Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard

This paper combines the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady-state equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no-shirking condition is binding or not. It is demonstrated that the efficiency wage approach is relevant when the unemployment rate is above a certain threshold. Furthermore, an efficiency wage is more likely when the disutility of effort is high, recruiting costs and workers' bargaining power are low, inspections are unlikely and the workers' productivity is weak.     

An evolutionary model of industry dynamics and firms’ institutional behavior with job search, bargaining and matching

By combining features from distinct theoretical approaches, namely the evolutionary and the job search, matching and bargaining literatures, we propose a model that captures the main dynamics of a world where heterogeneous firms and workers interact and co-evolve. Within a micro-meso framework, the model focuses on the influence of firms’ labour choices (“institutional settings”) on industry dynamics, taking into account the existence of employment adjustment costs. The consideration of endogenous matching and bargaining processes in the labour market results in significant frictions, such as the simultaneous coexistence of unfilled job vacancies and unemployment. In a setting where technological progress is not biased a stylized fact of industrialized world economies in the last few decades emerges, the increasing wage inequality. Additionally, turbulence in the industry increases after a negative demand shock. As expected, the negative demand shock causes a decrease in the number of vacancies and, consequently, unemployment rates increase considerably. Interestingly, and mimicking the recent experiences of countries such as US, Spain, Greece and Portugal, the rise in unemployment is matched by a rise in contractual wages. This outcome is explained by the lower ability of the firms to fill their posted vacancies, which results from friction in the interactions among agents.     

Intermediation in Search Markets

In markets, in which exchange requires costly search for trading partners, intermediaries can help to reduce the trading frictions. This intuition is modeled in a framework with heterogeneous agents, who have the choice between intermediated exchange and search accompanied by some bargaining procedure. The equilibria of such a game are characterized. In the case of a monopolistic intermediary, the tradeoff between the bid-ask spread and the costs of delay during private search determine the intermediary's clientele. In equilibrium the monopolist charges a positive spread. Traders with large gains from trade prefer to deal with him, whereas traders with relatively low gains from trade engage in search. In case of competition among intermediaries, the classical Bertrand result obtains, and bid and ask prices converge to the (unique) Walrasian equilibrium price. Thus, in the confines of the model, the Walrasian auctioneer of the market under consideration can be replaced by competing intermediaries. In addition a multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria emphasizes the coordination problems inherent in models of intermediation.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.     

Household debt and labor market fluctuations

The co-movements of labor productivity with output, total hours, vacancies and unemployment have changed since the mid 1980s. This paper offers an explanation for the sharp break in the fluctuations of labor market variables based on endogenous labor supply decisions following the mortgage market deregulation. We set up a search model with efficient bargaining and financial frictions, in which impatient borrowers can take an amount of credit that cannot exceed a proportion of the expected value of their real estate holdings. When borrowers' equity requirements are low, the impact of a positive technology shock on the marginal utility of consumption is strengthened, which in turn results in lower hours per worker and higher wages in the bargaining process. This shift in labor supply discourages firms from opening vacancies, reducing the impact of the shock on employment. We simulate the effects of an increase in both the loan-to-value ratio and the share of borrowers in total population. Our exercise shows that the response of labor market variables might have been substantially affected by the increase in household leverage in the US in the last twenty years.     

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the U.S. vaccine market: Implications for childhood immunization policy

The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.     

Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth communication

Workers can find a job either directly or through personal contacts. From this micro scenario, we derive an aggregate matching function that has the standard properties but fails to be homogeneous of degree one. We show that, when the network size increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear about more vacancies through their social network. However, above a certain critical value, job matches decrease with network size. We then establish existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium and study its properties. Finally, we demonstrate that the decentralized market equilibrium is not efficient because of both search and network externalities.     

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets with decentralized trade and pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for their abstention. In stable market outcomes, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to deviations. The set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and its full characterization is provided. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel restrains trade and market participation is balanced; (ii) only one cartel is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent’s.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers

This paper analyzes the noncooperative game on the choice of strategic variable to set in duopoly in the presence of an upstream market for the input. For the case of labor input, the analysis shows that if the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain, a duopoly producing substitutes may choose to compete either in the quantity space or in the price space, depending upon the distribution of bargaining power in the wage negotiation and the union's relative preference over the wage. For the case of input suppliers as profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that a vertically differentiated duopoly may prefer to compete either in the quantity space or in a mixed strategy setting where the high-quality firm plays price and the low-quality firm plays quantity, depending upon the extent of substitutability, the degree of vertical product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power in the input price negotiation.     

The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions

A general equilibrium model is presented of an economy where mobile and immobile households engage in decentralized market behavior and where immobile households control the expenditure and tax policy of each local government, subject to a local budget constraint. It is shown how central government grant policy (which is a formula with lump-sum, matching, and population elements) affects the general equilibrium of the system determined through market and local political decisions. The welfare effects of grants are discussed, with particular emphasis on distortions that may arise at lower levels of decision making that grants may be useful in (partially or completely) correcting.     

