Who's afraid of a globalized world? Foreign Direct Investments, local knowledge and allocation of talents

We study the distributional effects of globalization within a model of heterogeneous agents where both managerial talent and knowledge of the local economic environment are required in order to become a successful entrepreneur. Agents willing to set up a firm abroad incur a learning cost that depends on how different the foreign and domestic entrepreneurial environments are. In this context, we show that globalization fosters FDI and raises wages, output and productivity. However, not everybody wins. The steady state relationship between globalization and income is U-shaped: high- and low-income agents are better off in a globalized world, while middle-income agents (domestic entrepreneurs) are worse off. Thus, consistently with recent empirical evidence, the model predicts globalization to increase inequality at the top of the income distribution while decreasing it at the bottom.     

Habit formation and fiscal transmission in open economies

In this paper we analyze the ability of an open economy version of the neoclassical model to account for the time-series evidence on fiscal policy transmission. Revisiting the evidence, we find that i) government spending raises output, while inducing a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account and ii) the responses of output and investment are more muted in more open economies while current account deficits tend to be larger. Turning to the model, we explore the role of habit formation for fiscal policy transmission. Specifically, we show that the model can account for the evidence if consumption behavior is characterized by habit formation and the terms of trade adjust endogenously.     

Political connections,political cycles and stock returns: Evidence from Iran

We examine the effect of political connections and political cycles on stock returns of listed companies in Iran. Using 1146 firm-year observations derived from firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2005–2017, we find that political connections are positively associated with firms' annual actual returns and annual abnormal returns. Presidential elections strengthen the positive relationship between political connections and cumulative abnormal returns. Transfer of power to the Moderation (Principlist) party in 2013 (2005) strengthened (weakened) the positive relation between political connections and cumulative abnormal returns. Several sensitivity tests show that the results are not materially different from the main findings. Consistent with the political economy perspective, the findings suggest that political connections in a centrally planned economy are valuable for both parties and they become even more valuable in election years. Moreover, consistent with rational partisan theory, results suggest that investors react to political uncertainties stemming from presidential elections and transfer of power, even in emerging market economies like Iran.     

Political Rivalry Effects on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality: A New Political Economy Approach

We propose an endogenous growth model with new political economy elements in order to (1) examine how political incentives affect economic allocations and (2) study the effects of political rivalry on human capital accumulation and income inequality. Focusing on two important policies affecting economic performance—fiscal policy and public investments in human capital accumulation—we find that different political incentives have distinct effects on policies and economic allocations. We also find that political rivalry increases income inequality and reduces economic growth and human capital accumulation through its negative impact on public investments in education, wages and individual learning choice.     

Economic Integration in East Asia: An International Input‐Output Analysis

To establish economic and monetary union (EMU) in East Asia, deepening regional integration through international trade is important. The economic interdependence (one of the important criteria for regional integration) study, using macro data does not reflect the indirect effects generated by interactions between different production sectors and different countries. We use the international input‐output (IIO) framework to study the economic interdependence at both macro and production sector levels. We refine the existing methods to reflect exogenous country effect and size effect of the economy. Our study suggests that establishing EMU in East Asia appears to be somewhat premature. However, we can be more optimistic for regional integration at the production sector level in East Asia when including Japan, which will create a basis for EMU in the region.     

开放经济下的贸易安全:内涵、挑战与应对思路

随着我国完善开放型经济体系和经济全球化的深入推进,各国的体制机制、发展水平以及世界经济等的变化将给我国贸易安全带来新挑战。调整外贸战略和转变外贸增长方式维护我国的贸易安全,带动国内生产效率的提高,促进我国经济又好又快发展,需要有长远的战略思维,不仅要制定和执行好国际经济政策,提高政府的带动效率,完善外贸发展的促进和支持体系,而且要在国际社会牢牢把握对我国维护贸易安全起关键作用的战略资源。     

Emerging economies and the global financial crisis: Evidence from China and India

