ECONOMIC RENT AND ESTIMATION OF SOVIET GNP GROWTH

The extraction of fuels and metals and production of agricultural goods in the USSR involve increasing marginal cost, which generates economic rent. In computing Soviet GNP accounts, though, the CIA excludes economic rent in measuring value added. The effect is to value output at average, as opposed to marginal, cost. The exclusion of rent understates the shares of fuels, metals, and agriculture in Soviet GNP, which adversely affects the CIA's calculations of Soviet growth. In this paper, the author estimates the economic rent generated by Soviet extraction of fuels and metals and agricultural production. He then uses the estimates to recompute the shares of these sectors in Soviet GNP, and GNP growth. The results suggest that inclusion of economic rent in value added (or alternatively, marginal cost valuation of output) more than doubles the share in GNP of mining (fuels and metals extraction), and increases agriculture's share during the 1980s from 20 percent to about 25 percent. The reestimates of Soviet GNP growth also differ from those of the CIA by 10–30 percent.     

Total factor productivity in postwar Soviet industry and its branches

The Cobb-Douglas production function with a declining rate of technical change or of total factor productivity growth (TFP) emerges as the dominant model for explaining the output-growth retardation in postwar Soviet industry when two sets of output data, from Soviet sources and from the CIA, are used for estimating Cobb-Douglas and CES specifications. Rates of output growth and TFP, though low, are higher with Soviet than with CIA data. However, their relative divergence is smaller in those industrial branches where Soviet output data are not exaggerated and where the CIA sample is representative of the branch output. J. Comp. Econ., March 1985, 9(1), pp. 1–23. Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.     

MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A COMMUNIST COMMAND ECONOMY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CIA ESTIMATES FOR THE U.S.S.R.

There are major methodological and practical problems in comparing the performance of capitalist and communist economies. They have been most carefully analysed for the former Soviet Union, for which there was a huge research input, mainly by the CIA. The CIA effort had considerable merit, particularly in assessing Soviet rates of growth. Unfortunately, it was terminated in 1991, partly because it suffered from unduly harsh criticism, partly because its political relevance waned. However, the CIA archives remain an important source for the study of comparative economic growth. It would be extremely useful if they were opened to scholars, a serious loss if they were destroyed.     

Measuring technological trends: A comparison between U.S. and U.S.S.R./Russian jet fighter aircraft

Measuring and forecasting technological change is a crucial issue from various points of view. This is particularly important in the case of weapon systems as this would enable technological performance and operational capabilities to be assessed in relation to potential threats. This paper measures and compares technological trends in U.S. and Soviet Union/Russian jet fighter aircraft by estimating the relationship between the first flight date and a set of performance and technical characteristics of these aircraft. From the point of view of technological advantage, we find that U.S. jet fighters were, on average, approximately 2 years ahead of the former Soviet Union/Russian jet fighters during the entire jet fighter era. Nevertheless, the technological advantage has swung from one side to the other during specific periods as particular models have been introduced. Finally, the development of 5th-generation jet fighters, in particular the development of the F-22 Raptor, has placed American technology about 20 years ahead of Russian technology, a difference that has never occurred before. This finding casts doubt on the ability of Russia, as the inheritor of the former Soviet Union aircraft industry, to match American technological progress in jet fighter aircraft.     

The tenability of the CIA estimates of Soviet economic growth

This paper evaluates the tenability of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates of Soviet economic growth during 1950–1980, published in December 1982. The evaluation involves applying the CIA methodology used in making these estimates to estimate economic growth in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States and then comparing the results with the official estimates of the respective countries themselves. Use of the CIA methodology understates substantially the growth of both the West German and the U.S. economies, which raises the possibility that it also understates Soviet economic growth.     

APPRAISING THE U.S. OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES FOR GOVERNMENT–WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Output and productivity estimates for U.S. government organizations are a useful management tool, and are of potential value for improving national income accounts. Real gross government product is currently estimated on the basis of labor input data. However, this imparts a downward bias to real GNP estimates since labor productivity of federal civilian employees has risen, according to Labor Department estimates begun in 1972, at an average annual rate of 1; percent since 1967. The estimates now cover almost 70 percent of the employees. The chief avenue for further improvement lies in refinement of the output indicators. Coverage of state and local government employees is spotty and needs to be expanded. The author also recommends a major effort to estimate public capital stocks in current and constant prices as a basis for measuring rental values, capital inputs, and productivity.     

