The 2008 financial crisis: Stock market contagion and its determinants

In this paper, we investigate worldwide contagion and its determinants during the 2008 financial crisis. Utilizing an international sample of returns from 2003 to 2009, we consider both uni- and bi-directional contagion. After controlling for crisis-related volatility, we find strong evidence that cross-market linkages increase among many financial markets. In contrast to previous crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets. The United States and other mature financial markets in the sample transmit and receive contagion. Country markets are less influenced by regions than they are by other country markets. We also construct variables that represent relative changes in economic variables before and during the crisis. We find that both economic fundamentals such as trade structure, interest rates, inflation rates, industrial production, and regional effects, and investors’ risk aversion contribute to international contagion.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

Unveiling investor-induced channels of financial contagion in the 2008 financial crisis using copulas

Understanding how financial crises spread is important for policy-makers and regulators in order to take adequate measures to prevent or contain the spread of these crises. This paper will test whether there was contagion of the subprime financial crisis to the European stock markets of the NYSE Euronext group (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) and, if evidence of contagion is found, it will determine the investor-induced channels through which the crisis propagated. We will use copula models for this purpose. After assessing whether there is evidence of financial contagion in the stock markets, we will examine whether the ‘wealth constraints’ transmission mechanism prevails over the ‘portfolio rebalancing’ channel. An additional test looks at the interaction between stock and bond markets during the crisis and allows us to determine if the transmission occurred due to the ‘cross market rebalancing’ channel or the ‘flying to quality’ phenomenon. The tests suggest that (i) financial contagion is present in all analyzed stock markets, (ii) a ‘portfolio rebalancing’ channel is the most important crisis transmission mechanism, (iii) and the ‘flight-to-quality’ phenomenon is also present in all analyzed stock markets.     

Stock market recovery from the 2008 financial crisis: The differences across Europe

This study investigates the influence of the 2008 financial crisis on a number of European stock markets. The sample includes EU benchmark indices as well as European markets with slowed or hampered recovery over a period of ten years (2004–2014) thus allowing a comparison on their development before, during and after the crisis. We utilize a novel approach based on a combination of stochastic modeling and continuous wavelet transform. It enables a robust distinction between expected and unexpected spillover effects as well as assessment of the expected speed of European stock markets recovery. It further quantifies the temporal boundaries of absorption of negative and positive shocks coming from the US stock market and explains the observed asymmetry. The studied European markets are divided into several groups and expectations are built on the speed of their recovery. We find that the major reasons for the discrepancies observed between actual and expected recovery for some of the markets are due to structural breaks in the co-movement with US market as well as to weak domestic fundamentals.     

Credit distortion and financial crisis

A simple and consistent theory based on credit distortion is developed to understand the origin of financial crises in the emerging markets. We prove that without the guarantee of various government agencies on the credit risk of foreign loans, the interest rate on foreign loans would be the same as the domestic loans, which would eliminate the incentive to borrow foreign loans on a great scale. We demonstrate that the common phenomena preluding the crisis, such as heavy foreign borrowing and overinvestment in real estate, are rational choices when a particular currency is overvalued and cheap credit is available.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

Financial sector structure and financial crisis burden

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.     

Islamic and conventional banks' soundness during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

The recent global financial crisis has induced a series of failure of many conventional banks and led to an increased interest in the Islamic banking business model. This paper attempts to answer empirically the following question: What was the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks and their conventional peers? Using the Z-score as an indicator of bank stability, our regression analysis (covering a matched sample of 34 Islamic Banks (IBs) and 34 conventional banks (CBs) from 16 countries) shows that there is no significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of IBs and CBs. This finding reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis.     

Individual financial risk tolerance and the global financial crisis

We investigate individual investors’ tolerance towards financial risk by focusing on changes associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is analysed longitudinally controlling for demographic, socio‐economic and regional variations. In absolute terms, the change in FRT is small and contrasts with a popular view that risk tolerance is an elastic psychological state overly influenced by the pervading market conditions. Even in the presence of significant financial events, FRT tends to be a reasonably stable attribute in the shorter term but possibly influenced and reshaped by events more gradually over time.     

Crisis transmission: Some evidence from the Asian financial crisis

We used a crisis measure of financial market as defined by Sexena (1998) to study the nature of crisis transmission and the channels through which the 1997 crisis was transmitted among Asian financial markets. Estimated with a vector autoregression (VAR) and an OLS model on Asian financial markets from January 1990 to December 1998, we found that:

1.

During the crisis period, crisis transmission was more significant than during other noncrisis periods;

2.

Comparing the crisis transmission within the industrialized countries (Taiwan, Korea, and Japan), within the emerging countries (Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Indonesia), and between the industrialized and emerging groups, it is shown that

2.1.

The crisis transmission among the three industrialized countries was not significant.

2.2.

The crises originated from Thailand and Malaysia were transmitted to other emerging countries.

2.3.

The crisis transmission between industrialized and emerging countries was not found to be significant. There was evidence showing that Singapore served as an intermediary transmitting crisis between industrialized and emerging countries during this particular crisis.

3.

