Why do private firms adopt IFRS?

Do private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS? If so, why? Answers to these questions have been very limited so far, mainly due to the absence of financial data on private firms. In this paper, I exploit the German setting where the financial statements of private firms are widely available. I estimate multi-period logit regressions on the choice between national GAAP and IFRS for the consolidated financial statements of nearly 3000 German private firms with more than 14,000 firm-years in the period 1998–2010. My results suggest that the expected net benefits of IFRS adoption vary substantially across the group of private firms, depending on their financing needs, governance system, and organizational and informational complexity. Specifically, I find that private firms using IFRS have more growth opportunities, are more leveraged, are externally rated, seek to raise external capital by issuing public bonds or equity, are registered as a stock corporation, are characterized by private equity (PE) involvement, have more international sales and operations, and have a Big Five auditor. These insights should be of great interest to both preparers and regulators in the current debate about the future of financial reporting in private firms.     

Why do privatized firms pay higher dividends?

We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show strong and robust evidence that the extent of state ownership is positively related to corporate dividends. We distinguish between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to protect minority shareholders, the fiscal deficit and the political orientation of the state. Our findings show that an incentive to enhance the state's reputation with minority shareholders can account for the high dividends of privatized firms.     

Why do bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate risk?

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?

This study investigates firms that repurchase their stock to finance an acquisition. Since research shows that cash-financed acquisitions perform better than stock-financed acquisitions, why do firms that have available cash initiate the extra transactional step. I find these firms are well compensated for their efforts, especially in the long run. On average, these firms have negative abnormal returns prior to their repurchase announcements and thus may choose repurchasing to signal undervaluation. Furthermore, the stock acquisition step allows these firms to share risk, counteract the negative effects of dilution, and enjoy a tax advantage for their efforts.

Why do firms disclose and not disclose structural intangibles?

This study conducts 22 interviews with the directors of 11 firms chosen from the top 30 listed firms by market capital on the Colombo Stock Exchange, with each firm representing an industry. The interviews explore senior executives' views about disclosing the structural intangibles in annual reports to attract financial investments. The study identifies 20 intangible resources in 10 intangible classes. It analyzes the interview data using latent thematic analysis and explores them as responses to social, political, and economic interest groups. Corroborating interview data with annual report data, this study identifies five broad reasons for disclosure and non-disclosure. Build empathy, show they are good corporate citizens, win government support, and build confidence are about disclosure, and divert attention from issues at hand is about non-disclosure. This study finds that disclosure results in managing legitimacy of the social and political interest groups, and also in managing impressions of the economic interest group. Non-disclosure results in managing impressions of the social and political interest groups. The findings contribute to building an evidence-led theoretical connection to understand the structural intangibles disclosed and not disclosed to attract financial investment to firms.     

Threatened by wildfires: What do firms disclose in their 10-Ks?

We examine the determinants of firms’ 10-K disclosures on the threat of and exposure to wildfires. We match the location of wildfires in the United States to firms in the same county as the wildfire. We first establish that wildfire disclosure is far from widespread. On average, 6.1% of firms with wildfires in their headquarters county mention wildfire information in their 10-Ks. Second, we find that the number of wildfire days in a company's headquarters county is a key determinant of wildfire disclosure. The sensitivity of wildfire disclosure to wildfire exposure has also increased in recent years, emanating mainly from firms having experienced wildfires impacting their past operations and in the western states and the utility and banking industries, and from those exhibiting a high level of tangible assets. Third, we find that wildfire exposure has no bearing on stock price, whereas more wildfire-related disclosure lowers stock price.     

Voluntary firm restructuring: why do firms sell or liquidate their subsidiaries?

This paper examines why companies decide to divest a subsidiary in a corporate environment characterised by concentrated ownership, using a unique dataset of non-listed Belgian subsidiaries. The results of the binomial logit analyses are consistent with the idea that management will intervene in order to improve the controlling firm’s focus or when subsidiary performance imposes a burden on the group’s financial situation. Especially when blockholders hold more than 75% of the shares, these motives drive the divestiture decision. At lower levels of ownership concentration, these hypotheses cannot explain the higher divestiture likelihood, which supports the agency hypothesis. Once the divestment decision has been taken, the choice has to be made between a sale and liquidation. The logit analysis reveals that although selling a subsidiary seems the preferred option, liquidation is likely when the subsidiary is small, active in a sector with few competitors and when financial distress is eminent.     

Why are firms unlevered?

In this paper, we examine why firms have no debt in their capital structure. We reject the hypothesis that zero-leverage policies are driven by entrenched managers attempting to avoid the disciplinary pressures of debt. These firms do not have weaker internal or external governance mechanisms. The debt initiation decisions of these firms are not preceded by shocks to their entrenchment, such as takeover threats or the emergence of activist blockholders. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that these firms are financially constrained. Zero-debt firms are small, young, conserve cash from cash-flow, and are more likely to lease their assets. When they have access to a line of credit, they face stricter covenants and higher all-in costs than comparable control firms. They lose market share in economic downturns, consistent with the financial constraints explanation, but inconsistent with theories of predation which suggest that they may be voluntarily stockpiling debt capacity.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

Do productive firms get external finance? Evidence from Chinese listed manufacturing firms

Due to information asymmetry problem in financial markets good quality firms often find it difficult to prove to external finance providers about their true quality and to distinguish themselves from bad quality firms. We argue that instead of sending indirect signals to financial market good quality firms could focus on improving their productivity to obtain external finance. Besides relying solely on firms' balance sheet information external finance providers using firms' TFP or labour productivity information would have a true knowledge of firms' efficiency and risk. Overall, using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2016 we find that productivity measured by TFP or labour productivity is statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We find that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but only some weak results for total leverage and long-term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firm sample. We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and non-exporting firms. The causality of the regression results is also confirmed by difference-in-difference tests using an exogenous industrial policy shock.     

