韩国存款保险公司救助和处置机制及启示

<正>近年来,韩国多次发生储蓄银行倒闭风波。韩国存款保险公司综合运用多种处置方式,成功缓释了储蓄银行风险,实现了对倒闭机构及时有序合理的处置,维护了金融稳定。借鉴韩国存款保险制度成功经验,对我国研究建立存款保险制度具有一定的参考价值。一、韩国存款保险制度概况韩国曾经实行隐性存款保险制度,1983年建立第一个存款保险基金以来,曾先后建立覆盖银行、证券和保险等6个行业的强制性存款保险基金~①。1995年12月,韩国出台了     

韩国存款保险金支付程序及对我国的借鉴

韩国于1996年建立了韩国存款保险公司(KDIC),建立了存款保险制度.经过近年来的发展,韩国形成了成熟的存款保险金申请及支付程序,为更好的保护存款人的合法权益发挥了重要作用,对我国建立健全存款保险金支付流程具有较强的借鉴意义.现将相关流程编译总结如下,供参考.     

从韩国应对银行“挤兑潮”谈建立存款保险制度的必要性

长期以来,我国始终没有建立存款保险制度,而银行存款保险清偿责任由国家承担的隐性存款保险代之。这一做法加重了财政负担,不利于货币政策和市场竞争。建立符合中国国情的存款保险制度,已成为我国深化金融改革、完善金融体制和制度的一项紧迫地战略性任务。从分析韩国成功应对银行业金融机构＂挤兑潮＂入手,论证了建立银行业存款保险制度的意义与作用。在此基础上,结合我国实际情况,阐明建立我国银行业存款保险制度的必要性。     

构建我国存款保险公司的若干问题研究

针对人们的疑问，本文提出：我国的存款保险公司应具备监管职能，与行政执法部门的监管构成互补：建立显性的存款保险制度能降低目前隐性存款保险制度下的道德风险；国有商业银行应参加存款保险。     

韩国存款保险公司现场检查权的改革与启示

本次国际金融危机发生后,国际金融组织和主要经济体纷纷把存款保险制度纳入系统性金融风险防范和处置体系。在韩国互助储蓄银行破产处置中,韩国存款保险公司发挥了重要的金融稳定作用,但也暴露了一些存在的问题。本文回顾了韩国存款保险公司现场检查权立法工作的沿革,分析了韩国强化存款保险公司单独现场检查权的改革方向与内在逻辑,比较研究了韩国存款保险公司与韩国金融监督院现场检查的工作重点和协调机制,总结了韩国存款保险公司现场检查职能改革的经验和启示,指出存款保险机构在事前风险防范方面所发挥的重要作用。     

从韩国应对银行"挤兑潮"谈建立存款保险制度的必要性

长期以来,我国始终没有建立存款保险制度,而银行存款保险清偿责任由国家承担的隐性存款保险代之.这一做法加重了财政负担,不利于货币政策和市场竞争.建立符合我国国情的存款保险制度,已成为深化金融改革、完善金融体制和制度的一项紧迫的战略性任务.本文从分析韩国成功应对银行业金融机构"挤兑潮"入手,论证了建立银行业存款保险制度的意...     

行业动态

人民银行在大连举办“存款保险国际论坛”本刊讯存款保险制度的建设是我国金融体制改革的一项重大理论和实践问题。为深入了解国际存款保险制度的先进经验和良好做法,探讨我国存款保险制度设计的可行性,推动建立适合中国国情的存款保险制度,中国人民银行于9月15～16日在大连举办了“存款保险国际论坛”。国际存款保险协会,美国、加拿大、日本、韩国、印度、马来西亚、菲律宾、俄罗斯、波兰、匈牙利、巴西、尼日利亚等国的存款保险机构和中央银行以及我国台湾、香港地区存款保险机构的负责人,国家发改委、财政部、国务院法制办、银监会、证监…     

我国建立存款保险制度的必要性及模式选择

存款保险制度具有稳定金融体系、保护存款人利益、降低金融风险等功能。本文从隐性存款保险制度的缺陷以及建立显性存款保险制度的重要性两方面分析了我国建立存款保险制度的必要性;并从存款保险组织机构的形式选择、存款保险范围及方式的确定、存款保险最高限额的确定以及存款保险费率的设定等方面,探讨了选择符合我国国情和经济发展状况的存款保险制度模式。     

韩国存款保险公司风险监测机制及启示

1995年12月,韩国出台《存款人保护法》,正式建立存款保险制度.为强化对金融机构的风险监测及评估,降低存款保险基金损失风险,韩国存款保险公司(KDIC)建立了相对完善的风险监测机制,起到了补充监管、推动金融机构稳健经营的作用.KDIC根据日常采集的各类金融信息,通过信息系统、模型评估等开展非现场监测,结合现场核查或与监管部门联合检查,实地研判金融机构风险状况,形成了从风险信息采集、监测、分析、研判到处置的较为完备的风险监测体系.我国存款保险制度于2015年5月1日正式实施,正逐步完善对金融机构的风险监测体系,KDIC的相关做法对我国具有一定的借鉴意义.     

