Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

The perils of debt deflation in the Euro area: a multi regime model

Academic research and policy makers in the Euro area are currently concerned with the threat of debt deflation and secular stagnation in Europe. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that secular stagnation and debt deflation in the Euro area may be rather slowly developing. Yet what appears as major peril is that debt deflation with a lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further rising debt may trigger household defaults, defaults of firms and banks, rise of risk premia, and default risk of certain sectors of the economy or sovereign defaults. It is this rising default and financial risk that may lead to a regime change to a slowly moving debt crisis with high financial risk and high financial stress. In order to explore those issues, a macro policy model of Svensson type is introduced, exhibiting a regime of low and high financial stress. Then, a four dimensional multi-regime VAR is employed to an Euro area data set to support the theoretical model and the claim that in particular Southern Euro area countries are affected by debt deflation and financial market stress.     

基于KMV模型的适用性研究与应用分析——以A股市场主要过剩产能行业为例

本文通过对2007年—2012年钢铁行业和水泥建材行业共45家上市公司的财务数据和股票历史信息的分析,基于KMV模型原理,通过使用Matlab、Excel等软件,实证分析了近几年来上述企业的违约距离,并探讨产能过剩和信用违约之间的关系。实证结果表明,KMV模型适用于钢铁行业和水泥建材行业的信用违约测度,结果符合经济运行形势;同时,上述行业产能过剩并不能直接解释以违约距离表征的公司信用违约风险。     

我国林业上市公司信用风险研究——基于KMV模型

文章以我国沪深两市A股林业上市公司为研究对象,选取2007-2012年首次成为ST的8家公司和对应的8家非ST公司为研究样本,运用KMV模型研究我国林业上市公司信用风险。实证过程中,文章根据我国林业公司特点研究确定KMV模型中各参数的计算方法,计算出在不同违约点下各个样本的违约距离,主要结论:财务危机前非ST公司与ST公司的违约距离表现出显著差异,运用KMV模型能够有效识别我国林业上市公司的信用风险状况;我国林业上市公司的违约点应设定为短期负债加上50%长期负债;在研究连续两年违约距离的基础上,构建了我国林业上市公司两级信用风险预警体系。     

Measuring systemic risk using vine-copula

We present an intuitive model of systemic risk to analyse the complex interdependencies between different borrowers. We characterise systemic risk by the way that financial institutions are interconnected. Using their probability of default, we classify different international financial institutions into five rating groups. Then we use the state-of-the-art canonical (C-) and D-vine copulae to investigate the partial correlation structure between the rating groups. Amongst many interesting findings, we discover that the second tier financial institutions pay a larger contribution to the systemic risk than the top tier borrowers. Further, we discuss an application of our methodology for pricing credit derivative swaps.     

Production and financial linkages in inter-firm networks: structural variety, risk-sharing and resilience

The paper analyzes how (production and financial) inter-firm networks can affect firms’ default probabilities and observed default rates. A simple theoretical model of shock transfer is built to investigate some stylized facts on how firm-idiosyncratic shocks are allocated in the network, and how this allocation changes firm default probabilities. The model shows that the network works as a perfect “risk-pooling” mechanism, when it is both strongly connected and symmetric. But the “risk-sharing” does not necessarily reduce default rates, unless the shock firms face is lower on average than their financial capacity. Conceived as cases of symmetric inter-firm networks, industrial districts might have a comparative disadvantage in front of heavy crises.     

Financial Instability under a Flexible Exchange Rate*

Many governments in developing countries contemplate the possibility of increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates despite having accumulated substantial dollar‐denominated debt. Using a model of corporate dollar debt in which the future exchange rate is uncertain, this paper studies the financial risks that might arise as a consequence of increased exchange rate flexibility. Since a firm may default on its debt either because its dollar income is too low or because investors refuse to roll over its debt, the measure of the overall risk of default should take into account both factors, as well as their interaction. Solving the model for the no‐default rational expectations equilibrium, we find that a small risk of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity.     

