构建国库会计分析框架模式研究

国库作为人民银行的重要职能部门,在经理国库、协调财政政策与货币政策的配合方面有着重要作用,本篇通过对国库会计数据整理及研究,运用数学统计和比较方法,结合财政与货币政策执行的重点信息,以建立国库会计分析框架体系为主导思想,力求通过国库会计分析准确全面地描述国库资金运行特点及变化,从国库税收和支出规模角度反映社会经济运行水平,预测及反馈财政政策的实施效果及对社会经济的影响。     

The fed and the term structure: Addressing simultaneity within a structural VAR model

This paper applies a new identification approach to estimate the contemporaneous relation between the term structure and monetary policy within a VAR framework. To achieve identification, we combine high-frequency Treasury futures and fed funds futures data with the VAR methodology. Results indicate that policy actions have a slope effect in the yield curve. We also find that the Fed responds to Treasury yields and that this response is stronger for the short and intermediate rates and less aggressive for long-yields. All estimated parameters are significant and robust to various model specifications.     

A Limited Central Bank

The President of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank from 2006–2015 discusses the Fed's essential role as preserver of the currency's purchasing power and how the institution might be improved to better fulfill that role. To that end, the author proposes the imposition of four limits on the central bank that, by restricting its discretion, can be expected to improve outcomes and accountability.

• First, limit the Fed's monetary policy goals to a narrow mandate in which price stability is the sole, or at least the primary, objective;
• Second, limit the types of assets that the Fed can hold on its balance sheet to Treasury securities;
• Third, limit the Fed's discretion in monetary policymaking by requiring a systematic, rule‐like approach; and
• Fourth, limit the boundaries of its lender‐of‐last‐resort credit extension.

These changes, by creating a more limited central bank, would help preserve the central bank's independence, thereby improving the effectiveness of monetary policy. They would also make it easier for the public to hold the Fed accountable for its policy decisions.     

The effect of Fed monetary policy regimes on the US interest rate swap spreads

This paper analyzes the asymmetric impacts of various economic shocks on swap spreads under distinct Fed monetary policy regimes. The results indicate that (a) during periods of aggressive interest rate reductions, slope of the Treasury term structure accounts for a sizeable share of the swap spread variance although default shock is also a major player. (b) On the other hand, liquidity premium is the only contributor to the 2-year swap spread variance in monetary tightening cycles. (c) The impact of default risk varies across both monetary cycles and swap maturities. (d) The effect of interest rate volatility is generally more evident in loosening monetary regimes.     

How to Promote Fed Independence: Perspectives from Political Economy and History

In two short histories of the independence of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank since its creation in 1913—the first with respect to the Fed's monetary policymaking, the second focused on its regulatory policymaking—the author shows that the range of the Fed's powers has varied greatly over time, and that changes in those powers have had major effects on the extent of Fed independence. Moreover, the shifts over time in Fed powers reflect, to a significant degree, conscious trade‐offs by Fed leaders. A large number of somewhat surprising Fed positions on important regulatory matters can be explained as more or less deliberate attempts to preserve the Fed's monetary powers from political interference by yielding some of its independence in exercising its regulatory authority. In a case involving one of the most destructive U.S. financial regulatory policies, the Fed's effective neutrality on, and thus failure to support, the elimination of restrictions on interstate branch banking is seen as contributing to the chronic instability of the U.S. banking system, which has suffered some 20 major crises since the early 1800s (as compared to the crisis‐free Canadian system, with its nationwide banking from its inception). The Fed's reluctance to intervene is attributed to its unwillingness to antagonize powerful Congressional supporters of state banking interests and, more generally, to a “game of bank bargains” that can be seen at work in the political economy of virtually all countries. In more recent times, the most costly episode in this time‐honored game features a series of implicit or, in some cases, explicit agreements between large U.S. banks and urban activist groups—under the aegis of the Community Reinvestment Act, and with the oversight and implicit blessing of the Fed—to make on the order of $4.6 trillion loans to “subprime” borrowers in exchange for the activists’ (and the Fed's) support in Congressional merger hearings. The resulting nationwide debasement of mortgage underwriting standards and sheer volume of “toxic assets,” in combination with clearly inadequate capital requirements (which the Fed also failed to correct), are viewed as if not the principal cause of the crisis, a far bigger contributor than, say, the Fed's widely criticized unwillingness to tighten monetary policy in the early 2000s. To prevent the Fed from continuing to sacrifice its independence in regulatory matters to preserve its freedom to conduct monetary policy, the author proposes that authority for regulatory and monetary policy be vested in two separate regulatory bodies. If carried out, such a policy change would enact a proposal made by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in 2008, just before the global financial crisis hit.     

