Corporate governance and ownership structure of target companies and the outcome of takeovers

This paper examines the influence of the corporate governance and ownership attributes of target companies on the outcome of takeovers in Australia between 1991 and 2000. The findings suggest that board composition and chairperson identity of target companies and director, institutional investor and external share ownership in targets have minimal effects on the likelihood of takeover success. The nature of the recommendations of target directors is found to be the most significant determinant of takeover success or failure, and bid premium levels and offer price revisions are also shown to be important in discriminating between successful and failed takeovers. The results bring into question the likely effectiveness of the introduction of formal corporate governance requirements in Australia and advocate a modification to existing corporate legislation to encourage takeover activity.     

THE LEGALITY OF THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS BY-LAW IN DELAWARE: PRESERVING THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

Just as some lawyers almost killed the takeover market with the invention of the poison pill in the 1980s, others are now about to reinvigorate it with another legal invention. The “shareholder rights bylaw,” which promises to be the next major legal battleground in the market for corporate control, aims to eliminate the current ability of target company boards of directors to block changes of control by keeping their poison pill defenses in place. The new bylaws require the poison pill (and other defensive measures) to expire automatically whenever the firm receives an allcash offer for 100% of the firm's stock at a price at least 25% above the prebid market price. The firm can keep its poison pill, but only if shareholders vote to keep it after receiving the offer. Although the legality of the share-holder rights bylaw has been challenged as an undue infringement on boards of directors' power to run companies, this article argues that their legality will be upheld for three reasons:

• ? First, shareholder rights bylaws merely reinforce the corporate manager's responsibility to manage the firm to maximize shareholder value.
• ? Second, Delaware and most other jurisdictions give shareholders the specific right to amend the bylaws of a corporation; and the shareholder rights by-law is a straightforward exercise of this explicit right granted to shareholders.
• ? Third, the adoption of shareholders rights by-law does not prevent the board of directors from advising share-holders to vote to reject a takeover bid, nor does it prevent shareholders from giving management the authority to use defensive mechanisms such as the poison pill.

As the article concludes, upholding this right of shareholders to choose whether a poison pill is used to block a takeover is critical to the vitality of the takeover market and, hence, to the preservation of the agency relationship between directors and shareholders. Upholding this right may also prove critical to Delaware's ability to maintain its predominance in the market for corporate chartering.     

The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors

Abstract:  This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.     

Governance and takeovers: are public-to-private transactions different from traditional acquisitions of listed corporations?

Using a unique hand-collected dataset comprising 96 public-to-private (PTP) transactions and 258 acquisitions of listed corporations by existing corporate groups completed during the period 1998 to 2000, this paper investigates the extent to which PTPs have different internal and external governance and other characteristics from traditional acquisitions of listed corporations by existing corporate groups. The paper analyses acquisition activity during a period in which three new features were present: the decline in hostile takeovers, the increase in the adoption of governance Codes of Best Practice and the growth in PTP activity. PTPs are usually a response to takeover threat (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) and so the paper analyses the acquisition decision from two perspectives: first, takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism which substitute for weak internal governance and second, as part of a non-disciplinary perspective where takeovers are complementary to internal governance mechanisms. We find support for the argument that improved internal governance and non-disciplinary takeovers, that is takeovers where the motive is not as a response to under-performing management, are complementary. PTPs are more likely to have higher board ownership and are likely to have duality of CEO and chairman. They are also more likely to have lower growth prospects and lower valuations. However, they do not have sub-optimal internal corporate governance structures in terms of lower proportions of outside directors. With respect to external governance, they are not more likely to experience pressure from the market for corporate control in the form of greater takeover speculation and are also not more likely to suffer hostile threats. We find that PTPs involving management buy-outs (MBIs) have fewer non-executive directors and a greater incidence of duality. MBO also have higher board shareholdings. We find no evidence that management buy-ins (MBIs) have different characteristics. Our results suggest that going private by MBO may result from management's knowledge of private information that leads them to believe that the market has an incorrect perspective of the company's prospects.     

