The Role of Structural and Planning Autonomy in the Performance of Internal Corporate Ventures

Historically, autonomy has been treated as a broad one‐dimensional construct. This paper proposes that there are two major types of autonomy for internal corporate ventures (ICVs)—planning autonomy and structural autonomy—and examines their respective impact on performance. Little prior knowledge exists regarding the autonomy–performance relationship for ICVs despite the billions of dollars of corporate investment in ICVs. In this study, I collect primary data on 38 ICVs at different stages of development from both venture‐level and corporate‐level managers from over a dozen companies in the U.S. Midwest. I find that a negative relationship exists for planning autonomy regardless of venture stage. However, for venture structural autonomy, a more complex relationship was discovered, which ranged from positive to negative to curvilinear based on the venture's stage of development.     

Short leash or long leash? Parenting style,initial strategic clarity,and the development of venture learning proficiency

Corporate venture development suggests that internal corporate ventures (ICVs) must become proficient learners if they are to cope successfully with the uncertainty inherent to their operations. Accordingly, the parent corporations in which ICVs operate are challenged to identify and enact appropriate parenting styles that foster their ICVs' learning proficiency. The current research of 145 ICVs in 72 corporations builds on parenting theory to theorize that ICVs demonstrate the greatest learning proficiency when corporate parents give them a “leash length”—indicated via observed levels of top management support and operational decision-making autonomy—depending on the degree of strategic clarity under which the ICV was founded.     

A dynamic perspective of internal fit in corporate venturing

Managers of corporate parents and their ventures have long been faced with the question of how closely to tie the parent and venture. A close connection may enable a venture to capitalize on the competencies and resources of the parent. However, venture autonomy could prevent corporate inertia and bureaucracy from constraining venture growth.The lack of consensus on this issue leads us to the first of two complementary research questions that we address in this paper: “What is the effect of internal strategic fit between a corporate parent and its venture on venture performance?” We suggest that a tight fit is positively associated with venture performance because of the venture's access to its parent's resources.Managers and researchers alike have often observed that growing enterprises are dynamic entities. In the case of corporate ventures, this implies that the relationship between parent and venture evolves over time. Our second research question directly addresses this issue by asking: “Does the relationship between a corporate parent and its venture(s) evolve over time, and if so, how?”We identify two dimensions of the fit between corporate parents and their ventures: relational and economic. A relational fit reflects organizational culture and structure, while an economic fit is a function of the needs of the venture and the resources of the parent. We develop a series of hypotheses and test them with survey data from 97 Canadian corporate ventures. For the purposes of this study, we define success as the ability of a firm to meet internal milestones on schedule.We find that the degree of fit between a corporate parent and its venture does affect the success of a venture, and that success is associated with high levels of awareness, commitment, and connection. Further, the relational dimension of the parent-venture interface appears to have a greater association with venture success than does the economic dimension.Our data support the idea that the parent-venture relationship is dynamic in nature as ventures in our sample generally lessened their economic connections with their parents as they matured (or vice-versa). We did find, however, that the relational bonds remained more or less intact. The exceptions to these general trends were an increasing emphasis on financial targets along with decreasing CEO involvement as ventures matured. Both of these findings make intuitive sense. Greater financial independence is accompanied by greater financial accountability. And, as a venture gains in both independence and accountability, there is less need for the CEO to provide “air cover.” These two issues aside, the basic model of enduring relational ties and diminishing economic ties was supported. As well, the increasing accountability is consistent with our expectation that a close connection is preferable to high venture autonomy.     

