Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts

This paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings‐based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures. I find an earnings‐based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest, tax, amortization, and depreciation expenses (EBITDA). However, my empirical analyses show that EBITDA is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses (EBIT) and even the bottom‐line net income. Thus, measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings‐based covenants. I conjecture that contracting parties choose an EBITDA‐related measure, instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses (e.g., EBIT), to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities, which can be controlled through other contractual terms, such as a restriction on capital expenditure, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture.     

Earnings Reported under IFRS Improve the Prediction of Future Cash Flows? Evidence from European Banks

This paper examines the relative costs and benefits of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in the European Union by testing the ability of earnings computed under IFRS to predict future cash flows. The study considers the contribution of net income, comprehensive income and other comprehensive income to the usefulness of earnings to predict cash flows, and it compares IFRS with domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Evidence from a sample of Continental European banks shows that IFRS improve the ability of net income to predict future cash flows. Comprehensive income, too, provides relevant information to predict future cash flows, although with a measurement error which is higher than that in net income for greater lags of time. In our interpretation, these findings are consistent with unrealised gains and losses recognised in other comprehensive income being more transitory and volatile in nature. Overall, our results are relevant to academics and standard setters debating the merits of IFRS adoption and to those who use financial statements and adopt reported earnings to form expectations about future cash flows.     

On the Usefulness of Operating Income,Net Income and Comprehensive Income in Explaining Security Returns

This study evaluates the usefulness of three earnings definitions (operating income, net income and comprehensive income) in explaining residual security returns. Usefulness is measured in terms of relative information content and incremental information content. In the former, the goodness-of-fit of the return-earnings relationship is compared under each earnings definition. In the latter, the increase in goodness-of-fit due to additional earnings components is measured. Based on a sample that averages 922 firms a year for 18 years, the analysis shows that operating income weakly dominates net income, and that both operating income and net income dominate comprehensive income, in information content. The results also show that those items that account for the difference between net income and operating income have incremental information content, but not those between net income and comprehensive income. The practical and academic contributions of these findings are discussed.     

Management earnings forecasts and bank loan contracting

We find that firms tend to issue management earnings forecasts and convey good news before bank loan initiation. Issuing firms enjoy more favorable contracting terms and attract more lenders. Management forecasts issuance within a nine‐month period prior to the loan activating quarter can lower the subsequent loan spread by 14.06 basis points. Moreover, firms with larger management forecast errors are charged harsher contracting terms and attract fewer lenders. Our study suggests that firms strategically issue management earnings forecasts before entering into debt contracts and lenders incorporate the information contained in management earnings forecasts into bank loan contracting.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Sign reversal in the relationship between income smoothing and cost of debt

Despite the fact that income smoothing by managers is a pervasive phenomenon that has been widely researched, extant literature provides incomplete evidence on how smoothing is associated with cost of debt in general, and in the private loan market in particular. The institutional factors associated with private loan contracts, combined with the theoretical motivations for smoothing, make it unclear whether smoothing will be positively, negatively, or not associated with loan spread. Using both cross‐country and within‐country analyses on an international sample of private loans, we predict and provide evidence that income smoothing is associated with lower cost of debt when the threat of private benefits consumption by managers is low, but is associated with higher cost of debt when the threat of private benefits consumption by managers is high. We provide the first evidence in the literature that the garbling effect of smoothing can predictably dominate the signaling view of smoothing in debt contract design, and we identify private benefits consumption threat as the feature of the contracting environment that empirically reveals a sign reversal in the relationship between smoothing and cost of debt.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

Usefulness of fair values for predicting banks’ future earnings: evidence from other comprehensive income and its components

This paper examines whether fair value adjustments included in other comprehensive income (OCI) predict future bank performance. It also examines whether the reliability of these estimates affects their predictive value. Using a sample of bank holding companies, we find that fair value adjustments included in OCI can predict earnings both 1 and 2 years ahead. However, not all fair value-related unrealized gains and losses included in OCI have similar implications. While net unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are positively associated with future earnings, net unrealized gains and losses on derivative contracts classified as cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings. We also find that reliable measurement of fair values enhances predictive value. Finally, we show that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward adjustments.     

Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of Earnings in Loan Contracts

Using a sample of firms that disclose the realizations of earnings used for determining covenant compliance in loan contracts, we provide direct evidence on the informational properties of earnings used in the performance covenants included in debt contracts. We find that the earnings measure used in performance covenants does not exhibit asymmetric loss timeliness and has significantly greater cash flow predictive ability than GAAP measures of earnings. We suggest that these results reflect the idea that contracting parties design accounting rules for performance covenants to enhance their efficacy as “tripwires.”     

