Wage bargaining and inflation

This paper investigates the issue of time inconsistency of monetary policy in a game with perfect information and infinite repetitions. The private sector is described by a wage negotiation process between a labour union and a firm. Unlike in the standard literature, the model has the feature that as the distortion of the economy gets larger, namely as the bargaining power of the union increases, the reputational equilibrium with low inflation becomes more likely to occur. This finding is consistent with the observation that higher levels of the labour cost are not typically associated with higher levels of inflation.     

Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare

This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression.     

Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation

This paper applies the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and studies its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of inefficiency that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice. (JEL: L11, J51)     

Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Wage bargaining and employment revisited: separability and efficiency in collective bargaining*

We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow. We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems – and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Trade agreements, bargaining and economic growth

Rebelo’s two-sector endogenous growth model is embedded within a two-country international trade framework. The two countries bargain over a trade agreement that specifies: (i) the size of the foreign aid that the richer country gives to the poorer one; (ii) the terms of the international trade that takes place after the aid is given. Foreign aid is given not because of generosity, but because it improves the capital allocation across the world and thus raises total world production. This world production surplus enables the rich country to raise its equilibrium consumption and welfare beyond their no-aid levels. To ensure it, the rich country uses a trade agreement to condition the aid on favorable terms of trade.     

Wage bargaining and shock sensitivity of a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of centralized bargaining over a nominal wage (indexation) rule on a small open economy with fixed exchange rates. It is shown that the relative bargaining power of the confederation of employers and the union, respectively, affects not only the level of the endogenous variables but also their reaction to exogenous disturbances. If the union's power exceeds a critical value, positive aggregate demand shocks increase unemployment since the actual nominal wage rises more than the market clearing one. Moreover, if the union's power is sufficiently close to its upper bound, the overreaction of wages becomes so large that positive aggregate demand shocks even lead to a decrease in output and employment, i.e., the multipliers become negative.     

China's potential future growth and gains from trade policy bargaining: Some numerical simulation results

Numerical simulation analysis of bargaining solutions is little developed in existing literature. In this paper, we use a numerical general equilibrium model which captures China and her major trading partners and examine the outcomes of trade policy bargaining solutions (bargaining over tariffs and financial transfers) over time, and then measure both absolute and relative gains to China from trade bargaining. These measurements are important for policy making. Our simulation results indicate that China's welfare gain from trade bargaining will increase over time if countries keep their present higher GDP growth rates for several decades, but there are major difference when using different bargaining solution concepts. These differences have not been noted in existing literature but have an intuitive explanation. Our results also indicate that if China jointly bargains along with India, Brazil and other developing countries with the OECD, and when we use PPP to adjust China's relative GDP size China's gain will further increase.     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.     

Complementarity, growth, and trade

We consider an endogenous growth model with international trade in complementary capital goods. The model possesses several distinct, balanced growth solutions, which we classify using stability under adaptive learning. Some of the equilibria can involve growth rates much higher than others. We show that, in addition to a small (usually positive) effect on a given equilibrium, an expansion in trade may sometimes yield a much larger, sudden jump in growth. The small effect on the initial equilibrium may reduce growth if the opportunity cost of capital rises very fast as growth accelerates. JEL Classification: F12, F15, O41
Complémentarité, croissance, et commerce international. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle de croissance endogène en présence de commerce international de biens capitaux complémentaires. Le modèle possède plusieurs solutions de croissance équilibrée distinctes que les auteurs classifient en utilisant des mesures de stabilité avec apprentissage adaptatif. Certains de ces équilibres peuvent impliquer des taux de croissance plus élevés que d'autres. Il appert qu'une expansion du commerce international, en plus d'avoir un petit effet (habituellement positif) sur un équilibre donné, peut parfois engendrer une augmentation plus forte et soudaine de la croissance. Le petit effet sur l'équilibre initial peut réduire la croissance si le coût d'opportunité du capital augmente rapidement à proportion que la croissance accélère.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

Multiple equilibria in bargaining models of decentralized trade

Summary A market in which population size is endogenously determined is modeled. Buyers and sellers are randomly matched upon entering the market, whereupon they engage in non-cooperative bilateral bargaining. It is shown that general matching technologies and heterogeneity of buyer or seller populations often result in multiple market equilibria. Up to four equilibria can occur and the equilibria can always be ranked according to population size. Under some conditions all equilibria can also be Pareto ranked. The set of equilibria depends on the relative population sizes of different types of potential entrant, market entry costs, and the degree of differentiation between agents on the same side of the market.This paper evolved from a chapter in my dissertation. I am indebted to Leo Simon for many helpful conversations. Michael Hanemann, Jeff Perloff, Stefan Reichelstein, Jim Vercammen, Brian Wright, and participants in seminars at U.C. Berkeley, the University of Maryland, the University of British Columbia and the Australian National University also provided useful comments. Lastly, I benefited greatly from the thorough comments and corrections provided by an anonymous referee.     

International status seeking, trade, and growth leadership

Abstract .  We study a two-country endogenous growth model where the utility of agents in developing countries is affected by consumption gaps with advanced economies. International status seeking tends to revert growth differentials in favour of the developing country. Preferences with endogenous status desire generate convergence in growth rates in the presence of structural gaps and convergence in income levels if productivity differences disappear. This process is driven by declining terms of trade and faster capital accumulation of the status seeker. The model predictions are shown to be consistent with the stylized facts that characterized the growth performance of East Asian economies.     

International trade, exhaustible-resource abundance and economic growth

Countries with oil and other natural resources have grown less rapidly than those countries without. This phenomenon is known as the “natural resource curse”. We develop an infinite-horizon, two-country model of trade in which countries are identical, except that one country is endowed with deposits of an exhaustible resource and the other is not. Within the context of the model, we show that this phenomenon can be explained in part by an inelastic demand for the exhaustible resource that increases growth in trade revenues and induces the resource-abundant country to invest relatively less than the country lacking in exhaustible resources. These results are derived analytically and illustrated by an empirical analysis based on plausible parameters obtained from data.     

Technology,trade, and growth: A unified framework

Our recent work examines the links among innovation, technology, trade, and growth. One strand focuses on research activity, technology diffusion, and growth. The other examines technology and trade. In this paper we exploit the common treatment of technology in these two strands to provide a parsimonious model of innovation, growth, and trade. We examine the effect of lower geographic barriers to trade on research and the effects of scale and research productivity on relative incomes.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

Technological convergence, R&D, trade and productivity growth

This paper analyses productivity growth in a panel of 14 United Kingdom manufacturing industries since 1970. Innovation and technology transfer provide two potential sources of productivity growth for a country behind the technological frontier. We examine the roles played by research and development (R&D), international trade, and human capital in stimulating each source of productivity growth. Technology transfer is statistically significant and quantitatively important. While R&D raises rates of innovation, international trade enhances the speed of technology transfer. Human capital primarily affects output through private rates of return (captured in our index of labour quality) rather than measured TFP.     

Credit constraints,inequality and the growth gains from trade

This paper tests the hypothesis that, in the presence of credit constraints, higher wealth inequality affects negatively the growth gains from trade liberalisation. Variations in the growth rate of value added–decomposed in the growth rate of the number of establishments and the growth rate in average size–of manufacturing industries in 34 developing countries before and after trade liberalisation are used to study the effects of inequality on the difference in growth under liberalised and nonliberalised regimes. The results show that the number of firms in industries with high dependence on external finance in countries with higher inequality grow significantly slower, in both statistical and economic terms, than in industries with low dependence on external finance in countries with lower inequality following a trade liberalisation relative to the closed-economy period.