Early-stage business model experimentation and pivoting

Recent literature suggests entrepreneurs struggle to pivot—or fundamentally change aspects of their venture—due to identity-based resistance to change. Yet, when entrepreneurs receive negative feedback, overcoming this resistance may be important to pivoting their business model. We adopt a convergent, mixed methods research design to explore when and why some entrepreneurs overcome resistance to change in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation. Building upon qualitative data that we gathered and analyzed, we theorize entrepreneurs may resist pivoting their value proposition relative to other business model components despite receiving negative feedback on this aspect of their business model. However, we find three factors – entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size – may enable entrepreneurs to pivot in response to negative feedback. We theorize that these factors broaden a startup team's perspective, enabling value proposition pivoting during early-stage business model experimentation. We test these relationships with quantitative data from 80 startups engaged in business model experimentation and find support across hypotheses. We contribute to understanding when and why entrepreneurs pivot aspects of their business models in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation.Executive summaryThe entrepreneurship literature suggests startups may benefit from experimentation and pivoting different parts of their business model in response to negative feedback from stakeholders (Andries et al., 2021; Camuffo et al., 2020; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). In early stages of starting a new venture, a business model refers to a cognitive schema or belief about an activity system that could potentially create and capture value (Massa et al., 2017; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Business model experimentation is the process of testing assumptions underlying this potential business model and pivoting business model assumptions in response to negative feedback (Andries et al., 2013; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2020; Leatherbee and Katila, 2020). Building upon prior literature, we define business model pivoting as a fundamental change to parts of the business model (Berends et al., 2021; Snihur and Clarysse, 2022; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Yet, literature also suggests founders often struggle to pivot assumptions despite negative feedback. Motives to preserve and protect certain assumptions relevant to founders' identities can interfere with pivoting (Grimes, 2018; Kirtley and O'Mahony, 2023; Zuzul and Tripsas, 2020). Despite the general understanding that founders struggle to change their ideas, however, the entrepreneurship literature currently lacks precise insight into when and why founders can overcome resistance to pivoting.In this research, we explore when and why startups pivot different parts of their business model. We do so within the context of early-stage business model experimentation, where founders explicitly state assumptions about different parts of their potential business model, test those assumptions against stakeholder feedback, and are encouraged to pivot business model components in response to negative feedback. Through a mixed methods research design, we find (1) founders tend to resist pivoting their value propositions relative to other parts of a business model in response to negative feedback; and (2) entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enables startups to overcome this resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback. We theorize these factors broaden founders' perspectives (Warshay, 1962), contributing to a greater willingness to pivot during experimentation.We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial pivoting by explaining nuanced variation in pivoting distinct business model components during experimentation. This contribution is important because it reveals that resistance to pivoting the business model may be more complex than previously thought. We also contribute to the literature at the nexus of business model experimentation and entrepreneurial cognition by finding that entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enable startups to pivot despite psychological resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback because it broadens founders' perspectives. This insight is important theoretically because it advances what we know about enabling experimenting with business models under conditions of uncertainty. The research presented here has clear and important implications for practice. This research suggests founders often resist changing the value proposition versus other components of their business models in early stages of venture development. This resistance can impede experimentation and pivoting in response to negative feedback. To the extent founders want to broaden their perspective to enable pivoting their value propositions in response to negative feedback during early stages of venture development, our data suggest they may be able to do so by recruiting members with entrepreneurial experience on their team (or gain entrepreneurial experience themselves), engage frequently with startup mentors, and increase the size of their team. Overall, we view the breath of perspective that comes from experience and interactions with others as an advantage for entrepreneurs when experimenting with their business models during early stages of venture development.     

基于资源基础观的中外合资企业绩效研究

根据资源基础观,中外合资企业建立的基本动因是为了克服各自资源限制而获得互补性资源。中外企业之间资源的互补性决定了合资企业资源的独特性,也决定了合资企业潜在的竞争优势和潜在绩效。在将合资企业潜在竞争优势和潜在绩效转化为现实竞争优势和现实绩效的过程中,母公司对资源的控制具有重要作用,资源控制的合理安排不仅有利于母公司独特资源向合资企业的有效转移,而且有利于资源在合资企业中价值创造功能的有效实现。     

Does Value for Money Create Advocates? A Study in the International Airline Services Industry

ABSTRACT

New carriers and business models have dramatically transformed the aviation industry. Using feedback ratings from 109 carriers and 36,710 passengers, this study first shows that emerging market airlines typically offer better value-for-money propositions than their established competitors. The study then relates perceived value for money with recommendation intention. The relationship is very strong without significant outliers; true loyalty shown by such customer advocates drives a service firm's profitability. Even the best entrenched airlines should not ignore this change in competitive climate, but respond by focusing on value for money as the standard for their business model's value proposition.     

