Do negative interest rates affect bank risk-taking?

We offer early evidence on the impact of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on banks’ risk-taking. Our primary result shows banks in NIRP-adopter countries reduce holdings of risky assets by around 10 percentage points following implementation of NIRP in comparison to banks in non-adopter countries. We augment this result by identifying NIRP’s impact on other aspects of banks’ risk-taking behaviour; NIRP is associated with reductions in banks’ loan growth and average loan price (by 3.7 percentage points and 59 basis points) and a rebalancing of asset portfolios towards safer assets. Secondly, we find the NIRP-effect is heterogeneous; post-NIRP risk-taking increases at strongly capitalised banks and at banks operating in less competitive markets that exploit market power to insulate net interest margins and profitability. Our robust empirical evidence supports the “de-leverage” hypothesis which suggests that banks acquire safer, liquid assets to bolster their capital positions rather than searching for value by acquiring riskier assets. We base our evidence on a sample of 2,584 banks from 33 OECD countries across 2012 to 2016, and from models that employ a difference-in-differences framework.     

Is the market valuation of banks’ loan loss provision conditional on auditor reputation?

We examine how auditor reputation conditions the market valuation of banks’ loan loss provision (LLP). The inherent uncertainty associated with and discretion permitted in estimating the LLP contributes to information asymmetry. The auditor’s certification and monitoring roles influence firm value by mitigating this information asymmetry. We examine two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type (Big 5 vs. non-Big 5) and auditor expertise, in the banking industry. We find a significant, positive association between the discretionary component of LLP and stock return for banks audited by the Big 5 auditors. Further analysis indicates that auditor expertise within banking and not auditor type drives this significant, positive association. Overall, our results are consistent with auditor expertise in the banking industry mitigating information asymmetry between bank managers and investors and enhancing the information conveyed by discretionary loan loss provision.     

Cost stickiness and bank loan contracting

This study examines whether and, if so, how borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., cost stickiness) is factored into the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. We provide strong and reliable evidence that ex-ante, the loan spread increases with cost stickiness after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Moreover, we find that the effect is more pronounced for borrowers with higher default risk and higher information risk. This is consistent with borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior increasing lenders' uncertainty about the liquidation value of assets, and hence, lenders need to be compensated ex-ante. Additionally, we conjecture that higher cost stickiness may increase the need for ex-post monitoring. Consistent with this conjecture, we find some evidence that lenders impose tighter non-price terms on firms with stickier costs. This study integrates cost stickiness research with the banking literature by showing that banks incorporate borrowers' asymmetric cost behavior into loan contracting terms.     

Is the Corporate Loan Market Globally Integrated? A Pricing Puzzle

We offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the United States, other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan, and lender characteristics do not appear to explain this phenomenon. Borrowers overwhelmingly issue in their natural home market and bank portfolios display home bias. This may explain why pricing discrepancies are not competed away, though their causes remain a puzzle. Thus, important determinants of loan origination market outcomes remain to be identified, home bias appears to be material for pricing, and corporate financing costs differ across Europe and the United States.     

Is there an optimal microcredit size to maximize the social and financial efficiencies of microfinance institutions?

Financial intermediation theory posits that a smaller loan size triggers a higher cost per dollar lent. This leads to question whether microfinance can become a self-sustainable industry. Hence, in microfinance innovations like loans without collateral, progressive loans, solidarity groups and relational lending are employed to reduce asymmetric information costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard while serving the poorest people. Crucially, we find a non-linear U-shaped effect of loan size on financial and social efficiencies. This reconciles the two opposite strands of the literature, aligning microfinance and banking central principles. The major implication of this study is that, unlike banking, microfinance institutions can grant small size loans while simultaneously obtaining high levels of financial and social efficiency. Indeed, our findings do not support the widely debated mission drift assumption since loan size does not generate a trade-off between financial and social outcomes. Therefore, loan size is a core management variable.     

Religiosity,borrower gender and loan losses in microfinance institutions: a global evidence

We examine the impact of religious beliefs on loan repayments in 770 microfinance institutions (MFIs) across 65 countries over the period 2006–2018. We find robust evidence of a negative relationship between religiosity and loan losses in MFIs. We also find that the relationship between religiosity and loan losses is stronger for MFIs in Protestant-dominated countries than in Catholic-dominated countries. Moreover, religiosity improves the operational self-sufficiency of MFIs through a reduction in loan losses. We find that religiosity does not improve the loan repayment behaviour of women borrowers, but it reduces the loan size per borrower. Overall, our evidence suggests that although religiosity reduces loan losses through religiosity-induced lender-risk aversion, it does not improve the loan repayment behaviour of borrowers. We also use several approaches to evaluate our results to the effects of endogeneity.

     

Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.     

The Effect of Down Payment Assistance on Mortgage Choice

Lack of wealth for a down payment is one of the most recognized barriers to home ownership. In response to this barrier, state and federal government have implemented many programs that provide down payment assistance to potential home buyers. Numerous studies have shown that this assistance can increase homeownership rates, but few have measured how receiving assistance may alter borrowing behavior. Using data from a down payment assistance grant in the Midwest, this study compares the loan type and size of grant recipients to other borrowers that report similar income and buy homes in the same census tract. Results indicate grant recipients are more likely to use conventional loans, which are less expensive than other loan types that require a smaller down payment. Estimates also suggest that the grant may reduce loan size for borrowers who are on the margin of using a conventional loan.     

The expansion of services in European banking: Implications for loan pricing and interest margins

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.     

