Executive team heterogeneity,equity pledges,and stock Price crash risk: Evidence from China

Heterogeneous characteristics of executive teams have drawn wide concern as a factor highly related to economic decisions. Using data from 2015 to 2020 among Chinese A-share listed companies, we examine the moderating role played by executive team heterogeneity in the positive impact of controlling shareholder equity pledges on stock crash risk. We find that executive team heterogeneity of overseas background and age reduce the positive impact, while tenure heterogeneity increases the positive impact. Further evidence shows that political connections, ownership property and D&O liability insurance can induce different moderating effects of executive team heterogeneity in the relationship between equity pledges and stock price crash risk. Our study also contributes to helping listed companies effectively manage stock crash risk connected with equity pledges.     

The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.     

Top management abnormal turnover and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

The activities and decisions of the top management have garnered considerable attention. The general phenomenon of management turnover has gradually become the focus of investors in capital market, especially top management abnormal turnover. This paper examines the correlation between top management abnormal turnover and stock price crash risk. The research finds that the higher the abnormal turnover rate of top management, the greater the risk of stock price crashes, indicating that top management abnormal turnover can exacerbate the stock price crash risk. Considering that directors' and officers' liability insurance is an instrument for enterprises to protect their own interests, this paper finds D&O insurance can mitigate the stock price crash risk caused by top management abnormal turnover. Based on China's special national conditions, further researches also consider political associations and the nature of property right. The results advance our understanding of top management abnormal turnover and directors' and officers' liability insurance, and remind companies to reduce stock price crash risk when the top management leaves.     

Stock price crash risk and CEO power: Firm-level analysis

This study examines the impact of stock price crash risk on future CEO power. Using a large panel sample with 17,816 firm-year observations, we posit and find a significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power, suggesting that CEO power becomes smaller after stock price crashes. We also find that our results are stronger for firms with female CEOs and are largely driven by firms with shorter-tenure CEOs. In addition, we find that the significant negative impact of stock price crash risk on CEO power is diminished for firms with strong corporate governance. Our study responds to the call in Habib, Hasan, and Jiang (2018) by providing more empirical evidence on the consequences of stock price crash risk.     

The cost of disclosure regulation: evidence from D&O insurance and nonmeritorious securities litigation

This study examines whether the required disclosure of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance premiums leads to nonmeritorious securities litigation. Our research setting uses a proprietary D&O insurance database that includes New York and non-New York firms, combined with the fact that New York firms must disclose D&O insurance premiums. We thus can exploit a natural experiment based on inter-state variation in disclosure regulation. Disclosed premiums may influence case selection in two ways. First, higher premiums signal higher limits, which plaintiffs’ lawyers likely believe enable higher settlements. Second, higher premiums indicate higher risk assessments from insurers and thus a higher likelihood that stock price drops signal misconduct rather than bad luck. We find that D&O insurance premiums for New York firms are associated with a higher dismissal rate. Offsetting this higher dismissal rate, plaintiffs’ lawyers can achieve higher settlements in the relatively few successful cases.     

Does takeover activity affect stock price crash risk? Evidence from international M&A laws

We exploit the staggered initiation of merger and acquisition (M&A) laws across countries as a plausibly exogenous shock to the threat of takeover to examine whether the market for corporate control has a real effect on firm-level stock price crash risk. Using a difference-in-differences regression on a large sample of firms from 32 countries, we find that stock price crash risk significantly decreases following the passage of M&A laws. This effect is stronger for firms domiciled in countries with poorer investor protection and information environments and for firms with weaker firm-level governance. Further, financial reporting opacity and overinvestment significantly decrease in the post-M&A law periods. Our study suggests that an active takeover market has a disciplining effect on managerial bad news hoarding and leads to lower future crash risk.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and loan spreads

We analyze the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the spreads charged on bank loans. We find that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with higher loan spreads and that this relation depends on loan characteristics in economically sensible ways and is attenuated by monitoring mechanisms. This association between loan spreads and D&O insurance coverage is robust to controlling for endogeneity (because both could be related to firm risk). Our evidence suggests that lenders view D&O insurance coverage as increasing credit risk (potentially via moral hazard or information asymmetry). Further analyses show that higher levels of D&O insurance coverage are associated with greater risk taking and higher probabilities of financial restatement due to aggressive financial reporting. While greater use of D&O insurance increases the cost of debt, we find some evidence that D&O insurance coverage appears to improve the value of large increases in capital expenditure for firms with better internal and external governance.     