Microfoundations of dynamic new venture partnering capabilities

Managing relationships with new venture suppliers require the adaptation of supplier management practices and routines. This research builds upon the dynamic capabilities perspective to explicate the ability to partner effectively with new venture suppliers as a dynamic capability. We argue that new venture partnering capability (NVPC) encompasses sensing, seizing, and transforming capabilities. Firms with sensing capabilities can interpret new ventures' value propositions and then match them to the needs of their business units. Seizing capabilities allow firms to coordinate and develop the relationship with a new venture supplier to capture value. Transforming capabilities enable firms to adapt resources and reconfigure their sensing and seizing capabilities. Our findings suggest that firms accelerate the transformation and strengthen dynamic NVPCs by applying entrepreneurial behavior through high-quality and regular interactions with new venture suppliers and embedding a dedicated new venture function. We also find that dynamic NVPCs can reside at different levels and that entrepreneurial managers can stimulate the development of organizational NVPCs. In general, we provide further empirical evidence on how buying firms can more effectively leverage the potential of new venture suppliers.     

So,you want to be an entrepreneur? Lessons from the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans with Disabilities

Based on helping dozens of military veterans refine their ideas for starting a business, we identify and discuss a series of potential pitfalls that aspiring entrepreneurs—veterans and civilians alike—must avoid in order to be successful. Potential entrepreneurs must not confuse the pursuit of hobbies and self-employment with the act of creating a business. People who wish to build a business around public speaking or consulting need to firmly establish why customers should be willing to pay for their advice. Individuals that seek to develop a new non-profit organization must have a viable value proposition even though they are not pursing a profit motive. Overall, the entrepreneurial ventures that are most likely to succeed are those that (1) are based on a sustainable business model, (2) leverage the entrepreneur's unique experiences and attributes, and (3) are built around a process or system that enables the venture to prosper even if the entrepreneur leaves the venture.     

Strategic capabilities and the emergence of the global factory: Omron in China

Omron Shanghai provides a detailed case study of a multinational subsidiary's long-term evolution. The study assesses three streams of international business literature that emphasize the seemingly competing roles of parent firm strategy, national institutions or local management in the development of subsidiaries. It looks at each business function separately to reveal which capabilities were effectively transferred from Japan to China. In tracing Omron Shanghai's development from international joint venture into wholly owned enterprise and then global factory, it is the strategic intent of the parent multinational corporations that emerges as the consistent formative influence on management practices and capabilities.     

Partner Symmetries,Partner Conflict and the Quality of Joint Venture Marketing Strategy: An Empirical Investigation

Joint venture research has overlooked the potential impact of partner conflict on the quality of joint venture marketing strategy. We address this issue by developing formal hypotheses concerning the antecedents to and consequences of functional and dysfunctional conflict between joint venture parent organisations on joint venture marketing strategy. We then describe an empirical examination of our model. Data collection was undertaken via a mail survey of New Zealand joint venture companies. Forty usable responses were returned, corresponding to a response rate of twenty-five percent. Correlation analysis of the data indicates that the degree to which partners exhibit both functional and dysfunctional conflict is influenced by (a) the degree to which joint venture partners share strategic and operational fit, (b) partners' level of mutual commitment, (c) levels of mutual trust, (d) opportunistic behaviours and (e) the adoption of collaborative communication approaches. Furthermore, both functional and dysfunctional partner conflict appear to significantly influence the quality of joint ventures' marketing strategy formulation and implementation. We discuss the managerial implications forthcoming from these results.     

Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder returns

This paper extends research on venture capital (VC) finance by studying its effects on a venture's performance and on its founders' returns beyond an initial public offering (IPO). A “founder performance” construct, defined as a founder's financial and nonfinancial returns, is proposed and used to measure and compare returns to founders with returns to investors and firm performance. In general, venture characteristics pre-IPO and venture performance post-IPO were not significantly different when comparing ventures with and without VC backing. Only when VC backing is very high, do pre-IPO resources and funding improve significantly. However, higher levels of resource endowments did not seem to affect post-IPO performance for the venture or its investors. On the other hand, founders resorting to VC funding before taking their company public generated significantly less wealth for themselves and were less likely to remain as CEOs of their ventures after the IPO. Results suggest that founders motivated primarily by wealth creation and those motivated by remaining in control of their ventures should, in both instances, minimize VC backing when taking their ventures public. The finding that founder performance differs from venture and investor performance calls for future research to explore potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the double role of founders as principals and agents.     

