国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

Beyond Bank Competition and Profitability: Can Moral Hazard Tell Us More?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between competition, profitability, and risk. The investigation uses bank-level panel data from 171 Chinese banks during 1993 to 2007. Throughout the whole sample, the empirical results divulge that increased bank concentration in China improves the profitability and the risk of its banks. These results support the structure-conduct-performance and the moral hazard hypotheses. In terms of persistence, both the profit and the risk of the banks rise significantly by showing the enhancement of profit and risk from one period to the next. When different types of banks are considered, joint-stock banks have the highest persistence in profit and risk, and therefore more stable profits. City banks support the moral hazard hypothesis. They have entrenched managers that tend to take on more risk when the bank’s charter value falls in a very competitive (less concentrated) environment. Further, deregulation which in 2003 China allowed foreign banks to formally enter China has a negative impact on the structure of China’s banking sector.     

Incentive-Based Lending Capacity,Competition and Regulation in Banking

This paper studies moral hazard in banking due to delegated monitoring in an environment of aggregate risk and examines its implications for credit market equilibrium and regulation, in a model where banks are price competitors for loans and deposits. It provides a rationale for an incentive-based lending capacity positively linked to the bank's capital and profit margin, for an oligopolistic market structure wherever banks have market power, and for capital requirements. Social-welfare-maximizing capital requirements are lowered in recessions, are higher the more fragmented the banking sector, and are increased when anti-competitive measures are removed. In equilibrium banks earn excessive profits and credit may be rationed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G28, L13.     

Beyond state-owned banks: Evidence from Shanghai bank customers

In light of a reformed and liberalized banking sector in China, this article sets out to examine the role of socio-demographic factors and customers’ banking experiences and priorities in customers’ selection of banks. As state-owned banks have long dominated the banking industry, the article also investigates the receptiveness of the Shanghai Chinese towards newer commercial banks, such as the joint-stock banks, and the penetration of foreign banks into China's banking industry. Comparing customers who use state-owned banks only and those who patronize joint-stock banks, it is found that education, income, age, occupation sector and location of hometown affects customers of state-owned banks only. Further, it is also found that state-owned banks remain dominant despite the opening up of the banking sector, and perception towards state-owned banks remains favourable.     

当代美国商业银行贷款的发展

20世纪80年代中期以来,美国商业银行贷款的发展呈现出若干值得关注的特征。本文以实际数据为支持,考察分析商业银行贷款在美国信贷市场以及商业银行资产中的相对重要性变化,贷款结构的变化,不同规模商业银行贷款构成的特点,以及贷款质量的发展,以期对我国不同类型商业银行今后的贷款经营与发展提供参考。     

Competition in banking and the lending channel: Evidence from bank-level data in Asia and Latin America

This paper examines how banking competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. We apply a two-step estimation procedure using bank-level panel data for commercial banks in 10 Asian and 10 Latin American countries during the period from 1996 to 2006. In the first step we measure the degree of banking competition by applying the methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). In the second step we estimate a loan growth equation where the explanatory variables include the Panzar–Rosse measure of banking competition. The estimation results provide consistent evidence that increased competition in the banking sector weakens the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. This is especially true for banks in Latin American countries and banks of small size, low liquidity, and low capitalization. We also discuss the policy implications of the main findings of this paper.     

构建合理的商业银行绩效评价体系

绩效考评工作在国外已经非常成熟。由于历史原因，我国银行绩效考评工作开展的一直不太理想。金融业作为国民经济的重要支柱产业，做好商业银行的绩效考评工作具有非常重要的现实意义。本从回顾绩效考评工作的历史发展情况入手，分析了我国商业银行在绩效考评工作中存在的主要问题，并对如何建立科学合理的商业银行绩效考评体系提出粗浅的建议。     

