Can Short Restrictions Actually Increase Informed Short Selling?

We use the 2008 short selling regulations to test whether short sale restrictions can increase informed short selling. For the preborrow requirement, we find more negative price reactions to short interest announcements though no reliable increase in the price impact of short sales volume. For the stocks with banned short sales, we find an increase in the price impact of short sale volume though no reliable change in the price reaction to short interest announcements. Both restrictions, however, are associated with increased informed trading. Our results suggest that short restrictions will not reduce informed short selling and may actually result in an increase by increasing the proportion of informed short sellers..     

DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices

This paper explores a model based on agents with heterogenous beliefs facing short sales restrictions, and its explanation for the rise, persistence, and eventual fall of Internet stock prices. First, we document substantial short sale restrictions for Internet stocks. Second, using data on Internet holdings and block trades, we show a link between heterogeneity and price effects for Internet stocks. Third, arguing that lockup expirations are a loosening of the short sale constraint, we document average, long‐run excess returns as low as ?33 percent for Internet stocks postlockup. We link the Internet bubble burst to the unprecedented level of lockup expirations and insider selling.     

Distribution of Ownership,Short Sale Constraints,and Market Efficiency: Evidence from Cross‐Listed Stocks

We investigate the interplay between the distribution of ownership, short sale constraints, and market efficiency. Using minute‐by‐minute data during the period surrounding the short sale ban of 2008, we demonstrate that short sale restrictions cause price disparities among cross‐listed stocks when ownership in the stocks is distributed unevenly across the two markets. The stocks tend to trade at a premium in the market where long sellers are relatively scarcer, which reduces the speed at which prices adjust to bad news. The premium is driven primarily by an increase on the ask side of the market where ownership is thinner, is only evident when prices are moving down, and disappears quickly.     

Short sale constraints,heterogeneous interpretations,and asymmetric price reactions to earnings announcements

This study tests Miller’s (1977) overpricing hypothesis from a new angle. Specifically, we investigate the effects of heterogeneous interpretations on price reactions to earnings announcements. We find that the difference between good news and bad news earnings response coefficients increases with the degree of heterogeneous interpretations in the presence of short sale constraints. This pattern is more pronounced when short sale constraints are more binding. These findings support the notion that, under short sale constraints, stock prices selectively incorporate more optimistic opinions rather than the average opinion of all investors. Therefore, reducing short sale constraints should facilitate price discovery and improve price efficiency. This study complements recent studies examining the joint effect of short sale constraints and ex ante opinion divergence on price reactions to earnings announcements.     

Options and the Bubble

Many believe that a bubble existed in Internet stocks in the 1999 to 2000 period, and that short‐sale restrictions prevented rational investors from driving Internet stock prices to reasonable levels. In the presence of such short‐sale constraints, option and stock prices could decouple during a bubble. Using intraday options data from the peak of the Internet bubble, we find almost no evidence that synthetic stock prices diverged from actual stock prices. We also show that the general public could cheaply short synthetically using options. In summary, we find no evidence that short‐sale restrictions affected Internet stock prices.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Restrictions on Short Sales,and Equilibrium Asset Prices

Under heterogeneous expectations, the mean–variance model of capital market equilibrium is employed to determine the effect restricting short sales has on equilibrium asset prices. Two equivalent markets differing only with respect to short sale restrictions are compared. It is shown that, in general, risky asset prices can either rise or fall due to short sale constraints. However, under a homogeneity of beliefs for the covariance matrix of future prices, short sale constraints will only increase risky asset prices.     

Price clustering on the limit-order book: Evidence from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong

We examine the clustering pattern in trade and quote prices on the electronic limit order book of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). Earlier research into clustering focuses on transaction prices only. We study clustering on quote prices over a maximum of five queues on the limit order book. We observe an abnormally high frequency of even and integer prices in trade and quote prices for all tick size groups on the SEHK. The deeper quotes display stronger clustering than the best quotes, indicating that the farther away the quotes are from the best queue, the less information they carry. Our analysis further reveals that an extremely fine tick size itself works as a binding constraint to hinder the price resolution process. We also find that short sale prohibition imposed on the majority of stocks listed on the SEHK causes a significant bias in clustering towards the ask side of the limit order book. This implies that a short sale prohibition impairs efficient price discovery in the market.     

Are short sellers positive feedback traders? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Short sellers are routinely blamed for destabilizing stock markets by exacerbating deviations from fundamental values. In response, regulators periodically impose short sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines. One explanation is that policy makers regard short sellers as behaving like positive feedback traders. Relying on the theoretical model put forward by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which stresses the conditional nature of returns’ persistence, bans on selected financial stocks in six countries during the 2008/2009 global financial crisis are examined. These provide us with a setting to analyze the impact of short sale restrictions on feedback trading. Our findings suggest that, in the majority of markets examined, restrictions of this kind amplify positive feedback trading during periods of high volatility and, hence, contribute to stock market downturns. On balance then, short selling bans do not contribute to enhancing financial stability.     

Short sale restrictions,differences of opinion,and single-country,closed-end fund discount

The purpose of this paper is to study the closed-end fund discount in Miller's (1977) framework. Miller's theory states that in the simultaneous presence of (1) short sale restrictions and (2) dispersion of investors' opinions, securities become overvalued. We show that discounts of single-country, closed-end funds are related to Miller's two conditions. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that neither dispersion of investor opinion nor short sale restrictions alone are positively related to the discount. However, when both conditions exist simultaneously, fund discounts increase.     

