Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense

We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited .     

SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO UTILITY REGULATION

Is it inevitable that monopoly networks should continue to be regulated in their present form? Such regulation has limitations as well as advantages. In some countries, negotiated settlements between utilities and users including customer groups provide greater flexibility and innovation and better representation of consumer interests. There is scope for applying such alternative institutional arrangements in the UK.     

Patent Settlements as a Barrier to Entry

We formulate a model of entry with two incumbent firms—a patent holder and an infringer—and a potential entrant, with asymmetric information about the validity of the infringed patent (patent strength) between incumbent firms and the entrant. Within this framework we show that patent settlements between the incumbent firms can be mutually beneficial even when the cost of trial is zero and the settlement agreement takes the form of a simple fixed license fee. For patents of intermediate strength, settlements are a tool for entry deterrence. The two parties agree on a high settlement amount which sends a credible signal to “outsiders” that the patent is not weak and therefore entry will not be profitable. This provides a novel explanation for the role of settlements and to the recent observation of high license fees negotiated in settlement agreements. It suggests that firms should disclose the settlement amount if they want to keep out further entrants. We also show that even nonreverse settlements that entail only a fixed fee can be anticompetitive because they are used to block entry.     

Getting Away with Robbery? Patenting Behavior with the Threat of Infringement

The paper examines how an innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator may find it optimal to patent her innovation even if litigation is not pursued in the event of patent imitation. The patent is valuable because it can be used to influence the entrant's location decision in a way that is profitable for the incumbent. In addition to showing that a patent need not be legally enforced to be valuable, the paper shows that the lower is the entrant's R&D cost, the smaller is the innovator's incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the lower is the R&D cost, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering imitation.     

Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?

This paper provides a solution to a puzzle in the analysis of tournaments, that of why there is no agent discrimination or differential contracting in certain business practice settings. The paper examines the problem of a principal contracting with multiple agents whose activities are subject to common shocks. The presence of common shocks invites the use of relative performance evaluation to minimize the costs of moral hazard. But, in the additional presence of adverse selection, the analysis shows that there may be no need for ex ante screening through menus of offers. This is so because the principal becomes better informed ex post about agent types, via the realization of common uncertainty, and can effectively penalize or reward the agents ex post. Thus, unlike the standard adverse selection problem without common uncertainty where the principal always benefits from ex ante screening, it is shown that ex post sorting through relative performance evaluation reduces the scope for ex ante screening through menus, and can eliminate it completely if agents are known to not be very heterogeneous. This is consistent with observed practice in industries where the primary compensation mechanism is a cardinal tournament which is uniform among employees. The analysis connotes that by using relative instead of absolute performance measures, firms with employees who are not substantially heterogeneous not only can alleviate the agency problem, but there is also no need to extract the agents' ex ante private information about their innate abilities via a screening menu.     

Knowledge spillovers in US patents: A dynamic patent intensity model with secret common innovation factors

During the past two decades, innovations protected by patents have played a key role in business strategies. This fact enhanced studies of the determinants of patents and the impact of patents on innovation and competitive advantage. Sustaining competitive advantages is as important as creating them. Patents help sustaining competitive advantages by increasing the production cost of competitors, by signaling a better quality of products and by serving as barriers to entry. If patents are rewards for innovation, more R&D should be reflected in more patent applications but this is not the end of the story. There is empirical evidence showing that patents through time are becoming easier to get and more valuable to the firm due to increasing damage awards from infringers. These facts question the constant and static nature of the relationship between R&D and patents. Furthermore, innovation creates important knowledge spillovers due to its imperfect appropriability. Our paper investigates these dynamic effects using US patent data from 1979 to 2000 with alternative model specifications for patent counts. We introduce a general dynamic count panel data model with dynamic observable and unobservable spillovers, which encompasses previous models, is able to control for the endogeneity of R&D and therefore can be consistently estimated by maximum likelihood. Apart from allowing for firm specific fixed and random effects, we introduce a common unobserved component, or secret stock of knowledge, that affects differently the propensity to patent of each firm across sectors due to their different absorptive capacity.     

The effect of environmental regulation on environmental innovation

Environmental expenditure estimates resulting from US environmental policy are based on current technology which may overstate policy's true costs. Existing evidence shows that ex ante cost estimates are greater than realized costs due to unexpected technological progress. This research programme asks whether innovation is a response to environmental regulation or whether the true regulatory compliance costs are overestimated ex ante when technological advancement is ignored? The author conducts an empirical study of the US manufacturing industry's environmental patent activities and environmental regulation as measured by pollution abatement and control expenditure (PACE) data. She finds a statistically significant positive relationship between environmental regulation and innovation when estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, the OLS coefficient of pollution abatement costs is inconsistent because of a correlation between the explanatory variable and unobservable variables. Two-staged least squares addresses the inconsistency problem, resulting in positive and significant PACE coefficients. Thus, there is evidence that innovation is a response to environmental regulation. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Learning by Exporting: New Insights from Examining Firm Innovation

Empirical findings across many nations show that exporters have superior productivity compared to nonexporters and that this relationship is driven by productive firms becoming exporters. The conclusion drawn from these studies is that there is little learning from exporting. We, however, assess if there are ex post benefits that accrue to exporting firms by examining innovation outcomes. We argue that exporters can often access diverse knowledge inputs not available in the domestic market, that this knowledge can spill back to the focal firm, and that such learning can foster increased innovation. We examine product innovation and patent application counts of a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms from 1990 to 1997. To conduct the analysis, we use a nonlinear GMM estimator for exponential models with panel data that allows for predetermined regressors and linear feedback. We find that exporting is associated with innovation. Moreover, the panel data allow us to explore the temporal relationship between exporting and innovation. In contrast to existing findings, we find evidence of learning by exporting—albeit in dimensions not previously examined in the literature.     

Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress

In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.     

Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents

In this article, a Tullock contest success function is used to model an innovation contest with endogenous innovation height. We can prove stability for this endogenous prize contest. The winner of the contest gains a monopoly rent, which has two dimensions. In the first dimension the winning firm influences the innovation height. The second dimension is the life span of the temporary monopoly. This life span is determined by the contest designer, who can be asocial planner or the consumers. We find interior solutions in both cases, whereas consumers prefer a monopoly life span below the social optimum. Furthermore, the optimal number of firms in the contest is two.     

The nonlinear effect of green innovation on the corporate competitive advantage

This study uses Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) to explore the nonlinear relationships between green innovation performance and corporate competitive advantage. The result indicates that green innovation performance has the nonlinear effect on the corporate competitive advantage. If companies hope to enhance their competitive advantages through green innovation, they must check their green innovation performance in advance. If their green innovation performance is low, they can obtain competitive advantages through the increase of the green innovation performance; however, if their green innovation performance is high, they can not necessarily obtain competitive advantages through the increase of the green innovation performance.     

The optimal disposition decision for product returns

We provide an analytic model for the optimal disposition decision for product returns. The manager decides which product returns to accept for processing at the remanufacturing facility, and which ones to sell immediately as-is at a salvage value. High congestion levels in the remanufacturing facility delay the sale of the remanufactured product at the secondary market, decreasing the value at which it can be sold; this may imply a more attractive salvaging option. This is particularly important for high-tech products with short life cycles, such as computers and printers. We propose a two-step policy. In the first step, the returned product’s random processing time is observed. In the second step, a disposition decision is made: if the processing time is larger than a threshold k* the product is salvaged; otherwise the product is remanufactured. We provide an approximate procedure to compute k* in industrial settings. Our numerical study demonstrates the superiority of our policy over the current industrial practice ignoring the time value of money.     

How Governments Should Support the Adjustment of Competitiveness in the Euro Area – and How They Should Not

In addition to unsustainable fiscal policies, the weak competitiveness of southern European countries is contributing to the ongoing crisis in the euro area. However, wages and productivity are only one element of competitiveness and the value of competitive wages is hard to measure. Hard‐to‐identify non‐price competitiveness such as quality, innovation and technology of goods affects overall competitiveness too. Given the lack of information, the necessary level of wage adjustment needs to be negotiated on the market. Governments can support a market based adjustment of competitiveness by liberalising labour markets and by strengthening the business environment.     

Design versus utility innovation: Is corruption sanding or greasing the wheels of innovation?

This paper studies whether corruption has a greasing or a sanding effect on the production of innovation. The main novelty lies in comparing the relative impacts on design versus utility innovation. On the one hand, corruption can undermine (sand) the expected returns from patents, whereas on the other hand, patent holders might be able to increase (grease) the scope and applicability of their patents. Using U.S. state-level data and controlling for bidirectional causality, results show the sanding effect of corruption with regard to utility patents, with the negative effect on design patents occurring only with a time lag.     

Technology fusion: Identification and analysis of the drivers of technology convergence using patent data

The concepts of technology convergence or technology fusion describe the phenomenon of technology overlap. Despite evidence of the higher value associated to interdisciplinary research and cross-industry innovation, few studies have investigated the characteristics of technology fusion based on patent data. This study identifies new cases of convergence relying on the International Patent Classification (IPC) of patents filed at the European Patent Office between 1991 and 2007: the first occurrence of a patent incorporating a combination of IPC subclasses signals a new instance of fusion. Duration models are employed to investigate the impact of field level characteristics derived from patent bibliometrics on the likelihood of identifying a new fusion. The results show that merges are more frequent if the focal technology fields are closely related (based on a higher number of cross citations), are characterized by wide technological scope, and are the result of an inter-firm collaboration. In contrast to previous findings, the results show that the more complex the technologies involved, the less the likelihood of their convergence or fusion. The correlation between fusion likelihood and the characteristics of the merging fields could help managers and policymakers to predict the emergence of new technology areas.     

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.     

Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate

With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.     

International entrepreneurial orientation and regional expansion

Abstract

This study examines how behavioral elements of international entrepreneurial orientation (i.e. product innovativeness, risk-taking, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness, and autonomy) increase variability in scope of regional market expansion, and the international marketing channel management conditions under which this occurs. Results from an empirical study in a developing market show that not all behavioral elements of international entrepreneurial orientation (IEO) increase scope of regional expansion. The study specifically finds that scope of regional expansion is fostered when high levels of product innovation intensity, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness, and autonomous behaviors are aligned with a stronger channel management capability. Conversely, the regional expansion values of product innovation novelty and proactiveness are cancelled out when channel management capability levels are high.     

基于博弈的专利诉讼与交叉许可决策研究

随着企业研发能力和知识产权保护意识的逐渐增强,越来越多的企业通过建立专利壁垒来保证自身的持续竞争力与市场地位。"专利丛林"的现象导致企业进行技术创新以及新产品的开发举步维艰。为了节省成本,科技企业之间相互的专利侵权现象时有发生。面对相互的专利侵权现象,有的企业运用专利诉讼的手段与对方发起"专利大战"以维持自身的竞争优势,也有的企业通过专利的交叉许可协议,与对方建立长期的专利合作关系。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究了企业进行专利诉讼以及交叉许可的选择决策的机理。