银行业市场结构对企业生产率的影响——来自工业企业的经验证据

本文在充分考虑中国信贷市场本地竞争特征的基础上,利用手工收集的商业银行分支机构独特数据构造了城市层面的银行业市场结构指标,并将其与2002-2007年中国工业企业数据库进行合并构造基础数据库,考察了银行业市场结构对企业生产率的影响。研究发现:首先,一个更具竞争性的银行业市场结构显著提高了企业生产率,这支持了银行业市场结构的“市场力量假说”;其次,从影响机制来看,一个更具竞争性的银行业市场结构更有利于缓解企业面临的融资约束;最后,银行业市场结构对企业生产率的影响在那些面临更多融资约束的企业中更为显著,小企业、非国有企业、新企业和高技术行业的企业从银行业竞争中获益更大。     

中国银行业商业方法专利保护现状及战略分析

金融业尤其是银行业的商业方法是商业思想、商业运行模式、计算机软硬件的集合体,文章探讨了金融创新环境下商业方法专利对我国银行业发展的重要意义,以翔实的数据分析了当前我国银行业商业方法专利保护工作的整体形势与主要问题,指出我国商业银行应从战略上加强商业方法专利乃至知识产权保护意识,完善战略制定、战略实施以及战略评估,并通过构建制度和加大技术创新扶持来改善外部环境。     

Capital regulation,heterogeneous monitoring costs,and aggregate loan quality

This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure. After analyzing an unregulated banking system, we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks. To gauge the impact of capital requirements, we define loan ‘quality’ in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population. Under the assumption of a specific cross-sectional distribution of banks, our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending, but has an ambiguous effect on loan ‘quality’. Nevertheless, once capital requirements are in place, the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan ‘quality’ by toughening capital requirements.     

浅析新形势下商业银行不良资产化解之道

数据显示,全国银行业不良贷款增量仍然较大,且信贷风险呈现“区域集聚、行业集群”的特点。如何处置与化解历史不良贷款成为各商业银行亟需解决的一个重大问题。本文从目前商业银行对不良贷款的处置方式,提出国内商业银行应更加重视不良贷款管理,实现不良贷款管理模式、体制机制的优化。     

The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking

One of the largest responses of the US government to the recent financial crisis was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). TARP was originally intended to stabilize the financial sector through the increased capitalization of banks. However, recipients of TARP funds were then encouraged to make additional loans despite increased borrower risk. In this paper, we consider the effect of the TARP capital injections on bank risk-taking by analyzing the risk ratings of banks’ commercial loan originations during the crisis. The results indicate that, relative to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks but decreased at small TARP banks. Loan levels also moved in different directions for large and small banks and, in supporting evidence, these effects are evaluated based on loan size and TARP repayment. For large banks, the increase in risk-taking without an increase in lending is suggestive of moral hazard due to government support. These results may also be due to the conflicting goals of the TARP program for bank recapitalization and bank lending.     

我国商业银行信贷风险的成因及化解方法探析

我国金融体系仍以银行业为主导,信贷业务作为银行主要收入来源的同时,与之相应的信贷风险也成为其面临的首要风险。本文分析了商业银行信贷风险的成因,并建设性提出加强商业银行风险管理是化解商业银行信贷风险的有效手段。     

中印国有商业银行经营效率比较研究

本文运用DEA方法,采用中国与印度共32家国有商业银行(其中中国4家,印度28家)2004财年的经营数据,分析了其技术效率、纯粹技术效率和规模效率,并将中国与印度的国有商业银行分成两组分别对三种效率做了对比检验。结论为两国国有商业银行技术效率值较高,但72%的银行处于规模不经济阶段,取得规模经济是两国大部分国有商业银行改革要面临的选择。印度国有商业银行各项效率稍微领先中国国有商业银行,但在统计上却均无显著性。虽然印度总量资产远小于中国,金融发展历史久于中国,但从整体上来说,作者认为并不像有些文献中提到的印度银行体系效率要远高于中国。     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

The effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks – The case of China

Although the relationship between bank ownership and performance is the current focus of much research, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership and the prudential behavior of banks. Using Chinese data, I show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by joint-equity banks, but has improved over time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accountability to shareholders and depositors gives joint-equity banks a better incentive than state-owned banks to engage in prudent lending, and with the hypothesis that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently in their lending.     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.