A note on comparative statics and stochastic dominance

This is a bibliographical note which points out the applicability of some existing results to the development of a sort of Stochastic Dominance ‘algebra’. The ‘more risk averse’ relation of Ross (1981) is established within a general framework.     

试论网络政治参与的影响及对策

随着我国网民数量的不断增加,网络政治参与也逐渐兴起并成为一种交流的新渠道,与传统政治参与相比,网络政治参与本身具有数字性、虚拟性、开放性、平等性、匿名性和交互性的特征,正式由于这些特征让公民可以更加方便、快捷、低成本的获得信息资源,和政府更好沟通并监督政府行为,然而,同时由于各种原因也导致了数字鸿沟网络暴力等危害,这就需要政府和公民携手共同应对。     

A framework for comparative institutional research on HRM

Abstract

This article argues that awareness of institutional context has been singularly lacking in the most influential areas of HRM. This lack of attention to external context has resulted in findings that fail to reflect reality. We offer a layered contextual framework embedded in economic institutional theory. We propose that it forms the basis of a comparative research agenda for HRM. We validate the framework using extant publications on institutionally based comparative HRM, drawing on findings from the Cranet research network published in the decade 2007–2017.     

An empirical analysis of social media usage,political learning and participation among youth: a comparative study of Indonesia and Pakistan

Quality & Quantity - Youth participation in political matters has gained attention among people around the globe where youth involvement in certain political activities has been witnessed (of...     

Face-to-face versus telephone surveys on political attitudes: a comparative analysis

Several researchers declared that the telephone survey reaches more accurate voting tendencies than the face-to-face surveys. Telephone survey shows numerous advantages compared to a face-to-face one but, however, the telephone survey also has some inconveniences. Among these it is important to highlight the scant quality of the sampling frame; absence of a telephone in some homes and the wide expansion of the mobile phone; low response rate of certain collectives and the overrepresentation of others. There are also some new barrierswhich make access more difficult (e.g. the automatic answering phone) and the saturation of the telephone medium because of the large amount of publicity activities which generate a large number of “unsuccessful” calls and interruptedinterviews. The objective of this paper is evaluating the adaptation of the telephone surveys in the electoral forecasts; in an attempt to see if it shows substantial improvements when they are compared to face-to-face interviews.     

Is the enterprise software sector still in transition? A research note

Advances in information technology have not only promoted competition since the 1980s, but they also advanced globalization in the 1990s. The information technology group has lost its momentum since 2000. One of its vital segments was the enterprise software software sector. The sector’s products—such as ERP, CRM—have spurred the speed and efficiency of scores of U.S. companies and service firms in the past fifty months. In 2000, the majority of enterprise software firms incurred losses. Were one to assume that these innovative firms have a real contribution to augment client firms’ efficiency, the question of how to analyze their performance in the absence of positive net income becomes a Gordian knot. To unravel, we have employed selected non-income based measures as proxy criteria. We classify twenty-two firms into three subsets: Pre-1990 and post-1990 firms, full-line and partial-line firms, and large-capitalized and small-capitalized firms, and perform a comparative analysis on the basis of the proxy measures. While pointing to significant differences in productivity and perceived risks among these subsets, our findings allow us to speculate that, one, cottage-industry status of the sector has ended, and, two, new beginnings, in the post-September era of anxiety, will crystallize in the form of a consolidated industry comprising a few firms that possess the intrinsic value of leveraging their innovative capabilities.     

A note on redistribution

A consequence of income redistribution may well be to make everyone (including lower-income groups to which redistribution takes place) worse off after a period of years. Possibly income redistribution might gain consent because of risk aversion. The paper also draws attention to the tendency for people to be more concerned about poverty close at hand rather than far away.     

Conjunctural causation in comparative case-oriented research

This article highlights one of the major benefits of qualitative comparative methodology as applied within a “small-N” research design, namely its potential use for specifying the scope conditions of (theoretically competing) causal mechanisms. It is argued that the identification of set-theoretic relationships, multiple paths, and analytic efforts in typological mapping can make valuable contributions to the elaboration and further development of middle-range theory.     

人力资源管理中的组织政治行为研究

政治行为广泛存在于各种组织中,它是个体为了达到提升或保护自身利益的目的,借助权力或是其他资源对他人或集体施加影响的行为,因此,在人力资源管理中必定存在政治行为.本文通过对组织政治行为的界定、产生原因的分析,对人力资源管理的招聘、绩效评价和职位晋升、薪酬福利以及员工职业生涯等环节进行剖析,探究组织政治行为在这些方面产生的主要影响,进而提出在人力资源管理中如何管理组织政治行为的一些对策.     

A note on linked bargaining

A recent result by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) describes a general framework for overcoming incentive constraints by linking together independent copies of a Bayesian decision problem. A special case of that work shows that if copies of a standard two-player Bayesian bargaining problem are independently linked (players receive valuations and trade simultaneously on a number of identical copies), then the utility cost associated with incentive constraints tends to 0 as the number of linked problems tends to infinity. We improve upon that result, increasing the rate of convergence from polynomial to exponential and eliminating unwanted trades in the limit, by introducing a mechanism that uses a slightly richer and more refined strategy space. Although very much in the same spirit, our declarations are constrained by a distribution which is skewed away from the expected distribution of player types. When a sufficiently large number of bargaining problems are linked, “truth” is an equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is incentive compatible with the utility cost of incentive constraints almost surely equal to 0.     

A note on minimum variance

Summary Minimizing is discussed under the unbiasedness condition: and the condition (A):f _i (x) (i=1, ..., p) are linearly independent , and .