水(自然垄断)行业改造模式初探

Natural monopoly, because of its spontaneous or natural characteristics, must have some mysterious causes of reasonableness. Thus, the regulations to its efficiency loss would have a different way compared to other monopolies. That the characteristics of natural monopoly, in the case of water industry, are that the infrastructure investments are very large, most of which are used to build the transportation system? The webs for transporting their products to their customers, and the products are identity goods or services. By examining the characteristics of natural monopoly, this paper proposed a way to break up and remodel the industry of "natural monopoly". The main clue of remodeling is that the governments, who represent the public and who have the power to control over public resources, should build and maintain a public web platform for the goods' transportation uses, and break up the barrier of the entry so as to produce a market-oriented competitive structure. The running model and the condition of remodeling are put forward and the cost-revenue analysis of the operation is briefly under consideration.     

垄断和自然垄断的自行终结与演变之质疑——与王廷惠教授商榷

市场是供求双方决定价格并交换商品的机制,是经济主体活动的场所。市场中存在着不同形式的垄断,对市场秩序产生不同的影响。而当垄断导致市场失灵时,是完全依赖竞争消除垄断,还是在一定时期内实施相应的政府规制以矫正市场失灵,这是经济学中一个争论不休的重要理论问题,也是政府在行使其职能的实践中经常遇到的难题。文章针对市场过程理论关于垄断和自然垄断终结与演变的一些观点提出质疑,从而探讨政府在面临市场失灵时应该如何作为才能有利于提高经济效率、减少经济不公平,以及保障经济稳定发展。     

Competition Policy: Some Neglected Issues in the Hilmer Report

The Hilmer Report focuses primarily on the very important issues of legislative and regulatory measures to directly reduce monopolistic structures and conduct. This article argues that competition policy also should embrace measures to reduce transaction costs. Lower transaction costs increase the substitutability of different options and help to extend the competitive market, and particularly to reduce entry barriers for new entrants and for innovations. Contrary to Hilmer, the article argues that economic theory, and particularly the marginal cost concept, can and should have a central role in the assessment of monopolistic behaviour and in the determination of access prices to ‘essential services’ provided by natural monopolies.     

国外自然垄断行业政府监管机制研究述评

由于技术进步、市场规模及范围的变化,自然垄断的合理性及其边界是动态变化的。相应地,政府监管理论及其实践中的监管机制、体制和制度也一直在不断调适。由于监管体制与制度在一定时期内具有相对稳定的性质,监管机制设计就显得特别重要。在主要市场经济国家,自然垄断行业政府监管理论及其监管机制研究十分活跃,呈现出特定领域处理政府与市场关系问题的新动向、新思考,对我国建立健全自然垄断行业政府监管机制具有一定的理论意义和政策参考价值。     

Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition

Price cap regulation is typically applied to natural monopolies operating with subadditive costs. Price caps are known to provide superior incentives for the regulated monopoly to pursue cost reduction and, in a multiservice/product context, undertake welfare enhancing price discrimination. It is well known that capping a Laspeyres index of the firm’s prices induces the monopoly to charge socially optimal “Ramsey” prices in the long run. This paper examines the suitability of the Laspeyres form of regulation when the regulated firm faces competition in the market for one of its services (outputs). We present the appropriately modified Ramsey pricing rule for the regulated dominant firm and demonstrate that capping a Laspeyres index of the dominant firm’s prices leads to prices that satisfy this pricing rule in the long run.     

Monopsony power and the existence of natural monopoly in energy utilities

The justification for price and entry regulation of firms hinges on whether the firms are natural monopolies, and empirical tests have been used to determine the natural monopoly status of public utilities. However, these tests are biased if the utilities possess monopsony power - a likely case. The bias is against finding natural monopoly status, which can lead to improper policies. An alternative method of testing is proposed which eliminates the bias.     

COMPETITION BETWEEN PORTS AND INVESTMENT PLANNING

The 1960s were a decade of rapid change in overseas transport technologies. That decade saw the introduction of container ships, hovercraft, massive tankers and ore carriers, LASH (lighter-aboard-ship) vessels, freightliners, and jumbo jets. Many of these will achieve their full potential in the 1970s. These new transport modes have not only had an effect upon the design of ports but also upon the procedures required to control their development at a national level. Whereas in the past there may have been no technological reason to exercise any national control at all, the current situation makes it unrealistic and inefficient to leave individual ports with power to plan and implement their own major developments. The basic theme of this paper is that the state of the technology for the transport of bulk and general cargoes is such that competition between ports for the business of British exporters and importers will result in higher than necessary overseas total distribution costs. Because inland transport costs and times are so much lower the effective hinterland of each port is much larger than it used to be. However, against this has to be weighed the fact that individual ports now can have the technical capacity to handle in a year a large proportion of British cargo of a given type and on a given trade route. Therefore, as the natural, long term tendency would be for port (and perhaps shipping) monopolies to develop it is in the best interests of the users of port facilities for national control to be exercised over them. In the past the threat of local port monopolies was thwarted by local user representation on port boards; now the likelihood of national monopolies requires control at a national level.     

