Bank Competition and Collateral: Theory and Evidence

We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We analyze asymmetric information about the borrowers’ type in a Salop model in which banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that the presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We perform logit regressions of the presence of collateral on bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions that bank competition reduces the presence of collateral. These findings survive several robustness checks.     

Local product market competition and bank loans

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.     

Inflation volatility effects on the allocation of bank loans

This paper examines the distortionary effects of inflation volatility on the allocation of bank loans. We argue that inflation volatility would render bank managers to behave more conservatively in issuing new loans. In contrast, when inflation volatility is low, bank managers would have the latitude to lend more idiosyncratically. Using a large panel of commercial bank data gathered from 15 countries, we provide support for our hypothesis by demonstrating a strong negative relation between inflation volatility and the dispersion of loans-to-assets ratio. Similar results are obtained when we split the sample between EU and non-EU country groups. The robustness of our findings is confirmed by a battery of sensitivity checks.     

Government guarantees of loans to small businesses: Effects on banks’ risk-taking and non-guaranteed lending

We analyzed the loan guarantees that the Japanese government provided for banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We modeled and estimated how much and under what conditions loan guarantees affected banks’ risk-taking and banks’ non-guaranteed lending.In the presence of controls for bank capital and other factors that might affect supplies of bank credit, our estimates supported our model's implications that loan guarantees increased banks’ risk-taking.Consistent with our model, our estimates imply that, when banks initially had fewer guaranteed loans and then got more guaranteed loans, guaranteed loans were complements to, rather than substitutes for, non-guaranteed loans. As complements, loan guarantees could be “high-powered” in that they generated increases not only in guaranteed loans, but also increases in non-guaranteed loans that were a multiple of the increases in guaranteed loans. In addition, banks’ having more capital was associated with doing more non-guaranteed lending.     

The interplay between quantitative easing,risk and competition: The case of Japanese banking

The Japanese economy is infamous for the magnitude of bank nonperforming loans that have originated back in the 1990s, whereas they are still causing controversies. Japan is also known for an extended quantitative easing programme of unprecedented scale. Yet the links between risk‐taking activities, quantitative easing and bank competition are largely unexplored. This paper employs, for the first time, the Boone indicator to measure bank competition in Japan to examine these underlying linkages. Given the scale of nonperforming loans, we explicitly measure bank risk‐taking based on a new data set of bankrupt and restructured loans. The dynamic panel threshold and panel Vector Autoregression analyses show that enhancing quantitative easing and competition would reduce bankrupt and restructured loans, but it would negatively affect financial stability. Given the recent adoption of negative rates in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study provides new insights as clearly there is a trade‐off between quantitative easing and financial stability beyond a certain threshold. Caution, therefore, regarding further scaling up quantitative easing is warranted.     

Finance companies in Mexico: Unexpected victims of the global liquidity crunch

We study the connection between the global liquidity crisis and the severe credit crunch experienced by finance companies (SOFOLES) in Mexico using firm-level data between 2001 and 2011. Our results provide supporting evidence that, as a result of the liquidity shock, SOFOLES faced severely restricted access to their main funding sources (commercial bank loans, loans from other organizations, and public debt markets). After controlling for the potential endogeneity of their funding, we find that the liquidity shock explains 64 percent of SOFOLES’ credit contraction during the recent financial crisis (2008–2009). We use our estimates to disentangle supply from demand factors as determinants of the credit contraction. After controlling for the large decline in loan demand during the financial crisis, our findings suggest that supply factors (such as nonperforming loans and lower liquidity buffers) also played a significant role. Finally, we find that financial deregulation implemented in 2006 may have amplified the effects of the global liquidity shock.     

The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis

We examine the stock market response to announcements of public, bank and privately placed debt issuance by large UK firms surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008. Prior to the crisis, we find that stock prices respond positively to announcements of bank debt issuance only. This is restricted to the sub-sample of syndicated bank loans and this is suggestive of the certification from multiple lenders conveying a signal of creditworthiness. We find that abnormal returns on the announcement of bank loans have declined since the financial crisis, both in absolute terms and in comparison to alternative borrowing sources. Overall, our results suggest that surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008, bank loans have become less informative as a signal of the creditworthiness of borrowing firms.     

