Sabotage in dynamic tournaments

This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, is sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if all players start off at the same position, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments.     

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor. Received: 22 April 2004, Accepted: 25 December 2005 JEL Classification: L1, M2 I would like to thank the editor Semih Koray, two anonymous referees, Ulf Schiller, Dirk Sliwka, Gunter Steiner, and the participants of the Microeconomics Seminar of the Humboldt University at Berlin for very helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Information in tournaments under limited liability

The problem of designing tournament contracts under limited liability and alternative performance measures is considered. Under risk neutrality, only the best-performing agent receives an extra premium if the liability constraint becomes binding. Under risk aversion, more than one prize is awarded. In both situations, performance measures can be ranked if their likelihood ratio distribution functions differ by a mean-preserving spread. The latter result is applied to questions of contest design and more general forms of relative performance payment.     

Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents

Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents' strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, the first acting agent may choose a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium by choosing a sufficiently small spread between winner and loser prize. Received: January 2003, Accepted: November 2004 JEL Classification: J3, M12, M5 We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor Kai Konrad for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), projects no. KR 2077/2-1 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Ranking participants in tournaments by means of rating functions

In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of paired comparison analysis to define the performance of a player in a natural way. Then, we determine a ranking (and rating) of the players in the given tournament. Finally, we show, among other properties, that the new ranking method is the unique one satisfying a natural consistency requirement.     

Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems

We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, reduction-consistency, of choice rules and study its implications. The property is a natural expression for the problems of a general principle of consistency having been studied extensively in resource allocation problems. We show that no scoring rule satisfies reduction-consistency, and base a characterization of the top rule on the property. We also investigate the minimal extension of a rule needed to recover reduction-consistency, and identify the minimal extensions of several rules including the Borda and plurality rules.     

Breaking ties in collective decision-making

Decisions in Economics and Finance - Many classic social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are...     

The sale of relational capital through tenure profiles and tournaments

In this paper, a specific form of human capital is analyzed, relational capital, which consists of matches between market parties. Search and information costs make these matches valuable to both parties. Its peculiarity is that the control over such matches is transferred within firms from those who initially control it to anyone who works with it for a period.This characteristic allows someone who approaches the end of his working life to sell his relational capital to junior partners. This sale can explain upward sloping tenure profiles and can result in tournaments if juniors are budget-constrained and perfect contracting is not possible. The need to keep the amount of relational capital constant implies a generational balanced workforce within each firm.     

Recent trends in collective bargaining in Nigeria

During the 1970s Nigerian industrial relations moved away from the voluntarist tradition into much greater formalisation of processes and practices. This article describes the present structure and scope of collective bargaining in Nigeria in the light of this development.     

集体跳槽现象的思索

沸沸扬扬的方正集团助理总裁周险峰率众加盟海信数码事件终于尘埃落定.除了周险峰以外,方正科技产品中心总经理吴京伟、销售平台副总经理吴松林、产品总监以及PC部门的一些基层管理人员和技术人员一起投奔海信.近年来我们的耳边不停地充斥着此类离职事件:陆强华离开创维,带着一群人去独自创业;当年"小霸王"段永平出走创建"步步高",几年以后,一个新崛起的品牌"步步高"迈入中国电器行业排头兵之列.中智上海外企服务公司对5000位去年至少跳过一次槽的外企员工进行的调查中发现,有二成属于集体跳槽.     

A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk

We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.JEL Classification: J40, L20, M50Alexander Matros: We are grateful to Karl Wärneryd and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Much of this paper was written while Matros was a Research Fellow at University College London and Friebel was at SITE, Stockholm. We are grateful for their research environmennt. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research Center for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.     

Worker directors and collective bargaining

Elizabeth Chell and Derek Cox report on some of their findings of a study into worker directors and collective bargaining which was carried out between 1976 and 1979 and funded by the Department of Employment. The research involved seven private sector companies which have some form of worker director system.     

Corporate merger and collective bargaining in the UK

Corporate merger since the war has transformed the private sector of the economy in Britain. This has had significant effects on collective bargaining arrangements and outcomes. In this article the authors review these effects and consider their implications for trade union organisation.     

Real and nominal wage rigidities in collective bargaining agreements

An earlier study of wage agreements, reached in the Canadian unionized sector between 1976–99, found that wage adjustment is characterized by downward nominal rigidity and significant spikes at zero. We extend this earlier approach to encompass the possibility of real as well as nominal wage rigidity. The addition of real wage rigidity variables enhances earlier results and suggests that real rigidity increases significantly the mass in the histogram bin containing the mean anticipated rate of inflation, as well as in adjacent bins. Downward nominal wage rigidities and spikes at zero remain important.     

Occupational prestige and sex typing in the collective conscience

Previous work has shown that prestige is the only factor that is consistently employed in individuals' perceptions of the occupational structure. Is is argued that these results are in part an artifact of the methods. Using direct paired comparison estimates of differences between occupations and metric MDS to analyze the data, it is shown that perceptions are highly multidimensional. The data also show that prestige and sex typing are salient features in the collective conscience of respondents. Implications for occupational choice research are discussed.     

Preferences,choices, tournaments: Alternative foundations for the evaluation of voting schemes

The standard assumption underlying most of the negative results of the social choice theory is that the individuals have complete and transitive preference relations over the candidates. As an alternative to this assumption we consider the possibility that individuals can be characterized as possessing preference tournaments (i.e. asymmetric and complete relations) over the candidate set. We discuss the implications of the latter assumption to the negative results of social choice theory. Finally some solution concepts applicable in the individual preference tournament framework are outlined.     

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce ‘output-dependent prizes’ where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agents’ output—it is high when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result.     

Disclosure of information: stratification and collective bargaining

Research has continually emphasised the lack of interest of management and trade unions into greater disclosure of information in collective bargaining. In this article the author explains this failure in terms of the stratification of new and existing information along hierarchical lines which do not disturb existing property rights and maintain status structures.