Effect of the ban on short selling on market prices and volatility

We examine the effects of the short‐selling ban, imposed by Australian regulators in the wake of the global financial crisis, on the trading of financial stocks. Our findings argue against commonly stated reasons for imposing short‐sale bans. We find no evidence that short‐sale restrictions provide support for stock prices or that they reduce volatility. Moreover, stocks subject to the short‐selling ban suffered a severe degradation in market quality. Controlling for the adverse effects of the financial crisis on markets, we show that short‐selling restrictions increase intraday volatility, reduce trading activity and increase bid–ask spreads.     

The skinny on the 2008 naked short-sale restrictions

On July 15, 2008, the US Securities and Exchange Commission announced temporary restrictions on naked short sales of the stocks of 19 financial firms. The restrictions offer a unique empirical setting to test Miller’s (1977) conjecture that short-sale constraints result in overpriced securities and low subsequent returns. Consistent with Miller’s overpricing hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive (negative) market reaction to the announcement (expiration) of the short-sale restrictions. Announcement returns are higher for firms that appear to be subject to more naked short selling in the days immediately preceding the announcement of the restrictions. The restrictions are successful in eliminating naked short sales for the restricted stocks, but naked short sales increase dramatically for a closely matched sample of financial firms during the restricted period. We also find that the restrictions negatively impact various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and trading volume. From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that, at a minimum, policymakers should pause when considering further short sale restrictions.     

Regulatory Uncertainty and Market Liquidity: The 2008 Short Sale Ban's Impact on Equity Option Markets

We examine how the September 2008 short sale restrictions and the accompanying confusion and regulatory uncertainty impacted equity option markets. We find that the short sale ban is associated with dramatically increased bid‐ask spreads for options on banned stocks. In addition, synthetic share prices for banned stocks become significantly lower than actual share prices during the ban. We find similar results for synthetic share prices of hard‐to‐borrow stocks, suggesting that the dislocation in actual and synthetic share prices is attributable to the increased hedging costs for options on banned stocks during the short sale ban.     

The Short Sale Stigma

Despite a recent upturn, housing prices remain in flux in most cities nationwide. Lenders are still left dealing with a glut of distressed properties. They can choose to foreclose on the property or allow the owner/mortgagor to attempt to sell the property for less than the outstanding balance of the mortgage in a short sale agreement. The best way to clear the market of distressed properties is an important policy question. This is the first study to examine not only the price and time on market effect of being a short sale but also whether the short sale process itself creates a market stigma.     

The impact of naked short selling on the securities lending and equity market

This paper examines the impact of naked short selling on equity markets where it is restricted to securities on an approved list. Consistent with Miller's (1977) intuition, stocks with the highest dispersion of opinions and short sale constraints are the only stocks to exhibit significant and negative abnormal returns in the post-event period. We also find slightly higher stock return volatility and a small reduction in liquidity when naked short sales are allowed. Overall, it impairs market quality (liquidity and volatility), although there appears to be some improvement in price efficiency in stocks with high short sale constraints.     

The Optimal Choice for Lenders Facing Defaults: Short Sale,Foreclose, or REO

When mortgage borrowers default and have no desire or ability to keep their property, then loss mitigation involves a sale of the property via one of the following options: (1) the lender allows pre-foreclosure “short sale” by the borrower, (2) the lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as real estate owned (REO). Sale of the property in the above three options is conducted by a motivated seller, either the owner or the lender, who desires to sell the property as quickly as possible. Thus, relative to a no-default sale, the house is most likely to be sold at a discounted price. It is generally expected that the discount would be lower in the case of a “short sale.” This option, however, may result in a longer marketing time, thus a higher total loss, than the other two options. We developed a model that allows simultaneous estimation of price and time-on-market effects of “short sales,” foreclosures, and REO options. We find that the short-sale option has the lowest-price discount, but significantly higher costs associated with marketing time. The pattern of price discount and marketing time reverses as we move to a sale while in the process of foreclosure and to a sale with an REO status.     

The Valuation Impact on Distressed Residential Transactions: Anatomy of a Housing Price Bubble

Most previous empirical studies on foreclosure price discounts are based on data from housing-markets during periods of relative stability (Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Arlington, Texas; and Las Vegas, Nevada in 1980s and 1990s). The few studies with sample periods containing the Liquidity Crisis of 2008 were all focused on the Las Vegas market and even fewer studies have examined the pricing implications of short sale transactions. This study examines the discounts associated with foreclosure and short sale status in the Fresno, California from 2006 to 2010, a time period containing significant housing price volatility. Generally, we find approximately 20 % and 13 % discounts for foreclosure transactions and short sale transactions, respectively. These discounts remain consistent even after controlling for endogeneity of time-on-the-market and self-selection bias. We also document that both the foreclosure and short-sale discounts are time varying based on market conditions. Both foreclosure and short-sale discounts increase from 2008 to 2009 and decrease in 2010. Also, the foreclosure status decreases time on the market while the short-sale status increases time on the market.     

REIT Short Sales and Return Predictability

We examine REIT short sale transactions and show REITs are shorted less frequently than non-REITs. Results also show short sellers are less able to predict negative future returns for REITs, relative to non-REITs, which is consistent with increased pricing efficiency for REITs and suggests REIT assets are more transparent. In a broader context, these results suggest differences in transparency across asset types influence the effectiveness of short selling. Results showing REIT short sellers are contrarian imply traders target REITs that are performing well instead of underperforming REITs, suggesting restrictions on REIT short sales should be re-evaluated.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

Short Selling and Intraday Price Pressures

We study episodes of significant intraday downward price pressures in individual stocks and find that price declines during such episodes are driven mainly by liquidity demanding nonshort volume. Although short sellers during these price pressure episodes are also active and somewhat exacerbate the magnitude of price declines, their influence on prices is secondary to that of nonshort sellers. As such, our findings are inconsistent with the recently reignited allegations of systematic trading abuses caused solely by short sellers and might shed light on the debate regarding the need to reinstitute short selling restrictions.     

Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.