Bank competition and the cost of bank loans

I comprehensively study the effect of bank competition on the cost of bank loans using U.S. bank loan data from 1995 to 2010. The cost of bank loans is analyzed with regard to loan spreads and covenant intensity. I show that loan spreads and covenant intensity are negatively related to bank competition. I also find that non-investment grade and financially constrained firms benefit more from bank competition than investment grade and financially unconstrained firms do. Lenders with low market power are more willing to reduce loan price than lenders with high market power in competitive lending markets. The results suggest that lenders give favorable loan terms to borrowers in competitive loan markets.     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Do foreign banks increase competition? Evidence from emerging Asian and Latin American banking markets

In this paper we examine the impact of foreign bank penetration on the competitive structure of domestic banking sectors in host emerging economies. We focus our analysis on Asia and Latin America during the period 1997-2008. Using bank-level panel data to identify foreign banks and to estimate measures of banking competition, we are able to provide robust empirical evidence that an increase in foreign bank penetration enhances competition in these host countries’ banking sectors. We find that this positive foreign bank penetration and banking competition link is associated with a spillover effect from foreign banks to their domestic counterparts. This spillover effect becomes stronger when more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter into less concentrated host country markets. We also find that the spillover effect is greater when foreign banks enter in the form of ‘de novo penetration’ than through mergers or acquisitions of domestic banks (‘M&A penetration’).     

国有和民营企业信贷融资差异研究-—基于上市公司的实证分析

基于沪深交易所上市公司的财务数据分析表明,我国国有企业的融资环境要优于民营企业的融资环境。民营企业不但因自身存在较多的问题,也因银行金融机构的信贷政策差异,导致外部融资极其困难。国有及民营企业融资影响因素的实证分析表明,国有企业不仅在获取银行贷款上具有先天优势,更容易获得中长期贷款。企业获取信贷的能力与企业本身的固定资产实力、盈利能力、资产负债率、资产规模、企业性质等因素有显著的影响关系,国有企业融资不仅在投资上挤占了民营企业的投资,也影响了我国居民的整体消费水平,进而不利于我国经济持续稳定的发展。     

Does the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations affect the cost of bank loans?

This study examines whether the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) is associated with the cost of bank loans. We find that more intensive tax haven subsidiary use by MNCs is positively associated with the cost of bank loans. In cross-sectional analyses, we identify channels through which the positive association between tax haven intensity and bank loan costs is more pronounced, such as a weak information environment, poor corporate governance, high CEO pay-for-performance and corporation-related wealth, and low managerial ability. We also find that intensive tax haven use is positively (negatively) associated with non-price loan contract terms, such as collateralization and financial covenants (loan maturity and general covenants). Our main result holds when public bonds are substituted for bank loans. Finally, additional analysis shows that MNCs with high levels of tax haven intensity are more likely to rely on bank loan financing than on raising debt from the bond market. Overall, this study adds to an emerging body of literature on corporate taxation and debt policy.     

Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: whydo banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarilywith core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance suchloans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationshiploans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also requirethe relationship between the bank and the borrower to endurein order for the bank to add value. However, the informationalopacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawalrisk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractivefunding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidityservices to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihoodof premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuityof relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wishto match the highest value-added liabilities with the highestvalue-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizesthe bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizesthe value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examinethe impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liabilitymatching and extract numerous testable predictions.     

How does greater bank competition affect borrower screening? Evidence from China's WTO entry

We analyze the relationship between greater bank competition and the screening of potential borrowers. Using a large sample of Chinese private firms and China's entry into the WTO as a unique setting leading to greater bank competition, we find the following. First, the sensitivity of bank credit to prior borrowing-firm performance increases after China's WTO entry. This sensitivity increase is greater in more bank-dependent industries and smaller in Chinese regions with greater financial sector development. Second, the increase in the sensitivity of bank credit to firm performance is much greater for state-owned firms compared to private firms. Third, the effect of bank credit on subsequent firm productivity and performance is greater for loans given after China's WTO entry compared to those given prior to WTO entry. Overall, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the stringency of bank screening of borrowers in China increased with greater banking sector competition.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

The impact of joint participation on liquidity in equity and syndicated bank loan markets

Market liquidity is impacted by the presence of financial intermediaries that are informed and active participants in both the equity and the syndicated bank loan markets, specifically informationally advantaged lead arrangers of syndicated bank loans that simultaneously act as equity market makers (dual market makers). Employing a two-stage procedure with instrumental variables, we identify the simultaneous equations model of liquidity and dual market maker decisions. We find that the presence of dual market makers improves the liquidity of the more competitive and transparent equity markets, but widens the spread in the less competitive over-the-counter loan market, particularly for small, informationally opaque firms.     

The relationship between banking market competition and risk-taking: Do size and capitalization matter?

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking “stability inefficiency” derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets.     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

Determinants of collateral

We estimate a comprehensive model of the determinants of collateral in loans extended to business firms. We use a panel data on a sample of bank loans to Spanish firms from 1984 to 2002. Consistent with theories that view collateral as a solution to adverse selection problems, our results provide direct evidence of a negative association between collateral and a borrower's risk. We also present evidence on previously unexplored determinants of collateral such as credit market competition, lender type, and the business cycle.