchising process, this paper discusses the main financial and operational problems that specifically contributed to the collapse of GNER. In particular, the paper argues that the fragmented structure of privatised train operations, the lack of industry coordination and the inherent problems of franchising an essential transport service explain the demise of GNER and have undermined the general objectives of railway privatisation. Overall, the paper highlights that privatisation of train services has failed to deliver both travelling benefits for the public and financial benefits to the state.     

“A deficient performance”: The regulation of the train operating companies in Britain's privatised railway system

This paper focuses on the performance and regulation of the train operating companies in Britain's privatised railway system. It places regulation in context by examining rail privatisation, with particular scrutiny given to the theory and practice of the franchising process which established these companies. The record of the regulatory authority is assessed up to the announcement in 2004 of its planned abolition. This assessment employs critical financial analysis, and draws on non-financial performance indicators, in order to examine the extent to which it achieved its five main objectives: increasing the number of rail passengers; managing franchises in the interests of passengers; encouraging efficiency and economy in the provision of passenger rail services; encouraging investment in rail services; and securing a progressive improvement in the quality of rail services. The paper concludes that the regulatory authority's performance was “deficient” as it only achieved the first of these objectives. It places this failure in context by highlighting the fundamental problem—the flawed concept of fragmenting and privatising a loss-making rail industry in the interests of British capitalism. The “stronger” regulation envisaged by the Blair Government is revealed as a smoke screen behind which there is a continuing transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the owners and providers of capital.     

The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail: was it really that bad?

This paper uses a social cost‐benefit analysis (SCBA) framework to assess whether rail privatisation in Britain has produced savings in operating costs. The paper shows that major efficiencies have been achieved and consumers have benefited through lower prices, whilst the increased government subsidy has been largely recouped through privatisation proceeds. We also find that output quality is no lower (and is probably better) than under the counterfactual scenario of public ownership (pre‐Hatfield). The achievement of further savings is key to delivering improved rail services in the future. This paper finds that a privatised structure, where shareholders demand a return on their investment, has led to significant improvements in operating efficiency. It remains to be seen whether the new regime, with a not‐for‐profit infrastructure owner, will deliver the same efficiency improvements.     

运费衍生品创新与上海国际金融航运中心建设

运费衍生品是规避海运运费波动风险的管理工具。由于国内运费衍生品的缺乏,中国企业在2004年以来国际海运运费的剧烈波动中处于被动接受者的不利地位。借鉴国外运费衍生品的发展经验,以创新运费衍生品作为上海国际金融中心和国际航运中心建设的抓手,构建上海运费衍生品的交易、结算和信息平台,推动上海成为国际航运定价中心。     

Rail as the Way Forward

It is a paradox that Britain's rail industry is now leading Europe in terms of growth in passengers and freight, while policy has been tightly focused on cost management and performance reliability. The author looks beyond these two good management principles to set out a strategy for the rail sector, and outlines how it can address issues of national economic competitiveness.     

中国城际高铁与商业信用供给——基于准自然实验的研究

本文利用中国城际高铁开通对公司产品质量保证动机产生的外生变化来考察其如何影响公司的商业信用供给决策。高铁开通通过降低运输成本,提高了公司与客户之间的交易量,不仅可以降低公司与客户之间的信息不对称,还可以促使公司提高产品质量,削弱了公司为了保证产品质量而提供商业信用的动机。借助高铁开通在时间和空间上错列发生的特征,构建准自然实验情境,本文使用双重差分方法的检验,结果表明高铁开通使公司商业信用供给减少约3.51%。研究发现,交易量提高是高铁开通减少公司商业信用供给的重要渠道。进一步分析发现,对于事前信息不对称程度较大、关系专用性投资水平较高和产品质量保证需求较低的公司,高铁开通导致公司商业信用供给减少更多。本文研究为商业信用供给的产品质量保证理论提供了进一步的补充和发展,研究结论对于理解交通基础设施的经济效应以及公司商业信用供给决策的影响因素具有一定的启示意义。     

The impact of implied facilities cost of money subsidies on capital expenditures and the cost of debt in the defense industry