Knut wicksell's norm of price stabilization and Swedish monetary policy in the 1930's

This paper examines the conduct and the effects of Swedish monetary policy in the 1930's. Three major conclusions emerge from the study: (1) The conduct of monetary policy specifically the devaluation of the Swedish currency in 1931 and the subsequent program of price stabilization, had a major effect on the aggregative behavior of the Swedish economy in the 1930's. (2) The impact of the new fiscal policy was insignificant compared to the effects of monetary measures and international developments. (3) The framing of Swedish monetary policy in the 1930's was strongly influenced by Wicksell's norm of price stabilization and the recommendations of the old generation of monetary economists represented by Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher.     

'The apotheosis of holding company accounting': Unilever's financial reporting innovations from the 1920s to the 1940s

The annual reports of Unilever were widely hailed in the 1940s as outstanding examples of holding company accounting. The accounts did indeed contain many new and innovative features, including segment reporting of sales turnover. This contrasts with the frequently negative assessments of the company's reporting before World War II, and the fact that the company was on record as a relatively late adopter of consolidated statements. In this paper, Unilever's reporting practices from the 1920s to the 1940s are analysed. We argue that the reporting changes of the 1940s had clear antecedents in the 1920s and 1930s, when they emerged in conjunction with the transformation of Unilever from a family-dominated enterprise into a professionally managed organisation. We also argue that, in order to evaluate properly Unilever's pre-war reporting practices, one needs to take into consideration the nature of Unilever as a complex federation of companies, rather than a unitary organisation, and to examine the chairman's address at the annual general meetings. The speeches by Francis D'Arcy Cooper, in particular, contained important disclosures not found in the annual reports. By the early 1940s, Unilever's commitment to improve its financial reporting was sufficiently developed for its officials, in particular Geoffrey Heyworth and P.M. Rees, to play important roles in the drafting of the English Institute's Recommendations on Accounting Principles and in the deliberations of the Company Law Amendment Committee whose report led to the Companies Act 1947. We therefore conclude that Unilever should be ranked with such companies as Dunlop Rubber among the key actors in the modernisation of British financial reporting during the 1930s and 1940s.     

中国企业去杠杆需考虑美联储货币政策变化吗?——加息和缩表的比较分析

本文构建了一个包含货币政策微观溢出效应的两国开放经济模型,提出企业结构性去杠杆需考虑开放经济因素,并在模型中引入企业融资约束机制,利用2002年第四季度-2018年第三季度中国沪深A股1023家上市公司平衡面板数据,实证检验美联储加息和缩表两类货币政策对我国企业杠杆率的差异性影响。研究发现,美联储缩表在初期对我国企业杠杆率的影响程度较大,但不存在长期溢出效应;而加息在初期影响程度相对较小,但对我国企业杠杆率存在长期溢出影响。在溢出方向上,美联储紧缩性货币政策会显著降低我国企业杠杆率。在溢出结构上,企业融资约束越严重,美联储货币政策对我国企业杠杆率溢出效应越明显。     

Treasury Bond Volatility and Uncertainty about Monetary Policy

We show that dispersion‐based uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy is the single most important determinant of Treasury bond volatility across all maturities. The link between Treasury bond volatility and uncertainty about macroeconomic variables is much stronger than for the more traditional time series measures of macroeconomic volatility and adds beyond the information contained in lagged bond market volatility. Uncertainty about monetary policy subsumes the uncertainty about future inflation (consumer price index and the deflator) and economic activity (unemployment, real and nominal gross domestic product and industrial production). In addition, causality clearly runs one way: from monetary policy uncertainty to Treasury bond volatility.     