Zero-leverage policy and stock price crash risk: Evidence from Korea

This study examines the difference in stock price crash risk between zero-leverage and non-zero-leverage firms. We find that zero-leverage firms have a significantly higher future stock price crash risk than non-zero-leverage firms. Next, we find that the positive relation between zero-leverage policy and future stock price crash risk is more pronounced when firms have higher controlling shareholders' ownership and foreign ownership. We also find that the positive relation is more pronounced for firms with low cash holdings than for those with high cash holdings. Further, we find that the positive relation is stronger for dividend-paying firms than non-dividend-paying firms. Our results are robust to alternative estimation specifications and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings shed light on the extent to which extreme corporate financial policy has an impact on future stock price crash risk. Our empirical evidence also provides meaningful implications for how stakeholders (especially investors) predict stock price crash risk in the context of extremely conservative capital structure.     

The impact of directors’ and officers’ insurance on audit pricing: Evidence from UK companies

This paper examines the impact of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance on audit pricing in a large sample of UK companies. The existence of D&O insurance is expected to exert a dual impact on auditors’ pricing decisions. The presence of an additional source of funds to satisfy stakeholder claims in the event of audit client failure suggests that audit fees in insured companies should be lower. Alternatively, recent research has identified a positive link between the presence of D&O insurance and a number of characteristics traditionally associated with more expensive audits. The main objective of this study is to ascertain which of these influences pre-dominates. Analysing a sample of 753 UK listed companies in the early 1990s, when companies were obliged to disclose the presence of D&O insurance, this study shows that D&O insurance is associated with higher audit fees. It also confirms that insured companies are larger, more complex and present a greater audit risk (using a range of measures) than uninsured companies. Further analysis suggests that the impact of D&O insurance on audit fees may be influenced by company size, auditor size, and the extent of non-executive presence on the company's board.     

董事高管责任保险能否抑制股价崩盘风险——基于中国A股上市公司的经验数据

股价崩盘严重损害投资者利益并阻碍股票市场健康发展,因此,探寻抑制股价崩盘风险的手段成为当前公司治理与企业财务领域关注的热点问题。使用2009~2013年我国 A 股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险与公司股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现：上市公司购买董事高管责任保险能有效监督与约束高管利己行为,进而降低股价崩盘风险。该结论有助于深入了解董事高管责任保险,同时也为监管部门遏制股价崩盘现象提供了新的思路。     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and acquisition outcomes

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.     

Multi-dimensional corporate social responsibilities and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Worldwide, there has been an ongoing debate about whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) can lead to better financial market performance, or whether corporations can do well by doing good. Working with a sample of all listed companies in China from 2010 to 2017, this study examines the impacts of three dimensions of CSR on stock price crash risk. We find that CSR, especially firms' responsibility to the environment and stakeholders, significantly reduces stock price crash risk, while social contributions such as charitable donations have no significant effect on stock crash risk. Attracting long-term institutional investors is the primary mechanism through which CSR can curb crash risk. Mitigating earnings management is also a channel through which overall CSR and stakeholder responsibility contribute to a lower stock crash risk. Finally, we find that stakeholder responsibility and environmental responsibility can help improve stock market performance.     

Does corporate eco-innovation affect stock price crash risk?

We examine the effect of corporate environmental innovation (hereafter eco-innovation) on stock price crash risk and document a significant negative association. Utilising a large sample of publicly listed U.S. firms for the period 2003 to 2017, we find that an increase in eco-innovation from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with 17.62% reduction in stock price crash risk. This outcome remains robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and after accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. Eco-innovative firms attract more institutional investors and equity analyst following and disclose more information leading to lower stock price crash risk. Additional tests reveal that the negative effect of eco-innovation is contingent on the political leadership's ideology and environmental sensitivity. Our paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on the costs and benefits of eco-innovation, documenting the value-enhancing perspective of eco-innovation.     