Will the fare be fair? An examination of the pricing effects of the privatization of rail services

This paper explores, with the help of a simple linear model, the implications of the proposals for restructuring British Rail within the recently proposed privatization plan. It is particularly concerned with the separation of responsibility for the provision of infrastructure from that for the provision of services, which will create a situation of bilateral monopoly, and the proposals for franchising services to a number of independent operators, creating complementary monopolies. The model predicts that both these changes will lead to higher fares and reduced demand for rail services, largely because individual agents do not take account the effect of their decisions on the other suppliers involved.     

中国国有企业改革：经验、困境与出路*

作为国有企业产权改革主要模式，“混合所有制”改革是否有助于确保国有资产保值增值，是否有助于推动中国经济可持续发展等问题仍存在探讨空间。本文基于对于改革开放以来中国国有企业改革的成就和教训的考察，指出“混合所有制”可以作为竞争性部门国有企业改革的一个过渡形式；对于垄断央企的改革应该充分借鉴国际上自然垄断行业的改革经验，打破行政垄断，推动竞争性框架建立，并切实实现从“管企业”逐步调整为“管资本”，通过改革实现国有资产的保值增值，并为经济创造新的增长点。     

Mutual,non‐profit or public interest company? An evaluation of options for the ownership and control of water utilities

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate various organizational models for the ownership and control of natural monopolies – specifically the infrastructure of water and sewage provision in England and Wales. First, it summarizes recent discussion of who should own water assets in Britain. The paper notes the opportunity that has arisen for increased consumer involvement, and examines the relative merits of three models that have been suggested as alternatives: a non‐profit trust or company, a public interest company, and a consumer mutual. Five criteria are suggested for evaluating the merits of each type: its ability to safeguard the interests of the most important stakeholder, the consumer; avoid the necessity for a heavy regulatory regime; incentivize management to manage efficiently but without ‘producer capture’; raise capital relatively cheaply; and resist pressures to demutualize. The paper agrees with the recent paper in this Journal by Morse (2000) that, in theory, the consumer mutual has advantages. It draws on Hansmann’s work that suggests consumer ownership of water would be less costly than investor‐ownership, providing there are no large conflicts of interest between different types of consumer. Hansmann’s thesis is expanded to consider the likely benefits from wider member participation, and the hidden costs of not taking members into account. It then tests out whether customers would be motivated in practice to be active members, introducing a theoretical model of what motivates members of co‐operatives and mutuals to participate. The conclusions are that provided managers and board members are committed to encouraging member participation, the consumer mutual model would work well. It would need only light regulation, would avoid producer capture, and would be able to raise capital fairly easily, both from money markets and from members. It would need legislation to prevent it from being demutualized at some time in the future. However, if a participatory corporate culture cannot be guaranteed, or if there is a risk of decline of participation over time, other options such as a non‐profit trust or a public interest company would be less risky.     

Quality of service,efficiency and scale in network industries: an analysis of European electricity distribution

Quality of service (QoS) is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries. In this article, we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis method to multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost efficiency and scale economies. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly, especially that smaller utilities’ efficiency seems to decrease. Our results emphasize that QoS should be an integrated part of efficiency and economic analysis of regulated natural monopolies.     

Estimating demand curve in the Korean VoIP telecommunications market

The VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) market in Korea is showing rapid growth since domestic carriers initiated the service in 2006. These carriers are now seeking new revenue sources from various convergence services and are increasing investment into VoIP. In particular, local exchange carriers (LECs), formerly reluctant to invest in technologies that would cannibalize their local telephone revenue, have started to invest in VoIP, in recognition of the current convergence of media and the telecommunications industry, as well as in the face of intensifying competition. In this study, we determined that VoIP call rates and landline telephony call rates were the most important factors affecting VoIP call demand, in addition to network externality. We also verified that landline telephony is no longer a supplement to VoIP, but rather, a substitute that has considerable influence on VoIP call demand. Empirical evidence is expected to be considered in policy decision making on current issues in the IT industry, such as access prices or competitiveness assessment. The current empirical analysis on the Korean VoIP industry and the adherence to lessons learned from policy enforcement should provide valuable information to countries seeking to develop their own VoIP industries, as well as to businesses developing new strategies based on the VoIP market.     