Simultaneous search with heterogeneous firms and ex post competition

In this paper we study the allocation of workers over high and low productivity firms in a labor market with coordination frictions. Specifically, we consider a search model where workers can apply to high and or low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that if workers apply to two jobs, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and sending both to the low productivity sector. But, efficiency requires that they apply to both sectors because a higher matching rate in the high-productivity sector can then be realized with fewer applications (and consequently fewer coordination frictions) if workers always accept the offer of the most productive firm. However, in the market the worker's payoff is determined by how much the firm with the second highest productivity is willing to bid. This is what prevents them from applying to both sectors. For many configurations, the equilibrium outcomes are the same under directed and random search so our results are not driven by random search. We discuss the effects of increasing the number of applications and show that our results can easily be generalized to N-firms.     

The efficiency of training and hiring with intrafirm bargaining

This paper demonstrates that firms hire and train workers efficiently in a matching and intrafirm bargaining economy when the Hosios condition holds and returns to scale are constant. This conclusion stands in contrast to the prevailing view that training costs are a source of inefficiency in imperfect labor markets. The efficiency of the competitive economy relies on the ability of large firms to take into account the negative impact of the training rate on the wages negotiated inside the firm through intrafirm bargaining: untrained workers accept a wage reduction in compensation for potential training that is accessible only following employment. This intrafirm bargaining process solves efficiency problems associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to inefficient hiring and training decisions. This conclusion holds true for both specific and general human capital.     

Prejudice and gender differentials in the US labor market in the last twenty years

Earnings differentials between men and women have experienced a stable convergence during the 1980s, following a process started in the late 1970s. However, in the 1990s the convergence has almost stopped. The first objective of the paper is to evaluate if discrimination, defined as explicit prejudice, may have a role in explaining this slowdown in the convergence. The second objective is to assess whether the prediction of a decrease in the proportion of prejudiced employers implied by the Becker’s model of taste discrimination is taking place and if so at what speed. These objectives are achieved by developing and estimating a search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining, employer’s prejudice and worker’s participation decisions. The results show that the proportion of prejudiced employers is estimated to be decreasing at an increasing speed, going from about 69% in 1985 to about 32% in 2005. Therefore prejudice is not estimated to be a relevant factor in explaining the slower convergence between male and female earnings in the 1990s. The results are consistent with the Becker’s model of taste discrimination if one is willing to assume a very slow adjustment process.     

Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees.     

Workers or Employers: Who is Shaping Wage Inequality?

An extensive micro data set matching firms, establishments and their employees, is used to study the determinants of earnings inequality in Portugal and its evolution from 1983 to 1992, with the Theil index, its decomposition, and the decomposition of its change as tools of analysis. The relevance of both worker and employer attributes in shaping earnings inequality and its trend is quantified. The impact of the firm on wage inequality in a European country is compared to the situation in the USA, and the results suggest that a more regulated and centralized European bargaining system might reduce the scope for firm action. A profile of an economy undergoing modernization, where rising labour market inequality signalled the lack of an adequate labour force, can be drawn, with the minimum wage having nonetheless a certain narrowing effect on the earnings distribution.     

Mismatch Shocks and Unemployment During the Great Recession

We investigate the macroeconomic consequences of fluctuations in the effectiveness of the labor market matching process with a focus on the Great Recession. We conduct our analysis in the context of an estimated medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and equilibrium search unemployment that features a shock to the matching efficiency (or mismatch shock). We find that this shock is not important for unemployment fluctuations in normal times. However, it plays a somewhat larger role during the Great Recession when it contributes to raise the actual unemployment rate by around 1.3 percentage points and the natural rate by around 2 percentage points. The mismatch shock is the dominant driver of the natural rate of unemployment and explains part of the recent shift of the Beveridge curve. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A theory of minimum wage compliance (or voluntary recognition of unions)

An urn-ball matching model of the labor market is used to develop a theory of minimum wage compliance or voluntary recognition of unions. Workers can direct their search but, in the absence of wage commitment from the firms, they have no basis to do so. The default means of wage formation in one-on-one matches is Nash bargaining. When there are multiple applicants competition drives the workers down to their continuation value. By attracting more applicants, a binding wage floor provides a means for firms to increase matching rates and improve match quality. An otherwise poorly enforced minimum wage acts as a commitment device for the payment of more generous wages.     

Identifying credit demand,financial intermediation,and supply of funds shocks: A structural VAR approach

In this paper, we identify three exogenous shocks to credit market: demand for credit, supply of funds into the financial system, and the willingness to lend of financial institutions (financial intermediation), and also, determine the contribution of these shocks to fluctuations in the credit market and overall economic activity. We estimate a structural vector autoregression model where the three credit shocks are identified with a set of sign restrictions motivated by a simple partial equilibrium model of financial intermediation. We find that the credit demand shock explains significantly the variations in the long-term loan rate proxied by the Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield, while the supply of funds shock contributes to most of the fluctuations in the short-term commercial paper rate. The financial intermediation shock drives most of the fluctuations in the quantity of loans as well as the spread between the Baa and commercial paper rates. Of the credit shocks, we find that the financial intermediation shock has the largest impact on real economic activity. In fact, our analysis implies that the sharp decline in output during the 2007–2009 financial crisis is largely attributable to the financial intermediation shock, along with shocks originating outside of the financial system.