A Study of the Interaction of Firm Business Area Relatedness and the Propensity to Joint Venture

Measures of relatedness were used to assess (1) the degree to which diversified firms utilize joint ventures, (2) the nature of the relatedness in firms that joint venture, and (3) the performance and relevance of risk. For firms that joint venture in related business areas, the results suggest the importance of the risk of failure to reach their target goals and the fact that joint venturing is not perceived as reducing risk for the parent firms.     

A Relational Framework for Analyzing Ventures in Cognitive Environments: Illustrations from the TNK-BP Experience

This article looks at multinational investments in Central and Eastern Europe from a relational matrix perspective. The matrix posits a set of business relationships as outcomes of environment, regulatory or cognitive, and cluster valence combinations of power, urgency, and legitimacy. BP's pursuit of petroleum reserves leading to the venture with Russia's TNK is offered as a case study pointing to two general propositions relating the conduct of global firms in the region. Data analysis relating foreign direct investment with degrees of perceived corruption supports the propositions of opportunistic behavior and acceptance of opaque environments by global petroleum companies. The legitimacy construct is shown to be most prone to erosion, and its diminution impacts a firm's operating flexibility.     

Parent inheritance,founder expertise,and venture strategy: Determinants of new venture knowledge impact

A genealogical theory of new venture creation posits that “parent” firm routines are transferred to “progeny” ventures founded by the former employees of these parents. This study examines how the knowledge available to a venture from its parent firms and individual founders, as well as its initial technological direction, influences its own creation of impactful knowledge. We argue that new knowledge creation involves the recombination of underlying knowledge elements and hypothesize that the degree to which the venture's knowledge domain overlaps with the parents' knowledge has positive, but diminishing effects on the impact of knowledge created by the venture. We also predict that the breadth of founders' personal knowledge has a positive effect, but that the divergence between individual founders' and parent firm's knowledge domains has a negative effect on the creation of impactful knowledge by the venture. We test our predictions using a sample of 219 biotechnology ventures founded over the eleven year period 1990–2000 and tracked through 2010. Our results contribute to the entrepreneurship, knowledge creation, and genealogical literatures.     

Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture decisions

Though risk plays a central role in most entrepreneurial decision making, little empirical research has explicitly examined how the elements of risk, risk perceptions, and entrepreneurs' propensities to take risks influence choices among potentially risky entrepreneurial ventures. This experimental study asked a sample of entrepreneurs leading America's fastest growing firms to make choices among a series of hypothetical new ventures. The results indicate that such choices are influenced by the risks inherent in the new ventures, as evidenced by the pattern of outcomes anticipated in each venture, the entrepreneurs' differing perceptions of those risks, and differences in their personal propensities to take risks.The subjects in our sample of entrepreneurs tended not to choose ventures having a high degree of variability in their pattern of anticipated outcomes. This avoidance of outcome variability suggests that the sensitivity analyses commonly prescribed for examining new venture attractiveness may inhibit risk taking, and may deter potential investors from investing in their firms. New approaches to assessing and presenting new venture risk, other than the traditional best case/expected case/worst case approach, may be advisable, as well as sufficiently through market research to provide evidence of the degree to which market acceptance is likely for the venture's products or services.We also found an effect of differences in risk propensities among entrepreneurs on their new venture choices. This effect suggests not only that entrepreneurs should be wary of any biases they bring to their new venture decisions, but that prospective investors should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities.Finally, while our sample of entrepreneurs tended to shun high levels of variability in their new venture choices, they appeared willing to accept a considerable degree of hazard, or possible downside, in their new venture choices, presumably in pursuit of potentially significant gains. Entrepreneurs are advised to seek a clear understanding of the downside entailed in their proposed ventures, and develop strategies to mitigate the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Thus they will not jeopardize chances for near term success and attracting support of investors and others in later stages of the venture or in subsequent ventures.Our research did not attempt to examine how our subjects' choices would have played out in terms of performance, but the apparent biases which entrepreneurs' risk propensities bring to their assessment of proposed new ventures is a potentially important issue that merits further scrutiny. On one hand, such biases may lead to patterns of suboptimal decisions. On the other hand, our results suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose risk propensities (and perhaps other personal characteristics) best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor's objectives. As many venture capitalists attest, the management of a proposed new venture should lie at the heart of their investment decision.     