双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择

城市公用事业通常是自然垄断行业,在我国从计划经济向市场经济转轨的过程中,它还具有较强的行政垄断性。我国对自然垄断与行政垄断并存的公用事业的规制改革与西方国家有所不同,应区别两种垄断的不同性质,有针对性地确定改革目标。本文阐述了我国城市公用事业的自然垄断特性,分析了其行政垄断的根源及表现,对双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择提出了一些建议。     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPORT STATUS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN SERVICES: A FIRM‐LEVEL ANALYSIS FOR SPAIN

This paper analyses the relationship between export status and productivity in a major service exporter, Spain, during 2001–07. I find that exporters in the services sector are 45 percent more productive than non‐exporters. This productivity premium is larger for firms that supply non‐internet‐related services than for firms that supply internet‐related services. The results show that exporters were more productive than non‐exporters before beginning to export, and also that exporting increases productivity growth; however, this positive shock vanishes quickly.     

Should uniform pricing constraints be imposed on entrants?

This paper analyzes uniform pricing, coverage constraints and price caps in markets newly opened to competition, e.g. broadband services. We show that the requirement of uniform pricing has strong repercussions on coverage decisions. Imposed on incumbents only it may distort their coverage decision downward to avoid duopoly entry. If also imposed on entrants it increases the likelihood that entry leads to independent monopolies rather than competition. A sufficiently large coverage constraint on incumbents reestablishes incentives for duopoly entry, but may lead to higher prices.      

Ownership, efficiency, and political interference

Privatisation is often explained by a desire to achieve efficiency. Some authors propose that the main reason for inferior performance under public ownership is interference from politicians who promote output and employment instead of profits to please voters. Western state-owned firms however typically operate in imperfectly competitive markets, or even in natural monopolies. Private ownership then leads to underprovision. This paper presents conditions under which political interference yields higher welfare than under commercial objectives, and vice versa. If effort affects utility, interference may be beneficial in a seemingly perfect market.     

中国地区性行政垄断与区域经济绩效——基于工具变量法的实证研究

在我国,地方官员间的晋升竞争和行政权力所带来的地下经济收益,都会导致地区性行政垄断的出现。地区性行政垄断变量因而会受到GDP、地方财税水平等政绩指标和企业经济指标的影响,并在OLS回归估计中表现出内生性问题。文章构建了一个省级面板数据计量模型,以工具变量法对地区性行政垄断的区域经济绩效及其内生性问题进行实证检验。结果发现:地区性行政垄断损害了4个方面的区域经济绩效——生产效率、资本配置效率、技术创新能力以及国际竞争力。由于地区性行政垄断这种地方官员行为在一定程度上内生于经济系统,以往常用的OLS估计可能会低估地区性行政垄断的危害性。     

Impact model for socially low tariffs in Zairian river transport

This article models the sequence of the effects of low tariffs in public river transport for goods. Within 10 years of deregulation, the public corporation had lost 83 per cent of its river traffic. The reasons for the inefficiency are made clear. The effects of low tariffs are examined, such as service rationing, overcharges, overcapacity and high budget claims, cost enhancement, and cross-subsidizing. The underlying objective is to formulate and apply an assessment method for transport policy that blends theories of rents and contestability in order to show how and why good intentions to boost demand by low tariffs in Zairian river transport produced very different results. Although illustrations are given for one mode of transport in one country, they are believed to be of much wider significance—to over 80 countries liberalizing their economies, including China, developing and east European countries. The National Transportation Authority (NTA, or Onatra) is a public corporation operating seaports, the Matadi–Kinshasa railway and an extensive network of river transportation 8,060 km long in the western half of Zaire. In the 1980s, it held monopolies on seaports and river ports, and shared the monopoly with the National Railway Authority (SNCZ) over the railways and the transport of mineral exports. The market in river transport appeared to be oligopolistic but it was dominated by the NTA. Since the NTA was one of the largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs), its experience is significant for many other SOEs and for the whole national economy. Ways to overcome inefficiencies are suggested, such as ending multiple public monopolies and cross-subsidies, privatization and deregulation.     

Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets

This paper describes the use of a genetic algorithm (GA) to model several standard industrial organisation games: Bertrand and Cournot competition, a vertical chain of monopolies, and a simple model of an electricity pool. The intention is to demonstrate that the GA performs well as a modelling tool in these standard settings, and that evolutionary programming therefore has a potential role in applied work requiring detailed market simulation. The advantages of using a GA over scenario analysis for applied market simulation are outlined. Also explored are the way in which the equilibria discovered by the GA can be interpreted, and what the market analogue for the GA process might be.     

THE MUNICIPAL WASTE MANAGEMENT SECTOR IN EUROPE: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE MARKET

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a comparative assessment of the organization of urban waste management in selected European countries and discusses the regulatory implications of the ongoing evolution. Using an institutional economic approach, focused on governance of transactions along the value chain, we argue that: i) there is evidence of an increasing shift towards operator‐based integrated systems; ii) the emphasis put on material and energy recovery opens the market far beyond the traditional legal monopolies established for managing urban services. These results pose new challenges for economic regulation and make it more complicate to trace the boundary between the public service and the market domain. Spaces for competition in the market have become much larger, but the role of public regulation and planning are nonetheless more far‐reaching than in the past.