我国商品房价格增长与宏观经济因素的关联性研究

文章基于我国商品房价格增长率、利率、工业增加值增速、通货膨胀率以及货币供给量增长率五个主要的宏观经济指标,利用多变量向量自回归(VAR)模型研究了我国商品房价格增长与宏观经济运行之间的相互关系。所得到的结果表明,我国通货膨胀率和货币供给量增长率能够显著影响商品房价格增长率,而利率和工业增加值增速对我国商品房价格增长率的影响作用较弱,因此,控制房地产行业的货币供给对限制房地产价格快速增长是一项行之有效的调控政策。     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S.S.R. IN THE 1980s

In 1989 Soviet authorities released unprecedented new data on the size distribution of income in the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s, including the distributions by republics. With the goal of providing a benchmark for evaluating the effect of current and future economic reforms on income distribution in the former Soviet Union, this paper estimates inequality measures for the new data. The estimation uses a simple nonparametric technique based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to fit the Soviet data to a lognormal distribution. The results suggest that, for income from official sources, (1) inequality in the Soviet Union as a whole declined throughout the 1980s-both before and after Gorbachev's accession in 1985, and (2) income inequality was greater in the poorer, southern republics of the U.S.S.R. than in the north. While the inclusion of unofficial (unreported) private income would probably reinforce the second of these two trends, its effect on the first cannot be determined on the basis of available information.     

CREDIT,HOUSING COLLATERAL,AND CONSUMPTION: EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN,THE U.K., AND THE U.S.

The consumption behavior of U.K., U.S., and Japanese households is examined and compared using a modern Ando‐Modigliani style consumption function. The models incorporate income growth expectations, income uncertainty, housing collateral, and other credit effects. These models therefore capture important parts of the financial accelerator. The evidence is that credit availability for U.K. and U.S., but not Japanese, households has undergone large shifts since 1980. The average consumption‐to‐income ratio rose in the U.K. and U.S. as mortgage down‐payment constraints eased and as the collateral role of housing wealth was enhanced by financial innovations, such as home equity loans. The estimated housing collateral effect is similar in the U.S. and U.K. In Japan, land prices (which proxy house prices) continue to negatively impact consumer spending. There are negative real interest rate effects on consumption in the U.K. and U.S. and positive effects in Japan. Overall, this implies important differences in the transmission of monetary and credit shocks in Japan versus the U.S., U.K., and other credit‐liberalized economies.     

THE TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLE RESOURCES AS CAPITAL

The author describes the results of his current research designed to measure total investment, tangible and intangible, and the derived capital stocks for the U.S., 1929–1966. With respect to total investment, the estimates show a marked increase in its ratio to GNP. All of the increase occurs in the intangible component comprising R & D, education and training, health, and mobility. The increase was concentrated in the government sector, although households increased the proportion of disposable personal income devoted to total investment.
Consistent with the relative investment trends, the stock of intangible capital grew considerably faster than the tangible stock. The growth of total capital stocks was somewhat less than that of GNP, however, in both current and constant prices. Thus, the rate of return on total capital rose somewhat over the period. Average rates of return on human and nonhuman capital were closely similar.
In real terms, the growth of total capital stocks accounted for two-thirds of the growth in real GNP, 1929–1966. One-third of the growth is attributed to residual forces, chiefly economies of scale, changes in inherent quality of human and natural resources, changes in values and motivations, and changes in rates of utilization of capacity.
The growth of the ratio of real intangible stocks to real tangible stocks accounted for less than half of the increase in total factor productivity 1929–1966. This is significantly less than the contribution of intangibles as estimated by Denison, and the author adduces several reasons why his estimates may understate the contribution. Nevertheless, it seems that the net effect of the residual forces enumerated above must also have made a substantial contribution to the growth of tangible factor productivity and real GNP over the 37-year period.     

Housing prices and population dynamics in urban China

In this study, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to investigate the influence of population on housing price dynamics in urban China. The contribution of population growth to the housing price trend and the contribution of population shocks to housing price fluctuations are quantitatively measured. The empirical results indicate that the ongoing policy to control the population size in large cities in China can decrease the growth rate of housing prices by 0.49% every year, which accounts for 1/10 of the total housing price trend. Furthermore, this policy cannot stabilize housing prices because population shocks have negligible effects on the housing price cycle. Housing technology shocks and housing preference shocks are responsible for most of the housing price fluctuations.     