We examine the public policy effects of a cash flow subsidy unique to the government contracting industry, on defense contractors’ capital expenditures and cost of debt over a relatively long time-period, 1978–2009. Because the Department of Defense found evidence of a shrinking defense industrial base in the early 1970s, it wanted to encourage capital spending by defense firms. The result was a cost accounting standard that reimbursed contractors for an imputed facilities capital cost of money (FCCOM) that has remained in effect, virtually unchanged, for almost 30 years, despite structural changes in the defense industry. Our results, using a sample of 628 defense firms, suggest that the standard met its intended objective of increased capital spending within 10 years of its promulgation. However, we also find that the FCCOM subsidy may have contributed to a decreased cost of debt within the defense sector over the long-term. Finally, further analyses indicate that the long-term persistence of this subsidy may have encouraged defense contractors to overinvest in capital goods. Our findings suggest that public policy makers should consider both direct and indirect effects of regulation embedded in accounting standards.     

Rail Franchising Matters—The Award of Open Access Rights on the ECML

In March 2006, the Rail Regulator made a controversial decision to award open access rights to a new train operator on the east coast route. A 10-year franchise had been granted to GNER on this route in 2005 on the assumption that there would not be competition from open access operators. This article examines this decision, concluding that it reflects confusion over responsibilities and the government's ambivalent attitude to rail privatization. Alternatives to the current ‘malaise’ are suggested.     

城市轨道交通出行幸福价值评估研究-以长沙地铁为例

基于计划行为理论,构建城市轨道交通出行选择框架,依据长沙地铁出行SP调查数据,运用因子分析法,考量城市轨道交通出行幸福价值指数和出行幸福价值.结果发现:客观价值、主观价值、主观感觉、出行者特征和出行特征等功能因子决定地铁出行幸福价值;部分常用出行选择决定因素没有得到认同;出行幸福价值中部分客观价值与主观价值的认知存在不一致.鉴此,应在线路成网、改善交通接驳和最后一公里的方便性、增加发车频次、优化公共交通等级计费、传播城市轨道交通优势等方面提高出行幸福价值.     

Public and private funding in new urban public transport

Pressures to reduce urban traffic pollution in the UK have not yet resulted in new policies to provide attractive alternatives to the private car. With growing pressure on public sector investment funds, this article considers ways in which the private sector could work in partnership with the public sector to create new light rail systems.     

Airport futures: Towards a critique of the aerotropolis model

It is predicted that the twenty-first century will be dominated by air transport, both for domestic and international carriage of passengers and cargo. Thus the airport, as a driver of regional growth, is expected to become more than merely a regional gateway. Rather, it will function as city in itself, with living spaces for workers and their families, factories relying on airborne inputs and service industries located around the airport, with major road and rail infrastructure connected to it. However, the ‘aerotropolis’, as this hub for industry and driver of economic development has been called, has not yet been critiqued adequately, especially from a long-term public policy and planning perspective. This article raises concerns about three different dimensions to the aerotropolis regarding its long-term sustainability, viz., energy provision, the security of critical infrastructure and export pathways. In particular, this article argues that air transport will not replace existing components of international economic development. The authors contend that the three dimensions need to be explored in order to arrive at a more balanced view of the aerotropolis and its place in an increasingly complex global future.     

产能利用不足和通胀压力并存的悖论——从产能角度思考中国经济的深层次问题及对策

从中国经济运行的实证轨迹来看,产能过剩存在于以钢铁等为代表的中上游工业制造业和以部分机械制造行业为代表的中下游工业制造业,近年来在以高速公路、高速铁路和轨道交通为代表的基础设施行业也有所体现.在产能过剩的同时,中国的通胀压力尤其是生产资料价格上涨压力却难以消减.产能利用不足与通胀压力并存的根源值得深入分析.生产要素价格...     

A public good approach to credit ratings – From concept to reality

From the onset of the 2008–2009 financial crisis to the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, credit rating agencies have been assigned considerable blame. Reforming the credit rating industry has hence become an important policy issue. In addition to the regulatory efforts in the context of accepting the for-profit business model of ratings, there is a growing realization that credit ratings bear the characteristics of a public good. Financial market participants need reliable, transparent and independent assessment of credit risks. Credit ratings are therefore better viewed as an infrastructure matter. However, the proposed regulations seem to have missed this point. This paper introduces a new approach to credit ratings undertaken by the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore that is predicated on the provision of credit ratings as a public good. With a public good alternative in place, the currently predominant for-profit business model may be counterbalanced.