Relational Investing And Firm Performance

A substantial academic and popular literature argues that the performance of American corporations might improve if American corporations had long‐term outside investors (relational investors) who would hold large stakes, actively monitor management performance, and engage with management in setting corporate policy. Institutional investors can perhaps play this role. We provide the first large‐scale test of the hypothesis that relational investing can affect corporate performance. We consider ownership and performance data for more than 1,500 large U.S. companies over a thirteen‐year period (1983–1995). Our results provide a mixed answer to the question of whether relational investing affects corporate performance. Our data suggest that there was a period in the late 1980s—a period with a uniquely high level of hostile takeover activity—when the presence of a relational investor was associated with higher stock market returns. This cohort of relational investors may have been able to induce corporate restructuring, whose principal effect was to reduce growth rates while improving profitability. But this pattern was not found in the early 1980s or repeated in the early 1990s.     

The Icahn Manifesto

The title of this opening chapter in the author's new book on activist investors refers to Carl Icahn's solution to the “agency” problem faced by the shareholders of public companies in motivating corporate managers and boards to maximize firm value. During the 1960s and '70s, U.S. public companies tended to be run in ways designed to increase their size while minimizing their financial risk, with heavy emphasis on corporate diversification. Icahn successfully challenged corporate managers throughout the 1970s and 1980s by buying blocks of shares in companies he believed were undervalued and then demanding board seats and other changes in corporate governance and management. This article describes the evolution of Icahn as an investor. Starting by investing in undervalued, closed‐end mutual funds and then shorting shares of the stocks in the underlying portfolio, Icahn was able to get fund managers either to liquidate their funds (giving Icahn an arbitrage profit on his long mutual fund/short underlying stocks position) or take other steps to eliminate the “value gap.” After closing the value gaps within the limited universe of closed‐end mutual funds, Icahn turned his attention to the shares of companies trading for less than his perception of the value of their assets. As the author goes on to point out, the strategy that Icahn used with such powerful effect can be traced to the influence of the great value investor Benjamin Graham. Graham was a forceful advocate for the use of shareholder activism to bring about change in underperforming—and in that sense undervalued—companies. The first edition of Graham's investing classic, Security Analysis, published in 1934, devoted an entire chapter to the relationship between shareholders and management, which Graham described as “one of the strangest phenomena of American finance.”     

Director networks and takeovers

We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.     

CORPORATE CONTROL IN COMMERCIAL BANKS

Unique factors in commercial banks' legal and regulatory environment may influence their mechanisms of corporate control. I investigate this issue in a sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) by analyzing how many underwent a change in corporate control by hostile takeover, friendly merger, management turnover by the board, or intervention by regulators. I compare the relative importance of these methods with those in nonfinancial firms. 1 relate the use of these methods to BHC board and ownership structure and performance. I find that the most important corporate control mechanism in banks is regulatory intervention, and that the primary market-based corporate control mechanism is action by the board of directors. Overall, however, BHC boards are much less assertive than their counterparts at nonfinancial firms. I examine reasons for this.     

Beyond takeovers: politics comes to corporate control

In the 1990s, politics will replace takeovers as the defining tool for corporate governance challenges, and a marketplace of ideas will replace the frenzied activity that once dominated the financial marketplace in the 1980s. In the transaction-driven market of the past, corporate raiders used junk bonds and other financial tools to take control of their targets. In the new marketplace of ideas, debate will replace debt as active shareholders press specific operating policies for their target corporations in a new politicized market for corporate control. John Pound, associate professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, reports that investors are already using shadow management committees, independent director slates, and outside experts to influence management policy. Pound cites Carl Icahn's battle for control of USX as an example of the emerging trend. What began as a hostile takeover ended with a negotiated solution in which many constituencies ultimately played a role in the restructuring of the company. This political approach to governance gives management a chance to embrace a bargain that is in its long-term interest. By promoting politically based tactics, managers can generate political capital with their major investors. Managers in companies as diverse as Avon and Lockheed now meet regularly with investors, seeking their input on both financial and strategic decisions. In the new politicized market for corporate control, striking a bargain with long-term investors is ultimately in the best interest of the corporation.     

How Has Takeover Competition Changed Over Time?