Determinants of corporate default risk in China: The role of financial constraints

Corporate default risk can affect financial stability and the macroeconomy. However, the determinants of corporate default risk in China are not well defined in the literature. We address this issue by using a rich credit event dataset of 981 Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2013 and study the factors that affect default risk. We demonstrate that leverage, liquidity, firm size are the key firm-specific factors in determining default risk in China, along with macroeconomic factors like interest rate and stock return. Moreover, ‘Too big to fail’ only applies to non-SOEs, as default risk of SOEs is not affected by the firm size. We further find that high liquidity fails to reduce firms default risk, because small-sized firms which are financially constrained have limited cash to prevent financial distress, whereas large firms with greater cash holdings are able to mitigate their default risk as they are unconstrained.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

中国银行业系统性风险研究*——宏观审慎视角下的三个压力测试

本文在传统网络模型中加入去杠杆—降价抛售机制,研究以下两类宏观经济冲击对银行体系系统性风险的影响。从房地产贷款违约压力测试看,房地产贷款违约引起的传染风险是系统性风险的重要来源;传染损失比重和去杠杆次数结果则表明,2007年我国银行面临的传染风险最高,之后呈现快速下降的趋势;参数敏感性结果表明,网络模型中去杠杆、降价抛售以及破产对传染风险的相对重要性依次递减。从地方政府融资平台贷款违约压力测试看,大型商业银行受平台贷款违约的影响小于股份制和城市商业银行。此外,平台贷款违约概率存在阈值,在阈值之上银行损失和倒闭急剧攀升。基于银行倒闭压力测试,量化出本文的网络模型相对于传统网络模型的优越性。本文还发现中国金融体系的系统重要性与系统脆弱性指标的“错配”对于维持金融体系稳定非常关键。     

Default and aggregate income

This paper studies how default varies with aggregate income. We analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed, idiosyncratic income by allowing for default. Default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance. Default penalties ensure that only these agents default. We show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income. We provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous.     

Modeling Guarantees,Over-Indebtedness and Financial Crises in an Open Economy

This work develops a simple framework to analyse how financial intermediaries’ balance sheet problems combined with financial guarantees make an economy more vulnerable to financial crises. A ‘double default’ problem – that is, the default of financial intermediaries on their debt repayments and of the government on its guarantees to bailout intermediaries’ losses – is modelled in this study. The possibility of multiple equilibria, including a crisis equilibrium where the government is not able or willing to honor its guarantees towards the domestic financial sector, arises from the interplay of all the above elements: financial intermediaries’ level of indebtedness, government implicit guarantees and high-risk creditors’ lending. This work also produces predictions concerning the vulnerability to a financial crisis: multiple equilibria are possible only in certain ranges of the fundamentals.     

Balance sheet changes and the impact of financial sector risk-taking on fiscal multipliers

We analyse implications of financial sector dynamics for fiscal expenditure multipliers in recessionary conditions. A new stock-flow consistent model is developed in which a financial sector with four financial instruments is integrated with the real sector. The transmission of policy innovations occurs through balance sheet effects. Higher government expenditure increases aggregate demand in the economy. This reduces the perceived probability of default on financial institutions’ loans, increases asset valuations, and leads financial institutions to reduce interest rate spreads. Expectations of higher future wealth and a reduction in credit constraints supports consumption growth. Stronger balance sheets across institutions and lower interest rates increase investment. The interaction between growth and balance sheet valuations creates financial accelerator effects though its impact on financial sector risk-taking. Inflows of foreign savings can increase the multiplier further than would be the case in a closed economy constrained by domestic savings. The results show that fully modelling interactions between real and financial sectors generates fiscal multipliers higher than have been found for South Africa in other types of model.     