Model-free jump measures and interest rates: common patterns in US and UK monetary policy around major economic events

We employ model-free jump measures to study monetary policy operations in the UK and USA around major economic events by exploiting the relationship between jumps, interest rates, and macroeconomic news releases related to monetary policy. In our analysis, we explicitly account for the timing of jumps in UK and US interest rates and the correlation across jumps in the same two interest rates and whether these match Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)/Monetary Policy Committee news releases. We find that FOMC news releases lag jumps in US interest rates, but lead jumps in UK Gilt rates. Overall, our analysis suggests that US Treasury Bills react to information in the aforementioned news releases before their announcement while UK Gilt yields react after them and that the Fed and Bank of England react similarly around major economic events.     

Congress and the Federal Reserve

We examine legislative activity to determine when Congress threatens the Fed and whether this pressure affects monetary policy. By the late‐1980s Congress shifted from threatening when unemployment was high to threatening when inflation was high. We use the Romer and Romer monetary shocks to isolate changes in the federal funds rate that cannot be explained by economic conditions and ask whether these shocks respond to pressure. In the 1970s, the Fed responded to bills credibly threatening Fed powers by lowering the federal funds target below that prescribed by current and forecast economic conditions. However, this accommodation ceased in the mid‐1980s.     

中国清末民初银本位下的汇率浮动:影响和启示

清末民初,银本位下的中国货币对大多数金本位国家的货币汇率自由浮动。浮动汇率并非影响中国国际收支和宏观经济的主要因素:在汇率大体持续贬值情况下,中国贸易逆差不断增大;汇率贬值有利于刺激外商直接投资和侨汇流入,弥补贸易逆差。关键问题是中国货币状况乃至整体经济活动受制于白银数量,容易大起大落。当前中国汇率弹性有待提高,对货币调控造成较大制约。我国汇率浮动早已有之,不必过于担心,中国完全具备主动加快汇率改革的条件。     

国库现金管理对我国货币政策的影响:一个实证分析

中央财政管理的国库资金是社会资金流量中的一个重要组成部分,对中央银行制定货币政策、调控货币供应量和公开市场操作都影响重大,在现代市场经济条件下,国库已成为连接财政和金融的窗口和桥梁,对财政政策和货币政策的有机配合发挥着重要的作用。本文以近年来我国正在开展的国库集中支付制度改革为背景,实证分析了国库现金管理对我国货币政策格局的影响,提出了我国进一步提高国库管理水平、加强货币政策管理的政策建议。     

美联储宏观分析模型与提高货币政策透明度

新任美联储主席耶伦上任以来,注重信息沟通在货币政策实施过程中的重要性。2014年4月3日,美联储首次对外公布了其政策分析所采用的宏观模型（FRB—US Model）,进一步推动货币政策信息透明化。文章从家庭、企业、金融部门、货币政策、供应方等部门角度梳理了美联储宏观分析模型的基本架构,分析介绍了该模型相比动态随机一般均衡模型的优点及部分市场评价,在回顾我国央行不断增强货币政策透明度举措的基础上,就进一步提高货币政策透明度提出相关建议。     

New Leadership at the Federal Reserve*

As Chairman of the Federal Reserve for the past 18 years, Alan Greenspan deserves praise for his stewardship of monetary policy. He has guided the Fed and monetary policy in a way that has led to low and stable inflation. But if Greenspan's record clearly deserves praise, he could have done more to move monetary policy into the 21st century and prepare the institution for the future. Greenspan has relied heavily on his personal judgment and has argued repeatedly that the Fed must have extensive flexibility to respond to the economic environment. But if Greenspan's judgment, skill, and luck have served him and the country well, it is dangerous to rely so heavily on the judgment of a single individual. When he departed, he took with him his skill and judgment, as well as his credibility and his personal commitment to low inflation. The Fed he leaves behind has no explicit institutional commitment to long‐run price stability. This article argues that by operating with a set of rules and guidelines, or at a minimum clearly stated institutional objectives, the Fed would eliminate much of the second guessing about what it is doing and why, and the associated volatility in markets. More generally, the benefits of more explicit guidelines for monetary policy include:

• ? Increasing public understanding of monetary policy, including what it can and cannot do.
• ? Increasing transparency and accountability. Most organizations have clear goals and we hold their leaders accountable. The Fed is different. The Fed seems to be held accountable for all things economic and thus it is truly accountable for nothing. It never has to explain its actions and what went right or wrong.
• ? Establishing a clear focus for the Fed regarding its goals and objectives.
• ? Creating increased confidence that sound monetary policy will be followed in the future.

     

U.S. monetary policy indicators and international stock returns: 1970-2001

It is documented in the literature that U.S. and many international stock returns series are sensitive to U.S. monetary policy. Using monthly data, this empirical study examines the short-term sensitivity of six international stock indices (the Standard & Poor 500 [S&P] Stock Index, the Morgan Stanley Capital International [MSCI] European Stock Index, the MSCI Pacific Stock Index, and three MSCI country stock indices: Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom) to two major groups of U.S. monetary policy indicators. These two groups, which have been suggested by recent research to influence stock returns, are based on the U.S. discount rate and the federal funds rate. The first group focuses on two binary variables designed to indicate the stance in monetary policy. The second group of monetary indicators involves the federal funds rate and includes the average federal funds rate, the change in the federal funds rate, and the spread of the federal funds rate to 10-year Treasury note yield. Dividing the sample period (1970-2001) into three monetary operating regimes, we find that not all policy indicators influence international stock returns during all U.S. monetary operating periods or regimes. Our results imply that the operating procedure and/or target vehicle used by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) influences the efficacy of the policy indicator. We suggest caution in using any monetary policy variable to explain and possibly forecast U.S. and international stock returns in all monetary conditions.     

The impact of quantitative easing on the US term structure of interest rates

This paper estimates the impact of the Federal Reserve’s 2008–2011 quantitative easing (QE) program on the US term structure of interest rates. We estimate an arbitrage-free term structure model that explicitly includes the quantity impact of the Fed’s trades on Treasury market prices. As such, we are able to estimate both the magnitude and duration of the QE price effects. We show that the Fed’s QE program affected forward rates without introducing arbitrage opportunities into the Treasury security markets. Short- to medium- term forward rates were reduced ( \(<\) 12 years), but the QE had little if any impact on long-term forward rates. This is in contrast to the Fed’s stated intentions for the QE program. The persistence of the rate impacts increased with maturity up to 6 years then declined, with half-lives lasting approximately 4, 6, 12, 8 and 4 months for the 1, 2, 5, 10 and 12 years forwards, respectively. Since bond yields are averages of forward rates over a bond’s maturity, QE affected long-term bond yields. The average impacts on bond yields were 327, 26, 50, 70, and 76 basis points for 1, 2, 5, 10 and 30 years, respectively.     

Macroeconomic cycles and the stock market’s reaction to monetary policy

This paper examines cyclical variation in the effect of Fed policy on the stock market. We find a much stronger response of stock returns to unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate in recession and in tight credit market conditions. Using firm-level data, we also show that firms that face financial constraints are more affected by monetary shocks in tight credit conditions than the relatively unconstrained firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.     

美联储百年沧桑:目标、框架与可信度

在美联储成立百年之际,现任美联储主席伯南克系统回顾了过去100年中美联储在政策目标、政策框架、可信度和沟通方面的变革。成立初期,美联储以维护金融稳定为目标的政策框架主要受实质票据学说和金本位制度的影响。大萧条时期,促进就业和价格稳定逐渐成为美联储的新目标。大通胀和大通缩时期,获得货币政策独立性的美联储控制通胀的能力逐步成熟。大稳健时期,货币政策目标和框架更加清晰,货币政策透明度逐渐提高。金融危机以来,维持金融稳定上升到与货币政策同等重要的位置,货币政策透明度明显改善,预期管理日益重要。未来,中央银行的理念和实践还将不断变革。