Costly Information Acquisition,Social Networks,and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence

We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks for incentives to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors' earnings, and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social communication crowds out information production as a result of an agent's temptation to free ride on the signals purchased by her neighbors. Although information exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity, and enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the available information in the market, it fails to improve price informativeness. Net earnings and social welfare are higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.     

The differential effects of classified boards on firm value

Classified boards actually benefit firms that have low monitoring costs and greater needs for advisory services. Previous literature has emphasized the entrenchment effect of classified boards. However, we find that this adverse impact of classified boards can be offset or even superseded by the potential benefits of board classification for firms who hope to benefit from the advisory services of their independent directors. We show that firms with greater advising needs appoint more outside directors with diverse attributes and expertise, qualifications that enhance the ability to provide useful advice to managers. Furthermore, in such firms, board classification is associated with higher performance sensitivity of forced CEO turnover and better acquisition performance. Conversely, in firms with high monitoring costs, board classification hurts managerial equity-based incentives and risk-taking incentives. These findings suggest how and through which channels classified boards engender the differential effects on firm value.     

The Value of Crowdfunding: An Explanation Based on Demand Uncertainty and Comparison with Venture Capital

This article notes that an advantage of crowdfunding is in its ability to help start-up firms acquire more accurate market demand information regarding new products when compared with venture capital (VC). The whole market of a given product can be conceptualized as being segmented into several, small local markets. VC has a comprehensive knowledge of local markets in general but is prone to noisy aggregate demand information as a result. While crowdfunding investors have intimate knowledge regarding local demand information in their respective locales, they lack knowledge in other local markets. We show that under certain conditions, crowdfunding can provide more accurate demand information and therefore can generate better incentives to entrepreneurs while improving product quality and helping entrepreneurs make correct decisions on whether or not to launch a new product. Therefore, the wisdom of the crowd can be more valuable than the wisdom of the expert.     

Market reaction to anticipated announcements

In this paper we analyze how anticipating a forthcoming public announcement affects the market reaction to the announcement by altering investors' incentives to acquire private information. Specifically, we study price change, volume, and information asymmetry at the time of the announcement. We also investigate how information acquisition, information asymmetry, price, and volume are influenced by the quality of prior knowledge, the marginal cost of gathering information, the degree of risk tolerance, and noise. Finally, we compare market reactions to anticipated announcements of known precision with the response to announcements that are either unanticipated or of uncertain quality.     

Regulating securities analysts

We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation.     

The Many Faces of Information Disclosure

In this article we ask: what kind of information and how muchof it should firms voluntarily disclose? Three types of disclosuresare considered. One is information that complements the informationavailable only to informed investors (to-be-processed complementaryinformation). The second is information that is orthogonal tothat which any investor can acquire and thus complements theinformation available to all investors (preprocessed complementaryinformation). And the third is information that substitutesfor the information of the informed investors in that it revealsto all what was previously known only by the informed (substituteinformation). Our main results are as follows. First, in equilibrium,all types of firms voluntarily disclose all three types of information.Second, in contrast to the existing literature, complementaryinformation disclosure by firms strengthens investors' privateincentives to acquire information. Substitute information disclosureweakens private information acquisition incentives. Third, whilecomplementary information disclosure has an ambiguous effecton financial innovation incentives, substitute information disclosureweakens those incentives.     

An empirical analysis of the incentives to engage in costly information acquisition: The case of risk arbitrage

In order for security prices to be informationally efficient, incentives must exist for traders to engage in costly information acquisition. This paper provides empirical evidence on this proposition. We observe that risk arbitrageurs (i.e., market participants who trade in securities of firms that are involved in mergers, tender offers, and voluntary liquidations) are able to generate private information regarding the success or failure of corporate reorganizations. Moreover, risk arbitrageurs earn substantial returns on their trading activities. These results suggest that security prices are sufficiently noisy to create incentives for costly information acquisition.     

Aligning incentives in supply chains

Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.     

Stock recommendation of an analyst who trades on own account

This article analyzes the provision of information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who can privately trade on own account. In a binary message and state space, I show that the analyst's reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market. Regardless of the true signal, the analyst issues the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value, given security prices. The analyst's information acquisition incentive is driven only by private portfolio considerations: he acquires information only if he will be holding a large enough position in the stock he covers.     

Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure

Firms often augment career concerns incentives with implicit incentive contracts. I formalize the interaction between these two incentives, and highlight its implications on a firm's decision to disclose its workers' productivity information. Disclosure enhances career concerns but inhibits implicit contracts. I show two main results. First, implicit contracts weaken (i.e., substitute) career concerns if the prior belief about the worker's ability is low, and vice versa. Second, when these incentives are substitutes, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cutoff rule: patient firms are opaque, and transparent firms never offer implicit contracts. These results need not hold if the incentives are complements.     

Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information in HMO Markets

This study examines incentives for voluntary disclosure of quality information by health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Economic theory predicts complete voluntary disclosure without mandatory rules. This article introduces plans' selection motives to avoid high-risk consumers as a deterrent of full unraveling; if disclosure is expected to attract high-risk members, plans have incentives to withhold information. The empirical analysis shows that while market unraveling was an important mechanism to bring disclosure, it was not complete, and plans in markets with high-risk consumers were less likely to disclose. This study suggests that market unraveling may not arise if risk selection incentives are prevalent.     