The global financial crisis (GFC) spread from the US and the EU economies to the developing world. In this article, we seek to gain a better understanding of clear contexts, attendant mechanisms, and processes associated with the GFC in China and India. We identify and synthesize the available evidence on the size of the external shock, the cushioning effects, and responses associated with the GFC to propose a framework that enables us to analyze more deeply the antecedents and consequences of the GFC in these two economies. Because of differences in their economic, social, and political backgrounds, China and India have exhibited noteworthy differences in the impacts and responses to the GFC. The findings indicated that trade and investment linkages with the outside world and the degree of personal globalization affected the size of the external shock associated with the GFC. In China's case, a sound macroeconomic policy framework and the state's control on the economy provided a cushion effect, which acted as a buffer to protect the economy against the external shock. China's and India's responses to the GFC included a shift from export‐driven to domestic demand‐led growth and diversion and shift of economic links away from economies associated with the GFC. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

Who Supplied My Cheese? Supply Chain Management in the Global Economy

Today, with an Internet connection and some specialized skills, individuals and companies located in the remotest ends of the earth can compete and collaborate globally. This paradigm shift has occurred as technological forces, the fracturing of political barriers, and a relentless drive for greater efficiencies changed how we work and where we work, ushering in the age of globalization in ways never imagined previously. While many factors can influence macroeconomic variables—including better monetary and fiscal policies, freer trade, and fewer economic shocks—evidence is presented here that better global supply chain management and a more global economy should not be overlooked. On the one hand, these new practices have likely helped to keep inflation lower, reduce economic volatility, strengthen productivity growth, and improve living standards. On the other hand, these new practices cause greater uncertainties and calls for protectionist policies, as outsourcing and offshoring move work to lower cost providers with little regard for geopolitical boundaries. JEL Classification F110, F020     

Beeinflussen Politiker das Ergebnis von nationalen Steuerschätzungen?

As voters increasingly favour sound public finances, solid budgets serve as an important quality signal. National tax revenue forecasts are a core element of national budget plans. Therefore, politicians might be tempted to influence them strategically. Examining 18 OECD countries from 1996 to 2012, the authors explore whether national tax revenue forecasts are manipulated by politicians. Their evidence points to partisan politics and the influence of fragmentation. Surprisingly and in contradiction to the theoretical conclusions from the ‘common pool’ problem, more fragmented governments or parliaments seem to underestimate tax revenues. There is no empirical evidence to support opportunistic behaviour, i.e. that tax revenue forecasts lead to political business cycles.     

Escaping a protectionist rut: Policy mechanisms for trade reform in a democracy

This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions and thus voters' trade policy preferences. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or tariff liberalization by trading partners, but generally not by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a protectionist political rut.     

Does globalisation affect the shadow economy?

We investigate the impact of globalisation on the shadow economy using panel data for 119 countries. Our evidence suggests that globalisation matters in mitigating shadow development. More specifically, we find that political globalisation reduces the shadow economy, whereas economic and social globalisations have limited statistical support after controlling for important factors that affect the size of the shadow economy. Overall, these results are robust after accounting for an alternative measure of the shadow economy, outliers, endogeneity and alternative model specifications.     

国际资本流动新趋势下中国的转移定价决策及控制机制研究

随着全球经济一体化、国际化的发展,国际资本无论从规模、品种,还是资本结构、流向等都一改往日投资追随贸易的现象而呈现出新的趋势。中国稳定的政治局面、良好的投资环境,成为国际资本追捧的热点。国际资本的大量流入,缓解了我国资本短缺的状况,促进了经济的迅猛发展。但是,由于我国转移定价机制不合理,监控措施不完善,使得我国利用外资的效益不尽人意。因此,应在国际资本流动新趋势下,制定适合中国国情的合理的转移定价决策机制和监控措施。     

The interface between globalization,trade and development: Theoretical issues for international business studies

Globalization, widely cited as the dominant international economic trend of the post-World War II era, is deeply connected with the opening of the world economy. The relationship between trade and growth has been intensively debated in the economic literature, within the fields of economics, sociology, political sciences, and others. However, in the areas of International Business (IB) and management studies, research about an integrated approach to the issues of globalization deserves further attention. In particular, in the 21st century, companies are being challenged to think differently about the purpose and societal impact of their activities on the poorest nations. Therefore, this paper addresses economic and social issues of accelerating globalization within a framework of IB and management studies.     