Why do firms engage in selective hedging? Evidence from the gold mining industry

The widespread practice of managers speculating by incorporating their market views into firms’ hedging programs (“selective hedging”) remains a puzzle. Using a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms, we find no evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among firms that are believed to possess an information advantage. In contrast, we find strong evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among financially constrained firms, suggesting that this practice is driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.     

Why do firms go dark? Causes and economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations

We examine a comprehensive sample of going-dark deregistrations where companies cease SEC reporting, but continue to trade publicly. We document a spike in going dark that is largely attributable to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Firms experience large negative abnormal returns when going dark. We find that many firms go dark due to poor future prospects, distress and increased compliance costs after SOX. But we also find evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak. Finally, we show that going dark and going private are distinct economic events.     

Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?

We survey the theories on why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence on the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature is divided into four strands: liquidity provision; asymmetric information; legal restrictions; and a medium of exchange. We assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations why banks promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct, payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par if the deposits are used in transactions. We examine the history of banking in several countries in different eras: fourth century Athens, medieval Italy, Tokugawa Japan, and free banking and money market mutual funds in the United States. Each of the theories explains some of the observed banking arrangements and none explains all of them.     

Why firms favour the AIM when they can list on main market?

It is often argued that the popularity of Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in terms of higher number of listings relative to the Main Market (MM) is mainly due to the strict listing requirements in the MM. During the 1995 to 2014 period, 577 out of 1143 AIM listed firms did not qualify for MM listing, but the rest (566) that raised equity in AIM could have joined the MM. This raises the question why firms that meet the heavier regulatory environment of the MM choose the AIM, a lighter regulatory environment. This paper subjects this question to a comprehensive investigation and finds that the market choice is a self-selection decision. The two markets attract companies with different characteristics, and dissimilar post-listing investment and financing priorities. The evidence also shows that smaller and younger companies choose to be listed on the AIM due to lower listing and on-going costs. Heckman Selection models addressing the important question of what would have been the operating performance if AIM companies joined MM indicate that AIM companies would not perform better had they selected to go public in the MM.     

Why do some Chinese technology firms avoid ChiNext and go public in the US?

Some Chinese technology firms prefer to go public on US exchanges despite the launch of ChiNext as a NASDAQ-style board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in late 2009. Conventional hypotheses based on sales internationalization and issuing costs fail to explain this preference. Instead, our findings suggest the existence of a separating equilibrium in which small but profitable firms choose ChiNext and large firms backed by foreign venture capital prefer US exchanges as their IPO location. Our findings have broader implications for entrepreneurial finance in China. Policy suggestions are offered for increasing the number of foreign VC-backed IPOs on ChiNext.     

Financial instruments in non-financial firms: what do we know?

Accounting for financial instruments is one of the most controversial standard setting issues. Attempts by standard setters to expand the scope of fair value measurement provoked fierce opposition from preparers, in particular from the financial industry but also, albeit less frequently and less scathingly, from non-financial firms. Academic research could help to bring the discussion onto a more objective level. Most of the existing research focuses on the financial industry and uses US disclosure data from the 1990s. More recent papers use recognition and measurement data from IFRS financial statements, again primarily from the financial industry. This paper provides novel evidence on the relevance of financial instruments for non-financial firms of the STOXX Europe 600 Index. The results in particular refute the myths that fair value measurement of financial instruments is pervasive and that many fair value measurements are of the problematic ‘level 3’ quality. The empirical evidence forms the background for a survey of the small body of existing research on the effects of accounting standards relating to financial instruments on non-financial firms. This survey covers research on the effects on risk management, on the volatility of cash flows and earnings, on earnings management and on the effects on user decisions. Both in the empirical sections and in the survey sections, I identify a number of areas for further research to overcome the poor current state of knowledge.     

Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

Why do companies issue sukuk?

This paper investigates the determinants for firms to choose sukuk over conventional bond. We investigate the potential impact of information asymmetries through moral hazard and adverse selection to explain why firms prefer using sukuk. We perform logit regressions of the choice of debt type to determine which characteristics lead a firm to issue a sukuk rather than a bond. We use a dataset of sukuk and conventional bond issuances in Malaysia from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of the influence of information asymmetries and adverse selection on the choice of the sukuk market.     

Why do accruals predict earnings?

Higher accruals are associated with lower subsequent earnings. We show this phenomenon can be explained by the way sales, profits, and working capital respond to changes in a firm's product markets. Empirically, high accruals predict high subsequent sales growth but a long-lasting drop in both profits and profitability. Accruals also predict an increase in future competition, suggesting that accruals are correlated with abnormally high—and, in equilibrium, transitory—true profitability that attracts new entrants to the industry. Overall, the predictive power of accruals is better explained by product-market effects than by measurement error in accruals or diminishing returns from investment.