Transaction cost economics applied? – consortia within process plant contracting

An increasing development in the competition for large engineering projects overseas is the formation by engineering contractors of consortia, which this article examines through the transaction cost economics paradigm. Consortia are contract specific governance structures designed to meet the particular requirements of individual clients. Hence, such governance modes are analysed through the comparative institutional approach. This approach leads to the conclusion that a consortium is a hybrid of institutional types. The major critical conclusions suggest that consortia are viewed by industry members as efficient, but for individual reasons. Also, efficiency considerations appear to be underpinned by the authority of capitalist market relations. In combination these conclusions suggest that in the conceptual hybrid of overall ‘efficiency’ motivations for consortia design or membership are individual, being based on relative power positions of industry members.     

决策系统的有效整合与降低摩擦成本的关系--对我国公立大学决策机制的分析

社会主义国家的公立大学,需要承担政党政治方面的社会功能。但大学是一个十分特殊的学术机构,其决策机制又不同于政权机关,为了使学校的党政决策系统有效地融为一体,从而降低摩擦成本,就需要用理智对决策机构进行有效整合。用法定制度清晰地界定大学党政机构的权力域,是降低决策成本非常重要的前提条件。在公立大学管理体制给定的情况下,降低决策成本还依赖于操作层面的制度供给。     

Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost economics perspectives

The public bureaucracy is a puzzle. How is it that an organizationalform that is so widely used is also believed to be inefficient- both in relation to a hypothetical ideal and in comparisonwith private bureaucracies? This article examines public bureaucracythrough the lens of transaction cost economics, according towhich the public bureaucracy, like other alternative modes ofgovernance, is well suited to some transactions and poorly suitedto others. Rather than proceed in a completely general way,I focus on what James Q. Wilson describes as 'sovereign transactions',of which foreign affairs is an example. I ask what it is thatdistinguishes sovereign transactions, after which I comparethe efficacy of public and private bureaucracies for managingsuch transactions. I conclude that there is an efficiency placefor public bureaucracy, but that all modes of governance (markets,hybrids, firms, regulation), of which public bureaucracy isone, need to be kept in their place. I further observe thatpublic bureaucracies are not all of a kind and that differencesbetween them need to be distinguished.     

管理费用预算影响因素关系研究

管理费用预算是年度费用预算中的重要一环,与日常运营息息相关,也是预算环节中的一部分,直接关系到预算管理的效果和企业的兴旺发达.本文以企业总资产为解释变量,建立了房地产行业上市公司管理费用计量模型,理论论述和实际案例相结合,对于管理费用预算进行了基础性研究.     

Wealth constraint and contractual arrangements

Abstract .  We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an unobservable effort when potential operators are wealth constrained. We show that, when potential operators' abilities are common knowledge, an operator's share of realized profit can be increasing, invariant, or decreasing in his ability depending on the nature of production technology. However, when potential operators are privately informed about both their abilities and their effort supply, a bunching contract arises in equilibrium for a general class of production technology. In the case of bunching, all potential operators are selected equally often and awarded an equal share of realized profit. The finding provides an explanation for the relative uniformity of contract terms in many practical settings.     

Theoretical isolation and explanatory progress: transaction cost economics and the dynamics of dispute

Two related goals are pursued. First, the development of, anddebates around Oliver Williamson's version of transaction costeconomics are organised in terms of an emerging metatheoreticalframework. It proposes looking at economic theorising and itschanges in terms of rival theoretical isolations which are oftenresponses to challenging explanatory questions. As a side product,Williamson's strategy of theorising is portrayed. Second, usingtransaction cost economics as an illustration and as a sourceof inspiration, the paper amends and refines the earlier frameworkof theoretical isolation by incorporating notions of explainingand explained items; notions of progress (in questions as wellas increased causal penetration and increased degree of unification);and the notion of the dynamics of dispute.     

A form of government organization from the perspective of transaction cost economics

Taking the approach of the superfirm, we characterize government organization through six different features. First, citizens are viewed as sovereign owners of a superfirm; elected officials are employees of the sovereign citizens. Second, in analogy to the economic principle of the division of labor and specialization, a division of labor between five independent branches of government is advocated: the legislative, the budgetary, the executive, the law enforcement, and the judiciary branch. Third, we do not suggest a mechanism of checks and balances between government branches but deal with the threat of tyranny using the principle of separation of decision control and decision management developed by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen. Fourth, with election as a decision control device, we demarcate the constituency of the budgetary branch by age groups to provide an explicit control mechanism for intertemporal and intergenerational trades. Fifth, to strengthen sovereign citizens' decision control, the powers to recall elected chief public servants, to declare emergency and war, to sign into international treaties, and to amend the constitution are vested with a national assembly. Sixth, there is no head of state.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

The economics of university computer provision: a case study in public production and cost

Is the provision of computer services in British universities provided efficiently? The pattern of expenditure in the last twenty years is explored and a study is made of current spending across universities. Variations in unit computing costs and the output of computing expreience is studied for British universities using conventional cost and production function estimation. In addition the three-demensional production surface for the output of computer provision is estimated using distance weighted techniques. This case study has more general applicability to other areas of public production and cost.     