Earnings changes associated with relaxing the reconciliation requirement in non-U.S. firms’ SEC filings

We investigate the changes in earnings information content and earnings attributes for non-U.S. firms listed in U.S. equity markets following the 2007 relaxation of the SEC requirement to reconcile IFRS earnings and stockholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in annual regulatory filings. We analyze a sample of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges from 2005 to 2008 that use IFRS, and compare them to non-U.S. firms that continue to use domestic GAAP or U.S. GAAP. Prior literature finds no changes in informativeness following the regulatory change for IFRS-using firms. However, when we partition the IFRS-using firms into two groups based on their history of providing reconciliation information, we find that firms which previously provided more information about the differences between their reporting GAAP and U.S. GAAP had significant increases in the information content of their earnings. In contrast, there is no change in earnings informativeness for firms that provided less informative reconciliations. We regard the reconciliation informativeness as a proxy for firms’ efforts to provide more informative disclosures, which is driven by their disclosure incentives. We also document that the change in the information content of earnings for more informative reconcilers was contemporaneous with a change in earnings attributes for these firms. Consistent with no change in earnings informativeness for less informative reconcilers, there is little change in their earnings attributes. Our results underscore the importance of incorporating disclosure incentives when examining the consequences of a regulatory change.     

Selección de proveedores basada en análisis dimensional

This article presents the evaluation of a group of six suppliers for an electromechanical component of hydraulic bombs. The comparison is made by using the dimensional analysis technique and the attributes evaluated were the component´s costs, product quality, post sale service from supplier, product reliability, supplier’s administration and organization and production technology in their production system. In addition, in order to integrate the opinion of several persons in the selection and decision process, the information analysis was done with the aid of a decision group integrated by five persons with responsibilities in the purchase area. The technique is easy to apply and has been widely accepted by its users, who are making its use extensive to other components supplier’s selection process.     

An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions

We address the following overarching questions: What kind of accountability framework could regulators use to (a) motivate auditors to improve audit quality, and (b) evaluate how well auditors have carried out their duties? We draw on research in accounting, economics, psychology, and neuroscience to critique the accountabilities, incentives, and learning opportunities embedded in auditors’ extant regulatory environment. We first establish that forward-looking estimates are the basis for most financial statement information and that some of these estimates are highly uncertain, which increases the challenges faced by auditors. We propose an accountability framework with two dimensions: rewards versus penalties and processes versus outcomes. We show that auditors’ current regulatory accountabilities generally are in the form of penalties rather than rewards and primarily depend on audit outcomes rather than attributes of auditors’ judgment processes. We provide evidence from a range of disciplines that questions the suitability of the present system for improving the quality of auditors’ judgments and the quality of evaluations of those judgments made by inspectors. We identify four potential changes for improvement in audit quality based on our framework. Each of these identified changes has an impact on one or both of the two dimensions in our framework. For each of these changes, we outline JDM research questions that could be addressed to inform our overarching questions and to provide empirical evidence to help refine our accountability framework and improve audit quality.     

Modelling the Accounting Information Requirements of Small Businesses

Studies in various locations have indicated that practising accountants are an important source of advice and information to the small business sector. However, prior research has concentrated on establishing a relationship between the two parties and in ascertaining the extent of services provided. This paper highlights the limited acquisition or preparation of detailed accounting information by Australian small business owner/managers. Operating and environmental variables which influence the preparation or acquisition of detailed accounting information are established and logistic regression techniques used to estimate an appropriate explanatory model, from which estimates of the probability that a firm, with particular attributes which are reflected in the explanatory variables in the model, will prepare or acquire a given level of accounting information.     

Transparency and incentives among peers

This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function‐based teams with process‐based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.     

Tick Size and Financial Reporting Quality in Small-Cap Firms: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (the SEC's 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program), we investigate the effects of an increase in tick size on financial reporting quality. The tick size pilot program reduces algorithmic trading (AT) and increases fundamental investors’ information acquisition and trading activities. This in turn increases the scrutiny of managers’ financial reporting choices and reduces their incentives to engage in misreporting. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find a significant decrease in the magnitude of discretionary accruals, a significant reduction in the likelihood of just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts, and a marginally significant decrease in restatements for the treated firms in the pilot program. Furthermore, we find that the change in financial reporting quality is concentrated in treated firms experiencing decreases in AT and increases in information acquisition activities. We also find that the mispricing of accruals is significantly lower for treated firms. Taken together, our results suggest that an increase in tick size has a causal effect on firms’ financial reporting quality.     

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.     

Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s

We investigate the extent to which managerial incentives, including golden parachute (GP) payments, have influenced target acquisition gains over the past two decades. We find that the use and scope of GP contracts expanded dramatically for a large sample of firms acquired from 1980 through 1995. To investigate the effect of managerial incentives on target acquisition gains, we estimate a regression of abnormal stock returns for acquisitions on variables including managerial incentives, the value of GP payments, and the interaction between GPs and management incentives. The regression results indicate that management incentives are positively associated with target acquisition returns and that GP payments serve to mitigate this influence. We do not, however, detect any direct association between the level of GP payments and target gains.     

Online banking in India: An approach to establish CRM

Technology is fast altering the business servicescape. Its role in improving customer service levels is being used strategically and increasingly by service organizations. The service attributes and quality can be enhanced by deployment of technology. The Internet has facilitated convenience in customer interactions and transactions with the banks. Online banking is currently emerging as a new approach in India for providing improved accessibility and expediency to customers. Most banks have their own websites for improving the customer interface and offering online services. The article studies the applicability of online banking in India and its role in fostering relationships with customers and giving them more value. The research was conducted on customers familiar with online banking in India, and their perceptions about online banking were studied. The findings reveal that customers are using the services but are skeptical about the financial transactions and service quality dimensions.