Strategic loan modification: An options-based response to strategic default

This paper presents a parsimonious barrier model for the optimal principal reset in a loan modification, thereby maximizing the loan value to the lender bank and minimizing the likelihood of strategic foreclosure by the homeowner. Writing down the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio will reduce the present value of future payments on the loan, but will also reduce the probability of default, thereby saving foreclosure losses. The optimal trade-off of these two countervailing effects will pinpoint the optimal LTV at which the loan must be reset. We present a simple barrier option decomposition of the loan value that makes the optimization of LTV easy to implement. An extension of the model is shown to account for varying growth rate assumptions about house prices. The model in this paper specifically accounts for the homeowner’s willingness to pay, and uses the framework to model shared-appreciation mortgages (SAMs).     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

Government guarantees of loans to small businesses: Effects on banks’ risk-taking and non-guaranteed lending

We analyzed the loan guarantees that the Japanese government provided for banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We modeled and estimated how much and under what conditions loan guarantees affected banks’ risk-taking and banks’ non-guaranteed lending.In the presence of controls for bank capital and other factors that might affect supplies of bank credit, our estimates supported our model's implications that loan guarantees increased banks’ risk-taking.Consistent with our model, our estimates imply that, when banks initially had fewer guaranteed loans and then got more guaranteed loans, guaranteed loans were complements to, rather than substitutes for, non-guaranteed loans. As complements, loan guarantees could be “high-powered” in that they generated increases not only in guaranteed loans, but also increases in non-guaranteed loans that were a multiple of the increases in guaranteed loans. In addition, banks’ having more capital was associated with doing more non-guaranteed lending.     

Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.     

Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending

We provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts. Our analysis builds on two key features. First, insurance markets are unavailable for labor income. Second, the “due-on-sale” clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income. If explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law, points serve effectively as prepayment penalties. We also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan.     

Policy Uncertainty and Bank Mortgage Credit

We document that banks reduce the supply of mortgage loans when policy uncertainty increases in their headquarter states as measured by the timing of U.S. gubernatorial elections. The reduction is larger for term-limited elections and close elections. We utilize high-frequency, geographically granular loan-level data to address an identification problem arising from changing local loan demand: (i) we estimate a difference-in-difference specification with state/time or county/time fixed effects; (ii) banks reduce lending outside their home states as well when their home states hold elections; and (iii) we observe important cross-sectional differences in the way banks with different characteristics respond to policy uncertainty.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

Learning by lending

This paper studies bank learning through repeated interactions with borrowers from a new perspective. To understand learning by lending, we adapt a methodology from labor economics to analyze how loan contract terms evolve as banks acquire new information about borrowers. We construct “proxy” variables for this information using data from borrowers’ out-of-sample, future credit performance. Due to the timing of their construction, banks could not have used these variables directly to price loans. We nonetheless find that these proxies increasingly predict loan prices as relationships progress, even after controlling for possible omitted variable bias. Our methodology provides strong evidence that: (a) bank learning affects loan prices, and (b) relationship benefits are heterogeneous. In particular, higher quality borrowers face differentially lower spreads as their relationship with lenders develop – and banks learn about their quality – while lower quality borrowers see loan prices increase and their loan amounts fall. We further find suggestive evidence that banks incorporate CEO-specific information into loan prices.     

A Multistage Model of Loans and the Role of Relationships

We develop a multistage model of the loan granting process to understand the contradictory findings of the existing literature on bank‐borrower relationships, credit availability, and loan rates. Upon estimating our model with the 1993, 1998, and 2003 versions of the Survey of Small Business Finances data set, we find that relationships matter in a borrower's decision whether to apply for a loan and in the loan approval/rejection decision by the financial institution. However, the effect of relationships on loan rates depends on the prevailing economic climate. While firms with preexisting relationships obtain credit at lower rates during periods of economic expansion, loan rates are not negatively correlated with preexisting relationships during periods of economic recession.     

Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans

This paper analyzes whether the political connections of listed firms in the United States affect the cost and terms of loan contracts. Using a hand‐collected data set of the political connections of S&P 500 companies over the 2003–2008 time period, we find that the cost of bank loans is significantly lower for companies that have board members with political ties. We consider two possible explanations for these findings: a Borrower Channel in which lenders charge lower rates because they recognize that connections enhance the borrower's credit worthiness and a Bank Channel in which banks assign greater value to connected loans to enhance their own relationships with key politicians. After employing a series of tests to distinguish between these two channels, we find strong support for the Borrower Channel but no direct evidence supporting the Bank Channel. Finally, we demonstrate that political connections reduce the likelihood of a capital expenditure restriction or liquidity requirement commanded by banks at the origination of the loan. Taken together, our results suggest that political connections increase the value of U.S. companies and reduce monitoring costs and credit risk faced by banks, which, in turn, reduces the borrower's cost of debt.     

The rise in student loan defaults

We examine the rise in student loan defaults in the Great Recession by linking administrative student loan data at the individual borrower level to student loan borrowers’ individual tax records. A Blinder-Oaxaca style decomposition shows that shifts in the composition of student loan borrowers and the massive collapse in home prices during the Great Recession can each account for approximately 30% of the rise in student loan defaults. Falling home prices affect student loan defaults by impairing individuals’ labor earnings, especially for low income jobs. By contrast, when comparing the default sensitivities of homeowners and renters, we find no evidence that falling home prices affect student loan defaults through a home equity-based liquidity channel. The Income Based Repayment (IBR) program introduced by the federal government in the wake of the Great Recession reduced both student loan defaults and their sensitivity to home price fluctuations, thus providing student loan borrowers with valuable insurance against negative shocks.