新司法解释对住房按揭贷款的风险影响分析

一、新司法解释的内容新司法解释第二十四条规定:"因商品房买卖合同被确认无效或者被撤销、解除,致使商品房担保贷款合同的目的无法实现,当事人请求解除商品房担保贷款合同的,应予支持。",同时,第二十五条第二款规定:"商品房买卖合同被确认无效或者被撤销、解除后,商品房担保贷款合同也被解除的,出卖人也当将收受的购房贷款和购房款的本金及利息分别返还担保权人和买受人。"在目前商业银行的住房按揭贷款中,为保证住房按揭贷款的如期归还,     

商业银行与信用担保机构合作探讨

贷款担保是信用担保机构为金融机构和借款人提供的第三方保证。信用担保机构保证在借款人没有按借款合同约定的期限还本付息时,负责支付借款人应付而未付的本金和利息。商业银行借助信用担保机构能够完善市场信号机制,解决企业融资过程中的信息不对称问题,将风险转移给担保机构,从而降低自身的风险。     

民间借贷如何书写借条

正民间借贷诉讼属于合同纠纷,但是当事人间往往没有书面借款合同,借据、收据、欠条等债权凭证可证明借贷关系,因此借条成为实施民间借贷关系的关键证据。一、书写借条应注意的事项借条至少应该具备以下基本内容:借款人及出借人姓名信息、借款数额、借款人签名、签署日期,这样就可以构成认定双方主体关系、借款数额等民间借贷关系的最主要的法律关系了。根据实际情况,借条中可选择标注"利息标准、借款期限、担保方式、借款用途、逾期归还的利息标准、借款人身     

不良贷款部分清偿还款顺序探讨

欠债还钱是天经地义的事情,借款人向银行借款,到期除归还本金外,还要偿付利息,如果借款人违约,还需要支付罚息和实现债权有关费用。偿还性是银行信贷的本质特征,因此银行一般都要通过借款合同明确借款人还款方式及违约责任。     

一起担保合同纠纷及其对银行的启示

基本案情2008年,林成、郑晓夫妻以买房的名义申请住房公积金个人借款。林成向西定县住房公积金办公室提供了一份其本人与九龙房地产开发有限公司的房屋买卖协议,但林成并未实际购买该房屋。2008年8月19日,林成、郑晓作为借款人,魏生、林卫(林成之妹)作为保证人与西定A银行签订了《北宁市住房公积金个人住房借款合同》。同日,西定县公证处对该借款合同进行了公证,公证内容包括三方当事人在订立合同时具有法律规定的民事权利能力和民事行为能力,合同上三方当事人的盖章、签字、指印属实等。同日,西定A银行向林成交付了10万元借款,林成在个人住房贷款凭证上签字确认。林成于2008年9月、10月、11月、12月分别按期偿还本金和利息共计3209.2元后于2009年元月死亡,剩余本金98521.19元及利息一直未予偿还。     

保险贷款——商业银行信贷机制的一种创新

保险贷款是在保险公司承保的条件下,商业银行向借款人提供的贷款。若借款人失去清偿能力,银行根据贷款五级分类法确认为损失类后,由保险公司承担贷款的全部或部分本金和利息。这种贷款方式是适应银行资产风险管理的要求,在保险业务和商业银行贷款业务领域内的机制创新...     

企业对自己所开办的公司不注入资本金将要承担什么法律后果？

1996年2月14日,中国农业银行某县支行与借款人黔建公司签订了《抵押担保借款合同》,约定县支行向黔建公司提供短期贷款150万元,借款人黔建公司以其所属的59套商品房作价190万元为该笔贷款提供抵押担保。但抵押商品房未到有关部门办理登记手续。合同签订后,县支行依约分三次向借款人黔建公司发放贷款150万元。贷款     

担保法实施以前签订的保证合同应如何计算保证期间

案情中国农业银行贵州省A 支行于1994年5月30日与借款人钢板锄锻造厂(以下简称锻造厂)、保证人轻纺贸易公司(以下简称轻纺公司)签订了《保证担保借款合同》,合同约定贷款本金213万元,履行期为1994年6月1日至1999年5月31日,轻纺公司对贷款承担连带保证责任。贷款到期后,A 支行于2000年11月2日向锻造厂送达《债务逾期催收通知书》,但该厂仍未归还贷款本息,遂 A 支行于2001年5月31日向地区中级人民法院提起诉讼,要求法院判令借款人锻造厂还本付息,担保人轻纺公司承担连带清偿责任。一审中,借款人锻造厂对借     

百姓担保的投资指南

如何让手中的钱增值保值呢?除了股票、基金、黄金、保险等传统理财方式外,现在有不少人把目光投向了担保投资产品。但投资有风险,进入须谨慎。据了解,担保投资是指个人将闲置资金借贷给经过担保公司严格考察、审核过的具备较强还款能力的借款人,借款人要以房产、汽车或其他资产作为抵(质)押物。担保公司作为中介,收取借款人的担保服务费,对借款人资金使用及回收情况进行全程监控,并提供连带责任担保。如借贷到期未还清借贷资金,担保公司三个工作日内代偿投资客户的本金、利息。担保投资的钱"机"随着经济的发展,大量中小企业纷纷涌现。但由于诸多客观因素,为数众多的     

浅析个人住房贷款贴息业务

贴息贷款是指住房资金管理部门与有关商业银行合作并负责担保，对符合住房公积金贴息条件的借款人，根据申请的贴息额度按商业性个人住房贷款和个人住房公积金贷款的利息差额进行贴息。在操作过程中应解决信用评估机制及各方当事人的法律关系。     

On Pricing and Hedging the No‐Negative‐Equity Guarantee in Equity Release Mechanisms

In a roll‐up mortgage, the borrower receives a loan in the form of a lump sum. The loan is rolled up with interest until the borrower dies, sells the house, or moves into long‐term care permanently. The house is sold at that time, and the proceeds are used to repay the loan and interest. Most roll‐up mortgages are sold with a no‐negative‐equity guarantee (NNEG), which caps the redemption amount at the lesser of the face amount of the loan and the sale proceeds. The core of this study is to develop a framework for pricing and managing the risks of the NNEG.     