Accounting and non-accounting based information in the market for debt: Evidence from Australian private debt contracts

This paper examines accounting and non-accounting based restrictive covenants in Australian private debt agreements. With respect to the former, our findings differ from previous research on public debt. We find more varied definitions of constraints and their specified tightness in private debt contracts than in public debt contracts. Further, limits on interest cover are found to be continuing constraints and not 'once-off' limits. The paper reports frequent use of more specific or 'tailored' accounting based constraints and the frequent inclusion of off-balance sheet numbers in the measurement rules specified.
The paper also provides the first Australian evidence on the use of non-accounting based constraints. These are pervasive and cover a wide range of corporate activity. While largely consistent with previous research the paper also reports evidence of restrictions previously argued to be sub-optimal and hence, unlikely to be observed. Specifically, there are frequent restrictions on firms' production and investment policies.     

Voluntary disclosure of operating income

This study investigates whether New Zealand firms’ voluntary disclosure of operating income, which is also known as earnings before interest and tax, in the income statement is related to the investment opportunity set. New Zealand provides an ideal setting to examine this because New Zealand generally accepted accounting principles do not require the disclosure of operating income as an intermediate income number in arriving at net income (earnings) in the income statement. We hypothesize and find evidence that firms with high assets‐in‐place and high leverage are more likely to voluntarily disclose operating income/earnings before interest and tax. However, the assets‐in‐place finding is sensitive to alternative measures of the investment opportunity set.     

Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in accounting earnings. Covenants govern the transfer of decision-making and control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a company approaches financial distress and thereby limit managers' abilities to expropriate bondholder wealth. Covenants are expected to constrain managerial opportunism, however, only if the accounting system recognizes economic losses in earnings in a timely fashion. Thus, the demand for timely loss recognition should increase with a contract's reliance on covenants. Consistent with this conjecture, I find evidence that reliance on covenants in public debt contracts is positively associated with the degree of timely loss recognition. I also find evidence that the presence of prior private debt mitigates this relationship.     

Fair Value Accounting and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Adoption of SFAS 159

We examine how fair value accounting affects debt contract design, specifically the use and definition of financial covenants in private loan contracts. Using SFAS 159 adoption as our setting, we find that a small but significant proportion of loans (14.5%) modify covenant definitions to exclude the effects of SFAS 159 fair values. Only a limited number of these modifications exclude assets elected at fair value (less than 7%), while all exclude liabilities elected at fair value. Notably, we document that covenant definition modification is unassociated with ex ante fair value elections. We find that covenant definition modification positively varies with common incentive problems attributed to fair value accounting and negatively varies with benefits attributed to fair value accounting. Our results suggest that fair value accounting is not uniformly detrimental for debt contracting and fair value adjustments are included when they are most likely to improve performance measurement.     

Measuring investors’ assessment of earnings persistence: do investors see through smoothed earnings?

Prior studies document that investors value persistent earnings more than transitory earnings. This argument offers incentives to managers to smooth their reported earnings and make them look more persistent. This study examines whether investors are misled by management’s income-smoothing behavior and whether they can correctly assess the persistence of smoothed earnings. Using a simple theoretical model, this paper shows that investors’ assessment of earnings persistence can be derived from their reactions to reported earnings, which is the ratio of the coefficient on earnings change relative to the coefficient on earnings level in the return–earnings relation. Empirical results show that investors’ assessment of earnings persistence is negatively associated with the level of income smoothing after controlling for time-series persistence of earnings and hence suggest that investors understand that the high persistence of smoothed earnings is not real and they discount the persistence of smoothed earnings when they react to such earnings news.     