Since the boom in takeovers in the 1980s, research in both law and financial economics has debated the role of takeover impediments such as poison pills, staggered boards, and state antitakeover laws. Have these impediments entrenched target management to the detriment of shareholders? Or have they increased the bargaining power of target boards of directors and left shareholders, if not better off, then at least unharmed? In their study published recently in the Journal of Corporate Finance, the authors provide new answers to these questions with a detailed analysis of takeover competition during the period 1981 through 2014. Using a random sample of 388 completed and withdrawn deals from this 34‐year period, the authors begin by confirming the already well‐documented increase in the use of takeover impediments over time. They then report evidence that takeover competition has not declined during this period. First of all, takeover premiums—the average percentage over market paid by acquirers to consummate transactions—have remained steady over time. Second, and the most striking of the authors' findings, is that the corporate auction process has “gone underground” since the 1980s. Although we now see fewer hostile attempts and publicly reported takeover bidding contests, the amount of competition for targets has remained largely unchanged when one takes account of “private” as well as public auctions—that is, contests that, as the authors discovered, included unidentified bidders. The authors view such a fundamental change in the takeover auction process as a response to the widespread growth of takeover impediments. In this sense, as Bill Schwert commented years ago, “hostile takeovers are less about shirking target management than about the bargaining tactics of targets and bidders.” Or as the authors put it, “the greater bargaining power provided by state laws and other takeover impediments has changed the manner in which takeover auctions are conducted,” but without greatly affecting the goal of economic efficiency that such transactions are designed to help bring about.     

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES

This article reinforces the message of the one immediately preceding by showing that small to medium‐sized firms have even stronger (non‐tax) motives for hedging risks than their large corporate counterparts. Although middle market companies have traditionally been viewed as less sophisticated than their larger corporate counterparts in the risk management arena, the authors suggest that such companies have become increasingly receptive to new hedging strategies using derivative products. When used appropriately, such products allow companies to stabilize their periodic operating cash flow by eliminating specific sources of volatility such as fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. Smaller companies recognize that a single swing in a budgeted cost can have a catastrophic effect on an entire budget, whereas a larger company can more easily absorb such a cost. Moreover, because the principal owners of mid‐sized firms often have a substantial part of their net worth tied up in the business, they are likely to have a far stronger interest than typical outside shareholders in using risk management to reduce the volatility of corporate profits and firm value. Perhaps most important to owners whose firms rely on debt financing, the greater cash flow stability resulting from active risk management significantly reduces the possibility of financial distress or bankruptcy. In this article, three representatives of Bank of America's risk management practice discuss three different exposures faced by middle market companies—those arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices—and show how these risks can be managed with derivatives. Besides shielding companies from financial trouble, risk management is also likely to improve their access to the money and capital markets. By protecting the firm's access to capital, risk management increases the odds that the firm will not be forced to pass up good investment opportunities because of capital constraints or fear of getting into financial difficulty.     

Does the monitoring role of buyout houses improve discretionary accruals quality?

Using a sample of reverse leveraged buyout (‘reverse‐LBO’) firms, I find that discretionary accruals quality (AQ), the quality of accruals that are subject to management discretion, significantly improves from pre‐LBO to post‐reverse LBO. Moreover, buyout houses’ board seats and the length of firms’ stay‐in‐private periods are significant explanatory variables for the cross‐sectional variation in discretionary AQ for post‐reverse‐LBO firms. My findings suggest that the monitoring provided by private equity buyout houses improves discretionary AQ, consistent with the view of Jensen (1989a,b) that LBOs are a solution to inefficiencies that arise from agency problems.     

Private Equity,Corporate Governance,and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt‐financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” and defined it as “the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources.” Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or “strategic”) and “financial” buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control—one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large‐sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, “private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations—those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities.”     

Entrenched controlling shareholders and the performance consequences of corporate diversification in Taiwan

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the value/performance effects of corporate diversification in an emerging market. Prior evidence on this issue is still mixed. The present study adds the role of entrenched controlling shareholders into this issue. We argue that when controlling shareholders have larger excess board seats control rights, they have higher ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate diversification. Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2003, we find that controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control is negatively associated with the market valuation of corporate diversification. Consistently, we also document that highly diversified firms run by more entrenched controlling shareholders have lower future financial performance than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our findings imply that corporate diversification is not necessarily harmful or beneficial for firms. We conclude that the agency problem arising from the excess board seats control rights owned by controlling shareholders is an influential factor leading to negative performance consequences with regard to firm diversification.     

Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.     

The role of managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: the 1990s evidence

This paper examines the relationship between the likelihood a firm is acquired and the governance and financial characteristics of the firm. Given many of the developments in the corporate control market in the late 1980s, I suspect that the process governing takeover likelihood may have changed in the 1990s. I examine a sample of 342 NYSE/AMEX firms that were acquired during the 1990–1997 period and compare them to a matched sample of nonacquired firms. I find that firms that were acquired over this period can be characterized as having lower managerial ownership and higher ownership by outsiders, particularly higher ownership by nonmanagement blockholders with board representation. The fact that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood is consistent with studies using data from 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that managerial ownership helps managers maintain control, or alternatively that ownership proxies for how much managers care about control.     

The Evolving Shareholder Activist Landscape (How Companies Can Prepare for It)

Shareholder activists remain an important force in the boardroom. More than 60 activist campaigns were initiated against S&P 1500 companies in 2016. And although activist hedge funds have under‐performed the broad market since 2013, activists’ assets under management are still nearly double their level of four years ago, and announcements of their campaigns continue to be met with increases in the target companies’ stock prices. At the same time, shareholder activism continues to evolve in constructive ways. Most important is the growing support of mainstream investors, as reflected in the increased backing of activist proposals by traditional institutional asset managers and the falling number of openly confrontational campaigns. Activists have also had continued success in gaining board representation, particularly at the largest target companies. And more board seats are being gained by activists in early settlements, which have also been associated with higher stock returns than those campaigns that resulted in later settlements or ended in a proxy contest. During the period 2006–2016, over 40% of activist campaigns made public demands for specific strategic actions, such as selling assets, spinning off divisions, or seeking buyers for the companies. And activist investors have been remarkably effective in accomplishing such changes in that those activist targets urged to seek buyers were four times more likely to be acquired than the average company. At the same time, a growing number of campaigns have focused on operating efficiency, capital allocation, business strategy, and other changes that often require longterm engagement. Perhaps because of their longer‐term focus, such campaigns have also more been likely to result in board seats for the activists. The authors' findings contain a number of messages for corporate managements and boards: listen to your shareholders, and assess your strengths and vulnerabilities through an activist's eyes; build an effective board; articulate your strategy clearly; consider the possibility of activist intervention when planning M&A transactions; and engage early when approached by an activist.     

Die Überwachung des versicherungsaufsichtsrechtlichen Risikomanagement durch den Aufsichtsrat

§ 64a VAG intensifies control of insurance undertakings through their supervisory board concerning risk management. These extended duties and the new risk management specific qualification standards will result in higher liability risks for the members of the supervisory board. However, the new law does not ensure that the supervisory board is supplied with the information necessary to comply with these requirements. Particularly information of the supervisory board of insurance undertakings in a group is seriously insufficient. On the other hand the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority in its MaRisk VA Circular concedes rights to information to the supervisory board which conflict with the basic conception of corporate law, e.g. permanent direct contacts between the supervisory board and staff of the risk management function. Insurance undertakings can react to the new challenges by professionalizing the supervisory board, establishing audit committees, internal limitation of the admissible maximum number of supervisory board’s seats and/or by purchasing D &; O insurance.     

The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the disciplinary role of the corporate takeover market using a sample of U.S. target firms over the period 1979 to 1998. The time period spanned allows a broader study not only of the disciplinary role of the takeover market in general, but also of the interaction between the takeover market and alternative governance mechanisms during the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view of the corporate takeover market as a “court of last resort,” that is, it is an external source of discipline that intercedes when internal control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective.     

Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a Source of Value

This paper estimates the value of tax benefits in 76 management buyouts of public companies completed in the period 1980 to 1986. The median value of tax benefits, estimated at the time the buyout company goes private, has a lower bound of 21% and an upper bound of 143% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders. The estimated value depends on the rate buyout debt is repaid and the tax rate applied to the interest deductions. The paper also presents evidence on the actual taxes paid and debt repayment rates by these companies after the buyout. The results in this paper suggest that tax benefits are an important source of the wealth gains in management buyouts.