Measuring the systemic risk transfer from the United States to the South African financial sector

The sub-prime crisis in 2008 illustrated how systemic risk in the financial sector of one country could spread to the financial sectors in other countries, and subsequently result in a global financial crisis. This direct transfer of systemic risk was made possible by phenomena such as contagion and common shocks. The way in which these elements of interconnectedness can magnify seemingly small levels of systemic risk, and subsequently transfer between financial sectors illustrate the necessity for a more in-depth analysis. This measurement is done using three approaches. A dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model is used to investigate contagion. To analyse the volatility spillover effect from the US to SA, an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model is employed. Finally, a new contribution is made where a marginal expected shortfall (MES) model is used to set the FTSE/JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) as a hypothetical bank in the financial sector of the S&P 500. All approaches show weak evidence for a direct systemic risk transfer and therefore indicate that any systemic risk transfer is more likely to take an indirect form through changes in capital flows or interest rates.     

Credit risk in general equilibrium

This paper contributes to the literature on default in general equilibrium. Borrowing and lending takes place via a clearing house (bank) that monitors agents and enforces contracts. Our model develops a concept of bankruptcy equilibrium that is a direct generalization of the standard general equilibrium model with financial markets. Borrowers may default in equilibrium and returns on loans are determined endogenously. Restricted to a special form of mean variance preferences, we derive a version of the capital asset pricing model with bankruptcy. In this case, we can characterize equilibrium prices and allocations and discuss implications for credit risk modeling.     

A model to analyse financial fragility

Summary. This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 6 October 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D52, E4, E5, G11, G21.C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos: We are grateful to T.F. Bewley, S. Bhattacharya, F. Hahn, C. Mayer, H.S. Shin and seminar participants at the Bank of Austria, Bank of England, Bank of Norway, Bank for International Settlements, Brown University, the 7th Annual Macroeconomic Conference, Crete, EcoMod-IIOA International Conference, Brussels, the 2nd Oxford Finance Summer Symposium and Nuffield, Oxford, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, Purdue University, the University of Birmingham, the VI SAET Conference, Rhodes, Yale University, and especially an anonymous referee and H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England. Correspondence to: D.P. Tsomocos     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

Volatility transmission to the fine wine market

The goal of this paper is to explore volatility transmission from various markets to the fine wine market. Knowledge of these channels for transmitting volatility to the wine market allows practitioners to anticipate the future volatility and the consequences of a shock on the wine market, to develop their investment strategy and diversify their risk. We especially analyse the impact of U.S. markets (i.e. art, commodities, credit, financial and real estate) during the 2007–2017 period. We shed additional light on how the volatility of the fine wine market varies during an extended period including a financial crisis. Our results indicate that, in the short-term, volatility is transmitted with a negative effect through the financial and commodity markets and with a positive effect through the art, residential real estate, and credit default markets. In the long-term, the wine market is impacted by all other markets. We show that correlations are time-varying.     

Evaluating borrower’s default risk in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from a lending platform in China

Recent years have witnessed the popularity of online peer-to-peer lending, which allows individuals to borrow from and lend to each other on an Internet-based platform. Using data from a large P2P platform in China, this article explores the factors that determine the default risk based on the demographic characteristics of borrowers. Moreover, we propose a credit risk evaluation model, which can quantify the default risk of each P2P loan. Empirical results reveal that gender, age, marital status, educational level, working years, company size, monthly payment, loan amount, debt to income ratio and delinquency history play a significant role in loan defaults. Finally, we analyse the relationship between default risk and these contributory variables, and the possible causes are also discussed in this study.     

风险厌恶测定与我国银行治理效率的实证研究

基于FDIC对商业银行贷款损失所设定的概率分布,本文利用VaR方法对商业银行风险厌恶程度进行了测定,并利用我国上市银行2004～2008年间的财务数据对商业银行的风险厌恶程度进行了实证分析,结果表明商业银行的风险控制可以反映其风险厌恶程度,风险厌恶程度在风险控制中得到充分体现.银行的风险厌恶程度越高,净资产回报率越高.