The Nash social welfare function for a measure space of individuals

In this paper we consider the Nash social welfare function for a society which is given as an arbitrary finite measure space. We show that the Nash social welfare function for the society is derived from certain rationality criteria.     

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (J Econ Theory 16:247–251, 1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley–Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker IIA axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms.     

Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges

We consider Nash implementation of social choice rules with restricted ranges, i.e., where some of the available alternatives are chosen at no preference profile. We show that the appropriate adaptation of Maskin monotonicity to this context depends on the range of the mechanisms: the wider is this range, the weaker is the monotonicity condition to be used. As a result, mechanisms employing outcome functions which allow for out-of-range alternatives at off-equilibrium messages can Nash implement social choice rules which fail to be Nash implementable by mechanisms whose ranges are restricted to the range of the social choice rule to be implemented. The Walrasian social choice correspondence is a particular instance of this. Moreover, social choice rules which are not Maskin monotonic can be “monotonized” by the addition of artificial out-of-range alternatives—a point we illustrate through Solomon’s Dilemma.     

出租车数量管制对社会福利的影响

运用经济学的研究方法对出租车行业的数量管制问题进行了考查。研究发现,由于出租车行业具有很强的竞争性,单纯依靠市场的自发调节就能够实现该行业的资源优化配置;对出租车行业的数量管制,不但影响了出租车行业的自身发展,而且造成了社会福利损失。事实上,管制的重要原因是为了获得管制租金而不是增进社会福利。因此放宽对出租车行业的数量管制才是增进社会福利的有效选择。     

On the impatience implications of Paretian social welfare functions

In this paper, we investigate the impatience implications resulting from the assumption of existence of a Paretian social welfare function (SWF) aggregating infinite utility streams. We show, for very general program spaces, that the set of utility streams, at which the SWF exhibits impatience, has the power of the continuum. In the context of a more special program space, which has figured prominently in the literature, we establish that this set is dense, so that even if there is a point in the program space at which the SWF does not exhibit impatience, there are points close to it at which it does. If the Paretian SWF is continuous (in the sup metric), we show that impatience is generic: the collection of points, at which the SWF does not exhibit impatience, is a closed, nowhere dense set.     

The effect of the minimum wage for tipped workers on firm strategy,employees and social welfare

Millions of workers derive much of their income from tips and are subject to the “tipped minimum wage” that differs from the regular minimum wage. This article examines the implications of the tipped minimum wage and shows that increasing it may lead restaurants to adopt a compulsory service charge in lieu of tipping to extract the economic rent enjoyed by waiters under tipping. Because servers are better off with tipping, this implies that increasing the tipped minimum wage in an attempt to increase servers' income may achieve the opposite result. Moreover, increasing the tipped minimum wage may reduce social welfare.     

The impact of entrepreneurship on economic,social and environmental welfare and its determinants: a systematic review

Management Review Quarterly - This paper presents a systematic review of (a) the impact of entrepreneurship on economic, social and environmental welfare and (b) the factors determining this...     

The welfare economics of city bigness

Money wages will vary among cities in an economy with perfect labor mobility, due to differences in costs of producing nontraded goods. Commuting costs contribute to making money wages higher in large cities. Increasing negative technological externalities, such as pollution and congestion, also make money wages higher in larger cities. Such externalities tend to make big cities too big, because marginal is greater than average externality. Internalizing the externalities would be likely to make a city larger if the externalities emanate from production of nontraded goods, but might make the city smaller if the externalities emanate from export production.     

A system for evaluating social welfare programs and allocating contributed resources based on citizen input

This paper describes the development and implementation of a social welfare program evaluation system developed by a Community Council to aid the resource allocation decision process of a local United Way. The system assigns a “utility” measure to each program based on how the program satisfies the long-term social welfare goals of the community adjusted for the effect of short range, time dependent criteria affecting the region. Data for the processes described was obtained by quantifying the subjective feelings of the individual members of the Community Council. The results have been accepted by the United Way Organization and are currently being used to assist in the planning and resource allocation functions of the fund.     

Inducing relations on incomplete ordinal data

Let X denote a set of n elements or stimuli which have an underlying linear ranking L based on some attribute of comparison. Incomplete ordinal data is known about L, in the form of a partial order P on X. This study considers methods which attempt to induce, or reconstruct, L based only on the ordinal information in P. Two basic methods for approaching this problem are the cardinal and sequel construction methods. Exact values are computed for the expected error of weak order approximations of L from the cardinal and sequel construction methods. Results involving interval orders and semiorders for P are also considered. Previous simulation comparisons for cardinal and sequel construction methods on interval orders were found to depend on the specific model that was used to generate random interval orders, and were not found to hold for interval orders in general. Finally, we consider the likelihood that any particular linear extension of P is the underlying L.     

The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection

To analyze the welfare gain from allowing for differentiated patent protection across sectors, this study develops a two-sector quality-ladder growth model in which patent breadth is a policy variable and derives optimal patent breadth under two patent regimes. We show that (a) uniform optimal patent breadth is a weighted average of sector-specific optimal patent breadth and (b) sector-specific optimal patent breadth is larger in the sector that has a larger market size and more technological opportunities. To derive the optimal policy, we allow for an arbitrary path of patent breadth and derive the optimal path by solving a Stackelberg differential game. We find that the optimal path of patent breadth under each patent regime is stationary, time-consistent and subgame perfect. Finally, we perform a numerical investigation and find that even a moderate degree of asymmetry across sectors can generate a significant welfare cost of uniform patent protection.     

Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Given an objective for a group of three or more agents that satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, Maskin (1977) proposes a two-step procedure for constructing a game that implements the objective in Nash equilibrium. The first step specifies the strategy set of the game and three properties of the game rule that are together sufficient to insure Nash implementation of the objective. The second step is the explicit construction of a game that has these properties. An example is presented here that shows that the constructed game of the second step need not have one of the three properties of the first step, and it does in fact not Nash implement the objective in the example. The problem is attributable to restricted preferences. A solution proposed here is to appropriately expand the domain of definition of the objective. This insures that the constructed game has the properties of the game in Maskin's first step, and it therefore Nash implements the original objective.     

Dealing with heterogeneity in ordinal responses

Quality & Quantity - In sample surveys where people are asked to express their personal opinions it is conceivable to register a high level of indecision among respondents and this circumstance...     

会计信息失真中的纳什均衡

文章针对会计造假和监督行为建立博弈模型,运用纳什均衡理论,分析当前会计信息失真的重要原因,同时提出了防范和治理措施。