Usefulness of comprehensive income reporting in Canada

In January 2005 the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) issued three new accounting standards that require Canadian firms to mark-to-market certain financial assets and liabilities and recognize the holding gains and losses related to these items as other comprehensive income or as part of net income. The Board’s objectives for issuing the new standards are (i) to harmonize Canadian GAAP with US and International GAAP, (ii) to enhance the transparency and usefulness of financial statements, and (iii) to keep pace with changes in accounting standards in other countries that are moving towards fair value accounting. This paper investigates empirically whether requiring Canadian companies to report comprehensive income and its components provides the securities market with incremental value-relevant information over the traditional historical-cost earnings approach.Previous empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the value relevance of other comprehensive income and its components. This mixed evidence may be attributed partially to the use of as if methodology to construct an ex-ante measure of other comprehensive income prior to the implementation of SFAS 130, which introduces measurement error. In contrast, this study uses actual data on other comprehensive income for a sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US in the period 1998–2003. We find evidence that available-for-sale and cash flow hedges components are significantly associated with price and market returns. We also find that aggregate comprehensive income is more strongly associated (in terms of explanatory power) with both stock price and returns compared to net income. However, we find that net income is a better predictor of future net income relative to comprehensive income. Our findings suggest that mandating all Canadian firms to adopt the new accounting standards is expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements. Our findings, therefore, should be of interest to Canadian accounting policy makers as they provide ex-ante evidence on the potential usefulness of mandating firms to report comprehensive income and the components of other comprehensive income in their financial statements.     

Changes in bonus contracts in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley era

We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes–Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes–Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes–Oxley and related reforms led to a decrease in earnings management and that firms responded by placing more weight on earnings in bonus contracts. We find no evidence that firms changed compensation contracts to compensate executives for assuming more risk.     

Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues

We examine whether firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing. We find significant income‐increasing earnings management prior to bond offerings. We also find that firms that manage earnings upward issue debt at a lower cost, after controlling for various bond issuer and issue characteristics. Our results are consistent with studies that report earnings management around equity issuance. The results indicate that, like equity holders, bondholders fail to see through the inflated earnings numbers in pricing new debt.     

Transitory earnings components and the two faces of non‐generally accepted accounting principles earnings

Non‐generally accepted accounting principles (non‐GAAP) earnings reporting has been linked with both informative and strategic incentives. We seek to disentangle these conflicting effects by examining the association between non‐GAAP earnings disclosure and transitory items in GAAP earnings, conditional on managers' reporting incentives. We report evidence of a statistically and economically significant asymmetric relation between disclosure propensity and transitory items in GAAP earnings conditional on both the sign and magnitude of the GAAP earnings surprise. Our findings suggest that non‐GAAP earnings disclosures tend to be driven by a desire for informative (strategic) reporting when GAAP earnings beat (undershoot) market expectations.     

Debt contracting and the goodwill debate

Extant literature offers mixed evidence on the quality of goodwill after the promulgation of SFAS 141/2 (Li and Sloan, 2017; Lee, 2011; Chen et al., 2008). We reconcile these conflicting findings by examining the role of managerial incentives in determining the efficacy of SFAS 141/2 in improving the quality of goodwill reporting. Using the context of debt contracting, we find that the value-relevance of goodwill is higher for firms that include goodwill in debt covenants in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. We also find that in the post-period, firms that include goodwill in their debt contracts appear to take timelier impairments. In addition, debt contracts in these firms also have tighter covenant thresholds, further corroborating the increased value-relevance of goodwill under the current impairment regime. We also document a relatively higher frequency of covenant violation for firms that use goodwill in their debt contract in the post-SFAS 141/2 period. Taken together, our results inform ongoing discussions regarding the accounting for goodwill and provide new insight into understanding of debt contracting and the role of accounting standards therein.     

Earnings Persistence, Losses and the Estimation of Earnings Response Coefficients

One of the major themes of capital markets accounting research concerns mapping the relation between accounting earnings and security returns. There is still not agreement on the functional form of this relation. The models analysed here are those where: the level of earnings alone, the change in earnings alone, or both, scaled by price, are used as explanatory variables for returns. This article demonstrates that if earnings are either completely permanent or entirely transitory, the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) estimated by levels and changes models should coincide. However, if earnings comprise a mixed process of permanent and transitory components, the ERC estimated by the levels will differ from that estimated by the changes model. Using losses to identify transitory components in earnings, empirical evidence consistent with these predictions is provided.
A combined model using both the level of, and change in, earnings is justified as a weighted average of an earnings and a book value valuation model (e.g., Ohlson, 1989). An alternative rationalization concerns the mitigation of an errors-in-variables problem associated with the estimation of unexpected earnings (Ali and Zarowin, 1992). The results for the combined model are more consistent with the latter. In this context, some previous empirical studies perceive the levels variable as a useful addition to the changes variable when there are transitory components in earnings. However, the evidence reported here suggests that the level of earnings, scaled by price, appears to be the fundamental earnings explanatory variable for returns (Ohlson, 1991, p. 1). The changes variable can, when the errors-in-variables problem is not mitigated by other methods, be a useful addition to the levels variable.