沟通与交易

本文在交易中正式引入“沟通”这一概念 ,以便扩展现有的交易理论的研究深度和广度。沟通作为交易中不可缺少的内容 ,发挥两方面的作用 ,即帮助交易双方达成互利的法律合约以及使交易双方互相了解对方的不成文规则 ,从而帮助合同的执行。本文提出了一个关于沟通的描述性理论框架 ,并将沟通置于外国直接投资的背景下 ,利用一个简单的理论模型讨论沟通对达成合同的作用及其后果     

Theories of the firm: contractual and competence perspectives

The article compares alternative approaches to the theory of the firm. The two main approaches confronted are the contractual (Coasian) perspective and the competence (evolutionary) perspective. Whereas the firm as a repository of tacit knowledge is neglected in the contractual perspectives, it occupies center stage in the competence perspective. It is argued that the competence perspective is not only applicable an understanding of the sources of firms' competitive advantage, but may also be applied to the issues of the existence and the boundaries of the firm. This means that a distinct theory of the firm can be constructed on the basis of evolutionary theory.     

The opportunity cost of social relations: On the effectiveness of small worlds

The aim of this paper is to extend the theoretical literature on knowledge and network structure by studying the use of social networks as a learning mechanism. The novelty of this approach is suggested by the empirical evidence on informal trading of know-how. In the model, we consider a set of actors who create and diffuse knowledge with the aim of increasing their own personal knowledge. They are located on a lattice (identifying the social space) and are directly connected to a small number of other individuals. We assume that individuals can learn individually or socially, and that individuals choose how to learn on the basis of a cost-benefit comparison. Within this framework, we compare network structures in terms of efficiency and equity. We find that the opportunity cost of using the network affects its optimal structure in terms of aggregate performance and that the small world does not emerge unambiguously as being the most efficient.     

International outsourcing versus FDI under contractual incompleteness

This paper empirically analyses the boundaries of a large sample of Italian multinational enterprises, with firm-level data from Capitalia, AIDA and Centrale dei Bilanci. Within the broad array of feasible contracts in a foreign country, we focus on the trade-off between international outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI), in a context of contractual incompleteness. Probit estimates reveal that Italian enterprises operating in highly relation-specific environments are more prone to international outsourcing than FDI, consistently with recent theoretical contributions on the topic. Results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures of contractual incompleteness and international outsourcing.     

女性主义经济学与中国经济学的本土化

经济学研究的是具体社会关系下人的理性行为以及人类行为造成的经济现象,因而具有强烈的人文性;而且,随着经济学研究领域的不断拓宽,人们已经开始引入了制度、文化等社会性因素,经济学的人文性已日益明显.正是基于这种人文性特征引发了人们对具体社会中人之理性的重新审视,以及对社会中人之行为的关注,并导致20世纪80年代之后女性主义经济学的勃兴;经济学领域的性别差异又进一步引发了社会性的思考,从而引发了对经济学本土化的探讨.事实上,不同社会文化下的经济学是有差异的,经济学本质上无法像自然科学那样科学化、客观化和通用化,而是具有强烈的本土化的色彩;而且,如果经济学理论没有本土化,就没有根植性,也就没有创新性,当然也就没有现代性和世界性.     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

建设工程交易模式和交易机制设计框架

建设工程交易模式和交易机制确定了工程交易的规则以及项目参与者的工作范围、权利、责任和义务,从而直接影响到项目的成败。本文基于物理-事理-人理(WSR)方法论,建立工程交易模式和交易机制的设计框架。工程物理空间结构构成物理维;人作用于物的工程实施过程是,构成事理维,反应工程的时间结构;工程交易各方协作机制构成人理维,即为工程交易机制。工程的物理维和事理维确定的工程交易对象、工程交易模式的设计包括:业主方的管理方式的设计、工程发包方式的设计和合同类型的选择。工程交易机制的设计包括:招标机制设计、合同设计、担保机制和合同机制设计等。这个统一的框架为工程交易治理机制的设计提供了完整的解决方案。     

Bargaining and the observability of contractual commitments via third parties

This paper analyzes a two-stage model of bilateral bargaining where one of the agents has the option to delegate. A first approach is to assume that the contract between the agent and his representative is perfectly observable and can be renegotiated. Commitment effects arise although renegotiation is possible. Then, perfect observability of the contract is weakened to observe it with certain probability. Commitment effects as pure-strategy equilibria exist if this probability is sufficiently close to 1, in contrast to Bagwell's [1995] findings that imperfect observability undermines commitment. Considering the realistic case of the actual agreement between two parties being private information, the commitment value as equilibrium outcome disappears since having closed a renegotiation-proof contract offers costless self-insurance against strategic misunderstandings. The author is grateful for helpful comments from Vasco Santos, participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 1999, Montreal, Canada, an anonymous referee, and David M. Aadland.