贷款转让对道德风险监督的影响研究

贷款转让是银行可规避诸多监管而获得低成本流动性的一种有效途径。本文以控制借款人道德风险为目的,采用效用函数分析了不同贷款转让情景下银行监督水平的最优选择。研究结果表明,贷款转让比例越高,边际收益递减阻碍了银行监督水平,可能扩大借款人的道德风险。投资者承担合理监督成本是激励银行实施最优监督水平的一条有效措施。除了承担合理监督成本外,贷款投资者对贷款的合理定价也是激励银行监督借款人的一个重要积极因素。     

The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.     

Mortgage Delivery to the Secondary Market when Interest Rates are Falling

A borrower whose loan is committed to the securitization process has the ability and incentive to switch lenders if market rates drop during the loan origination period, which creates significant exposure for primary lenders. A simple secondary market contract innovation we call a mortgage rate drop guarantee (MRDG) could shift this risk to the securitizers who represent portfolio investors. Our simulation results indicate this shifting would have improved the risk/return distribution faced by originators without damaging the risk/return position of securitizers during our 1977–2010 sample period. Assuming conservative loan lives and origination periods, and competitive lending markets, the risk reduction features of MRDGs could also have generated significant interest savings for borrowers.     

基于法律视角下商业银行贷款核准制的风险分析与控制

贷款担保核准制要求借款人先落实合法有效的担保并经银行核准之后,再对其发放贷款。这一制度存在许多不足之处,如贷款担保核准制容易引发担保合同法律效力的争议与纠纷,容易造成部分抵押、质押担保丧失法律效力,容易产生民事争议与纠纷,可能导致权力寻租和孳生腐败,已办理抵(质)押担保登记却未能核准放款而引起的违约纠纷等问题。鉴于此,作者提出如下风险防范建议:(1)修改现行的贷款核准制,改贷前担保核准为提款之前核准;(2)完善信贷台账管理系统;(3)允许一份合同使用两种编号;(4)尽量签订最高额担保合同;(5)修改《借款合同》附条件生效约定。     

Competition,risk neutrality and loan commitments

We rationalize fixed rate loan commitments (forward credit contracting with options) in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality. Future interest rates are random, but there are no transactions costs. Borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs. Credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a (non-cooperative) Nash game between the bank and the borrower. The initial formal analysis is basically in two steps. First, we show that the only spot credit market Nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank's informational handicap. Second, we show that loan commitments, because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank's expected profit and the loan interest rate, enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly Pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium. Perhaps our most surprising result is that, if the borrower has some initial liquidity, it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing.     

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Pricing of Loan Commitments for Facilitating Stochastic Liquidity Needs

A bank loan commitment is often priced as a European-style put option that is used by a company with a known borrowing need on a known future date to lock in an interest rate. The literature has abstracted some of the important institutional features of a loan commitment contract. First, the timing, number, and size of the loan takedowns under such a contract are often random, rather than fixed. Second, companies often use loan commitment contracts to reduce the transaction costs of frequent borrowing and to serve as a guarantee for large and immediate random liquidity needs. Third, commercial banks maintain liquidity reserves for making random spot loans or random committed loans. Partial loan takedowns raise, rather than lower, the opportunity cost of a committed bank??s holding of excess capacity. This paper introduces a ??stochastic needs-based?? pricing model that incorporates these features. Simulations are conducted to illustrate the effects of various parameters on the fair price of a loan commitment.     

The Supply‐Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness

Using a measure of contract strictness based on the probability of a covenant violation, I investigate how lender‐specific shocks impact the strictness of the loan contract that a borrower receives. Banks write tighter contracts than their peers after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolios, even when defaulting borrowers are in different industries and geographic regions from the current borrower. The effects persist after controlling for bank capitalization, although bank equity compression is also associated with tighter contracts. The evidence suggests that recent defaults inform the lender's perception of its own screening ability, thereby impacting its contracting behavior.     

Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their Homes?

We use a detailed dataset of seriously delinquent mortgages to examine the dynamic process of mortgage default—from initial delinquency and default to final resolution of the loan and disposition of the property. We estimate a two-stage competing risk hazard model to assess the factors associated with post-default outcomes, including whether a borrower receives a legal notice of foreclosure. In particular, we focus on a borrower’s ability to avoid a foreclosure auction by getting a modification, by refinancing the loan, or by selling the property. We find that the outcomes of the foreclosure process are significantly related to: loan characteristics including the borrower’s credit history, current loan-to-value and the presence of a junior lien; the borrower’s post-default payment behavior, including the borrower’s participation in foreclosure counseling; neighborhood characteristics such as foreclosure rates, recent house price depreciation and median income; and the borrower’s race and ethnicity.