CEO overconfidence and corporate cash holdings

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.     

The evolution of debt policies: New evidence from business startups

We investigate the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies over a period of 15 years after startup, considering leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity. Our analysis is based on a unique sample covering all non-financial Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998. We find that the debt policy of entrepreneurial firms is remarkably stable over time. The debt policy in the initial year of operation is a very important determinant of future debt policies, even after controlling for traditional contemporaneous determinants. The founder-CEO has an important impact on the stability of debt policies: the influence of initial debt policies on future debt policies is significantly reduced when the founder-CEO is replaced or when (s)he dies. Combined, our findings support imprinting theory.     

The influence of cash flow volatility on capital structure and the use of debt of different maturities

The empirical literature on the relationship between capital structure and firm cash flow volatility is inconclusive. We explore this relationship using several measures of a firm's cash flow volatility and econometric methods that account for the non-linear relationship of proportional variables. Overall, our evidence indicates that ceteris paribus a one standard deviation increase from the mean of cash flow volatility implies an approximately 24% decrease in the long-term debt ratio, a 26% decrease in probability of holding debt with over 10 years to maturity, and a 39% increase in the probability of holding neither short nor long term debt.     

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Differences in the sophistication of Value-based Management – The role of top executives

This paper responds to recent calls for studying the diffusion of management practices beyond classifying companies as adopters and non-adopters (Ansari et al., 2010, Lounsbury, 2008). In particular, we examine how characteristics of CEOs and CFOs as well as perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) of the top management team (TMT) affect the sophistication of Value-based Management (VBM) for which we develop a multi-dimensional construct.We base our analyses on a unique dataset that comprises archival data, interviews and survey data from top executives of German HDAX companies (58% response rate). The results of our Partial Least Squares (PLS) model (R² = 55%) support most of our hypotheses and provide interesting findings.We find that the CFOs in our sample have substantially more influence on VBM-sophistication than CEOs. In particular, we document that cognitive styles (educational background in business) of CFOs have a substantial impact on VBM-sophistication. Moreover, short-tenured CFOs are associated with high VBM-sophistication. As expected, the related negative effect of long tenure on VBM sophistication is practically offset if the CFO has an educational background in business.Another relevant finding is that high perceived environmental uncertainty of the top management team is significantly associated with lower VBM-sophistication. The results of our control variables moreover reveal that systematic risk (‘beta’) leads to higher VBM sophistication.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

MicroHoo: Deal failure,industry rivalry,and sources of overbidding

On February 1, 2008, Microsoft offered $43.7 billion for Yahoo. This offer was a milestone in the battle between Microsoft and Google to control the Internet search industry. The announcement accompanied a substantial decrease in Microsoft's stock price. Investors apparently considered the bid too high and doubted Microsoft's ability to create value with Yahoo's assets (the announcement combined returns implied a total value destruction of $13.29 billion). Using the abnormal returns pattern of industry firms and customers, this article examines the sources of overbidding. Our analyses indicate that Microsoft's aggressive move is rooted in its rivalry with Google, but the personality traits of the involved CEOs might explain also a portion of the overbidding.     

Overconfidence and tax avoidance: The role of CEO and CFO interaction

We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance.     

Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments

We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.     

Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Terrorist attacks and corporate investment: The beneficial value of CEO overconfidence

This study examines whether terrorist attacks influence corporate investments and firm value. We expect that overconfident CEOs can mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by terrorist attacks because they overestimate the returns on investment. Using measures of terrorist attack proximity in the U.S., we find that firms with non-overconfident CEOs significantly decrease their investment growth when terrorist attacks affect them, while firms with overconfident CEOs do not. Consequently, the impact of terrorist attacks on firm value varies between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, this study suggests that CEO overconfidence can benefit shareholder value under certain conditions, such as terrorist attacks.     

CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.     

New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire

I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during the periods 1989–1993, 1995–1999 (before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) and 2001–2005 (after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). My results suggest that retired CEOs became less popular on boards after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. In addition, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989–1993 sample, as Brickley et al. (1999) have found, it does not explain this number for the 1995–1999 sample and 2001–2005 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure is negatively related to the number of outside directorships only in the 2001–2005 sample. Fourth, the number of outside directorships is positively correlated with the size of a retired CEO's original firm before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, but this is not the case after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Finally, if retired CEOs worked in regulated industries, their probability of serving at least one outside directorship 2 years after retirement falls by 21% in the 1989–1993 sample. However, this negative effect is marginally significant in the 1995–1999 sample, and vanishes in the 2001–2005 sample.     

Overconfidence and Early‐Life Experiences: The Effect of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies

We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity financing. Such overconfident managers use less external finance and, conditional on accessing external capital, issue less equity than their peers. Second, CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression are averse to debt and lean excessively on internal finance. Third, CEOs with military experience pursue more aggressive policies, including heightened leverage. Complementary measures of CEO traits based on press portrayals confirm the results.     

The impact of shareholder intervention on overinvestment of free cash flow by overconfident CEOs

This paper examines the impact of shareholder intervention on investment distortions, which we capture using overinvestment of free cash flow by overconfident CEOs. Using this definition and U.S. data for 1996–2014, our fixed effects and difference-in-difference matching estimation results provide consistent evidence that the threat of potential intervention of shareholders can curb overinvestment by overconfident CEOs. Specifically, firms with greater voting premium and hedge fund activism experience less overinvestment and exhibit lower sensitivity of free cash flow to investment. Such disciplining effects are stronger for firms managed by overconfident CEOs. Overall, our results suggest that shareholder intervention is particularly effective at mitigating overinvestment that is more likely to be distorted.     

Predictive regression with order-p autoregressive predictors

Studies of predictive regressions analyze the case where y_t is predicted by x_t ? 1 with x_t being first-order autoregressive, AR(1). Under some conditions, the OLS-estimated predictive coefficient is known to be biased. We analyze a predictive model where y_t is predicted by x_t ? 1, x_t ? 2,… x_t ? p with x_t being autoregressive of order p, AR(p) with p > 1. We develop a generalized augmented regression method that produces a reduced-bias point estimate of the predictive coefficients and derive an appropriate hypothesis testing procedure. We apply our method to the prediction of quarterly stock returns by dividend yield, which is apparently AR(2). Using our method results in the AR(2) predictor series having insignificant effect, although under OLS, or the commonly assumed AR(1) structure, the predictive model is significant. We also generalize our method to the case of multiple AR(p) predictors.     

Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction

Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs’ personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90$-90$ basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12$-12$ basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance.     

Short‐selling pressure and last‐resort debt finance: evidence from 144A high‐yield risk‐adjusted debt

This study examines why non‐financial publicly traded firms knowingly issue wealth destroying Rule 144A debt, which is associated with a negative announcement return and a higher yield. We provide a plausible ‘demand‐side’ explanation (i.e. last‐resort debt financing) for the motivation for issuing such debt. We also provide evidence as to what drives this negative reaction. Our findings suggest that the negative market impact is mainly driven by short‐selling pressure from convertible bond arbitrageurs.     

The importance of size in private equity: Evidence from a survey of limited partners

Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized − measured by the degree to which the investor focuses on private equity rather than other classes of investments − and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. In particular, endowments are not special according to the survey measures. These results are consistent with the changing LP–GP relationship in private equity as capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of large investors.