Missing the boat or sinking the boat: a study of new venture decision making

Taking two conceptualizations of risk, Dickson and Giglierano's [J. Mark. 50 (1986) 58] nautical analogy of entrepreneurial risk (sinking vs. missing the boat) to represent the likelihood of loss element of new venture risk, and March and Shapira's [Manage. Sci. 33 (1987) 1404] risk as hazard (boat size) to represent the magnitude of loss element of new venture risk, we investigated how two contextual factors, the suitability of entrepreneurs' skills and their sources of funds, and two individual differences factors, the entrepreneurs' risk propensities and their perceptions of risk, influence their new venture decision making. Metaphorically speaking, we found that most entrepreneurs would rather risk missing than sinking the boat, and that they preferred to pilot bigger craft than smaller ones. Perhaps surprisingly, our sample of highly successful entrepreneurs made relatively risk-averse choices, with 83% choosing either of the two ventures for which the chances for loss were lowest. We also found that the source of new venture funding—the entrepreneur's own money versus that of investors—influenced our subjects' choices between ventures whose chances for loss or gain differed. A similar effect was found for the entrepreneur's risk propensity. On the other hand, we found that the risk the entrepreneurs perceived in the choice set also influenced choices, but only where the magnitude of the new venture's potential gain or loss varied. When viewed in total, our study and results suggest a risk- and reward-based typology of new venture opportunities, one that may provide a conceptual foundation for future explorations of a variety of questions relevant for entrepreneurs and theorists alike.     

Parent control mechanisms,knowledge attributes,knowledge acquisition and performance of IJVs in Taiwan service industries

The study explores parent companies' use of control mechanisms in their international joint venture (IJV), IJV knowledge acquisition and IJVs' performance. Traditionally, control mechanisms are criticized for potentially limiting autonomous learning. However, we propose that knowledge-oriented control mechanisms used by the parent company on its subsidiaries could facilitate knowledge acquisition and learning. This study takes samples from 104 Sino-foreign joint ventures in service industries in Taiwan. The results of the study indicate that in IJV, parent companies require a ‘personnel training’ control mechanism as a guide for gaining codified knowledge from foreign partners. MNCs should apply ‘culture’ and ‘performance’ control mechanisms to gain non-codified knowledge. In turn, the tacit knowledge of IJV results in a better economic, competency-based performance, while explicit knowledge more significantly influences the synthetic performance.     

When do spinouts benefit from market overlap with parent firms?

We examine how market overlap with parent organizations impacts the performance of startups founded by the former employees of these incumbent firms. Building on knowledge inheritance and competitive dynamics theories, we propose that the degree to which the operating markets of spinouts overlap with their parent organizations has a curvilinear relationship with their likelihood of survival. Market overlap is beneficial to spinouts because it reduces uncertainty during the early stages of new venture development. However, substantial market overlap may spark hostile actions by the parent organizations, thereby creating disruptive competition that may lower the likelihood of spinouts' survival. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the previous hierarchical position of founders in parent organizations moderates the overlap–performance relationship. Using a sample of European biotech spinouts and their parent firms, we find support for our hypotheses.     

Evolution of an international joint venture: The case of a French‐Brazilian joint venture

Considering the situation of low performance of joint ventures, a certain number of studies have concluded that there is a close relationship between the initial conditions of creation of joint ventures and their success or failure. Nevertheless, other explanatory factors can be identified through dynamic analysis of the joint venture. For this purpose, on the basis of the case of the Franco‐Brazilian Algar‐Bull joint venture in the information technology sector, from its creation in 1983 to its dissolution in 1998, the aim of our research is to study the influence of external evolution processes ( partners' adaptive strategies and changes in environmental constraints) on the success or failure of a joint venture. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.