Party leadership,corporate governance and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

In this paper, we provide evidence supporting the negative effect of corporate party organizations on Chinese state-owned enterprises' stock price crash risk. To illustrate the underlying mechanisms, we verify the impact of corporate party organizations on chairmen of different ages and positions and find that the restraining effect only exists in companies with strong promotion incentives for senior executives, supporting the governance role of the corporate party committee. Further, the impact of corporate party organization is weakened when the chairman is more powerful and alternative governance mechanisms work. In contrast, the governance effect is more pronounced in the companies controlled by local governments and after the new anti-corruption policy. We adopt several methods to address endogeneity concerns and find our results robust. Overall, this paper contributes to the mixed evidence on governance and stock price crash risk from the perspective of a unique arrangement, corporate party organizations.     

Board directors with foreign experience and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of board directors with foreign experience (BDFEs) on stock price crash risk. We find that BDFEs help reduce crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including a firm fixed effects model, controlling for possibly omitted variables, and instrumental variable estimations. Moreover, we find that the negative association between BDFEs and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with more agency problems, weaker corporate governance, and less overall transparency. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of board directors matter in determining stock price crash risk.     

Do geographically nearby major customers mitigate suppliers’ stock price crash risk?

This study examines the impact of geographically nearby major customers on suppliers' stock price crash risk. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms and their top five (major) customers during the period 2008–2019, we find a significantly negative association. This association is robust in a series of robustness checks, including the use of instrumental variables estimations, propensity score matching procedure, and Heckman two-step sample selection model. The mitigating effect of supplier?customer proximity on crash risk is more pronounced for suppliers with lower corporate transparency and greater operational uncertainty. Finally, we identify two possible mechanisms through which geographically nearby major customers reduce suppliers’ crash risk: fewer financial restatements and higher accounting conservatism of suppliers. The findings of this study indicate that listed firms may choose geographically nearby customers to reduce crash risk.     

Corporate board reforms around the world and stock price crash risk

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms around the world on stock price crash risk. Using a sample of firms in 41 economies that passed major board reforms between 1990 and 2012, we find that board reforms are associated with a significant reduction in crash risk of about 13%. The effect of reforms on crash risk is stronger among firms with more severe ex ante agency problems. Our analysis further suggests that board reforms reduce crash risk by improving financial transparency and enhancing investment efficiency. In sum, our findings are consistent with the notion that board reforms improve board oversight and mitigate agency problems.     

On Litigation Risk and Disclosure Complexity: Evidence from Canadian Firms Cross-Listed in the US

We find that D&O insurance premiums for Canadian firms cross-listed in the US are more than twice those of Canadian-only listed firms, and audit fees are approximately 50% higher. While this supports the view that both service-providers view the US as a more litigious environment, our findings also suggest that these differentials for cross-listed firms reflect premia for both litigation risk and the complexity of firms' financial disclosures. In particular, we show that D&O liability insurers charge differently for cross-listed firms that have different levels of disclosure; while D&O premiums are significantly higher for all cross-listed firms, they increase and then decrease with increased disclosure complexity. In contrast, audit fees increase monotonically as the filing complexity increases. We also find that auditors appear to price abnormal premiums charged by D&O insurers. Thus, audit fee premia for cross-listed firms appear to capture aspects of both litigation risk and increased disclosure complexity.     

Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance and bond credit spreads: Evidence from China

Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019, we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads. The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect. We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls, external monitoring, information asymmetry and default risk. Moreover, the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation. Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.     

Bearing an imprint: CEOs' early-life experience of the Great Chinese Famine and stock price crash risk

We propose and test whether adverse life events experienced by CEOs are associated with firms' stock price crash risk. Based on a large sample of Chinese companies from 2000 to 2015, we find evidence that companies whose CEOs experienced the Great Chinese Famine in early life have lower stock price crash risk than those with CEOs who did not experience the famine. Further, the negative association between famine experience and crash risk is more pronounced for firms whose CEOs have greater decision-making powers and for non-State-owned enterprises. We also find direct links between famine experience and various factors that have already been documented as determinants of crash risk. Our results support behavior economics theory on imprinting: CEO memories of adverse life experiences have an indelible effect on their decision-making processes, which in turn influence how the financial information is provided and disclosed to the stock market.