The transmission through the wake-up call effect was found to be more significant than other transmission channels. Trade relationship and cash-in effects only existed in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.

     

Volatility and risk relevance of comprehensive income

Motivated by concerns that the volatility of comprehensive income leads to the perception of increased risk we investigate the volatility and risk relevance of comprehensive income relative to net income for a sample of non-financial firms over the period 2005–2010. We find that comprehensive income is more volatile than net income and that comprehensive income is associated with market-based measures of risk (volatility of stock returns and beta). However, the volatility of comprehensive income incremental to net income is not associated with market risk and is not priced. These results have important implications for the FASB in deciding whether to report comprehensive income in a single statement of performance.     

The synergy of financial sector development and information sharing in financial access: Propositions and empirical evidence

This study assesses the role of information sharing in financialization (or coexistence of financial sub-systems) for financial access. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-contemporary Fixed Effects and Quantile regressions on 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011. The positive complementarity of information sharing offices (ISOs) and financial formalization is an increasing function of financial activity (or access to credit) whereas the negative complementarity of ISOs and financial informalization is a decreasing function of financial activity. In order to leverage on the synergy between ISO and financial formalization for enhanced financial access, some policy measures are proposed.     

Capital income taxation and economic growth in open economies

Can reductions in domestic capital income taxes attract foreign capital and, at the same time, foster economic growth? Using a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and internationally mobile capital, this paper shows that the effect of domestic capital taxes on the international allocation of capital and on the rate of economic growth do not necessarily go in the same direction. A country can attract capital by reducing its taxes, but this may lower the rate of economic growth depending on the elasticity of saving to the net-of-tax interest rate and on the effect of taxes on domestic factor productivity.     

On the rationality of Korea's stock market: was the recent Korean financial crisis due to fundamental factors?

This paper examines whether the recent financial crisis in Korea was due to fundamental factors. To address this issue, we identify various components of Korea's stock market prices (KOSPI) and examine their responses to different types of shocks. Given the stationary behavior of KOSPI dividends, we relate stock price directly to earnings by deriving and using a log-linear model of the spread between price and earnings with a time-varying discount factor. Therefore, stock-price movements are explained by earnings (numerator component), time-varying discount factors (denominator component), and non-fundamental factors. Although we find evidence of substantial non-fundamental components in Korea's stock market prices, the sudden decline in Korea's stock market prices during the 1997 financial crisis was primarily due to fundamental components, in particular, the numerator component (e.g. earnings) combined with the denominator component (i.e. time-varying discount factor) rather than non-fundamental factors.     

Housing markets and the financial crisis of 2007–2009: Lessons for the future

An unsustainable weakening of credit standards induced a US mortgage lending and housing bubble, whose consumption impact was amplified by innovations altering the collateral role of housing. In countries with more stable credit standards, any overshooting of construction and house prices owed more to traditional housing supply and demand factors. Housing collateral effects on consumption also varied, depending on the liquidity of housing wealth. Lessons for the future include recognizing the importance of financial innovation, regulation, housing policies, and global financial imbalances for fueling credit, construction, house price and consumption cycles that vary across countries.     

The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis

We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of credit for fear banks would restrict access in the future, and sold more assets to fund their operations. We also find that the inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments. Our results also hold in Europe and Asia, and in many cases are stronger in those economies. Our analysis adds to the portfolio of approaches and knowledge about the impact of credit constraints on real firm behavior.     

CDOs and the financial crisis: Credit ratings and fair premia

We study risk and return characteristics of CDOs using the market standard models. We find that fair spreads on CDO tranches are much higher than fair spreads on similarly-rated corporate bonds. Our results imply that credit ratings are not sufficient for pricing, which is surprising given their central role in structured finance markets. This illustrates limitations of the rating methodologies that are solely based on real-world default probabilities or expected losses and do not capture risk premia. We also demonstrate that CDO tranches have large exposure to systematic risk and thus their ratings and prices are likely to decline substantially when credit conditions deteriorate.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

A perfect storm in the financial market

This study provides a model explaining how small changes in asset prices may disrupt an entire financial market. Based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), our model implies that during a market crash, asset price changes affect the relative distribution of the CAPM betas of individual assets and force all tradable assets to co-move. Using US stock market data, our empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions. Overall, the study aids understanding of the price patterns of assets during substantial market downturns, such as financial crises.     

Exchange market pressures during the financial crisis: A Bayesian model averaging evidence

In this paper, we examine whether pre-crisis leading indicators help explain pressures on the exchange rate (and its volatility) during the global financial crisis. We use a unique data set that covers 149 countries and 58 indicators, and estimation techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Our results are threefold: First and foremost, we find that price stability plays a pivotal role as a determinant of exchange rate pressures. More specifically, the currencies of countries that experienced higher inflation prior to the crisis tend to be more affected in times of stress. Second, we investigate potential effects that vary with the level of pre-crisis inflation. In this vein, our results reveal that an increase in domestic savings reduces the severity of pressures in countries that experienced a low-inflation environment prior to the crisis. Finally, we find evidence of the mitigating effects of international reserves on the volatility of exchange rate pressures.