REVISED REAL CANADIAN GNP ESTIMATES AND CANADIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1870–1926

Revised Canadian real GNP estimates for the 1870–1926 period, based on the nominal GNP estimates constructed by M. C. Urquhart and on a variety of sector-specific price indexes, are presented below. The construction of this revised real GNP series allows for the creation of real output estimates for the major sectors of the Canadian economy as well as for a new implicit price index series. These revised estimates cast new light on our present understanding of Canadian economic growth and reinforce the view that the Canadian wheat boom probably played an important and positive role in the process of Canadian economic development.     

More Uncertainty about the Unit Root in U.S. Real GNP

The new KPSS test is used to test the null hypothesis that U.S. real GNP is a trend stationary process. When appropriately sized, the test fails to reject the trend stationary null. This provides an important counter-example to the generic inability to reject the difference stationary null hypothesis for output by classical hypothesis testing. The evidence in favor of the trend stationary representation is weakened, however, by showing that such size correction dramatically reduces power. Reversing the null and alternative hypotheses, this paper complements Rudebusch’s (1993) recent analysis.     

THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON THE U.S. STOCK MARKET*

It is shown that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock differs greatly depending on whether the change in the price of oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the oil market. The demand and supply shocks driving the global crude oil market jointly account for 22% of the long‐run variation in U.S. real stock returns. The responses of industry‐specific U.S. stock returns to demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market are consistent with accounts of the transmission of oil price shocks that emphasize the reduction in domestic final demand.     

Predicting European Union Recessions in the Euro Era: The Yield Curve as a Forecasting Tool of Economic Activity

Several studies have established the predictive power of the yield curve for the U.S. and various European countries. In this paper we use data from the European Union (EU15), from 1994:Q1 to 2008:Q3. We use the European Central Bank’s euro area yield spreads to predict European real GDP deviations from the long-run trend. We also augment the models tested with non monetary policy variables: the unemployment and a composite European stock price index. The methodology employed is a probit model of the inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard distribution using several formal forecasting and goodness of fit evaluation tests. The results show that the yield curve augmented with the composite stock index has significant forecasting power in terms of the EU15 real output.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INCREASING HOUSE PRICES

Abstract.  Several cities and countries in Asia and North America have experienced large increases in housing prices. We extend the 1991 paper by S. Rebelo to simulate this situation. We show that growth in real housing prices can result as economic growth persists, even when population growth is zero. Another finding is that reported increases in housing prices might be underestimated. In particular, the growth rate of a relative price index may converge to zero even when house prices in real terms display sustained growth.     

Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporations

We derive the quantitative implications of growth theory for U.S. corporate equity plus net debt over the period 1960–2001. There were large secular movements in corporate equity values relative to GDP, with dramatic declines in the 1970's and dramatic increases starting in the 1980's and continuing throughout the 1990's. During the same period, there was little change in the capital–output ratio or earnings share of output. We ask specifically whether the theory accounts for these observations. We find that it does, with the critical factor being changes in the U.S. tax and regulatory system. We find that the theory also accounts for the even larger movements in U.K. equity values relative to GDP in this period.     

MEASURING THE PRICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OUTPUT

We construct a price index for the scientific R&D services industry, a significant producer of R&D in the United States. Unlike most previous R&D price indexes, our index is not based on input costs but rather on measures of R&D sales. Consequently, unlike input‐cost price indexes, our output‐based index is able to account for changes in productivity and markups in the scientific R&D services industry. We compute that scientific R&D services prices increased, on average, by 7.14 percent at an annual rate from 1987 to 2006. Using our index, we find that real revenues grew at an annual average rate of 2.85 percent. We then propose using our index, in combination with an input‐cost price index, to deflate total R&D nominal expenditures. We find that real total U.S. R&D expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 1.42 percent from 1987 to 2006.     

FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION SERVICES INDIRECTLY MEASURED: ESTIMATES FOR FRANCE AND THE U.K. BASED ON THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN THE 1993 SNA

The 1993 SNA proposes a revised treatment of the output of financial intermediaries which treats intermediation services in part as a component of final demand, so that GDP is higher than the 1968 SNA suggests. In this paper we present the results of attempts to estimate FISIM (Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured) for France and the U.K. The French study uses a reference rate calculated to ensure that no imputation is made with respect to own funds, while the U.K. study relies on a market interest rate. Both studies present an allocation of intermediation services by industry as well as by category of demand. The adjustments to GDP are of similar magnitudes in both countries.