建立存款保险制度 防范化解金融风险

建立存款保险制度防范化解金融风险石慧梅存款保险制度是从保护存款者利益的角度出发,防止银行倒闭出现挤兑风潮,稳定金融秩序的有效措施之一。即通过对金融机构的存款进行保险,将一部分存款风险转移给保险公司,一旦金融机构出现风险不能保证客户存款支付时,可从保险...     

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance,Risk‐Taking,and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.     

Wealth and Risk Effects of Adopting Deposit Insurance in Canada: Evidence of Risk Shifting by Banks and Trust Companies

This paper confirms that adopting explicit deposit insurance expanded risk-shifting incentives for Canadian Banks and Trust Companies. By transferring responsibility for monitoring non-systematic risk to the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), deposit insurance eliminated the compensation previously paid to large-block stockholder monitors. This transfer fueled a redistribution of insured-institution stock from poorly diversified large-block shareholders to diversified investors. Also, subsequent changes in market volatility support the hypothesis that CDIC insurance and the absorption of catastrophic risk it provided reduced systematic risk in the stock market as a whole even as it increased non-systematic risk in the banking and trust-company sector.     

Increased Concentration in Banking: Megabanks and Their Implications for Deposit Insurance

During the past two decades, the U.S. banking industry has experienced an unprecedented wave of consolidation, marked by a substantial decline in the number of insured depository institutions and the emergence of banking behemoths with assets totaling in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This unparalleled concentration of assets and deposits among a handful of "megabanks" has important implications for deposit insurance. Most importantly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) now faces a situation in which the failure of even a single megabank could overwhelm the resources immediately available to the deposit insurance system and expose both the banking industry and the government (i.e., taxpayers) to huge potential liabilities. This article highlights the current structure of the banking industry, examines the threat that this structure poses to the deposit insurance funds, and suggests possible approaches for dealing with megabanks and the increasing concentration of insured deposits.     

金融双语

存款保险制度 存款保险制度主要是通过建立存款保险机构，运用风险补偿机制来保护存款人免受因金融机构破产而导致的财物损失，从而提高公众对银行部门的信任，有助于金融系统的稳定。同时，通过防止流动性恐慌，存款保险还可以使实体经济避开银行体系不稳定造成的部分恶劣影响。存款保险制度有隐性的和显性的两种。     

Persistency of window dressing practices in the U.S. repo markets after the GFC: The unexplored role of the deposit insurance premium

We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the United States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium.     

The Effects of Variations in Laxity (or Strictness) of Closure Rules on the Valuation of Deposit Insurance

The passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which removed some of the freedom or latitude the FDIC had in resolving and closing insolvent institutions, makes it clear that regulatory closure rules are not invariant with regard to time and events. Therefore, this paper analyzes the effects of variations in the laxity or strictness of bank closure rules on the valuation of deposit insurance. Hardly predictable state variables, such as political, economic and bureaucratic constraints, represent potential sources of uncertainty that drive changes in the stringency of closure policy. A variation of Ronn and Verma's [14] model is extended to consider situations where the insurance agency's closure rule is uncertain.     

The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves

A common feature of many insurance systems is that they are backed by an insurance fund and insurance premiums are adjusted to target this fund's reserves. This study analyzes the fund targeting policy of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It examines the distortions to banks' cost of deposit financing that result from setting premiums in this manner. The study's framework is a multiperiod, multibank contingent claims model where the stochastic rates of return on individual banks' assets are assumed to be correlated and match the actual empirical distribution of a sample of U.S. banks. The model identifies factors that are likely to exacerbate distortions due to insurance mispricing. The relative merits of a targeting policy and a flat-rate insurance policy are discussed, and the real effects of insurance mispricing are estimated. A method for valuing a government subsidy under a reserve targeting policy is also presented.     

Further Evidence on Equity Market Contagion: the FSLIC's Solvency and the Liquidity Crisis of Financial Corporation of America

Whether pure contagion is more likely to occur when a federal deposit insurer is severely undercapitalized is an unanswered question. This paper provides evidence on this issue by examining the stock market reaction of savings and loans (S&Ls) to the crisis of Financial Corporation of America (FCA) in 1984, when the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was fiscally unsound. Consistent with a contingent insurance guarantee hypothesis, the results show large, significant negative abnormal returns (ARs) for a portfolio of high insured deposit S&Ls during FCA's crisis.     

国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

金融宏观审慎管理框架下我国存款保险制度主要问题探讨

存款保险是经济金融危机的产物,也是防范系统性金融风险的重要宏观审慎管理工具。本文基于政策设计的视角,对我国金融宏观审慎管理制度框架下的存款保险制度建设中的主要问题进行探讨,以期增加我国存款保险制度的完备性和效用性。