The interface of market and nonmarket strategies: Political ties and strategic competitive actions

We focus on corporate political connections as a critical nonmarket strategy and propose that political ties can facilitate firms’ strategic competitive actions but may also hurt the outcomes of such actions, depending on whether the ties are associated to central versus local political actors. Studying China's television manufacturers at the onset of deregulation and globalization, we find that central and local political ties have contrasting effects on firms’ competitive actions and their performance outcomes. To further shed light on theoretical mechanisms, we examine the impact of China's WTO accession on firm actions and contrast domestic-based and internationalization competitive actions.     

EMU and Labour Market Reform: Needs,Incentives and Realisations

Despite improving labour market conditions in recent years, a number of EMU countries still suffer from high and persistent unemployment. It could therefore be expected that labour market reform would be given a prominent position on the political agenda. The new constraints associated with the common monetary policy only increase the pressure for reform. Relying on the introduction of the single currency as a trigger for labour market reform may be a risky strategy. EMU generates a complex set of re‐optimising strategies of the players on the labour market, which makes it difficult to get a clear idea what impact it will have on labour market reform. Evaluation of recent reform measures does not make one confident either. The empirical analysis confirms to some extent the idea that countries with higher unemployment rates have carried out more labour market reform. This finding holds, however, only for countries that do not belong to EMU. EMU countries have on average carried out no more reform than countries outside EMU and any link between the initial unemployment level and the labour market reform indicators seems to lack. It may become apparent that more reform is needed once the macroeconomic environment becomes more unfavourable.     

The challenges and opportunities for the trade union movement in the transition era: two socialist market economies – China and Vietnam

Both China and Vietnam are undergoing a social experiment as they diverge from the path of their Soviet compatriots and attempt the transition to a ‘socialist market economy’. This article tackles the role of trade unions in China and Vietnam in the context of globalization and market-orientated economic reform by identifying both challenges and opportunities for the trade unions in the areas of policy formation at national level and participation in collective bargaining and dispute mediation at enterprise level. Trade unions in both countries will have a significant role on a wide range of social issues under their special political, social and economic systems in the transition era into the twenty-first century.     

Planning for self-employment at the beginning of a market economy: Evidence from individual data of East German workers

We investigate the plans of individual workers concerning future self-employment in the former German Democratic Republic shortly before the economic, monetary and social union in June/July 1990. Our data base is the Socio-Economic Panel East. We find that the desire to become an entrepreneur is basically determined by individual and household characteristics, including income and asset indicators, and not as much by the current job situation of the individual. The work experience attained in the socialist economy seems to be irrelevant for the decision to become self-employed in a market economy. Furthermore, we find evidence of barriers to entry which may come from capital market constraints and institutional restrictions. We also present an estimation of the determinants of the probability of being self-employed in Summer 1990. Due to institutional restrictions we find only a few individual characteristics to be important.For estimation, we use the binary and the ordinal logit model. The corresponding stochastic assumptions are tested extensively using pseudo-Lagrange multiplier tests against omitted variables, non-linearity, asymmetry of distribution, and heteroscedasticity.     

How will EMU affect cohesion?

The new policy environment of EMU affects economic, political and social cohesion in different ways: the policy mix and menu will be reconfigured; it will provide for more macroeconomic stability in cohesion countries; economic competition will intensify and change patterns of specialisation; and comparison of living standards will become easier, which puts pressure on policymakers to reduce inequalities. This article assesses the significance of these effects and their likely consequences in the short, medium and long run. Then the salient cohesion issues as regards eastern enlargement are discussed. Finally, policy conclusions are drawn, mindful of the considerable uncertainties that warrant further research. joint editor of the Journal of Common Market Studies. He has just moved to the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He is also Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Aveiro     

Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.